Ex Parte Hill

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

Nov 5, 2008

11160024 (B.P.A.I. Nov. 5, 2008)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
__________

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES
__________

Ex parte DIANE S. HILL
__________

Appeal 2008-5238
Application 11/160,024
Technology Center 3700
__________

Decided: November 5, 2008
__________

Before ERIC GRIMES, RICHARD M. LEBOVITZ, and FRANCISCO C.
PRATS, Administrative Patent Judges.

PRATS, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
This is an appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134 involving claims to a board
game apparatus and methods of playing a board game. The Examiner has
rejected the claims as anticipated and obvious. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm.

Appeal 2008-5238
Application 11/160,024

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Claims 1-3, 5-14, and 16-22 stand finally rejected and are on appeal
(App. Br. 3).1 Claim 1 is representative and reads as follows:
1. A game board apparatus, comprising:
a board comprising a grid of multiple rows and multiple
columns of playing spaces in a fixed area;
a set of individual game pieces, wherein each individual
game piece comprises at least a first predetermined
characteristic and a second predetermined characteristic such
that none of the individual game pieces comprise an identical
first predetermined characteristic and an identical second
predetermined characteristic as any other of the individual game
pieces of the set, the first predetermined characteristic and the
second predetermined characteristic are not of a same group,
and the number of individual game pieces in the set is equal to a
number of playing spaces on the board;
each of the individual game pieces is positioned on the
board such that each of the individual game pieces singly
occupies a related playing space; and
individual game pieces are positioned, exchanged with
other individual game pieces positioned on the board, or a
combination thereof, until one or more predetermined winning
configurations of game piece arrangements are evident on the
board.

The Examiner applies the following documents in rejecting the
claims:
Werner US 854,547 May 21, 1907
McMahon US 1,550,552 Aug. 18, 1925

The following rejections are before us for review:

1 Appeal Brief filed August 21, 2007.
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Claims 1-3, 5-14, and 16-22 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)
as being anticipated by McMahon (Ans. 3).2
Claims 1-3, 5-14, and 16-22 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as being obvious over Werner in view of McMahon (id. at 3-4).
ANTICIPATION
ISSUE
The Examiner cites McMahon as disclosing a game board having all
of the claimed limitations, including “a first set of game pieces with each
piece having a first predetermined characteristic (outer color), a second
characteristic (inner color) and the number of game pieces in each set being
equal to a number of game spaces” (Ans. 3). The Examiner contends that
McMahon teaches the “limitations of . . . game pieces having a first and
second characteristics from a different group of colors, a first group being
outer colors (orange, pink, brown, green) and a second group being inner
colors (white, blue, yellow, gray)” (id.).
Appellant contends that independent claims 1 and 12 require the game
pieces to “include two predetermined characteristics, a first and second, and
each of the first predetermined characteristic and the second predetermined
characteristic of each game piece are to be selected from a different group,
i.e., color, shape, size, or printed symbol” (App. Br. 11). Therefore,
Appellant argues, “if the first predetermined characteristic of a game piece
in the present invention is color, the second predetermined characteristic
cannot be color. Instead, the second predetermined characteristic is to be
chosen as shape, size, or printed symbol” (id.). Thus, Appellant contends,

2 The Examiner’s rejection statements include claim 15 (Ans. 3). However,
claim 15 has been canceled (see App. Br. 5).
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“[a]s the game pieces in McMahon only use colors for both the primary
distinguishing characteristic and the secondary distinguishing characteristic,
the primary distinguishing characteristic and the secondary distinguishing
characteristic of McMahon are of the same ‘group’” (id.).
Furthermore, Appellant argues, “according to claim 1, all the
individual game pieces are positioned on the board prior to the start of the
game at which point individual game pieces are exchanged with one
another's position on the game board” (id. at 13). In contrast, Appellant
contends, “[t]he game play taught by McMahon does not include placing the
all the game pieces on a game board and exchanging the game pieces
position with one another as claimed in the present invention” (id.).
Appellant does not argue any of the claims subject to this ground of
rejection separately. We select claim 1 as representative of the rejected
claims. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii).
The issue with respect to this rejection, then, is whether the Examiner
erred in finding that McMahon meets all of the limitations in claim 1, in
particular, the limitation requiring the game pieces to have two sets of
predetermined characteristics, in which “the first predetermined
characteristic and the second predetermined characteristic are not of a same
group,” and the limitations requiring the pieces to be placed on the board in
a specific configuration.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. McMahon discloses a puzzle game comprising a board and game
pieces, which in a preferred embodiment “includes sixteen chips or pieces
made from eight colors, two colors being placed on each chip (McMahon, p.
1, ll. 83-86; see also Figure 1). Figure 1 of McMahon, reproduced below,
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“is a plan view of the puzzle board, with the puzzle pieces in their position
when the puzzle is solved . . .” (id. at p. 1, ll. 26-28):

