Ex Parte Holness

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jun 10, 2014

11204754 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 10, 2014)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARKOFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
11/204,754 08/15/2005 Wilfred Washington Holness WH101US 1653
7590 06/11/2014
Wilfred Holness
Suite 4A
4400 Wickham Avenue
Bronx, NY 10466
EXAMINER
JALALZADEH ABYAN, SHILA
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3764
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
06/11/2014 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte WILFRED WASHINGTON HOLNESS
____________________

Appeal 2012-001175
Application 11/204,754
Technology Center 3600
____________________

Before JENNIFER D. BAHR, LYNNE H. BROWNE, and
LISA M. GUIJT, Administrative Patent Judges.

GUIJT, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Wilfred Washington Holness (Appellant) seeks our review under 35
U.S.C. § 134(a) of the final rejection of claims 1-38, which are all of the
claims pending in the application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C.
§ 6(b). We AFFIRM-IN-PART.

CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to an apparatus, method, and kit for an
exercise machine that can, among other limitations, inhibit, for an amount of
time, further movement of a movable surface, when moved by a user.
Claims 1, 36 and 37 are independent. Claim 36 is reproduced below.
36. A method of using a resistance exercise machine
comprising:
a) contacting a movable surface on the machine which is
linked to a resistance source with a body part;
b) applying a force to the movable surface through the body
part as to cause the movable surface to move in a direction
opposite the force created by the resistance source;
c) inhibiting for an amount of time the movement of the
movable surface after a distance has been traveled by the
movable surface in the direction caused by the force created by
the body part;
d) removing the inhibition of movement of the movable
surface after the amount of time; and
e) moving the movable surface pass the distance that has
been traveled.

PRIOR ART

Voris US 4,765,613 Aug. 23, 1988
Boyd US 5,195,746 Mar. 23, 1993
Whipps US 5,556,362 Sep. 17, 1996
Moser US 6,234,939 B1 May 22, 2001
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Burrell US 7,160,042 B2 Jan. 9, 2007
Rexach US 2002/0091043 A1 Jul. 11, 2002
Capuano US 2003/0211916 A1 Nov. 13, 2003
Cordova US 2005/0239602 A1 Oct. 27, 2005
Schneider US 2006/0094570 A1 May 4, 2006

REJECTIONS
Appellant requests review of the following rejections:
A. Claim 36 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as being
anticipated by Cordova;
B. Claims 1-5, 25, 28-32, 35, 37, and 38 stand rejected under 35
U.S.C. § 102(b) as being anticipated by Voris;
C. Claims 24, 26, 27, and 33 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Voris and Schneider;
D. Claims 6, 9, 12, and 18 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as being unpatentable over Voris and Burrell;
E. Claims 7, 10, 13, and 19 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Voris and Moser;
F. Claims 8, 11, 14, and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Voris and Capuano;
G. Claims 15 and 21 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Voris, Burrell and Whipps;
H. Claims 16 and 22 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Voris, Moser, and Whipps;
I. Claims 17 and 23 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Voris, Capuano and Whipps; and
J. Claims 31 and 34 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Voris and Rexach.
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OPINION
A. Claim 36 – Anticipation by Cordova
Appellant argues that the method of claim 36, and particularly steps
(d) and (e), require “that after removing the inhibition of movement of the
movable surface after an amount of time, the movable surface is moved
pas[t] the distance that has been traveled by the movable surface.” Br. 20.
Appellant points out that Cordova describes an exercise machine “where a
movable member is moved in one direction to a limit position where the
movable member is locked while the machine then reverses the direction of
the movable member” and that “there are mechanisms specifically set in
place to prevent any further movement past the limit point.” Br. 21, 23.
Appellant concludes that “Cordova does not anticipate claim 36 since there
is no contemplation of moving [the] movable member past the [limit
position].” Br. 24.1
The Examiner finds that after the inhibition of movement of the
movable member is removed, as required by step (d), the machine may be
reprogrammed by the user to set a new upper limit, enabling the user, to
move past the prior distance traveled, accomplishing step (e). Ans. 6, 18-19.
Alternatively, the Examiner finds that “since no order has been specified . . .
for performing the steps,” . . . “the user can move the movable member to a
desired position other than the limit position first (before it gets to a limit
position)[(steps (a) and (b)),] and then move the movable member pas[t] that
position to the limit position[ (step e),]” at which time the movable member

