Ex Parte Hyser

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

Oct 20, 2010

10638008 (B.P.A.I. Oct. 20, 2010)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES
____________

Ex parte CHRIS D. HYSER
_____________

Appeal 2009-007945
Application 10/638,008
Technology Center 2400
____________

Before KENNETH W. HAIRSTON, MARC S. HOFF,
and ELENI MANTIS MERCADER, Administrative Patent Judges.

MANTIS MERCADER, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL1

1 The two-month time period for filing an appeal or commencing a civil
action, as recited in 37 C.F.R. § 1.304, or for filing a request for rehearing,
as recited in 37 C.F.R. § 41.52, begins to run from the “MAIL DATE”
(paper delivery mode) or the “NOTIFICATION DATE” (electronic delivery
mode) shown on the PTOL-90A cover letter attached to this decision.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the
Examiner’s final rejection of claims 1-16. We have jurisdiction under 35
U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

INVENTION
Appellant’s claimed invention is directed to a secure kernel which
assumes direct control of the I/O system controller(s) and, through an
interface provided by the secure-platform kernel and secure-platform global
services layer (SPK/SPGS), does not allow access to operating systems and
other untrusted entities. The secure kernel allocates a high order portion of
32-bit system-memory address space for exclusive use by the SPK/SPGS,
and does not provide any address translations to the system controller
directed to the portion of system-memory address space allocated for
exclusive use by the secure kernel. See Spec. 14:18-25.
Claims 1 and 11, reproduced below, are representative of the subject
matter on appeal:
1. A method for passing control of a system-resource-accessing
device, which accesses a system resource through system-resource
addresses, to an untrusted entity within a secure computer system having a
secure kernel without passing control of the entire system resource to the
untrusted entity, the method comprising:
assuming control of address-translation provision to system
controllers within the computer system by the secure kernel;
allocating a specific portion of the system resource for exclusive
access by the secure kernel; and
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during system operation, providing, by the secure kernel, address
translations to the system controllers that are not directed to the allocated
portion of the system resource for exclusive access by the secure kernel.

11. A secure computer system comprising:
a system resource;
an untrusted processing entity;
a secure kernel that allocates a specific portion of the system resource
for exclusive access by the secure kernel; and
a system-resource-accessing device that contains an internal view of
the system resource, provided by the secure kernel, that does not include a
view of the specific portion of the system resource allocated for exclusive
access by the secure kernel, the system-resource-accessing device used by
the untrusted processing entity to access only that portion of the system
resource corresponding to the internal view of the system resource within the
system-resource-accessing device.

THE REJECTIONS
The Examiner relies upon the following as evidence of
unpatentability:
Blumrich US 5,659,798 Aug. 19, 1997
Larson US 6,505,263 B1 Jan. 7, 2003
Strongin US 2003/0188184 A1 Oct. 2, 2003
Barnes US 6,823,433 B1 Nov. 23, 2004
The following rejection is before us for review:
1. The Examiner rejected claims 11, 13, 14, and 16 under 35 U.S.C. §
102(e) as being anticipated by Strongin.
2. The Examiner rejected claims 1, 2, 4-10, and 15 under 35 U.S.C. §
103(a) as being unpatentable over Strongin in view of Blumrich.
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3. The Examiner rejected claim 12 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Strongin in view of Barnes.
4. The Examiner rejected claim 3 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Strongin in view of Blumrich and further in view of
Larson.

ISSUES
The pivotal issues are:
1. whether Strongin teaches the limitation of: “a system-resource-
accessing device that contains an internal view of the system resource,
provided by the secure kernel, that does not include a view of the specific
portion of the system resource allocated for exclusive access by the secure
kernel” as recited in claim 11; and
2. whether the combination of Strongin in view of Blumrich teaches
the limitation of: “providing, by the secure kernel, address translations” as
recited in claim 1.

