Ex Parte Hyde et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jul 23, 2018

13374747 (P.T.A.B. Jul. 23, 2018)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
13/374,747 01/09/2012 Roderick A. Hyde
80118 7590 07/25/2018
Constellation Law Group, PLLC
P.O. Box 580
Tracyton, WA 98393
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
SE2-1157-US 6712
EXAMINER
MORGAN, ROBERT W
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3626
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/25/2018 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
admin@constellationlaw.com
Ty ler@constellationlaw.com
ISFDocketlnbox@intven.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte RODERICK A. HYDE, EDWARD K. Y. JUNG,
JORDIN T. KARE, ERIC C. LEUTHARDT, ROYCE A. LEVIEN,
RICHARDT. LORD, ROBERT W. LORD, MARK A. MALAMUD, JOHN
D. RINALDO, JR., DENNIS J. RIVET, CLARENCE T. TEGREENE, and
LOWELL L. WOOD, JR.
Appeal2017-000825
Application 13/374,747 1
Technology Center 3600
Before MAHSHID D. SAADAT, MARC S. HOFF, and
SCOTT B. HOWARD, Administrative Patent Judges.
HOW ARD, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Final Rejection
of claims 1-3, 7, 8, 10, 12-16, 19-21, 23-26, 30, 31, 34, 35, 37-39, 41, 42,
63, 84, 105, and 126-130, which constitute all of the claims pending in this
application. Claims 4---6, 9, 11, 17, 18, 22, 27-29, 32, 33, 36, 40, 43-62, 64--
83, 85-104, and 106-125 have been cancelled. Br. 37--46 (Claims App'x).
We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b ).
We affirm.
1 Appellants identify Elwha, LLC as the real party in interest. Br. 4.
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Application 13/374,747
THE INVENTION
The disclosed and claimed invention is directed "to managing
information in an evidence-based medical practice, particularly data relating
to patients or to diagnostic or therapeutic treatments." Spec. ,r 1.
Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject
matter:
1. A healthcare information management system
compnsmg:
circuitry for obtaining an indication that a particular
condition was treated in a first patient with a first protocol;
circuitry for causing a record of a second patient to
include the indication that the particular condition was treated
in the first patient with the first protocol; and
circuitry for retrieving the record of the second patient
selectively in response to an association between the second
patient and an indication of an institutional readmission after
the record of the second patient includes the indication that the
particular condition was treated in the first patient with the first
protocol.
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner as evidence in rejecting the
claims on appeal is:
Joao
Farooq
US 2002/0032583 Al Mar. 14, 2002
US 2011/0295622 Al Dec. 1, 2011
REJECTIONS
Claims 1-3, 7, 8, 10, 12-16, 19-21, 23-26, 30, 31, 34, 35, 37-39, 41,
42, 63, 84, 105, and 126-130 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being
directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 2.
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Claims 1-3, 7, 8, 10, 12-16, 19-21, 23-26, 30, 31, 34, 35, 37-39, 41,
42, 63, 105, and 126-130 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Farooq and Joao. Final Act. 3-23.
ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the Examiner's rejection in light of Appellants'
arguments that the Examiner erred. In reaching this decision, we have
considered all evidence presented and all arguments made by Appellants.
We are not persuaded by Appellants' arguments regarding claims 1-3, 7, 8,
10, 12-16, 19-21,23-26,30,31,34,35,37-39,41,42,63, 105,and 126-
130. Instead, we incorporate herein and adopt as our own: (1) the findings
and reasons set forth by the Examiner in the action from which this appeal is
taken (Final Act. 2-23), and (2) the reasons and rebuttals set forth in the
Examiner's Answer in response to Appellants' arguments (Ans. 25-31 ). We
incorporate such findings, reasons, and rebuttals herein by reference unless
otherwise noted. For the avoidance of doubt, as set forth in footnote 2, infra,
we do not incorporate the sections of the Final Rejection and Answer
relating to the Examiner's alternative conclusion that the claims "are
directed to the abstract idea of 'comparing new and stored information and
using rules to identify options,"' as set forth at page 25 of the Answer.
However, we highlight and address specific findings and arguments for
emphasis as follows.
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Section 1 OJ Reiection
General Principles
Patent-eligible subject matter is defined in § 101 of the Patent Act,
which recites: "Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions
and requirements of this title."