Figure 1 shows board 5 “having a checkered surface 6 forming rest
places for game pieces, which rest places are aligned in two directions . . . .
The particular form of board shown is of square form in plan and embodies
four rows of rest places with four rest places in each row” (McMahon, p. 1,
ll. 32-39).
2. McMahon discloses that the puzzle pieces “correspond[] in number to
the number of rest places on the surface of the board and embody[] a
plurality of groups of pieces, respectively designated by the characters ‘A’,
‘B’, ‘C’, and ‘D’” (McMahon, p. 1, ll. 40-45).
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3. McMahon discloses that the “pieces of each group have a similar
primary distinguishing characteristic 7, but the primary distinguishing
characteristic of one group is different from that of each of the other groups”
(McMahon, p. 1, ll. 53-57; see also Figure 1). Thus, in the preferred
embodiment, “the primary distinguishing characteristic of one group consists
of a border of green, another group having brown as its primary
distinguishing characteristic, still another employing pink, and still another
employing orange” (id. at p. 1, ll. 59-64).
4. McMahon discloses that a “secondary distinguishing characteristic is
also provided on each game piece, as at 8, and as shown these secondary
distinguishing characteristics are preferably in the nature of colored centers
provided on the game pieces” (McMahon, p. 1, ll. 65-70; see also Figure 1).
Thus, for example, with respect to group “A”, “the secondary characteristics
preferably embody colored centers on the game pieces, respectively white,
yellow, blue and gray” (id. at p. 1, ll. 78-82).
5. McMahon discloses that, because of the mixture of different border
and center colors, “no two of the game pieces of each groups are alike, and
that each secondary distinguishing characteristic of the pieces of one group
are similar to the secondary characteristic of one piece of each of the other
groups” (McMahon, p. 1, ll. 72-77).
6. McMahon discloses that “[t]he object of the puzzle is to so arrange the
game pieces [so] that there will be no two colors alike in any row, crosswise
or lengthwise, as shown in Figure 1” (McMahon, p. 1, ll. 90-93). Thus, the
objective can be attained by putting the game pieces “on the board at any
point desired, or by placing the pieces at random upon all the rest places
except one and then sliding the chips from one square to another without
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raising them from the board until they are in position as shown in Figure 1”
(id. at p. 1, ll. 94-100).
PRINCIPLES OF LAW
“To anticipate a claim, a prior art reference must disclose every
limitation of the claimed invention, either explicitly or inherently.” In re
Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473, 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1997). During examination, the
PTO must interpret terms in a claim using “the broadest reasonable meaning
of the words in their ordinary usage as they would be understood by one of
ordinary skill in the art, taking into account whatever enlightenment by way
of definitions or otherwise that may be afforded by the written description
contained in the applicant’s specification.” In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048,
1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
However, “while ‘the specification [should be used] to interpret the
meaning of a claim,’ courts must not ‘import[ ] limitations from the
specification into the claim.’ . . . [I]t is improper to ‘confin[e] the claims to
th[e] embodiments’ found in the specification . . . .” In re Trans Texas
Holdings Corp., 498 F.3d 1290, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (quoting Phillips v.
AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005), citations omitted,
bracketed text in internal quotes in original); see also Sjolund v. Musland,
847 F.2d 1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“[W]hile it is true that claims are to
be interpreted in light of the specification and with a view to ascertaining the
invention, it does not follow that limitations from the specification may be
read into the claims.”); In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(“Absent claim language carrying a narrow meaning, the PTO should only
limit the claim based on the specification . . . when [it] expressly disclaim[s]
the broader definition.”).
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ANALYSIS
We do not agree with Appellant that the Examiner erred in finding
that McMahon meets all of the limitations of claim 1.
Specifically, we agree with the Examiner that McMahon meets the
limitation requiring a board with multiple rows and multiple columns of
playing spaces in a fixed area (see FF 1). McMahon also discloses that,
because of the mixture of different border and center colors of its game
pieces, “no two of the game pieces of each groups are alike” (McMahon, p.
1, ll. 72-73 (FF 5)). Thus, as seen in Figure 1 (FF 1) none of the game
pieces has the same combination of border and center colors.
We therefore also agree with the Examiner that McMahon meets the
limitation in claim 1 requiring the set of individual game pieces to be
configured such that “each individual game piece comprises at least a first
predetermined characteristic and a second predetermined characteristic such
that none of the individual game pieces comprise an identical first
predetermined characteristic and an identical second predetermined
characteristic as any other of the individual game pieces of the set.”
McMahon also meets the limitation requiring the number of game pieces to
equal the number of spaces on the board (see FF 2).
As to the disputed limitations, McMahon discloses that its game
pieces are identified by two predetermined characteristics -- the border color
of the game pieces and the center color of the game pieces (FF 1 and 3-5).
None of the colors used to identify the first predetermined characteristic --
green, brown, pink, and orange (FF 3) -- is in the same group of colors used
to identify the second predetermined characteristic -- white, yellow, blue,
and gray (FF 4). Because the first predetermined characteristic of the game
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pieces in McMahon’s game is identified by a group of colors that is entirely
different from the group of colors that identifies the second predetermined
characteristic of the game pieces, we agree with the Examiner that
McMahon meets the limitation in claim 1 requiring the game pieces to have
“at least a first predetermined characteristic and a second predetermined
characteristic such that . . . the first predetermined characteristic and the
second predetermined characteristic are not of a same group.”
Appellant argues that “McMahon only teaches that the game pieces
have two distinguishing characteristics; both of which are only identified as
being color, that is, of the same group” (App. Br. 12). Thus, Appellant
argues “McMahon fails to describe each and every aspect of the presently
claimed invention in which the game pieces include first and second
predetermined characteristics which are to be selected from a different
group, i.e., color, shape, size, or printed symbol” (id. at 13).
Appellant’s arguments do not persuade us of error. While a claim
must be given its broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the
Specification, Morris, 127 F.3d at 1054, it is improper to read limitations
into the claims from the Specification. See Trans Texas Holdings Corp.,
498 F.3d at 1299; see also Sjolund, 847 F.2d at 1581; Bigio, 381 F.3d at
1325.
By its terms, claim 1 does not require the second predetermined
characteristic to be something other than color when the first predetermined
characteristic is color. Rather, claim 1 only requires the game pieces to have
“at least a first predetermined characteristic and a second predetermined
characteristic such that . . . the first predetermined characteristic and the
second predetermined characteristic are not of a same group.”
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Thus, we agree with the Examiner that one of ordinary skill in the art
giving claim 1 its broadest reasonable interpretation would have viewed
claim 1 as encompassing game pieces with two different predetermined
characteristics in which the characteristics are not in the same group.
Because the colors identifying the first predetermined characteristic -- green,
brown, pink, and orange (FF 3) -- are not in the same group of colors used to
identify the second predetermined characteristic -- white, yellow, blue, and
gray (FF 4) -- we agree with the Examiner that McMahon meets the
limitation at issue.
Appellant’s arguments also do not persuade us that the Examiner
erred in finding that McMahon meets the limitations in claim 1 directed to
the placement of the game pieces. Regarding placement of the game pieces,
claim 1 recites:
each of the individual game pieces is positioned on the
board such that each of the individual game pieces singly
occupies a related playing space; and
individual game pieces are positioned, exchanged with
other individual game pieces positioned on the board, or a
combination thereof, until one or more predetermined winning
configurations of game piece arrangements are evident on the
board.

