Ex Parte HurseyDownload PDFBoard of Patent Appeals and InterferencesNov 19, 201010417194 (B.P.A.I. Nov. 19, 2010) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 10/417,194 04/17/2003 Neil John Hursey 03.009.01 6130 7590 11/19/2010 Zilka-Kotab, PC P.O. Box 721120 San Jose, CA 95172-1120 EXAMINER PEARSON, DAVID J ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2437 MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE 11/19/2010 PAPER Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS AND INTERFERENCES ____________ Ex parte NEIL JOHN HURSEY ____________ Appeal 2009-006073 Application 10/417,194 Technology Center 2400 ____________ Before HOWARD B. BLANKENSHIP, ST. JOHN COURTENAY III, and THU A. DANG, Administrative Patent Judges. BLANKENSHIP, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL1 1 The two-month time period for filing an appeal or commencing a civil action, as recited in 37 C.F.R. § 1.304, or for filing a request for rehearing, as recited in 37 C.F.R. § 41.52, begins to run from the “MAIL DATE” (paper delivery mode) or the “NOTIFICATION DATE” (electronic delivery mode) shown on the PTOL-90A cover letter attached to this decision. Appeal 2009-006073 Application 10/417,194 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE This is an appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s final rejection of claims 1, 2, 5-14, 17-26, and 29-40, which are all the claims remaining in the application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. Invention Appellant’s invention relates to examining video codec identifiers in computer data containing compressed video data. The identifiers may be correlated with banned computer data, such as pirated or copyright- infringing video material. See Abstract. Representative Claim 1. A computer program product embodied on a tangible computer readable medium having a computer program for controlling a computer to detect computer data containing compressed video data as being banned computer data, said computer program product comprising: identifier reading code operable to read from said computer data an identifier of a decoder operable to decompress said compressed video data; identifier comparing code operable to compare said identifier with one or more predetermined characteristics indicative of whether said identifier is associated with banned computer data; and triggering code operable if said identifier is associated with banned computer data, to trigger a banned computer data action; Appeal 2009-006073 Application 10/417,194 3 wherein said identifier is a decoder identifying field embedded within said compressed video data; wherein said decoder identifying field is a key used by an operating system to associate said computer data with a decoder registered to said operating system. Prior Art Schmelzer U.S. 2003/0037010 A1 Feb. 20, 2003 Nwe Nwe Hlaing, Browser Security: A Requirements-based Approach (Master’s thesis), Queensland University of Technology (March 2003) (“Hlaing”). Examiner’s Rejections Claims 1, 2, 5-14, 17-26, and 29-38 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) as being anticipated by Hlaing. Claims 1, 39, and 40 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as being unpatentable over Schmelzer. Claim Groupings Based on Appellant’s arguments in the Appeal Brief, we will decide the appeal on the basis of claims 1, 10, 39, and 40. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii). FINDINGS OF FACT We refer to, and rely on, the Examiner’s findings set out in the Final Rejection and the Answer. Appeal 2009-006073 Application 10/417,194 4 PRINCIPLES OF LAW “Anticipation requires the presence in a single prior art reference disclosure of each and every element of the claimed invention, arranged as in the claim.” Lindemann Maschinenfabrik GMBH v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 730 F.2d 1452, 1458 (Fed. Cir. 1984). During prosecution before the USPTO, claims are to be given their broadest reasonable interpretation, and the scope of a claim cannot be narrowed by reading disclosed limitations into the claim. See In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997); In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319, 321 (Fed. Cir. 1989); In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 1404-05 (CCPA 1969). Our reviewing court has repeatedly warned against confining the claims to specific embodiments described in the specification. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). ANALYSIS Hlaing Appellant alleges that the Examiner has relied “on the following excerpt” (§ 6.4.1.1) from Hlaing to show a limitation that is expressed in claim 1 as: “identifier reading code operable to read from said computer data an identifier of a decoder operable to decompress said compressed video data.” See App. Br. 10. Appellant then reproduces the cited portion of Hlaing and adds the following remarks. Appellant respectfully asserts that the excerpt from Hlaing relied upon by the Examiner merely teaches that “to filter users’ requests . . . [t]he browser checks the file extension against the list” to determine “[i]f the requested file is a permitted file type” (emphasis added). However, merely checking the file extension against a list in order to determine if it is a permitted Appeal 2009-006073 Application 10/417,194 5 type, as in Hlaing, fails to suggest “reading from said computer data an identifier of a decoder operable to decompress said compressed video data ” (emphasis added), as claimed by appellant. Clearly, a file extension, as in Hlaing, simply fails to suggest “an identifier of a decoder,’ in the manner as claimed by appellant. App. Br. 10 (alteration in original). Appellant’s remarks