Ex Parte Huke et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Oct 20, 2017

13614257 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 20, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/614,257 09/13/2012 Casey Huke EDGE-001-US 1096
62008 7590 10/24/2017
MAIER & MAIER, PLLC
345 South Patrick Street
ALEXANDRIA, VA 22314
EXAMINER
COUGHLAN, PETER D
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2129
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
10/24/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
patent @ maierandmaier. com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte CASEY HUKE and WILLIS LEE FLAHERTY
Appeal 2016-008514
Application 13/614,2571
Technology Center 2100
Before DEBRA K. STEPHENS, ADAM J. PYONIN, and
DAVID J. CUTITTAII, Administrative Patent Judges.
PYONIN, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
This is a decision on appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a Non-
Final Rejection of claims 1, 3, and 6—19, which are all of the pending claims.
See Br. 2. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
1 The real party in interest is identified as Casey Huke. Br. 2.
Appeal 2016-008514
Application 13/614,257
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Introduction
The Application is directed to a “system for planning, managing, and
analyzing sports teams and events,” including “sports-related events such as
practices and games.” Abstract. Claim 1, the sole independent claim, is
reproduced below for reference:
1. A sports management system, comprising:
a user interface;
a processor;
a memory; and
a management module stored on the memory, wherein
the management module is configured to receive and store data
input by the user relating to sports plays and the results of
implementing the sports plays, wherein the data relating to
sports plays and the results of implementing the sports plays is
associated with attributes including play, play formation, play
goal, play effectiveness, player personnel package, and
situational data;
analyze the data input by the user;
provide the user with feedback and suggestions based on
the analysis conducted;
determine and record a play effectiveness of a most
recent play by comparing a play result with the play goal and
considering the situational data;
automatically updating the data relating to sports plays
and the results of implementing sports plays in real time to
include the play effectiveness of the most recent play; and
generating at least one report of a subgroup within said
player personnel package, wherein said subgroup includes at
least one personnel group representing a plurality of players,
and wherein said at least one report includes at least one action
in which the at least one personnel group were involved and a
result of the at least one action.
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Application 13/614,257
References and Rejections
The following is the prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting
the claims on appeal:
Jacobson
Lore
Seacat
Fleming
Koivisto
US 4,953,873
US 2008/0051201 A1
US 2008/0140233 A1
US 2010/0137057 A1
US 2011/0183734 A1
Sept. 4, 1990
Feb. 28, 2008
Jun. 12, 2008
June 3, 2010
July 28, 2011
Three Things Every Football Coach Should Know, Buddy Kite, Esquire
Magazine, Dec. 1, 2006 (hereafter, “Kite”).
Claims 1, 3, and 6—19 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being
directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. See Non-Final Act. 3.
Claims 1,3, 6—13, and 15—19 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as being unpatentable over Seacat, Kite, Lore, Fleming, and Koivisto. See
Non-Final Act. 4—5.
Claim 14 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Seacat, Kite, Lore, Fleming, Koivisto, and Jacobson. See
Non-Final Act. 18.
ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellants’
arguments. Any other arguments Appellants could have made but chose not
to make in the Briefs are deemed to be waived. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(l)(iv) (2012); cf Hyatt v. Dudas, 551 F.3d 1307, 1313-14 (Fed.
Cir. 2008) (The Board may treat arguments Appellant failed to make for a
given ground of rejection as waived). We are not persuaded the Examiner
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erred; we adopt the Examiner’s findings and conclusions as our own, and we
add the following primarily for emphasis.
A. 35 U.S.C.§ 101
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. The
Supreme Court, however, has long interpreted § 101 to include an implicit
exception: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not
patentable. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLSBankInt’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354
(2014) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court,
in Alice, reiterated the two-step framework previously set forth in Mayo
Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 79 (2012),
“for distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible applications of those
concepts.” Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355. The first step in that analysis is to
“determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of those patent-
ineligible concepts,” e.g., to an abstract idea. Id. If the claims are directed
to a patent-ineligible concept, the inquiry proceeds to the second step, where
the elements of the claims are considered “individually and ‘as an ordered
combination”’ to determine whether there are additional elements that
“‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” Id.
(quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79, 78).
The Court acknowledged in Mayo, that “all inventions at some level
embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena,
or abstract ideas.” Mayo, 566 U.S. at 71. We, therefore, look to whether the
claims focus on a specific means or method that improves the relevant
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technology, or instead are directed to a result or effect that itself is the
abstract idea and merely invoke generic processes and machinery. See
Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
Appellants argue the Examiner erred in concluding the claims are
patent-ineligible, because “[t]he claims do not recite a basic concept that is
similar to any abstract idea previously identified by the courts.” Br 5.