McMahon discloses that the puzzle pieces “correspond[] in number to
the number of rest places on the surface of the board” (McMahon, p. 1, ll.
40-42), and in Figure 1 discloses that when pieces are placed in the puzzle’s
solved position, each piece singly occupies a playing space (FF 1; see also
FF 6). We therefore agree with the Examiner that McMahon meets the
limitation requiring each of the individual game pieces to be “positioned on
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the board such that each of the individual game pieces singly occupies a
related playing space.”
Appellant argues that, “according to claim 1, all the individual game
pieces are positioned on the board prior to the start of the game at which
point individual game pieces are exchanged with one another's position on
the game board” (App. Br. 13). We are not persuaded by this argument, nor
do we agree with Appellant’s statement.
The last-recited limitation in claim 1 is directed to how the game is to
be played, rather than any specific structural property. Claim 1, however, is
directed to an apparatus, and not a process of playing a game.
Thus, claim 1 does not require performing any process steps, much
less performing the actions in the last two paragraphs in the recited order.
Even assuming for argument’s sake, however, that the last paragraph of
claim 1 limits the structure to one capable of functioning as claimed, we do
not agree with Appellant that McMahon fails to meet this limitation.
Specifically, McMahon explicitly discloses that the game pieces are to
be placed “on the board at any point desired, or by placing the pieces at
random upon all the rest places except one and then sliding the chips from
one square to another without raising them from the board until they are in
position as shown in Figure 1” (McMahon, p. 1, ll. 94-100 (FF 6)). We
therefore agree with the Examiner that McMahon meets the limitation
requiring the “individual game pieces [to be] positioned, exchanged with
other individual game pieces positioned on the board, or a combination
thereof, until one or more predetermined winning configurations of game
piece arrangements are evident on the board.”
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Because we agree with the Examiner that McMahon meets all of the
limitations of claim 1, we affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 as
anticipated by McMahon. Because they were not argued separately from
claim 1, we also affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 2, 3, 5-14, and
16-22 over McMahon. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii).
OBVIOUSNESS
ISSUE
Claims 1-3, 5-14, and 16-22 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as being obvious over Werner in view of McMahon (Ans. 3-4).
The Examiner cites Werner as teaching a set of game pieces with each
piece having “a first predetermined characteristic (shapes), a second
characteristic (color) and the number of game pieces in each set being equal
to a number of game spaces. Werner also teaches each game piece having a
third characteristic (numerals). Werner also teaches arranging game pieces
on spaces to form designs” (id. at 3). The Examiner concedes that “Werner
does not teach a game board with spaces in rows and columns” and cites
McMahon to meet that limitation (id. at 4).
The Examiner finds that “[w]hereas experienced players can arrange
game pieces in a predetermined fixed number of rows and columns without
using a board others such as younger players find it difficult placing game
pieces in a proper arrangement” (id.). Therefore, the Examiner contends, to
“make placement of puzzle pieces in a predetermined rows and column
arrangement, it would have been obvious to provide a game board outlining
cells in rows and columns. McMahon solves the problem in Werner by
providing a game board of rows and columns for easy placement of game
pieces” (id.). The Examiner concludes that “[o]ne of ordinary skill in art at
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the time the invention was made would have suggested providing a game
board with rows and columns for placing game pieces” (id.).
Appellant contends that the Examiner’s conclusion of obviousness is
erroneous because, contrary to claim 1, Werner uses playing cards rather
than game pieces, and because Werner uses at least three characteristics
(App. Br. 15). Thus, Appellant contends:
Werner fails to teach or suggest the presently claimed invention
having “a set of individual game pieces, wherein each
individual game piece comprises at least a first predetermined
characteristic and a second predetermined characteristic such
that none of the individual game pieces comprise an identical
first predetermined characteristic and an identical second
predetermined characteristic as any other of the individual game
pieces of the set, the first predetermined characteristic and the
second predetermined characteristic are not of a same group,
and the number of individual game pieces in the set is equal to a
number of playing spaces on the board.”

