Ex Parte Hind et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Feb 6, 2014

11350416 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 6, 2014)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
__________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
__________

Ex parte JOHN R. HIND, YONGCHENG LI,
and STEVEN W. POGUE
__________

Appeal 2011-004713
Application 11/350,416
Technology Center 2100
__________

Before DONALD E. ADAMS, LORA M. GREEN, and
JEFFREY N. FREDMAN, Administrative Patent Judges.

FREDMAN, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
This is an appeal1 under 35 U.S.C. § 134 involving claims to a method
of managing a web site that includes dynamic protected data. The Examiner
rejected the claims as obvious. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We reverse.

1 Appellants identify the Real Party in Interest as IBM Corporation
(see App. Br. 3).
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Statement of the Case
Background
“[T]he invention enables public data for a web site, including dynamic
public data, to be processed by a searching system and indexed by a search
site, while also enabling dynamic protected data to be presented to a user
after authentication” (Spec. 3 ¶ 0007).
The Claims
Claims 1, 3, 4, and 10-20 are on appeal. Claim 1 is representative and
reads as follows:
1. A method of managing a web site that includes
dynamic protected data, the method comprising:
receiving, at a computing device, a request for a web
page from a requesting system;
identifying, by the computing device, whether the
requesting system is a browser system;
obtaining a public web page using the at least one
computing device in response to the requesting system not
being identified as a browser system, wherein the public
web page includes dynamic public data and does not include
dynamic protected data;
providing the public web page for processing by the
requesting system using the at least one computing device in
response to the requesting system not being identified as a
browser system.

The issues
A. The Examiner rejected claims 1, 4, 10, 15, and 20 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as obvious over Najork2 and Shah3 (Ans. 4-5).

2 Najork, M., US 2003/0131048 A1, published Jul. 10, 2003.
3 Shah et al., US 2006/0242137 A1, published Oct. 26, 2006.
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B. The Examiner rejected claims 3, 11, and 16 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as obvious over Najork, Shah, and Mikami4 (Ans. 5-6).
C. The Examiner rejected claims 12, 13, 17, and 18 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as obvious over Najork, Shah, and Pearson5 (Ans. 6-7).
D. The Examiner rejected claims 8, 9, 14, and 19 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as obvious over Najork, Shah, Pearson, and Mikami (Ans. 7-8).
A. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Najork and Shah
The Examiner finds that
Najork discloses a method of managing a web site that
includes dynamic protected data, the method comprising:
receiving a request for a web page from a requesting
system at one or more computing devices (Figure 5, items
510 and 520)
determining if the requesting system can be identified
as a browser system using the at least one computing device
(paragraphs 0006-0009, 0040, and 0047: Here, the server
determines if the request is a request generated by a
browser)
obtaining a public web page using the at least one
computing device in response to the requesting system not
identified as a browser (paragraph 0033: Here, when the
requesting system is determined to have come from a search
engine, and not a browser, a default webpage is provided)

(Ans. 4). The Examiner finds that “Najork fails to specifically disclose
wherein the public webpage does not include dynamic protected data and
providing the public web page for processing by the requesting system using

4 Mikami, Y., US 2004/0034799 A1, published Feb. 19, 2004.
5 Pearson et al., US 2006/0218629 A1, published Sept. 28, 2006.
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the at least one computing device in response to the requesting system not
being identified as a browser system” (Ans. 4).
The Examiner finds that Shah discloses “a crawler, which is not a
browser, retrieves dynamic public pages during the crawl” (id. at 4-5). The
Examiner finds it obvious to “have combined Shah with Najork, since it
would have allowed a user to retrieve a default dynamic page for analysis”
(id. at 5).
The issue with respect to this rejection is: Does the evidence of record
support the Examiner’s conclusion that Najork and Shah render the claims
obvious?
Findings of Fact
1. Najork teaches “a search engine receiving from a client a
representation of a first object that was returned by a web server to the client
in response to a request from the client” (Najork 2 ¶ 0015).
2. Najork teaches that “Web servers are able to identify the
program (i.e., a web crawler/search engine or a user’s web browser) that
emitted a request (e.g., an HTTP request) for a particular object by reference
to content of the request” (Najork 1 ¶ 0003).
3. Najork teaches a table with “the USER_AGENT field, which
identifies the program that emitted the request. In this example,
‘Mozilla/4.71’ and the remaining text identifies the program as a Netscape®
web browser. Note that web browsers are typically associated with users, not
search engines” (Najork 1 ¶ 0006).
4. Najork teaches that the URLs which are stored in “web servers
220 do not specify a hierarchical description of an object or object location
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on a web server 50, which are typically configured to provide a default
object when a hierarchical description of an object or object location are not
included in an object request” (Najork 3 ¶ 0033).
5. Figure 5 of Najork is reproduced below:

“FIG. 5 illustrates steps used to implement a preferred embodiment of the
present invention” (Najork 2 ¶ 0022).
6. Shah teaches that:
[E]very logical resource in the schematized store is modeled
as a document that the search engine can crawl and index. In
the sharing system discussed above, if the individual user
decides to share a profile, that profile may be modeled as a
document. When the data store returns a document for any
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resources that were newly created or modified, the data store
actually outputs every page, object, and field as a separate
unique HTML file that the search engine can crawl. Pages
are not necessarily real or viewable public pages, but are
built on the fly and for the instance that the item is being
crawled.

(Shah 4 ¶ 0044.)
Principles of Law
“In proceedings before the Patent and Trademark Office, the
Examiner bears the burden of establishing a prima face case of obviousness
based upon the prior art.” In re Fritch, 972 F.2d 1260, 1265 (Fed. Cir.
1992).
Moreover, “obviousness requires a suggestion of all limitations in a
claim.” CFMT, Inc. v. Yieldup Int’l Corp., 349 F.3d 1333, 1342 (Fed. Cir.
2003).
Analysis
Appellants contend that they were unable to identify a teaching that
“‘the public web page includes dynamic public data and does not include
dynamic protected data.’ Shah makes no mention of dynamic protected data.
Thus, Shah cannot teach not providing dynamic protected data. Therefore,
the Examiner has again improperly determined the scope and content of the
prior art” (App. Br. 10).
The Examiner disagrees, and finds that “Shah is directed toward
allowing a web crawler, which is not a browser, to access and catalog
dynamic pages” (Ans. 9). The Examiner finds that “[p]ages that are built on
demand by accessing and incorporating data stored in a relational data store
constitute a dynamic web page, as the page is generate [sic] based upon a
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request from a web browser” (Ans. 9). The Examiner finds that “the
applicant’s argument that Shah is unrelated to dynamic data is not
persuasive” (id.).
We find that Appellants have the better position. Independent claims
1, 10, and 15 all are drawn to systems for managing web sites which include
“dynamic protected data” and each claim incorporates a requirement that the
“public web page includes dynamic public data and does not include
dynamic protected data” (see, e.g., claim 1). In the initial rejection, the
Examiner acknowledges that “Najork fails to specifically disclose wherein
the public webpage does not include dynamic protected data” and relies
upon Shah for this element. (Ans. 4.)
However, the Examiner has not explained how Shah teaches the
specific terms of the claims, which require that the web site “includes
dynamic protected data” but “wherein the public web page . . . does not
include dynamic protected data” (see, e.g., claim 1). The Examiner states
that “Shah discloses wherein the default webpage does not include dynamic
protected data” (Ans. 4), but does not explain how paragraph 44 of Shah
teaches or suggests the absence of dynamic protected data as required by the
claims.
Indeed, the Examiner states that “Shah discloses the web crawler
modeling each dynamic web page as a document, which can be crawled and
indexed” (Ans. 9). The intent of claim 1, however, is to exclude dynamic
protected data from the public web page, not to incorporate such data. The
Examiner does not explain where either Najork or Shah teach or suggest
excluding dynamic protected data from the public web page, in a web site
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which positively contains such dynamic protected data. We therefore are
constrained to reverse this rejection as failing to address all of the limitations
of the claims.
Conclusion of Law
The evidence of record does not support the Examiner’s conclusion
that Najork and Shah render the claims obvious.
B.-D. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
These rejections rely upon the underlying obviousness rejection over
Najork and Shah. Having reversed the rejection of independent claims 1, 10,
and 15, we necessarily reverse these obviousness rejections further including
Mikami and Pearson, since the Examiner does not rely upon these references
to address the issue of dynamic protected data as discussed above.
SUMMARY
In summary, we reverse the rejection of claims 1, 4, 10, 15, and 20
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over Najork and Shah.
We reverse the rejection of claims 3, 11, and 16 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as obvious over Najork, Shah, and Mikami.
We reverse the rejection of claims 12, 13, 17, and 18 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as obvious over Najork, Shah, and Pearson.
We reverse the rejection of claims 8, 9, 14, and 19 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as obvious over Najork, Shah, Pearson, and Mikami.

REVERSED

cdc