Ex Parte Hogue et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Dec 5, 2016

11537493 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 5, 2016)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
11/537,493 09/29/2006 Andrew Hogue 16113-126001 1501
26192 7590 12/07/2016
FISH & RICHARDSON P.C.
PO BOX 1022
MINNEAPOLIS, MN 55440-1022
EXAMINER
CHANNAVAJJALA, SRIRAMA T
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2157
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/07/2016 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
PATDOCTC@fr.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte ANDREW HOGUE, JEFF REYNAR, MICHAEL GORDON,
DAVID VESPE, and DAVID PETROU
Appeal 2015-004016
Application 11/537,493
Technology Center 2100
Before CAROLYN D. THOMAS, DANIEL N. FISHMAN, and
KARA L. SZPONDOWSKI, Administrative Patent Judges.
THOMAS, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants seek our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the
Examiner’s Final Rejection of claims 20, 22, 23, 25, 27—34, 51, 53, 54, 56—
58, 60-63, and 65—69, all the pending claims in the present application.
Claims 1—19, 21, 24, 26, 35—50, 52, 55, 59, and 64 are canceled. See Claim
Appendix. We have jurisdiction over the appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
Appeal 2015-004016
Application 11/537,493
The present invention relates generally to retrieving a set of search
results having at least one associated location. See Abstract.
Claim 20 is illustrative:
20. A computer-implemented method comprising:
receiving, by a device, a search query that does not
specify a geographic location;
identifying, by the device and based on the search
query, at least one document,
the at least one document including content
describing at least one historical event that is related to the
search query,
the content of the at least one document specifying
at least one geographic location associated with the at least one
historical event;
identifying, by the device, the at least one
geographic location based on extracting location information
included in the content of the at least one document;
generating, by the device and based on the
identified at least one geographic location, a map including the
identified at least one geographic location and including a
respective marker that identifies each respective geographic
location, of the at least one geographic location, on the map;
and
providing, by the device and for display, a
document that includes the map and links to query results
associated with the search query,
each query result, of the query results, being
associated with a respective indicator, and
each respective marker including the respective
indicator.
Appellants appeal the following rejection:
Claim 20, 22, 23, 25, 27-34, 51, 53, 54, 56-58, 60-63, and 65-69 are
rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Dimitrova (US
2
Appeal 2015-004016
Application 11/537,493
2007/0124304 Al, May 31, 2007) and Celik (US 2007/0100802 Al, May 3,
2007).
ANALYSIS
Claims 20, 22, 25, 27-24, 51, 53, 57, 58, 60-63, and 65-69
Issue 1: Did the Examiner err in finding that Dimitrova and Celik
collectively teach or suggest a search query that does not specify a
geographic location, as set forth in representative claim 20?
Appellants contend “claim[] 20 recites ‘providing . . . links to query
results associated with the search query’ that ‘does not specify a geographic
location.’ CELIK clearly disclose using ‘geographic information,’ entered
via ‘location box 314,’ to determine listings 204, 206 for the ‘given
location’” (App. Br. 9—10).
The Examiner finds that “the cited prior art of Dimitrova et al. is
directed to retrieving information, more specifically using [a] portable
information system . . . capable of retrieving information located in various
geographically locations [sic] such as images, famous landmark as detailed
in para 0033” (Ans. 5—6; see also Final Act. 3). We agree with the
Examiner.
Appellants’ arguments do not take into account what the collective
teachings of the prior art would have suggested to one of ordinary skill in the
art and is therefore ineffective to rebut the Examiner’s prima facie case of
obviousness. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981) (“The test
for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be
bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference; nor is it that
the claimed invention must be expressly suggested in any one or all of the
3
Appeal 2015-004016
Application 11/537,493
references. Rather, the test is what the combined teachings of the references
would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art.”) (citations
omitted). This reasoning is applicable here because Appellants direct our
attention to Celik’s teachings, yet the Examiner’s findings are directed to
Dimitrova.
For example, the Examiner finds that Dimitrova, not Celik, teaches a
search parameter may be a picture, such as a picture of a landmark (see Final
Act. 3). Specifically, Dimitrova discloses “[t]he user then enters a command
to CPU 105 via one of the user input units 145 to tell CPU 105 that the
picture of the landmark is a search parameter. The user then commands
CPU 105 to perform a search for information relating to the landmark in the
picture” (133). In other words, Dimitrova teaches a search query that does
not specify a geographic location, i.e., a picture. Appellants’
aforementioned contentions fail to rebut this specific finding of Dimitrova.
