Ex Parte Hubig et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Sep 26, 2014

11526515 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 26, 2014)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte STEPHAN M. HUBIG, STEPHEN X. SKAFF,
MONICA P. TINDEL-KOUKAL, MIHNEA A. POPA, and
RUSSELL D. MAZIARKA
____________

Appeal 2012-007088
Application 11/526,5151
Technology Center 3700
____________

Before EDWARD A. BROWN, THOMAS F. SMEGAL, and
TIMOTHY J. GOODSON, Administrative Patent Judges.

BROWN, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a decision on appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134 from the
Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–11, 14–16, 33, and 37–49.2 Appeal Br. 3.
We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm-in-part.

1 Appellants indicate the real party in interest is Ecolab Inc. Appeal Br. 3.
2 Claims 12, 13, 17–32, and 34–36 are cancelled. Appeal Br. 3.
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Claimed Subject Matter
Claims 1, 33, 41, 48, and 49 are independent. Claims 33 and 41,
reproduced below, are illustrative of the claimed subject matter.
33. A device comprising:
a temperature sensor that senses temperature information
concerning a temperature associated with a dryer; and
a controller that counts dryer cycles of the dryer based on
the received temperature information.

41. A device comprising:
a humidity sensor positioned outside a drying
compartment of a dryer that senses humidity information
concerning humidity levels associated with the dryer;
a controller that determines dryness of items in the dryer
based on the sensed humidity information and determines
whether the items in the dryer are overdry a defined period of
time after the controller determines that the items in the dryer
are determined to be dry.

Rejections
Claims 33, 37, 38, and 40 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as
being anticipated by Grennan (US 4,763,425, issued Aug. 16, 1988).
Answer 4.
Claims 41 and 43 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as being
anticipated by Wakaeya (US 5,050,313, issued Sept. 24, 1991). Id. at 5.
Claims 39 and 48 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Grennan and Lee (KR 10-2002-0076590, published Oct.
11, 2002). Id.
Claims 1–3, 5, 14–16, and 48 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as being unpatentable over Lee and Grennan. Id. at 6.
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Claims 4, 7, and 8 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Lee, Grennan, and Moon (KR 10-2005-0118484,
published Dec. 19, 2005). Id. at 7.
Claim 6 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Lee, Grennan, and Somod (US 2008/0184588 A1,
published Aug. 7, 2008). Id. at 8.
Claims 4, 7, and 9–11 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Lee, Grennan, and Wakaeya. Id.
Claims 41 and 43 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Lee and Wakaeya. Id. at 9.
Claims 44–47 and 49 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Lee, Wakaeya, and Grennan. Id. at 10.
Claims 1–5, 7–11, 14–16, 39, and 44–49 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Wakaeya and Grennan. Id. at
11.
Claim 6 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Wakaeya, Grennan, and Somod. Id. at 12.