There are, however, three judicially created exceptions to the broad
categories of patent-eligible subject matter in § 101: laws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int 'l, 134
S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs.,
Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 70-71 (2012). Although an abstract idea, itself, is patent-
ineligible, an application of the abstract idea may be patent-eligible. Alice,
134 S. Ct. at 2355. Thus, we must consider "the elements of each claim both
individually and 'as an ordered combination' to determine whether the
additional elements 'transform the nature of the claim' into a patent-eligible
application." Id. ( citing Mayo, 566 U.S. 79, 78). The claim must contain
elements or a combination of elements that are "sufficient to ensure that the
patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the
[abstract idea] itself." Id. ( citing Mayo, 566 U.S. 72-73).
The Supreme Court set forth a two-part "framework for distinguishing
patents that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas
from those that claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts." Id. at
2355.
First, we determine whether the claims at issue are directed to
one of those patent-ineligible concepts. [Mayo,] 132 S. Ct., at
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Id.
1296-1297. If so, we then ask, "[w]hat else is there in the
claims before us?" Id., at--, 132 S. Ct., at 1297. To answer
that question, we consider the elements of each claim both
individually and "as an ordered combination" to determine
whether the additional elements "transform the nature of the
claim" into a patent-eligible application. Id., at--, 132 S.
Ct., at 1298, 1297. We have described step two of this analysis
as a search for an "'inventive concept'"-i.e., an element or
combination of elements that is "sufficient to ensure that the
patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent
upon the [ineligible concept] itself." Id., at--, 132 S. Ct., at
1294.
"The 'abstract idea' step of the inquiry calls upon us to look at the
'focus of the claimed advance over the prior art' to determine if the claim's
'character as a whole' is directed to excluded subject matter." Affinity Labs
of Tex. v. DirectTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting
Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir.
2016)); see also Enfzsh, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed.
Cir. 2016). There is no definitive rule to determine what constitutes an
"abstract idea." Rather, the Federal Circuit has explained that "both [it] and
the Supreme Court have found it sufficient to compare claims at issue to
those claims already found to be directed to an abstract idea in previous
cases." Enfzsh, 822 F.3d at 1334; see also Amdocs (Israel) Ltd. v. Openet
Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (explaining that, in
determining whether claims are patent ineligible under § 101, "the decisional
mechanism courts now apply is to examine earlier cases in which a similar
or parallel descriptive nature can be seen-what prior cases were about, and
which way they were decided").
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Under the second step of the Alice/Mayo framework, we examine the
claim limitations "more microscopically," Elec. Power, 830 F.3d at 1354, to
determine whether they contain "additional features" sufficient to
"'transform the nature of the claim' into a patent-eligible application."
Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355, 2357 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 78). "[M]ere
recitation of concrete, tangible components is insufficient to confer patent
eligibility to an otherwise abstract idea. Rather, the components must
involve more than performance of 'well-understood, routine, conventional
activit[ies]' previously known to the industry." In re TL! Commc 'ns LLC
Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 613 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing Alice, 134 S. Ct. at
2359).
Step 1 - Abstract Idea
The Examiner concludes that claim is directed to a basic concept of
providing healthcare, which is an abstract idea. Final Act. 2. The Examiner
further determines "that the claims as currently submitted by the
[Appellants] are directed to the abstract idea of 'comparing new and stored
information and using rules to identify options'. Several cases have found
concepts relating to processes of comparing data that can be performed
mentally abstract, such as comparing new and stored information and using
rules to identify options (SmartGene)." Ans. 25.
Appellants argue the Examiner "has provided no evidence
demonstrating that 'providing healthcare' is an 'abstract idea' under MPEP
and legal standards." Br. 7-8. More specifically, Appellants argue that
providing healthcare does not fit within the four examples provided in a
recent PTO memo: "'(1) Fundamental economic practices -Alice, (2)
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Certain methods of organizing human activities Bilski, (3) ' [ A ]n idea of
itself - Benson and [LeRoy]; and ( 4) Mathematical relationships/formulas -
Benson and Flook.'" Id. at 8 (footnotes omitted). Without giving a reason,
Appellants state "that 'providing healthcare' is clearly distinguishable from
such concepts." Id.
We are not persuaded by Appellants' arguments that the Examiner
erred. To the contrary, our reviewing court has recognized that practicing
medicine-in other words, providing healthcare-is an abstract idea and
merely implementing it on a computer does not make it any less abstract.
See SmartGene, Inc. v. Adv. Bio. Labs., SA, 555 F. App'x 950 (Fed. Cir.