1 Although Appellant also argues that “Cordova teaches away from the
present invention[,]” we note that “teaching away” arguments are not
relevant to anticipation rejections. Br. 19; See In re Malagari, 499 F.2d
1297, 1302 (CCPA 1974).
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is inhibited (step c), and finally the inhibition is removed, after an amount of
time (step d). Ans. 19.
We agree with Appellant that the Examiner has failed to establish a
prima facie showing of anticipation. In particular, the Examiner has not
shown that the methods of operating the Cordova exercise machine, as
suggested by the Examiner above, are described in Cordova. If a prior art
device, in its normal and usual operation, would necessarily perform the
method claimed, then the method claimed will be considered to be
unpatentable over the prior art device. In re King, 801 F.2d 1324, 1326-7
(Fed. Cir. 1986). However, in Cordova, the normal and usual operation of
the exercise machine requires inhibiting any further movement of the
movable surface beyond the limit position and, moreover, maximizing the
applied force to prevent further movement past the limit position if the
movable surface is not moved in reverse. Cordova, para. [0087]. Thus, in
normal and usual operation of its apparatus, Cordova would not necessarily
perform the method claimed in claim 36. Furthermore, the mere existence
of an apparatus does not necessarily render unpatentable all the possible
methods to which it may be adapted. Carnegie Steel Co. v. Cambria Iron
Co., 185 U.S. 403, 424-5 (1902). For these reasons, Cordova does not
anticipate claim 36, and we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection.