ANALYSIS
Anticipation of claims 33, 37, 38, and 40—Grennan
Claims 33, 38, and 40
Independent claim 33 recites, inter alia, “a controller that counts dryer
cycles of the dryer based on the received temperature information.”
Emphasis added.
The Examiner finds that Grennan’s controller 54, 106 counts dryer
cycles of dryer 10 based on received temperature information from
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temperature sensor 102, 42. Answer 4, 5 (citing Grennan, col. 5, ll. 6–44;
col. 9, ll. 11–53). In particular, the Examiner determines that the counting of
individual on and off temperature regulating cycles within an overall dryer
cycle in Grennan corresponds to “a controller that counts dryer cycles of the
dryer based on the received temperature information” in claim 33. Answer
16.
In contrast, Appellants contend that Grennan does not disclose a
controller that counts “dryer cycles” of a dryer based on received
temperature information, as claimed (Appeal Br. 8), but “teaches counting
individual on and off temperature regulating cycles within a dryer cycle to
determine when the dryer should be turned off” (id. at 10 (emphasis added)).
Grennan discloses that microprocessor 54 determines the upper
regulating temperature for drying fabric to a desired final dryness. Col. 5, ll.
11–18; Figs. 1, 2. The upper regulating temperature and the sensed
operating temperature are provided to cycler 106, which initiates a first cycle
to increase the operating temperature up to the upper regulating temperature.
Col. 5, ll. 18–32. Based on the amount of time that it takes to reach the
upper regulating temperature, and the desired final dryness and fabric type,
microprocessor 54 determines the total number of cycles to be executed.
Col. 5, ll. 32–44; col. 9, ll. 54–60.
Figure 5 of Grennan shows a plurality of sequential heating cycles
executed in operation of a clothes dryer. Col. 4, ll. 14–15. As shown, the
temperature is increased to the upper cycling temperature (150°F). Once
this temperature is reached, heating is deactivated and the exhaust air
temperature drops. Col. 9, ll. 35–38. Then, heating is activated for a second
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cycle beginning at point 139. Col. 9, ll. 38–41. The determined total
number of cycles is completed to dry the clothes. Col. 9, ll. 57–60.
Appellants disagree with the Examiner determination that Grennan’s
cycles depicted in Figure 5 correspond to the claimed “dryer cycles.” Claim
33 does not recite a definition of “dryer cycles.” We give claims their
“broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification,”
reading claim language “in light of the specification as it would be
interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art.” In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech.
Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).
Appellants further contend:
As known to those of skill in the art, and as described in
the Grennan patent, it is very common for the heating element
of a clothes dryer to be “cycled” on and off during a dryer cycle
in order to maintain the appropriate temperature within the
clothes dryer. In addition, as is also known to those of skill in
the art, these individual temperature regulating cycles are not
analogous to the overall dryer cycle, in which the clothes dryer
is started or turned on at the beginning of the dryer cycle and
the clothes dryer is stopped or turned off at the end of the dryer
cycle at which point, in theory, the clothes should be dry.
Reply Br. 6 (emphasis added).
Appellants appear to contend that a “dryer cycle[]” means an “overall
dryer cycle,” which begins when the clothes dryer is started or turned on,
and ends when the clothes dryer is stopped or turned off.
Appellants also contend that the Specification “refers only to these
overall dryer cycles.” Reply Br. 6. In support, Appellants reference several
paragraphs of the Specification. Id. at 7. However, the paragraphs
referenced by Appellants do not limit the meaning of “dryer cycle” to an
“overall drying cycle” that begins when the clothes dryer is started or turned
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on, and ends when the clothes dryer is stopped or turned off. In this regard,
Appellants reference paragraph 3 of the Specification, which describes
“[c]onventional clothes dryers” and a “drying cycle.” Reply Br. 7. The
description in this paragraph appears to be consistent with Appellants’
definition of an “overall dryer cycle” as beginning when the clothes dryer is
started or turned on, and ending when the clothes dryer is stopped or turned
off.
However, the Specification also states, “[i]n one embodiment,
controller 30 detects the start of a dryer cycle when the sensed temperature
exceeds a ‘start’ temperature for a first predetermined period of time.” See
Spec. ¶ 44.3 We understand that the “sensed temperature” would be sensed
after starting or turning on the clothes dryer. The Specification also states
that “controller 30 may detect the completion of a dryer cycle when the
sensed temperature is less than a ‘stop’ temperature for a second
predetermined period of time.” Id. This disclosure does not indicate that the
completion of the dryer cycle necessarily corresponds to stopping or turning
off the clothes dryer. Accordingly, Appellants’ Specification paragraph 44
does not limit the “beginning” and “end” of the “dryer cycle” to correspond
to starting or turning on and stopping or turning off, respectively, of the
dryer. In contrast to Appellants’ definition of “dryer cycle” discussed above,
the “beginning” and “end” of the dryer cycle are described as corresponding
to different sensed temperatures.

3 Appellants appear to refer to paragraph 44 of the Specification as
paragraph [0045]. See Reply Br. 7 n. 13.
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Accordingly, the paragraphs of the Specification referenced by
Appellants do not establish that the claim term “dryer cycle” has a specific
meaning in the context of the application. Thus, the Specification does not
establish that the term “dryer cycle” means an “overall dryer cycle”
beginning when the clothes dryer is started or turned on, and ending when
the clothes dryer is stopped or turned off. Appellants’ contention that the
claim term “dryer cycle” should be construed to have this specific meaning
is not persuasive.
Grennan, which is also in the field of clothes dryers, describes “drying
cycles.” Col. 9, ll. 54–57. The “drying cycles” in Grennan each have a
beginning and end corresponding to different sensed temperatures. Grennan
also counts the “drying cycles.” Appellants do not establish a specific
definition of “dryer cycle,” and do not apprise us of error in the Examiner’s
determination that Grennan’s controller “counts dryer cycles of the dryer,”
as broadly claimed.
In view of the above, we sustain the rejection of claim 33, and its
dependent claims 38 and 40, which are not separately argued, as anticipated
by Grennan.
Claim 37
Claim 37, which depends from claim 33, recites that the controller
“compares the temperature information with a predefined start temperature
to detect a start of a dryer cycle” and “increments a dryer cycle count after
detecting the start of the dryer cycle.”
Regarding Grennan, the Examiner finds that “controller 54, 106
compares the temperature information with a predefined start temperature to
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detect a start of a dryer cycle[,] and [then] increments a cycle count.”
Answer 4–5 (citing Grennan, col. 5, ll. 6–44; col. 9, ll. 11–53).
Appellants contend that Grennan does not disclose “a predefined start
temperature” and “incrementing a dryer cycle count after detecting the start
of a dryer cycle” as claimed. Appeal Br. 10. Appellants also contend that
reaching the upper regulating temperature in Grennan “does not correspond
to detection of the start of the dryer cycle, as does the claimed “predefined
start temperature” in claim 37. Id. at 11.
The Examiner correctly notes that the term “predefined start
temperature” is not defined in claim 37. Answer 17. Appellants contend
that one skilled in the art would understand the meaning of this term in view
of the Specification. Reply Br. 9 (citing Spec. ¶¶ 47–48). However,
Appellants neither indicate what meaning “predefined start temperature”
would have, nor direct us to any specific definition of this term in the
Specification. Accordingly, Appellants’ do not apprise us of any error in the
Examiner’s findings and reasoning for claim 37.
Thus, we sustain the rejection of claim 37 as anticipated by Grennan.
Anticipation of claims 41 and 43—Wakaeya
Independent claim 41 recites, inter alia, “a controller that determines
dryness of items in the dryer based on the sensed humidity information and
determines whether the items in the dryer are overdry a defined period of
time after the controller determines that the items in the dryer are
determined to be dry.” Emphasis added.
The Examiner finds that Wakaeya discloses the claimed device,
including humidity sensor 26 and controller 21–25. Answer 5. Regarding
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controller 21–25, the Examiner states that “a predetermined degree of
dryness is considered an overdried degree.” Id.
Appellants contend that Wakaeya “teaches a system in which the
drying operation is stopped once the items are dry, thus preventing the items
from becoming overdried.” Appeal Br. 12 (citing Wakaeya, col. 8, ll. 19–
27; Abstract; Fig. 12; and col. 8, ll. 19–21). Appellants also contend that
Wakaeya “‘implies that the ‘predetermined degree of dryness’ and a state of
being ‘overdried’ are two entirely separate things.” Id. Appellants further
contend that Wakaeya’s system would be unable to “determine when the
defined period of time after the controller determines that the items in the
dryer are determined to be dry recited in claim 41 has elapsed.” Id. at 13.
Appellants’ contentions are persuasive. Wakaeya discloses that “the
goods to be dried can be prevented from being overdried, but can be dried to
a predetermined degree of dryness.” Col. 8, ll. 20–24. Claim 41 recites that
the controller “determines whether the items in the dryer are overdry a
defined period of time after the controller determines that the items in the
dryer are determined to be dry.” Emphasis added. Appellants contend that
the Examiner does not make a finding that Wakaeya discloses this
limitation. Appeal Br. 12. The Examiner states that the claim does not
define a standard of “dryness” or what the “defined period of time” is.
Answer 19. Even if Wakaeya’s disclosure of “a predetermined degree of
dryness” corresponds to the claimed “overdry,” we agree with Appellants
that the Examiner does not make findings supported by a preponderance of
the evidence that show Wakaeya discloses a controller that determines the
claimed “overdry” state of items and determines that the items are dry a
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defined period before the controller determines the “overdry” state (i.e., “a
predetermined degree of dryness”), as required by claim 41.
Accordingly, because the Examiner does not find that Wakaeya
discloses every limitation of claim 41, we do not sustain the rejection of
claim 41 as anticipated by Wakaeya.
Claim 43 depends from canceled claim 42. As the Examiner (Answer
21) and Appellants (Appeal Br. 7) both indicate that claim 43 should
properly depend from claim 41, we treat claim 43 as depending from claim
41.4 We do not sustain the rejection of claim 43 as anticipated by Wakaeya.
Obviousness of claims 39 and 48—Grennan and Lee
Appellants rely on the dependency of claim 39 from claim 33 for
patentability. Appeal Br. 15.
As we find no deficiency in the Examiner’s rejection of claim 33 as
anticipated by Grennan, and Appellants do not apprise us of any error in the
Examiner’s articulated reasoning for combining Grennan and Lee, we
sustain the rejection of claim 39 as unpatentable over Grennan and Lee for
the same reasons.
Independent claim 48 recites, inter alia, “a controller that . . . further
compares the temperature information with a predefined start temperature to
detect a start of a dryer cycle and increments a dryer cycle count after
detecting the start of the dryer cycle.”
Appellants contend that claim 48 includes the limitations discussed
above for claim 33, and therefore claim 48 is also patentable. Appeal Br. 15.

4 Appellants indicate claim 43 will be amended to depend from independent
claim 41. Appeal Br. 7.
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This contention is also not persuasive. As we find no deficiency in
the rejection of claim 33 as anticipated by Grennan, and Appellants do not
apprise us of any error in the Examiner’s articulated reasoning for
combining Grennan and Lee, we also sustain the rejection of claim 48 as
unpatentable over Grennan and Lee for the same reasons.
Obviousness of claims 1–3, 5, 14–16, and 48—Lee and Grennan
Independent claim 1 recites, inter alia, “a controller that determines
dryness of items in the dryer based on the sensed humidity information and
that counts dryer cycles of the dryer based on the sensed temperature
information.”
Appellants contend that claim 1 includes the limitations of the
controller discussed above in regard to claim 33, and neither Lee nor
Grennan discloses a controller that counts dryer cycles based on sensed
temperature information. Appeal Br. 16–17.
These contentions are not persuasive. As discussed above, Appellants
do not apprise us of any error in the Examiner’s determination that Grennan
discloses a controller as recited in claim 33. In addition, Appellants do not
apprise us of any error in the Examiner’s articulated reasoning for
combining Grennan and Lee. Thus, we also sustain the rejection of claim 1
as unpatentable over Lee and Grennan.
Appellants rely on the dependency of claims 3 and 5 from claim 1 for
patentability. Appeal Br. 17. Thus, we sustain the rejection of claims 3 and
5.
Claims 14–16 depend from claim 1. Appellants contend that claim 14
includes the limitations discussed in the Appeal Brief in regard to claim 48
and that neither Grennan nor Lee discloses a controller as recited in claim
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14. Appeal Br. 17. This contention is not persuasive for the reasons stated
above for the rejection of claim 48 over Grennan and Lee. Accordingly, we
sustain the rejection of claim 14.
Claim 15 recites that “the controller further detects start of a dryer
cycle when the temperature information indicates that a temperature
associated with the dryer remains at least as high as a threshold start
temperature for at least a defined start period of time.” Emphasis added.
Appellants’ contention that the Examiner does not find that Grennan
and Lee disclose the limitations of claim 15 (see Answer 6, 25–26) is
persuasive. See Appeal Br. 18. We do not sustain the rejection of claim 15.
Claim 16 recites that “the controller further: compares the temperature
information with a predefined start temperature to detect a start of a dryer
cycle; compares the temperature information with a predefined stop
temperature to detect a stop of a dryer cycle; and increments a cycle count
after detecting the stop of the dryer cycle.”
Appellants contend that neither Grennan nor Lee teaches the counting
of drying cycles, and thus, does not teach or suggest the limitations of claim
16. Appeal Br. 18.
As discussed above in regard to claim 33, the Examiner determines
that the individual on and off temperature cycles in Grennan correspond to
the claimed dryer cycle. See also Answer 6, 25–26. These “dryer cycles” in
Grennan each have a beginning and end temperature. Appellants do not
persuasively explain why these beginning and end temperatures do not
correspond to the claimed “start of a dryer cycle” and “stop of a dyer cycle,”
respectively. Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claim 16.
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Independent claim 48 recites, inter alia, “a controller that . . . counts
dryer cycles of the dryer, and further compares the temperature information
with a predefined start temperature to detect a start of a dryer cycle and
increments a dryer cycle count after detecting the start of the dryer cycle.”
Appellants contend that neither Lee nor Grennan discloses these
limitations of claim 48. Appeal Br. 18–19. For the reasons discussed above
with respect to the rejection of claim 33 based on Grennan, Appellants’
contentions are not persuasive. In addition, Appellants do not apprise us of
any error in the Examiner’s articulated reasoning for combining Lee and
Grennan. We sustain the rejection of claim 48.
Obviousness of claims 4, 7, and 8—Lee, Grennan, and Moon
Claims 4, 7, and 8 depend from claim 1. Appellants contend that
claims 4, 7, and 8 are patentable for the same reasons as discussed in the
Appeal Brief for claim 1. Appeal Br. 19.
However, because Appellants do not apprise us of any error in the
Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 over Lee and Grennan, or apprise us of any
error in the Examiner’s articulated reasoning for combining the reference
teachings, we sustain the rejection of claims 4, 7, and 8 as unpatentable over
Lee, Grennan, and Moon.
Obviousness of claim 6—Lee, Grennan, and Somod
Claim 6 depends from claim 1. Appellants contend that claim 6 is
patentable for the same reasons as those discussed in the Appeal Brief for
the rejection of claim 1 over Lee and Grennan. Appeal Br. 20.
However, because Appellants do not apprise us of any error in the
Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 over Lee and Grennan, or apprise us of any
error in the Examiner’s articulated reasoning for combining the reference
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teachings, we sustain the rejection of claim 6 as unpatentable over Lee,
Grennan, and Somod.