2014). In SmartGene, the claims defined a "method for guiding the
selection of a therapeutic treatment regimen for a patient with a known
disease or medical condition" and provided three steps for performing the
method. 555 F. App'x at 954--55 (citation omitted). The Federal Circuit
concluded that the claim "does not purport to identify new computer
hardware .... Nor does it purport to identify any steps beyond those which
doctors routinely and consciously perform." Id. at 955. Accordingly, our
reviewing court determined that the claims are directed to an abstract idea.
Id. at 955.
Similar to the claims in SmartGene, the claims at issue in this appeal
are directed to circuitry that performs the steps a doctor practicing evidence-
based medicine would perform mentally or with pen and pencil. That is, the
claims are directed to no more than circuitry to link records based on similar
medical conditions and treatments. Accordingly, the claims are directed to
practicing medicine, just like the claims in SmartGene. See also
CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir.
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2011) (methods that can be performed in the human mind are abstract)
(citing Gottschalkv. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). 2
Appellants also argue that the claims are not directed to an abstract
idea because there is no preemption. Br. 9-11. We are not persuaded by
[Appellants'] argument. Although the extent of preemption is a
consideration, the absence of complete preemption is not dispositive. See,
e.g., Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed.
Cir. 2015) ("While preemption may signal patent ineligible subject matter,
the absence of complete preemption does not demonstrate patent
eligibility."); Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 722 F.3d 1335, 1346 (Fed.
Cir. 2013) ("[T]he Supreme Court has stated that, even if a claim does not
wholly pre-empt an abstract idea, it still will not be limited meaningfully if it
contains only insignificant or token pre- or post-solution activity-such as
identifying a relevant audience, a category of use, field of use, or
technological environment.") (citations omitted), vacated and remanded,
WildTangent, Inc. v. Ultramercial, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 2870 (2014) (remanding
for consideration in light of Alice, 134 S. Ct. 2347).
Step 2 - Something More
The Examiner determines that "[t]he claims do not amount to
significantly more than the abstract idea itself such as not being an
2 Because we agree with the Examiner that the claims are directed to the
abstract idea of providing healthcare, we need no reach the Examiner's
alternative conclusion that the claims "are directed to the abstract idea of
'comparing new and stored information and using rules to identify options.'"
Ans. 25. Accordingly, Appellants' arguments directed to that conclusion are
moot.
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improvement to the functioning of a computer itself." Final Act. 2. The
Examiner further determines "the computer related claims require no more
than a generic computer to perform generic computer functions that are well-
understood, routine and conventional activities previously known to the
industry." Id. Specifically, the Examiner finds the Specification stats that
circuitry includes a general purpose computer that performs generic
computer functions. Ans. 26-27.
Appellants argue that the claims are directed to something more
because they effect a transformation. Br. 12-13. Specifically, Appellants
contend that the claims require the modification of a record of the second
patient. Id.
We are not persuaded by Appellants' argument that the Examiner
erred. Appellants have not identified any cases holding that the modification
of a data record can be something more. To the contrary, the Federal Circuit
has recognized that "[m]erely requiring the selection and manipulation of
information ... by itself does not transform the otherwise-abstract processes
of information collection and analysis." Elec. Power, 830 F.3d at 1355.
Appellants also argue the Examiner erred by not providing evidence
that the claims are "well-understood, routine and conventional." Br. 13-14.
We disagree. The Examiner cited sections of the Specification
indicating that the claim can be accomplished using generic computer
components such as a general purpose computing device. See Ans. 26-27
( citing Spec. ,r,r 59, 60, 169). Additionally, using a "computer server and
code implemented in software"-a generic computer component-to
perform a method does not impart patentability. Our reviewing court "found
similar claims to be ineligible despite the recitation of a general purpose
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computer or the Internet." Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793
F.3d 1306, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (collecting cases). As in Versata, the
claims here "do not improve some existing technological process or solve
some technological problem in conventional industry practice." Id.
Similarly,
[T]he claims at issue are not rooted in computer technology to
solve a problem specifically arising in some aspect of computer
technology. Instead, the claims at issue are more like the
claims we summarized in DDR Holdings as insufficient to
reach eligibility----claims reciting a commonplace business
method aimed at processing business information despite being
applied on a general purpose computer.
Id.; see also CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366,
1373-77 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (merely using a computer readable medium is not
sufficient to transform an abstract idea to patentable subject matter); see also
Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (finding a
method for distribution of products over the Internet directed to unpatentable
under the Alice/Mayo framework).