B. Claims 1-5, 25, 28-32, 35, 37 and 38 – Anticipation by Voris
Appellant argues that “Voris does not teach inhibition of movement of
its movable member in any direction[,]” but “only discloses a mechanism to
gradually vary resistance while permitting movement of its movable
member in any direction.” Br. 25. In addition, Appellant contends that
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Voris does not disclose “that the movable surface is free to move in the
opposite direction of the external force.” Id. Appellant also argues that
“Voris does not teach any timer” or “an interval timer.” Br. 28.
Regarding claims 1 and 37, the Examiner finds that Voris discloses
“that resistance is applied to the movement of the bar” and reasons that the
applied resistance can inhibit movement of the bar if either the user is too
weak to overcome the resistance or if the user has pushed the bar to its upper
limit of movement due to the construction of the machine. Ans. 6-7, 19-21.
The Examiner also finds that Voris discloses that the apparatus permits
uninhibited movement of the movable surface in the opposite direction to the
external force, while the mechanism inhibits movement of the movable
surface in the direction caused by the external force. Ans. 6. Finally, the
Examiner finds that a timer is inherently disclosed in Voris, “since the
amount of time [that the movable member has stopped moving in the
positive resistance direction] has to be compared with a threshold time in
order to see if the user has pass[ed] that limit . . . .” Ans. 20-21.
We agree with the Examiner’s finding that if the user is too weak to
overcome the applied resistance, the mechanism inhibits movement of the
movable surface. We note that, in addition to the disclosures in Voris cited
by the Examiner (see Ans. 6-7, citing col. 4, ll. 36-46, 55-51; col. 5, ll 6-24),
Voris states as follows:
The present invention . . . provid[es] an exercise device which
gradually applies resistance . . . to the movement of a lifting
mechanism by an exerciser in at least a first positive resistance
direction . . . . Further, the exercise device . . . is controlled to reduce
the resistance applied in the first direction to substantially zero if the
exerciser, due to fatigue, fails to continue moving the lifting
mechanism in the first direction for more than a selected time period.
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Voris, col. 3, ll. 5-17 (emphasis added).
As required by claims 1 and 37, movement of the movable surface is
inhibited “for an amount of time,” which is described directly above as “a
selected time period.” We also note that this passage from Voris confirms
the Examiner’s conclusion that Voris discloses that the mechanism inhibits
movement of the movable surface in a direction caused by an external force
while permitting uninhibited movement of the movable surface in the
opposite direction. See also Voris, col. 4, ll. 55-61 (“A device in accordance
with the invention will only apply a resistance to the movement of a
particular lifting mechanism in that direction which will result in the
application of a positive resistance to the movement of that particular lifting
mechanism . . . .”) (emphasis added).
We do not agree with the Examiner’s alternative finding that the
frame of the machine is a mechanism that inhibits movement of the bar, for
example, in the instance when the user pushes the bar to its upper limit,
because the Examiner has not provided support that Voris discloses that the
mechanism does so for an amount of time, as claimed.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that Voris does not
disclose “the use or need of a timer” or that “[t]he reversal of the Voris
mechanism, the changing of the gears, or numerous other factors are likely
to be the cause of any alleged delay when [the] Voris’ device reduces the
resistance over a period of time[,]”—or even that “[n]owhere is it . . .
implied in Voris that a timer is determining any amount of time as in the
present invention.” Br. 27. When relying on the theory of inherency, an
examiner has the initial burden of providing a basis in fact and/or technical
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reasoning to reasonably support the determination that the allegedly inherent
characteristic reasonably flows from the teachings of the applied prior art.
See In re King, 801 F.2d 1324, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 1986). We are persuaded
that the Examiner has provided sufficient facts to support that a timer must
necessarily be used to determine the amount of time that the movement of
the movable surface disclosed in Voris is inhibited, because Voris describes
that the time period wherein the movable surface is inhibited begins when
the user fails to continue moving the bar in the positive resistance direction
and ends when a period of time greater than a given threshold time limit is
reached. Voris, col. 5, ll. 11-24. We are also persuaded by the Examiner’s
finding that gears may be considered a timer as claimed. Ans. 21. Voris
further describes such an amount of time as “a selected period of time,” “a
defined lapse of time,” “a pre-defined lapse of time,” “a defined period of
time,” and “a prescribed period of time.” Voris, col. 3, ll. 13-17; col. 8, ll.
52-60; col. 11, ll. 31-37; claims 11, 12, 15, and 16. We agree with the
Examiner’s reasoning that such an amount of time is inherently determined
by a timer.
For the above reasons, Appellant’s arguments do not apprise us of
error in the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1. Thus, we sustain the rejection
of claim 1 and of dependent claims 2-5, 25, 28, 29, 30-32, and 35, for which
Appellant does not present separate arguments and which thus fall with
claim 1, as being anticipated by Voris. See Br. 24; 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(vii) (2011).
Regarding claim 37, which claims a kit, and in view of our agreement
with the Examiner’s finding that Voris teaches uninhibited movement of the
movable surface in the opposite direction to the external force, we further
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agree with the Examiner’s reasoning that Voris anticipates claim 37 by
disclosing the same components that perform the same functions. Ans. 22.
Appellant does not present a reasonably specific argument explaining how
the “kit comprising parts,” as claimed in claim 37, is distinguished from the
components of the machine disclosed in Voris.
Regarding claim 38, in addition to the findings and reasoning above,
we agree with the Examiner’s findings that Voris discloses a sensing
mechanism, namely, an encoder, which determines the position of the
movable surface and relays a signal to a microprocessor, which inherently
includes a timer for signaling a halting effector mechanism, such as a brake,
which can inhibit movement of the movable surface in one direction. Ans.
8, 22-24.
Appellant has not shown error in the Examiner's determination that
Voris anticipates the subject matter of claims 37 and 38. Accordingly, we
sustain the Examiner’s anticipation rejection of claims 37 and 38.

