Ex Parte Ionescu et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Sep 29, 2016

13711970 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 29, 2016)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
131711,970 12/12/2012 PAUL IONESCU
73109 7590 10/03/2016
Cuenot, Forsythe & Kim, LLC
20283 State Road 7
Ste. 300
Boca Raton, FL 33498
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
CA920110094US1_8150-0309 4755
EXAMINER
KU, SHIUH-HUEI P
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2128
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
10/03/2016 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address( es):
ibmptomail@iplawpro.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte PAUL IONESCU, IOSIF VIOREL ONUT, ORI SEGAL, and
WAYNE DUNCAN SMITH
Appeal2015-007371
Application 13/711,97 0
Technology Center 2100
Before CAROLYN D. THOMAS, JEFFREYS. SMITH, and
TERRENCE W. MCMILLIN, Administrative Patent Judges.
THOMAS, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants seek our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the Examiner
finally rejecting claims 1-20, all the claims pending in the application. We
have jurisdiction over the appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b ).
We AFFIRM.
The present invention "relates generally to in-session detection in a
data processing system and more specifically to identification of requests
causing a session invalid state in the data processing system" (Spec. i-f 17).
Appeal2015-007371
Application 13/711,970
Claim l is illustrative:
1. A computer-implemented process for identifying a
request invalidating a session, the computer-implemented
process compnsmg:
excluding all marked logout requests of a Web
application;
identifying a next portion of the Web application;
crawling the identified next portion of the Web
application;
determining, in one instance, whether a state of a crawl is
out of session;
responsive to a determination, in one instance, that the
state of the crawl is out of session, logging in to the Web
application;
selecting all crawl requests sent since a last time the
crawl was in-session, excluding all marked logout requests;
determining whether any requests remain;
responsive to a determination that requests remain,
selecting a next unprocessed request;
crawling the selected next unprocessed request;
determining whether, in a next instance, the state of the
crawl is out of session;
responsive to a determination, in the next instance, that
state of the crawl is out of session, determining whether the
selected request meets logout request criteria; and
responsive to a determination that the selected request
meets logout request criteria, marking the selected request as a
logout request.
Appellants appeal the following rejections:
RI. Claim 8 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed
to non-statutory subject matter.
R2. Claims 1, 7, 8, 14, and 15 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. §
103(a) as being unpatentable over Ragusa et al. (US 2012/0226813 Al, Sept.
6, 2012) and Conley et al. (US 2006/0069671 Al, Mar. 30, 2006).
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Application 13/711,970
R3. Claims 2-6, 9-13, and 16-20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. §
103(a) as being unpatentable over Ragusa, Conley, and Pennington et al.
(US 7 ,467 ,402 B2, Dec. 16, 2008).
Claim Groupings
Based on Appellants' arguments in the Appeal Brief, we will decide
the appeal on the basis of claims 1 and 8, as set forth below. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(l)(iv).
ANALYSIS
Rejection under§ 101 of claim 8
Issue 1 : Did the Examiner err in finding that the claimed computer
recordable-type media can be considered a signal?
Appellants contend that "a distinction has been made in the present
specification between a storage media and a signal (i.e., the signal medium)"
(App. Br. 8) and that "Appellants' specification should be accorded the
special definition of 'storage medium' that excludes transitory, propagating
signals per se" (Id.).
The Examiner finds that the broadest reasonable interpretation of
"computer recordable-type media to include signal and/or carrier wave"
(Final Act. 8; see Ans. 3), and that Appellants' Specification does not
discuss the claimed recordable-type media or exclude radio frequency and
light wave transmissions that "are signal and/or carrier wave" (Ans. 3). We
agree with the Examiner.
We are not persuaded by Appellants' argument because the
Specification describes only by example that a computer readable storage
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Application 13/711,970
medium may include (i.e., but not limited to) "electronic, magnetic, optical,
electromagnetic, infrared, or semiconductor system, apparatus, or device, or
any suitable combination of the foregoing" (Spec. i-fi-120-21 ). We find that
describing a list of examples does not exclude any particular embodiment
from the list, and therefore does not exclude transitory signals as being
within the computer readable medium. Furthermore, Appellants'
Specification is silent towards the claimed computer recordable-type media.
The USPTO provides the following guidance:
The broadest reasonable interpretation of a claim drawn to a
computer readable medium ... typically covers forms of non-
transitory tangible media and transitory propagating signals per
se in view of the ordinary and customary meaning of computer
readable media, particularly when the specification is silent. ...
When the broadest reasonable of a claim covers a signal per se,
the claim must be rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as covering
non-statutory subject matter.