Appellants further contend that “the Examiner’s basis for combining
DIMITROVA et al. and CELIK is based on impermissible hindsight. . . .
there is no teaching or suggestion in DIMITROVA et al. . . . to include a
map feature” (App. Br. 10-11). We find Appellants’ argument unavailing.
“[AJnalysis [of whether the subject matter of a claim would have been
obvious] need not seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject
matter of the challenged claim, for a court can take account of the inferences
and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.”
KSRInt’l, Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007) (quotingIn re
Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 C.A. Fed. 2006); see also DyStar Textilfarben
GmbH & Co. Deutschland KG v. C.H. Patrick Co. 464 F.3d 1356, 1361
(C.A. Fed. 2006) (“The motivation need not be found in the references
4
Appeal 2015-004016
Application 11/537,493
sought to be combined, but may be found in any number of sources,
including common knowledge, the prior art as a whole, or the nature of the
problem itself.”)
The Examiner finds that “Celik teaches displaying search results
along with the geographical location map” (Ans. 7) and that it would have
been obvious to modify Dimitrova’s method with Celik’s “to achieve the
predictable results of displaying search results including map features
indicating various geographical location^]” (id. at 8). We point out that
“[a]ny judgment on obviousness is in a sense necessarily a reconstruction
based upon hindsight reasoning, but so long as it takes into account only
knowledge which was within the level of ordinary skill at the time the
claimed invention was made and does not include knowledge gleaned only
from applicant's disclosure, such a reconstruction is proper.” In re
McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392, 1395 (CCPA 1971). Here, the Examiner has
identified knowledge in both Dimitrova and Celik.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 20.
Appellants’ arguments regarding the Examiner’s rejection of independent
claims 51 and 62 rely on the same arguments as for claim 20, and Appellants
do not argue separate patentability for the dependent claims (except as noted
below). See App. Br. 7—12. We, therefore, also sustain the Examiner’s
rejection of claims 22, 25, 27—34, 51, 53, 57, 58, 60—63, and 65—69.
Claim 23
Issue 2: Did the Examiner err in finding that Dimitrova and Celik
collectively teach or suggest a description of the at least one historical event
is provided, for display, with the query results, as set forth in claim 23?
5
Appeal 2015-004016
Application 11/537,493
Appellants contend that “DIMITROVA et al. merely ‘displays the
results of the search to the user’ and does not also provide a ‘description of
the at least one historical event’ with ‘the results’” (App. Br. 13).
The Examiner finds that Dimitrova “strongly supports ‘historical
information concerning the landmark including maps that shows the area
surrounding the landmarks” (Ans. 9, citing Dimitrova 140). We agree with
the Examiner.
For example, Dimitrova discloses that the “Web information
extraction software 118 may obtain historical information concerning the
landmark. The historical information may be in the form of... a text
presentation. . . . may also comprise maps that show the location of
historical events that occurred near the landmark” (| 40). In other words,
Dimitrova clearly provides a description and the location of historical events
with the landmarks, i.e., query results. Thus, we find unavailing Appellants’
contention that Dimitrova does not provide a description of historical events.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 23.
Claims 54 and 56
Issue 3: Did the Examiner err in finding that Dimitrova and Celik
collectively teach or suggest information specifying the at least one
geographic location based on the information relating to the person, as set
forth in claim 54 and similarly set forth in claim 56?
Appellants contend that “[n]o ‘geographic location’ is specified in
DIMITROVA et al. based on ‘information relating to a person’ that is
included in ‘at least one document’ that is identified based on receiving ‘a
6
Appeal 2015-004016
Application 11/537,493
search query that does not specify a geographic location’” (App. Br. 14; see
also id. at 15).
The Examiner finds that “Dimitrova supports search result [and] web
document [that] contains historical building information identifying the
builder or the architect in addition to the history of the building [and the]
geographical location” (Ans. 9, citing Dimitrova 141). We agree with the
Examiner.
For example, Dimitrova discloses that “a search result for a building
may contain information that sets forth . . . the identity of the builder or
architect. . . and the locations from which the information has been
extracted can be part of the search service” (141). We find that the claimed
at least one geographic location based on the information relating to the
person reads on Dimitrova’s precise location of a building and the identity
of the builder or architect of that building. Thus, we find unavailing
Appellants’ contention that in Dimitrova there is no geographic location
specified based on information relating to a person that is associated with the
search query.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 54 and 56.
DECISION
We affirm the Examiner’s § 103(a) rejection of claims 20, 22, 23, 25,
27-34, 51, 53, 54, 56-58, 60-63, and 65-69.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED
7