C. Claims 24, 26, 27, and 33 – Obviousness over Voris and Schneider
Appellant argues that Schneider is not prior art because Schneider was
filed on December 18, 2005, whereas the present application was filed on
August 15, 2005. Br. 31. Appellant has not, however, rebutted the
Examiner’s finding that the subject matter disclosed in Schneider and relied
upon to reject claims 24, 26, 27, and 33 (specifically, the abstract and
paragraph 38), was also disclosed in the parent application, U.S. Patent
Application Serial No. 10/153,943, filed on May 22, 2002, which in turn was
filed with the benefit of U.S. Provisional Patent Application No. 60/293,359
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filed on May 24, 2001. Ans. 24. Therefore, we adopt the Examiner’s
finding as our own.
Appellant further argues that “the combination of both references
cannot render the present invention obvious since neither reference
possess[es] all the element[s] of the claims in dispute, such as a timer . . . .”
Br. 34. This argument is not convincing, because, as discussed above, we
agree with the Examiner’s finding that Voris discloses, either explicitly or
inherently, a timer as called for in claim 1. Accordingly, we sustain the
Examiner’s obviousness rejection of claims 24, 26, 27, and 33.

D. Claims 6, 9, 12, and 18 – Obviousness over Voris and Burrell
Claims 9, 12, and 18 depend directly or indirectly from claim 6, and
Appellant has not asserted arguments regarding the specific limitations for a
halting effector mechanism as set forth in claims 9, 12, and 18. Thus, we
decide the appeal of this rejection on the basis of claim 6. 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(vii) (2011). Claim 6, which incorporates the limitations of
claims 1-5, requires that the sensing mechanism comprises, inter alia, a snap
action sensor switch.
Appellant argues that “an element in all the claims rejected above is a
timer, which controls the amount of time the movable surface is inhibited.”
Br. 35-36. Appellant disagrees with the Examiner’s finding that a timer is
inherently disclosed in Voris. Id. Appellant further argues that although
Burrell mentions several sensors (including a snap action switch), “[t]hese
switches and sensors are relevant to the Burrell disclosure and do not
suggest . . . to combine this reference with anything of the present invention
. . . .” Br. 36-37.
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The Examiner finds that “Voris teaches a position sensor” and that
Burrell “teaches that different types of sensors can be used such as positions
sensors and snap action sensors along with some other types of sensors (col.
4 lines 1-9) to carry out the same function.” Ans. 25. The Examiner
concludes that “[i]t would have been obvious to substitute one position
sensor with another sensor to provide the same predictable results.” Id.
In view of our agreement with the Examiner’s findings regarding the
disclosures of Voris, we also agree with the Examiner’s conclusion of
obviousness, because “when a patent claims a structure already known in the
prior art that is altered by mere substitution of one element for another
known in the field, the combination must do more than yield a predictable
result.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416 (2007).
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of claims 6, 9,
12, and 18.