Appellants argue that, “[ijnstead, the claims are directed toward improving a
specific technological area to overcome a problem specifically arising in
managing and analyzing sports teams and events” and therefore “are not
directed to a judicial exception” under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Id.
We are not persuaded the Examiner erred. Appellants’ arguments are
directed to claim 1, which recites a sports management system comprising
computer equipment and configured to receive sports-related data, analyze
the data, and provide reports, feedback, and suggestions relating to the data.
See Br. 4; see also Non-Final Act. 3^4. Thus, we determine the claims are
not directed to improving a specific technological area. See Br. 5. Instead,
we agree with the Examiner that “the claimed invention is to improve the
chances of a victory in a sports competition” (Ans. 20) using a
“computerized scheme for managing sports plays,” which is directed to the
abstract concept of organizing human activity (Non-Final Act. 3).
We determine the Examiner’s position is supported by case law, as
our reviewing court has held claims similarly directed to certain methods of
organizing human activity to be abstract ideas. See, e.g., Elec. Power Grp.
LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (collecting,
analyzing, and displaying certain results of the collection and analysis);
Accenture Global Services, GmbHv. Guidewire Software, 728 F.3d 1336,
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1344 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (generating task based rules based on an event); In re
Ferguson, 558 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (structuring a sales force or
marketing company); Planet Bingo, LLC v. VKGS, LLC, 576 Fed.App’x
1005 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (managing a game of bingo); In re Maucorps, 609 F.
2d 481 (CCPA 1979) (using an algorithm for determining the optimal
number of visits by a business representative to a client).
Further, we determine the technological features recited by the
claim—including the processor and memory—do not add any inventive
concept, as the recited limitations are to “only a generic computer
performing generic computer functions.” Ans. 21; see In re TLI
Communications LLC Patent Litigation, 823 F.3d 607, 612 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(“the claims here are not directed to a specific improvement to computer
functionality. Rather, they are directed to the use of conventional or generic
technology in a nascent but well-known environment, without any claim that
the invention reflects an inventive solution to any problem presented by
combining the two.”).
Thus, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in determining the
claims are directed to an abstract concept. Appellants do not challenge the
Examiner’s concluding that the “additional claim elements do not provide
meaningful limitations to transform the abstract idea into a patent eligible
application of the abstract idea such that the claims amount to significantly
more than the abstract idea itself.” Non-Final Act. 4. Accordingly, we
sustain the Examiner’s rejection of the claims as being non-statutory under
35U.S.C. § 101. See Ans. 21.
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B. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
Appellants argue the Examiner erred in rejecting independent claim 1
as obvious in view of the cited references, because “[n]one of the cited
references, even when considered in combination, teach or suggest each and
every limitation of claim 1Br. 6. Appellants further argue both Lore and
Fleming are directed toward fantasy sports, whereas “[t]he present invention
is not a fantasy based contest.” Id. 8—9.
Appellants’ arguments are unpersuasive of error because they attack
the references individually, and thus, fail to address the Examiner’s findings.
See Br. 6—11; see also In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 426 (CCPA 1981) (“one
cannot show non-obviousness by attacking references individually where, as
here, the rejections are based on combinations of references.”). Appellants
argue the teachings of the individual references, but do not proffer sufficient
evidence or argument to persuade us the Examiner erred in finding the
limitations of claim 1 to be taught or suggested by the combined teachings of
the references.
Appellants appear to be arguing each reference as a whole would not
be incorporated into the system of Seacat by an ordinarily skilled artisan.
However, the Examiner is relying on teachings from each reference and not
combining the entire systems of each reference.
To justify combining reference teachings in support of a
rejection it is not necessary that a device shown in one
reference can be physically inserted into the device shown in
the other. The test for obviousness is not whether the features
of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the
structure of the primary reference; nor is it that the claimed
invention must be expressly suggested in any one or all of the
references. Rather, the test is what the combined teachings of
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the references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill
in the art.
In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981) (citations omitted).
Accordingly, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in finding the
combination of Seacat, Kite, Lore, Fleming, and Koivisto teaches or
suggests the limitations of independent claim 1. See Non-Final Act. 10; see
also Seacat Fig. 2, || 7, 21, 27; Kite 1—2; Lore 143; Fleming 116; Koivisto
Figs. 36-42; 1231. We sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of
claim 1, and of claims 3, 6—13, and 15—19, not separately argued. See Br.
11. Appellants argue Jacobson, cited in the rejection of dependent claim 14,
does not cure the deficiencies of Seacat, Kite, Lore, Fleming, and Koivisto,
but do not otherwise present separate patentability arguments. See Br. 10.
Thus, we sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of dependent claim
14 for the reasons provided above with respect to independent claim 1.
DECISION
The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1, 3, and 6—19 is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED
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