Finally, Appellants assert the claim does not just generally link the use
of providing healthcare to a particular technological environment. Br. 15.
Instead, Appellants assert the claims specifically link to the steps performed
by the circuitry. Id.
We are not persuaded by Appellants' argument the Examiner erred.
First, Appellants' argument consists of no more than reciting the limitations
of the claims with a naked assertion the limitations make the claims patent-
eligible:
Applicant submits that the above-noted recitations of
Claims 1, 42, 63, 84 and 105 do not merely "generally" link
the use of "providing healthcare" or "comparing new and stored
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information and using rules to identify options" to a "particular
technological environment." Rather, the claims specifically
link to "obtaining an indication that a particular condition was
treated in a first patient with a first protocol"; "causing a record
of a second patient to include the indication that the particular
condition was treated in the first patient with the first protocol"
and "retrieving the record of the second patient selectively in
response to an association between the second patient and an
indication of an institutional readmission after the record of the
second patient includes the indication that the particular
condition was treated in the first patient with the first
protocol." Such a link clearly distinguishes from the "general"
link to a particular environment contemplated by Alice (e.g.
mere "implementation via computers"). For at least this reason,
Applicant requests withdrawal of the rejections und 35 U.S.C.
101.
Id. (footnote omitted). Merely reciting the claim limitations and stating it is
specifically linked to the claim without providing a reason is not persuasive.
Cf In re Lovin, 652 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Rule 41.37 requires
"more substantive arguments in an appeal brief than a mere recitation of the
claim elements and a naked assertion that the corresponding elements were
not found in the prior art."); 37 C.F.R. § 4I.37(c)(l)(iv) ("A statement which
merely points out what a claim recites will not be considered an argument
for separate patentability of the claim.").
Second, claim 1 simply recites circuity for performing the steps
identified by Appellants. Because, as discussed above, the Specification
states that circuitry can be a general purpose computer, contrary to
Appellants' argument, the claim does no more than implement a method on
a general purpose computer.
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Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner's rejection of claims 1-3, 7, 8,
10, 12-16, 19-21,23-26,30,31,34,35,37-39,41,42,63,84, 105,and
126-130 as directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. 3
Section 103 Re;ection
Although stated several different ways, Appellants' primary argument
is that the Examiner erred in finding Farooq teaches "circuitry for causing a
record of a second patient to include the indication that the particular
condition was treated in the first patient with the first protocol," as recited in
claim 1. See Br. 15-16, 20-30. More specifically, Appellants argue because
the Examiner finds at one specific point in the Examiner's Answer Farooq
does not teach "circuitry for obtaining an indication that a particular
condition was treated in a first patient with a first protocol," as recited in
claim 1, the Examiner erred in finding at another specific point in the
Examiner's Answer Farooq teaches "circuitry for obtaining an indication
that a particular condition was treated in a first patient with a first
protocol," as recited in claim 1. Id. ( emphasis added).
The Examiner finds Joao teaches "circuitry for obtaining an indication
that a particular condition was treated in a first patient with a first protocol,"
as recited in claim 1, and that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have
"expand[ ed] the system of Farooq to further include, circuitry for obtaining
an indication that a particular condition was treated in a first patient with a
first protocol, as taught by Joao." Final Act. 5; see also Ans. 28-30
( discussing the combination of Joao and Farooq). Accordingly, the
3 Appellants argue the claims as a group. We decide the appeal of these
claims on the basis for claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. § 4I.37(c)(l)(iv).
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Examiner finds "that Farooq in view of Joao more than seemingly suggest,
'circuitry for causing a record of a second patient to include the indication
that the particular condition was treated in the first patient with the first
protocol," as recited in claim 1. Ans. 29.
Nonobviousness cannot be established by attacking the references
individually when the rejection is predicated upon a combination of prior art
disclosures. In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986). The
test for obviousness is not whether the claimed invention is expressly
suggested in any one or all of the references, but whether the claimed subject
matter would have been obvious to those of ordinary skill in the art in light
of the combined teachings of those references. In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413,
425 (CCPA 1981). Because Appellants' arguments are directed to Farooq
individually and not the combination of Farooq and Joao, Appellants do
persuade us that the Examiner erred.