thus take the following form. Appellant respectfully asserts that the excerpt from Hlaing relied upon by the Examiner merely teaches that “to filter users’ requests . . . [t]he browser checks the file extension against the list” to determine “[i]f the requested file is a permitted file type” . . . . However, merely checking the file extension against a list in order to determine if it is a permitted type, as in Hlaing, fails to suggest “reading from said computer data an identifier of a decoder operable to decompress said compressed video data ” . . . as claimed by appellant. Clearly, a file extension, as in Hlaing, simply fails to suggest “an identifier of a decoder,’ in the manner as claimed by appellant. App. Br. 10 (emphasis changed from original). The bulk of Appellant’s remarks in the briefs are of a similar structure -- cite from text in an applied reference, allege that the text “merely teaches” the cited text, allege that the literal language of the reference “fails to suggest” or “does not meet” language quoted from the instant claims, and conclude that “clearly” the teachings of the reference “simply fails to suggest” the language quoted from the claims. Appellant’s remarks do little to persuade us of error in any of the Examiner’s findings. Appellant’s main contention, with respect to instant claim 1, appears to be that the “identifier” the Examiner points to in Hlaing is not an Appeal 2009-006073 Application 10/417,194 6 “identifier” as claimed. In particular, Appellant contests the finding that Hlaing uses a “file extension” as an identifier for all that the claim requires. Hlaing describes a browser that checks the file extension of a received file to determine if the particular type of file is to be restricted or permitted. Hlaing at 83-84. The browser may also check a file type indicator, encoded in MIME format, from the HTTP header of a file provided from a server. Id. at 83-84. As the Examiner correctly notes, the file extensions and file type indicators are used to determine the type of file (id. at 9). “[B]rowsers use a list of the registered file types and associated applications to determine the downloaded file type.” Id. at 85. The file types include those for files which are passed to particular plug-in or helper applications, such as “Windows Media Player,” “QuickTime,” and “RealNetworks,” to decompress and play audio or video content. Id. at 17-19. As the Examiner also correctly notes, Appellant’s claimed “decoder identifying field embedded within said compressed video data” does not distinguish over the file extension or file type indicator (“Content-type”) in Hlaing, which is contained in MIME format along with the audio or video content (see, e.g., Hlaing at 17).2 Nor does the decoder identifying field claimed as a “key used by an operating system to associate said computer data with a decoder registered to said operating system” distinguish over the browser using the operating system’s registered file types to find the associated helper application for the particular file type (id. at 85). 2 As the Examiner also indicates, the identifier in Hlaing is “embedded within said compressed video data” at least to the extent that the “identifier” in the header portion of the file is “embedded within” the compressed video data, as depicted in Appellant’s Figure 2 (header portion 28). See Spec. 8:6- 9. Appeal 2009-006073 Application 10/417,194 7 Thus, while Hlaing does not use the word “identifier” or “key” when referring to the file extension or MIME file type indicator, we do not see how instant claim 1 might distinguish over the steps of permitting or restricting file types based on the file extension or file type indicator associated with a particular file, as described by the reference. For a prior art reference to anticipate in terms of 35 U.S.C. § 102, every element of the claimed invention must be identically shown in a single reference. However, this is not an “ipsissimis verbis” test. In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831, 832 (Fed. Cir. 1990). With respect to claim 10, we agree with the Examiner that the modified Lynx browser as described by Hlaing (at 82-85) is an “Internet content scanner.”3 Hlaing thus anticipates claim 10. We are thus not persuaded that any claim rejected over Hlaing has been rejected in error. We sustain the § 102(a) rejection of claims 1, 2, 5-14, 17-26, and 29-38. Schmelzer Rather than repeat the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 over Schmelzer, we simply note that Appellant’s remarks in the briefs do not persuade us of error to any extent in the rejection. With respect to claims 39 and 40, we agree with the Examiner that Schmelzer describes comparing the file type identifier with characteristics that are “associated with known suspicious video handler identifiers” (¶ [0012] -- e.g., DivX) and that the 3 See pages 1 through 4 of the reference for a general discussion of how browsers and servers interact via the Internet. Appeal 2009-006073 Application 10/417,194 8 comparison may be made on a server (¶ [0033]), as further explained at pages 13 through 15 of the Answer. We therefore sustain the § 102(e) rejection of claim 1 over Schmelzer, and that of dependent claims 39 and 40. DECISION The rejection of claims 1, 2, 5-14, 17-26, and 29-38 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) as being anticipated by Hlaing is affirmed. The rejection of claims 1, 39, and 40 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as being unpatentable over Schmelzer is affirmed. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f). AFFIRMED msc Zilka-Kotab, PC P.O. Box 721120 San Jose CA 95172-1120 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation