Ex Parte Huang et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Feb 29, 2016

12317160 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 29, 2016)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
12/317, 160 12/19/2008
109673 7590 03/02/2016
McClure, Qualey & Rodack, LLP
3100 Interstate North Circle
Suite 150
Atlanta, GA 30339
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
Liang-wei Huang
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
251812-5100 6360
EXAMINER
PANW ALKAR, VINEETA S
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2633
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
03/02/2016 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address( es):
uspatents@mqrlaw.com
dan.mcclure@mqrlaw.com
gina.silverio@mqrlaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Exparte LIANG-WEI HUANG, CHIH-YUNG SHIH, and
SHIEH-HSING KUO
Appeal2013-005105
Application 12/317, 1601
Technology Center 2600
Before MARC S. HOFF, ERIC B. CHEN, and
IRVINE. BRANCH, Administrative Patent Judges.
BRANCH, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner's
decision to reject claims 1--4, 7-9, 16, and 19. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b). Claims 5, 6, 10-15, 17, and 18 are found to have
allowable subject matter. Final Act. 12 (filed June 1, 2012).
We affirm.
1 According to Appellants, the real party in interest is Realtek
Semiconductor Corporation. Appeal Br. 2.
Appeal2013-005105
Application 12/317,160
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants' claimed subject matter adjusts a gain of a digital signal
according to a digital gain value from a gain-mapping table according to an
analog gain level and a digital gain level. Abstract. Claim 1 is illustrative:
1. A method for gain control, comprising the steps of:
providing a gain-mapping table;
determining a first analog gain level according to a power
of a far-end transmitted signal obtaining a first gain-mapping
value from the gain-mapping table according to the first analog
gain level;
obtaining a first digital gain value according to the first
gain-mapping value; and
adjusting a gain of a digital signal according to the first
digital gain value.
THE REJECTIONS
The Examiner rejected claims 1, 3, 7, 9, 16, and 19 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as unpatentable over Molnar (US 7,218,905 Bl; May 15, 2007) and
Yen (US 2006/0120491 Al; June 8, 2006). Ans. 4--11.2
The Examiner rejected claims 2, 4, and 8 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Molnar, Yen, and Eddington (US 5,165,017; Nov. 17,
1992). Id. at 11.
THE OBVIOUSNESS REJECTION OVER MOLNAR AND YEN
Claims 1, 3, 7, 9, 16, and 19
The Examiner finds that the combination of Molnar and Yen teaches
or suggests all limitations of claim 1. Ans. 4--5. Appellants argue error
2 Throughout this opinion, we refer to (1) the Appeal Brief filed October 10,
2012 ("App. Br."); (2) the Examiner's Answer mailed January 29, 2013
("Ans."); and (3) the Reply Brief filed February 18, 2013 ("Reply Br.").
2
Appeal2013-005105
Application 12/317,160
because Molnar does not disclose "adjusting a gain of a digital signal," as
claimed, because "the gain calibration device of Molnar [is] used to adjust a
gain level of an analog amplifier (VGA 40) and not a digital gain." App. Br.
6. But Appellants acknowledge that the Examiner "cited Yen as disclosing a
digital gain stage" and not Molnar. Id. at 7. Appellants argue error based on
Yen, which Appellants acknowledge discloses both an analog gain and a
digital gain (see, e.g., Yen, Fig. 3), because neither Yen's digital gain nor
Yen's analog gain is controlled by a "gain value from a table."
The Examiner concludes that it would have been obvious to one of
ordinary skill in the art at the time of Appellants' invention to modify
Molnar "by converting the second analog gain stage (VGA stage) to a digital
gain stage based on Yen's teaching of using a digital gain stage which
adjusts its value in accordance with a digital gain value." Ans. 5. The
Examiner reasons that this would have been obvious for the purpose of
compensating for insufficiency of the analog gain, which Yen discloses. Id.
(citing Yen, Abstract.).
Appellants argue error because "the resulting structure would be [a]
system with an analog gain stage that is controlled by a gain value from a
look-up table (as taught by Molnar) followed by a separate digital gain stage
(but no such look-up table generated control value controls the digital
stage)." App. Br. 8. Appellants assert that this structure would be the
opposite of the claimed invention. Id. at 9.
We are unpersuaded of error based on Appellants' argument that
Molnar does not disclose adjusting a digital signal (App. Br. 6; Reply Br. 2)
because the Examiner cites Yen for adjusting a digital signal (Ans. 5). We
are similarly unpersuaded of error based on Appellants' argument that Yen
3
Appeal2013-005105
Application 12/317,160
does not teach adjusting a signal based on a value from a lookup table (App.
Br. 8; Reply Br. 2), because the Examiner cites Molnar for adjusting a signal
based on a value from a lookup table (Ans. 4--5). Appellants' arguments as
to alleged gaps between the teachings of the prior art and the claimed
invention amount to an unpersuasive attack on individual references when
the rejection is based on what the combined teachings of the references
would have taught or suggested to one skilled in the art. See In re Keller,
642 F.2d 413, 426 (CCPA 1981); In re Merck & Co., Inc., 800 F.2d 1091,
1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
We also find unpersuasive Appellants' arguments that the references
are not properly combinable because the resulting structure would allegedly
be opposite of what is claimed. App. Br. 8-9; Reply Br. 2-3. "The test for
obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be
bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference . . . . Rather,
the test is what the combined teachings of the references would have
suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art." Keller, 642 F.2d at 425. See
also In re Sneed, 710 F.2d 1544, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("[I]t is not necessary
that the inventions of the references be physically combinable to render
obvious the invention under review."); In re Nievelt, 482 F.2d 965, 968
(CCP A 1973) ("Combining the teachings of references does not involve an
ability to combine their specific structures."). Rather, "if a technique has
been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art
would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way,
using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or
her skill." KSR Int'! Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007).
4
Appeal2013-005105
Application 12/317,160
Here, Appellants fail to persuasively rebut the Examiner's reasoning
that it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art based on the
combined teachings of Molnar and Yen to adjust a digital signal as taught by
Yen (Fig. 3, i-f 21) with a lookup table value as taught by Molnar (Fig. 1,
4: 12-26, 4:42--48) for the purpose of compensating for insufficiency of the
analog gain as taught by Yen (Abstract). Ans. 4--5. In other words,
Appellants have failed to persuade us that the claimed invention amounts to
anything more than a combination of familiar elements according to known
methods that yields a predictable result. See, e.g., Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v.
Fisher-Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (quoting KSR, 550
U.S. at 416 ("The combination of familiar elements according to known
methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable
results.")). Thus, we find the Examiner to have satisfied the burden of
establishing prima facie obviousness by showing "some articulated
reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of
obviousness." KSR, 550 U.S. at 418 (quoting In re Kahn, 441F.3d977, 988
(Fed. Cir. 2006).
In view of the foregoing, we sustain the Examiner's decision to reject
claim 1 and also claims 7 and 16, which Appellants argue on the same bases.
App. Br. 9-10. Appellants do not separately argue claims 3, 9, and 19.
Appellants separately argue the rejections of claims 2, 4, and 8. App.
Br. 13-15. We are unpersuaded of error in the Examiner's decision to reject
these claims for the reasons stated by the Examiner (Ans. 14--15), which
Appellants do not persuasively rebut.
5
Appeal2013-005105
Application 12/317,160
DECISION
In view of the foregoing, we sustain the Examiner's decision rejecting
claims 1--4, 7-9, 16, and 19.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv).
AFFIRMED
6