E. Claims 7, 10, 13, and 19 – Obviousness over Voris and Moser
Claims 10, 13, and 19 depend directly or indirectly from claim 7, and
Appellant has not asserted arguments regarding the specific limitations for a
halting effector mechanism as set forth in claims 10, 13, and 19. Thus, we
decide the appeal of this rejection on the basis of claim 7. 37 C.F.R. §
41.37(c)(1)(vii) (2011). Claim 7, which incorporates the limitations of
claims 1-5, requires that the sensing mechanism comprises, inter alia, an
opto interrupter sensor and means to activate the sensor. The Examiner
finds, inter alia, that “it is known to one [of] ordinary skill in the art that a
sensor can be used in different scenarios to detect different parameters[,]”
and that “the opto-interrupter of Moser can be interchangeable with the
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encoder of Voris to provide the same function.” Ans. 27. We note that the
encoder in Voris interfaces with a microprocessor, which controls the
amount of resistance being exerted by the brake, in response to information
provided by the encoder concerning the relative position of the bar. Voris,
col. 5, ll. 48-56.
Appellant argues, inter alia, that “the opto sensor of [Moser] does not
communicate any direction of movement unlike the encoder in Voris and
therefore cannot be interchanged with Voris’ encoder.” Br. 40-42. The
Appellant also argues that “there is no motivation to combine the teachings
of a unipedal apparatus [of Moser] with the apparatus of Voris.” Br. 41-42.
Appellant again contends that Voris does not disclose a timer, inherent or
otherwise, as required by claim 1. Ans. 41.
We are persuaded by the Examiner that Moser describes using optical
encoder disks to provide optical data to on-board electronics for controlling
resistance in an exercise machine, and it would be obvious to modify the
position encoder disclosed in Voris accordingly. We note that Voris
provides a reason to combine the references by suggesting that “[w]hile any
suitable type of mechanism which can sense the rotational position of the
[movable member] may be utilized . . . , it has been found particularly
advantageous to utilize an optical encoder . . . .” Voris, col. 7, ll. 39-45. In
view of our agreement with the Examiner’s findings regarding the
disclosures of Voris, we also agree with the Examiner’s conclusion of
obviousness. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection
of claims 7, 10, 13, and 19.

F. Claims 8, 11, 14, and 20 – Obviousness Voris and Capuano
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Claims 11, 14, and 20 depend directly or indirectly from claim 8, and
Appellant has not asserted arguments regarding the specific limitations for a
halting effector mechanism as set forth in claims 11, 14, and 20. Thus, we
decide the appeal of this rejection on the basis of claim 8. 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(vii) (2011). Claim 8, which incorporates the limitations of
claims 1-5, requires that the sensing mechanism comprises, inter alia, a bar
code reader and a processor and means to activate the reader. The Examiner
finds that “it is within [the knowledge of] one [of] ordinary skill in the art to
substitute one sensor for another, [and] in this case[,] [to] substitute the
encoder [disclosed in Voris] with a barcode reader [as disclosed in
Capuano,] since they both can serve the same purpose and produce the same
predictable result.” Ans. 28. Appellant, however, argues “that the bar code
system in Capuano does not recognize a distan[ce] travelled by a movable
surface and thus does not render obvious the use of a bar code system for
such purpose.” Br. 45. Appellant also contends that Voris does not disclose
a timer. Br. 46.
We note that Capuano discloses using a bar code system specifically
for the purpose of recognizing a distance traveled by a movable surface, at
least indirectly, by describing “[o]ptional progression bar-code readers 22
[that] record the weights passing upwards and downwards” . . . “and [a]
peak-lift bar-code reader 26 [that] ensures [a] user has completed a lift.”
Capuano, p. 5, para. [0053], fig. 5. In view of our agreement with the
Examiner’s findings regarding the disclosures of Voris, and the Examiner’s
finding and reasoning above, we also agree with the Examiner’s conclusion
of obviousness. Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claims 8, 11, 14,
and 20.
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G. Claims 15 and 21 – Obviousness over Voris, Burrell and Whipps
Claim 21 depends directly from claim 15, and Appellant has not
asserted arguments regarding the specific limitations for a halting effector
mechanism as set forth in claim 21. Thus, we decide the appeal of this
rejection on the basis of claim 15. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii) (2011).
Claim 15, which incorporates the limitations of claims 1-6, requires that the
halting effector mechanism comprise a solenoid and a retractable pin.
Appellant argues that “one skilled in the art would not be motivated to
combine the references proposed by the Examiner since Boyd pertains to an
apparatus for controlling the movement of an electronic image on a video
display, Voris to a bi-directional varying resistance exercise device, and
finally, Whipps pertains to the selection of weights.” Br. 50. Appellant
states: “Further, . . . [this] combination lack[s] all the elements of the
rejected claims such as a timer . . . .” Id.
The Examiner notes that a typographical error was made in that Boyd
has not been relied upon for rejecting claims 15 and 21, but rather Burrell
has been applied to address the limitations of claim 6 (see above), from
which claims 15 and 21 depend. The Examiner finds that “Voris teaches
each and every element of claim 1[,] Burrell has only been relied upon to
teach another type of sensor [namely, a snap action sensor], and Whipps has
been used to teach a solenoid and a retractable pin as a halting effector
mechanism.” Ans. 14, 28. Whipps discloses the use of solenoid operated
pin controllers to adjust the resistance applied by an exercise machine based
upon a signal representative of a user’s momentary muscle failure. Whipps,
col. 2, ll 17-22. The Examiner reasons that “Voris already teaches a halting
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effector mechanism which is a brake, and it is within [the knowledge of] one
[of] ordinary skill in the art to substitute one type of a halting effector
mechanism/resistance device with another such as a solenoid and a pin.”
Ans. 28.
In view of our agreement with the Examiner’s findings regarding the
disclosures of Voris, and findings and reasoning regarding the combination
of Voris, Burrell and Whipps, we also agree with the Examiner’s conclusion
of obviousness. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s obviousness
rejection of claims 15 and 21.