David J. Kappos, Subject Matter Eligibility of Computer Readable Media,
1351 OtT Gaz. Pat. Otlice 212 (Feb. 23, 2010).
In short, Appellants' non-exhaustive list of examples in the
Specification - without a corresponding claim amendment - falls short of
overcoming the Examiner's§ 101 rejection of claim 8. See id. (noting that
adding the term "non-transitory" to a claim drawn to a computer readable
medium that covers both transitory and non-transitory embodiments can
avoid a rejection under§ 101). See Ex parte Busche, No. 2009-007718,
2010 WL 5184640, at 5 (BP AI 2010) (non-precedential).
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner's rejection RI of claim 8 as
being directed to non-statutory subject matter.
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Application 13/711,970
Rejection under§ 103 over Ragusa and Conley
Issue 2: Did the Examiner err in finding that the combined teachings
of Ragusa and Conley teach or suggest "excluding all marked logout
requests of a Web application," as recited in claim 1?
Appellants contend Ragusa's session tokens are not logout requests,
as claimed (App. Br. 15). Specifically, Appellants argue Ragusa does not
"require a logout request in order for a session to expire" (App. Br. 17).
In response, the Examiner finds Ragusa's session expiration requires
re-login and thereby teaches or suggests a logout, and that the claim does not
describe a specific manner of logout to exclude the logout of Ragusa. (Ans.
4). We agree with the Examiner.
For example, Ragusa discloses "requiring the user to re-login if the
session has expired (e.g., a certain time limit has passed without user
activity)" (Ragusa i-f 44). Ragusa also discloses "a session may comprise a
specified time out, i.e. a time period, a session can remain inactive before a
client application having initiated the session is logged out and the session is
closed" and "a session token for a session may comprise a time out, i.e. a
time period within which the session token can be inactive before the session
token's validity period is expired" Id. i-f 69). Ragusa further discloses that
the "clean up method 157 removes expired session tokens" (Id. i-f 88).
In other words, Ragusa teaches a session expiring after a timeout
period, the session token becoming invalid, needing to re-login after the
session has expired, and the cleanup of expired session tokens. The claim is
directed towards "logout requests." The claim language is silent towards
any specific requirements of a logout request, and instead just requires
requests that lead to or are associated with logging out or ending a session.
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Appellants do not provide persuasive evidence or argument that
Ragusa's expired session requiring re-login does not teach or suggest the
claimed logout requests. Thus, we agree with the Examiner's finding that
Ragusa's cleanup of expired session tokens, where the session tokens are for
expired sessions that require re-login, teaches excluding all marked logout
requests, as required by claim 1.
Issue 3: Did the Examiner err in finding that the combined teachings
of Ragusa and Conley teach or suggest
determining, in one instance, whether a state of a crawl is
out of session; responsive to a determination, in one instance, that
the state of the crawl is out of session, logging in to the Web
application; selecting all crawl requests sent since a last time the
crawl was in-session ... responsive to a determination, in the
next instance, that state of the crawl is out of session, determining
whether the selected request meets logout request criteria,
as recited in claim 1?
Appellants contend "Ragusa is silent with regard to crawling" (App.
Br. 17, 20, 21 ). Specifically, Appellants argue a "crawler is an automated
browser" and not the same as the user browsing employed by Ragusa (Id. at
18).
Appellants' argument against Ragusa, separately from Conley, does
not persuasively rebut the combination made by the Examiner. One cannot
show non-obviousness by attacking references individually, where the
rejections are based on combinations of references. In re Merck & Co., Inc.,
800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986); In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425
(CCPA 1981).
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Specifically, we agree with the Examiner's findings that Conley
teaches "crawling/parsing of web pages," that browsing is the "nature of the
action performed," and that "Ragusa in view of Conley discloses a crawler,
than [sic] performs the actions of Ragusa" (Ans. 5).
For example, Conley discloses placing "the initial URL of the target
application into a URL list 45," reading the first line of the HTML traffic for
the first URL, and "pars[ing] through all of the HTML traffic" (Conley
i-f 44). In other words, Conley teaches automatically parsing through the web
pages.
Appellants do not provide persuasive evidence or argument that
Conley's parsing through the web page does not teach or suggest crawling
the Web application. Thus, we agree with the Examiner's finding that
Conley's automatically parsing through the web pages teaches "crawling,"
as required by claim 1.
Appellants further contend that "Ragusa is silent with regard to ...
state of a crawl" (App. Br. 20, 21), and that Ragusa's session tokens do not
teach the claimed determining "whether the selected request meets the
logout request criteria," as claimed (Id. at 21-22). Appellants also argue
Ragusa's session expiration and expired session token cannot teach both the
claimed "state of the crawl is out of session" and the claimed "logout request
criteria" (Id. at 22-23).
In response, the Examiner finds Ragusa's expired token teaches the
claimed logout request criteria, and Ragusa's expired sessions requiring re-
login teaches the claimed out of session state (Ans. 6-7). We agree with the
Examiner.
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Application 13/711,970
For example, Ragusa discloses "reqmnng the user to re-login if the
session has expired (e.g., a certain time limit has passed without user
activity)" (Ragusa i-f 44); and the "clean up method 157 removes expired
session tokens" (Ragusa i-f 88).