FINDINGS OF FACT (FF)
The following Findings of Fact are supported by a preponderance of
the evidence:
1. Appellant’s description of “view” regarding claim 11 (App. Br. 4
(citing Spec. 6:3–9:3)) includes describing the SPK/SPGS layer 316
which shields and protects all but non privileged instructions and non
privileged registers of the underlying hardware architecture from
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“access” by operating systems and higher-level software programs
and utilities (Spec. 6:26–7:2 (emphasis added)).
2. Appellant’s Specification further describes the SPK as maintaining
confidential information in memory that cannot be accessed by an
operating system, third party applications, or controllers (Spec. 7:8-
11).
3. Strongin teaches that the CPU includes a CPU security check unit
(SCU) which is responsible for checking each memory access
generated by the CPU to determine if the access falls within a region
of memory previously designated as secure by the security kernel (¶¶
[0023]-[0024]).
4. Strongin teaches that if the region of memory has not been designated
as secure, then the CPU SCU allows the memory access to proceed to
an address translation mechanism (¶ [0024]).
5. Strongin teaches that if the memory access falls within a secure
region, then the CPU SCU analyzes the memory access to determine
if the requesting agent has a sufficiently high privilege level to initiate
such a request (¶¶ [0023]-[0024]).
6. Strongin teaches that the secure sections of memory are exclusively
accessible by the secure kernel (¶ [0023]).
7. Blumrich teaches a kernel that “translates virtual addresses to physical
addresses” and verifies the user-level process permission (col. 6, ll.
66-67).

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PRINCIPLES OF LAW
During ex parte prosecution, claims must be interpreted as broadly as
their terms reasonably allow since Applicants have the power during the
administrative process to amend the claims to avoid the prior art. In re Zletz,
893 F.2d 319, 322 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
The claims, of course, do not stand alone. Rather, they
are part of “a fully integrated written instrument” consisting
principally of a specification that concludes with the claims.
For that reason, claims “must be read in view of the
specification, of which they are a part.” . . . [T]he specification
“is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis.
Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single best guide to the
meaning of a disputed term.”
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citations
omitted).
Although claims are interpreted in light of the specification,
limitations from the specification are not read into the claims. In re Van
Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
“[O]ne cannot show non-obviousness by attacking references
individually where . . . the rejections are based on combinations of
references.” In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 426 (CCPA 1981).