H. Claims 16 and 22 – Obviousness over Voris, Moser, and Whipps
Claim 22 depends directly from claim 16, and Appellant has not
asserted arguments regarding the specific limitations for a halting effector
mechanism as set forth in claim 22. Thus, we decide the appeal of this
rejection on the basis of claim 16. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii) (2011).
Claim 16, which incorporates the limitations of claims 1-5 and 7, requires
that the halting effector mechanism comprise a solenoid and a retractable
pin.
In view of our agreement with the Examiner’s conclusion of
obviousness as stated with respect to claims 15 and 21 above, we also agree
with the Examiner’s conclusion of obviousness with respect to claims 16 and
22. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of claims
16 and 22.

I. Claims 17 and 23 under 103(a) over Voris, Capuano and Whipps
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Claim 23 depends directly from claim 17, and Appellant has not
asserted arguments regarding the specific limitations for a halting effector
mechanism as set forth in claim 23. Thus, we decide the appeal of this
rejection on the basis of claim 17. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii) (2011).
Claim 17, which incorporates the limitations of claims 1-5 and 8, requires
that the halting effector mechanism comprise a solenoid and a retractable
pin.
In view of our agreement with the Examiner’s conclusion of
obviousness as stated with respect to claims 15, 16, 21, and 22 above, we
also agree with the Examiner’s conclusion of obviousness with respect to
claims 17 and 23, and accordingly, sustain the Examiner’s obviousness
rejection of claims 17 and 23.

J. Claims 31 and 34 under 103(a) over Voris and Rexach
Appellant argues that “the combination of both references cannot
render the present invention obvious since neither reference possess[es] all
the element[s] of the claims in dispute, such as a timer . . . .” Br. 57.
Appellant further argues that “Rexach discloses an exercise apparatus with
more versatility and highly compact storage[,]” but that “[i]t does not
disclose the present invention.” However, Appellant does not identify any
specific missing claim elements except for the timer.
In view of our agreement with the Examiner’s findings regarding the
disclosures of Voris, we also agree with the Examiner’s conclusion of
obviousness. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection
of claims 31 and 34.

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DECISION
A. The Examiner’s decision rejecting claim 36 is reversed.
B. The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1-5, 25, 28-32, 35,
37, and 38 is affirmed.
C. The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 24, 26, 27, and 33 is
affirmed.
D. The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 6, 9, 12, and 18 is
affirmed.
E. The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 7, 10, 13, and 19 is
affirmed.
F. The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 8, 11, 14, and 20 is
affirmed.
G. The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 15 and 21 is affirmed.
H. The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 16 and 22 is affirmed.
I. The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 17 and 23 is affirmed.
J. The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 31 and 34 is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a).
AFFIRMED-IN-PART

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