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Obviousness of claims 4, 7, and 9–11—Lee, Grennan, and Wakaeya
Claims 4 and 7 depend from claim 1. Appellants contend that claims
4 and 7 are patentable for the same reasons as those discussed in the Appeal
Brief for the rejection of claim 1 over Lee and Grennan. Appeal Br. 20.
However, because Appellants do not apprise us of any error in the
Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 over Lee and Grennan, or apprise us of any
error in the Examiner’s articulated reasoning for combining the reference
teachings, we also sustain the rejection of claims 4 and 7 as unpatentable
over Lee, Grennan, and Wakaeya.
Claim 9 depends from claim 1 and recites that “the controller further
determines whether the items in the dryer are overdry.” Appellants contend
that Wakaeya does not disclose this feature for reasons stated for the
rejection of claim 41. Appeal Br. 20–21.
As discussed above, the Examiner finds that Wakaeya’s disclosure of
“a predetermined degree of dryness” corresponds to the claimed “overdry.”
Answer 5. Appellants do not persuasively explain how the claimed
“overdry” state of the items is distinguishable from “a predetermined degree
of dryness” of items disclosed in Wakaeya. Nor do Appellants apprise us of
any error in the Examiner’s articulated reasoning for combining the
reference. Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claim 9.
Claims 10 and 11 depend from claim 9. Appellants contend that
Wakaeya does not disclose the features of claims 10 and 11 for reasons
stated for the rejection of claim 41. Appeal Br. 20–21.
We agree, and thus, do not sustain the rejection of claims 10 and 11.