ANALYSIS
Analysis with respect to the rejection of claims 11, 13, 14, and 16
under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as being anticipated by Strongin
Appellant argues that nothing in Strongin teaches or suggests “a
system-resource-accessing device that contains an internal view of the
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system resource, provided by the secure kernel, that does not include a view
of the specific portion of the system resource allocated for exclusive access
by the secure kernel” (App. Br. 16). Appellant asserts that Strongin’s CPU
SCU views all of the system memory, and that at best, Strongin teaches a
security kernel separate from the operating system that designates portions
of the memory being accessible only by the security kernel (id.).
Appellant further characterizes the Examiner’s interpretation of the
claimed “internal view of the system resource” as meaning the “non secure
region/section of the memory” and the claimed “a view of the specific
portion of the system resource” as the “secure region/section of the memory”
as completely inconsistent with the meaning of the term “view” (Reply Br.
10). According to Appellant, a view of a system resource is not, for
example, a portion of the system resource, but rather, information that
describes the system resource (id.). In the case of system memory, for
example, a view may be a range of addresses that an entity possessing the
view considers to describe the contents of the memory (id.). Appellant
asserts that in Strongin, each component sees the same system memory (id.).
Different components may not be able to access certain portions of memory,
depending on their execution privilege level and access permissions
associated with that portion of memory, but they are all aware of the full
address space provided by the system memory (id.).
In other words, Appellant makes a distinction between the terms
“access” and “view,” and essentially argues that “view” is not tantamount to
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“access” but rather view is more specific and relates to a description of range
of addresses.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument.
At the outset, we note that claim 11 is silent as to any recitation of
“addresses,” let alone a description of addresses or memory size stored in the
system-memory-size register as argued in Reply Brief page 9. Thus,
Appellant’s argument is not commensurate in scope with the claim language.
Furthermore, Appellant’s description of “view” regarding claim 11
includes describing the SPK/SPGS layer 316 which shields and protects all
but non privileged instructions and non privileged registers of the underlying
hardware architecture from “access” by operating systems and higher-level
software programs and utilities (FF 1). Appellant’s Specification further
describes the SPK as maintaining confidential information in memory that
cannot be accessed by an operating system, third party applications, or
controllers (FF 2).
Strongin teaches that the CPU includes a CPU SCU which is
responsible for checking each memory access generated by the CPU (i.e.,
processor) to determine if the access falls within a region of memory
previously designated as secure by the security kernel (FF 3). If the region
of memory has not been designated as secure (i.e., an internal view of the
system resource non secure region/section of the memory), then the CPU
SCU allows memory access (FF 4). On the other hand, if the memory
access falls within a secure region (i.e., a view of the specific region/portion
of the memory), then the CPU SCU analyzes the memory access to
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determine if the requesting agent has a sufficiently high privilege level to
initiate such a request (FF 5). Strongin teaches that the secure sections of
memory are exclusively accessible by the secure kernel (FF 6).
Thus, the Examiner correctly interpreted (Ans. 10-11) the claimed
limitation “internal view of the system resource” as access to a non secure
region/section of the memory, and correctly interpreted “a view of the
specific portion of the system resource” as access to a secure region/section
of the memory. In other words, Strongin teaches a system-resource-
accessing device that contains an internal view of the system resource (i.e.,
an internal view of the system resource non secure region/section of the
memory—FF 4), provided by the secure kernel, that does not include a view
of the specific portion of the system resource allocated for exclusive access
by the secure kernel (i.e., a view of the specific region/portion of the
memory—FF 5, 6). This interpretation of the term “view” is consistent with
Appellant’s Specification describing the function of a secure kernel as
maintaining confidential information in memory that cannot be accessed by
an operating system, third party applications, or controllers (FF 2). See
Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315.
The Examiner also appropriately interpreted the claims in light of the
Specification, without reading limitations from the Specification into the
claims (i.e., limitations such as addresses or memory size stored in the
system-memory-size register as argued in Reply Brief page 9). See Van
Geuns, 988 F.2d at 1184.
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For the reasons articulated supra, we will sustain the Examiner’s
rejection of claim 11 and for similar reasons the rejection of claims 13, 14,
and 16 as no other additional arguments of patentability were presented with
respect to these claims.
Analysis with respect to the rejection of claims 1, 2, 4-10, and 15
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Strongin in view
of Blumrich
Appellant argues (App. Br. 20) that Blumrich does not once teach,
mention, or suggest a secure kernel, separate from an operating system, that
either allocates a specific portion of the system resource for exclusive use by
the secure kernel or that assumes control of an address-translation provision
or memory-sizing registers of a system controller in order to prevent the
system controller from accessing portions of memory. Appellant further
argues (App. Br. 21) that neither Strongin nor Blumrich teaches “assuming
control of address-translation provision to system controllers within the
computer system by the secure kernel.”
We are again not persuaded by Appellant’s argument. The Examiner
modified Strongin with Blumrich’s teaching of a kernel that “translates
virtual addresses to physical addresses” and verifies the user-level process
permission (FF 7). Based on this modification, Strongin’s security kernel
would perform the address-translations, as taught by Blumrich, to the system
controllers that are not directed to the allocated portion of the system
resource for exclusive access by the secure kernel (FF 4, 6).
One cannot show non-obviousness by attacking references
individually (i.e., Blumrich not teaching allocating a specific portion of the
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system resource for exclusive use by the secure kernel or preventing the
system controller from accessing portions of memory) where the rejections
are based on combinations of references (i.e., Strongin teaches these
limitations as discussed above). See Keller, 642 F.2d at 426.
Accordingly, we will also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1
and for similar reasons the rejection of claims 2, 4-10, and 15.
Analysis with respect to the rejections of claims 3 and 12
We will also sustain the Examiner’s rejections of claims 3 and 12 for
the same reasons as set forth above, because Appellant does not provide any
separate arguments of patentability with respect to the additional references
of Larson or Barnes, but rather relies on their respective dependencies from
claims 11 and 1.

ORDER
The decision of the Examiner to reject claims 1-16 is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(v).

AFFIRMED

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