Appellants also argue the Examiner has not sufficiently explained the
rejection because "the Patent Office has merely cited extensive portions of
Farooq (e.g.[,] references to the entirety of numerous paragraphs), presented
unsupported paraphrased interpretations of those portions, and made the
conclusory statements that those portions 'disclose' the specific recitations
of' the claims. Br. 17-18. According to Appellants, the rejection does not
comply with 37 C.F .R. § 1.104( c )(2). Id. at 16-20.
We are not persuaded by Appellants' arguments that the Examiner
erred. First, as our reviewing Court has held, "all that is required of the
office to meet its prima facie burden of production is to set forth the
statutory basis of the rejection and the reference or references relied upon in
a sufficiently articulate and informative manner as to meet the notice
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requirement of [35 U.S.C.] § 132." In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed.
Cir. 2011). We have reviewed the Examiner's rejection (Final Act. 3-23)
and conclude that the notice requirement is satisfied in this case by "the
examiner's discussion of the theory of invalidity ... , the prior art basis for
the rejection ... , and the identification of where each limitation of the
rejected claims is shown in the prior art reference by [paragraph] number."
Jung, 637 F.3d at 1363. No more is required to make a prima facie
rejection.
Second, contrary to Appellants' arguments, the Examiner has
provided more than just the recitation of relevant paragraphs. For example,
the Examiner identifies why the paragraphs are being cited and how they
teach the claim limitations. See Final Act. 3-23, 26-30; Ans. 28-30. For
example, the Examiner makes detailed findings in the Answer tying together
the cited sections of the prior art references. Ans. 28-30. Appellants did not
file a Reply Brief addressing this finding.
Finally, Appellants argue the Examiner erred in finding sufficient
reason to combine the prior art. Br. 30-34. Relying on pre-KSR case law,
Appellants assert the Examiner's "rational is analogous to stating 'it would
be obvious to combine Reference A (which teaches element X) with
Reference B (which teaches element Y) simply because reference B says
that its invention is 'beneficial."' Id. at 33.
The Examiner finds:
One of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the
invention would have been motivated to expand the system of
Farooq in this way since it facilitates improved healthcare
quality, efficient information collection, processing and
dissemination, efficient diagnosis and treatment, cost
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efficiency, cost containment, as well as many other benefits and
advantages.
Final Act. 5 (citing Joao ,r 14). The Examiner also quotes from the Manual
of Patent Examining Procedure, which states:
[a]n implicit motivation to combine exists not only when a
suggestion may be gleaned from the prior art as a whole, but
when the 'improvement' is technology-independent and the
combinations of references results in a product or process that
is more desirable, for example because it is stronger, cheaper,
cleaner, faster, lighter, smaller, more durable, or more efficient
... we have held that there exists ... a motivation to combine
prior art references even absent any hint of suggestion in the
references themselves.
Ans. 31 ( emphasis omitted) ( quoting MPEP § 2143)
In KSR, the Supreme Court rejected the rigid application of the
teaching, suggestion, or motivation (TSM) test in favor of a more expansive
and flexible approach to the determination of obviousness. KSR Int 'l Co. v.
Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398,415 (2007). The Court stated, "the analysis need
not seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the
challenged claim, for a court can take account of the inferences and creative
steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ." Id. at 418.
Instead, "if a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person
of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar
devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual
application is beyond his or her skill." Id. at 417. Additionally, the
conclusion of obviousness can be based on the interrelated teachings of
multiple patents, the effects of demands known to the design community or
present in the marketplace, and the background knowledge possessed by a
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person having ordinary skill in the art. Id. at 418. The skilled artisan is "[a]
person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton." Id. at 421.
Applying KSR, we are not persuaded by Appellants' argument that the
Examiner erred. To the contrary, as the Examiner determined, it would have
been obvious to apply a stated advantage in one prior art reference and apply
it to a second. Indeed, that is exactly what the Supreme Court held in KSR
when determining it would have been obvious to add a pedal position sensor
to the design of support member of the pedal assembly.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner's rejection of claims 1-3, 7, 8,
10, 12-16, 19-21,23-26,30,31,34,35,37-39,41,42,63,84, 105,and
126-130 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Farooq and
Joao.
DECISION
For the above reasons, we affirm the Examiner's decisions rejecting
claims 1-3, 7, 8, 10, 12-16, 19-21, 23-26, 30, 31, 34, 35, 37-39, 41, 42, 63,
84, 105, and 126-130.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this
appeal may be extended under 3 7 C.F .R. § 1.13 6( a)( 1 )(iv). See 3 7 C.F .R.
§ 4I.50(f).
AFFIRMED
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