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Obviousness of claims 41 and 43—Lee and Wakaeya
Claims 41 and 43 are rejected over Lee and Wakaeya. The Examiner
finds Lee discloses “controller 52 that determines dryness of items in a dryer
based on sensed humidity information,” but does not disclose that the
“controller determines whether the items in the dryer are overdried.”
Answer 9. The Examiner relies on Wakaeya for teaching this feature. Id.
Appellants contend that neither Lee nor Wakaeya discloses “a
controller that determines whether the items in the dryer are overdry a
defined period of time after the controller determines that the items in the
dryer are determined to be dry,” as recited in claim 41. Appeal Br. 22.
For the reasons discussed above for the rejection of claim 41 based on
Wakaeya, Appellants contentions are persuasive. We do not sustain the
rejection of claims 41 and 43 over Lee and Wakaeya.
Obviousness of claims 44–47 and 49—Lee, Wakaeya, and Grennan
The Examiner’s application of Grennan for claims 44–47 (Answer
10), which depend from claim 41, does not cure the deficiencies of the
Examiner’s reliance on Lee and Wakaeya for claim 41. Thus, we agree with
Appellants (Appeal Br. 23–24) that the combination of Lee, Wakaeya, and
Grennan does not support the rejection of claims 44–47. We do not sustain
the rejection of claims 44–47.
Obviousness of claims 1–5, 7–11, 14–16, 39, and 44–49—Wakaeya
and Grennan
The Examiner relies on Grennan for disclosure of a controller that
counts dryer cycles based on sensed temperature information. Answer 11–
12. Appellants contend that Grennan does not disclose “a controller that
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counts dryer cycles of the dryer based on received temperature information.”
Appeal Br. 25.
Appellants’ contention is not persuasive for reasons discussed above.
Thus, we sustain the rejection of claims 1–5, 7–11, 14, and 16, which
depend from claim 1.
The rejection of claim 15 has the same deficiency as discussed above
for the obviousness rejection of claim 15 over Lee and Grennan, in that the
Examiner does not find that Wakaeya or Grennan discloses the limitations of
claim 15. See Ans. 11–12. Thus, we do not sustain the rejection of claim
15.
Appellants rely on the dependency of claim 39 from claim 33 for
patentability. Appeal Br. 25–26. Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of
claim 39 for reasons discussed above.
Claims 44–47 depend from claim 41. The Examiner’s application of
Grennan for the rejection of these claims does not cure the deficiencies of
the Examiner’s reliance on Wakaeya for the rejection of claim 41, as
discussed above. Thus, we do not sustain the rejection of claims 44–47.
For claim 48, Appellants contend that Grennan does not disclose a
controller that counts dryer cycles of the dryer based on received
temperature information. Appeal Br. 25. For reasons discussed above, this
contention is not persuasive. We sustain the rejection of claim 48.
Claim 49 recites, inter alia, that “the controller further determines
whether the items in the dryer are overdry a defined period of time after the
controller determines that the items in the dryer are dry and tracks an amount
of time the dryer continues to run after the items in the dryer are determined
to be overdry.” For the reasons discussed above for the rejection of claim 41
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based on Wakaeya, Appellants’ contentions are persuasive. We do not
sustain the rejection of claim 49.
Obviousness of claim 6—Wakaeya, Grennan, and Somod
Claim 6 depends from claim 1. Appellants rely on the dependency of
claim 6 from claim 1 for patentability. Appeal Br. 20. Accordingly, we
sustain the rejection of claim 6.

DECISION
We affirm the rejection of claims 33, 37, 38, and 40 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(b) as being anticipated by Grennan.
We reverse the rejection of claims 41 and 43 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)
as being anticipated by Wakaeya.
We affirm the rejection of claims 39 and 48 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as being unpatentable over Grennan and Lee.
We affirm the rejection of claims 1–3, 5, 14, 16, and 48, and reverse
the rejection of claim 15, under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable
over Lee and Grennan.
We affirm the rejection of claims 4, 7, and 8 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as being unpatentable over Lee, Grennan, and Moon.
We affirm the rejection of claim 6 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Lee, Grennan, and Somod.
We affirm the rejection of claims 4, 7, and 9, and reverse the rejection
of claims 10 and 11, under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over
Lee, Grennan, and Wakaeya.
We reverse the rejection of claims 41 and 43 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as being unpatentable over Lee and Wakaeya.
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We reverse the rejection of claims 44–47 and 49 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Lee, Wakaeya, and Grennan.
We affirm the rejection of claims 1–5, 7–11, 14, 16, 39, and 48, and
reverse the rejection of claims 15, 44–47, and 49, under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as being unpatentable over Wakaeya and Grennan.
We affirm the rejection of claim 6 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Wakaeya, Grennan, and Somod.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED-IN-PART

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