In other words, Ragusa teaches session expiration and the requirement
to re-login. Similarly, the claim is directed towards determining "whether a
state of a crawl is out of session" and "determining whether the selected
request meets logout request criteria." The claim language is silent towards
any distinction between determining an out of session crawl or a logout
request criteria during a crawl.
Appellants do not provide persuasive evidence or argument that
Ragusa's session expiration does not teach or suggest being out of session
and being a criteria for a logout request. Thus, we agree with the
Examiner's finding that Ragusa's session token expiration teaches
determining "whether a state of a crawl is out of session" and "determining
whether the selected request meets logout request criteria," as recited in
claim 1.
Appellants further contend Ragusa is "non-analogous prior art that
cannot be properly applied against the claimed invention" (App. Br. 25-26),
and the Examiner does not identify how the combination of Ragusa and
Conley teach steps performed in a certain order (Id. at 29-30). "Whether a
reference in the prior art is 'analogous' is a fact question." In re Clay, 966
F.2d 656, 658 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (citing Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co.,
810 F.2d 1561, 1568 n.9 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
Here, the Examiner has found actual teachings in the prior art and has
provided rationales for the combinations (see Final Act. 9-13; see also Ans.
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Application 13/711,970
10, 14--15). Specifically, the Examiner finds, and we agree, that "Ragusa's
disclosures are related to client application/web service/session token
management" (Ans. 14, citing Ragusa's i-f 7; see also Abstract) similar to
Appellant's disclosure of Web application/session check. Thus, the
Examiner has shown that Ragusa is in the same field of endeavor.
For at least these reasons, we do not find, and Appellants have not
established, the Examiner erred.
Issue 4: Did the Examiner err in finding that the combined teachings
of Ragusa and Conley teach or suggest "marking the selected request as a
logout request," as recited in claim 1?
Appellants contend Ragusa "does not involve a marking of a selected
request as a logout request" and "[ n Jo marking is involved with the
expiration of a session" (App. Br. 24--25).
In response, the Examiner finds that "only how the data is used is
relevant" and that the claimed marking can be defined "to include a 'logging
in' to be analogous to determining that a session has ended and logging back
in" (Ans. 8-9). We agree with the Examiner.
Ragusa teaches a session expiring after a timeout period, the session
token becoming invalid, needing to re-login after the session has expired,
and the cleanup of expired session tokens (see Ragusa i-fi-1 44, 88).
Meanwhile, the claim language is silent towards how a request is marked,
and instead just requires "marking," or indicating, that a request is a logout
request.
Appellants do not provide persuasive evidence or argument that
Ragusa's requirement to re-login after a session has expired does not teach
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Application 13/711,970
or suggest an indication that a request is for logout. Thus, we agree with the
Examiner's finding that Ragusa's re-login requirement after session token
expiration teaches "marking the selected request as a logout request," as
recited in claim 1.
Issue 5: Did the Examiner err in finding that the combined teachings
of Ragusa and Conley teach or suggest "selecting all crawl requests sent
since a last time the crawl was in-session," as recited in claim 1?
Appellants contend Conley's recursive processing "does not establish
that all crawl requests are selected" without any clear indication as to the
starting point of the crawl" (App. Br. 28).
In response, the Examiner finds Conley "recursively processes
everything" (Ans. 12). We agree with the Examiner.
For example, Conley discloses "pars[ing] through all of the HTML
traffic" (Conley i-f 44), and "recursively read[ing] lines of the HTML traffic
to parse any session related data" (Id. i-f 46). In other words, Conley teaches
parsing through all traffic. Ragusa teaches noting sessions with session
tokens that expire and require re-login (see Ragusa i-fi-1 44, 88).
Appellants do not provide persuasive evidence or argument that
collectively Ragusa's being in or out of session, and Conley's recursively
parsing through all traffic while in session, do not teach or suggest selecting
all crawl requests while in session. Thus, we agree with the Examiner's
finding that Ragusa and Conley's recursively parsing through traffic while in
session teaches "selecting all crawl requests sent since a last time the crawl
was in-session," as recited in claim 1.
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For at least these reasons, we are unpersuaded the Examiner erred.
Accordingly, the Examiner's 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection R2 of independent
claim 1, as well as commensurate independent claims 8 and 15 and
dependent claims 7 and 14, not separately argued (App. Br. 15), is sustained.
Rejection under§ 103 (a) over Ragusa, Conley, and Pennington
Appellant has provided no separate arguments towards patentability
for claims 2---6, 9--13, and 16-20 (App. Br. 30). Therefore, the Examiner's
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection R3 of claims 2---6, 9--13, and 16-20 is sustained
for similar reasons as noted supra.
DECISION
We affirm the Examiner's rejections Rl-R3.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv).
AFFIRMED
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