(Id. at 15-16.) Appellant contends that “McMahon fails to remedy the
deficiencies of Warner” (id. at 16).
Appellant does not argue any of the claims subject to this ground of
rejection separately. We select claim 1 as representative of the rejected
claims. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii).
The issue with respect to this rejection, then, is whether the Examiner
made a prima facie case that one of ordinary skill would have considered
claim 1 obvious in view of Werner and McMahon.
FINDINGS OF FACT
7. Werner discloses a puzzle in the form of “cards for playing solitaire”
(Werner, ll. 9-10). Specifically, the puzzle is
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[A] deck of playing cards and consists of a number of cards,
numbered consecutively and arranged in sets or suits, each set
being formed by a number of cards, and each card being
provided with a colored design, preferably a geometrical figure,
the designs and their colors in a set being different, and the
colors of the same designs in the several sets being different.

(Id. at ll. 22-31.)
8. Werner discloses that to solve the puzzle all the cards in the deck must
be arranged in horizontal and vertical rows such that “each row contains the
same number of cards, that the aggregate amount of the numerals in each
horizontal, vertical and diagonal row is the same, and that the same design
and the same color do not appear more than once in the same row
horizontally, vertically or diagonally” (Werner, ll. 35-41).
9. The drawing in Werner, reproduced below, shows an embodiment in
which the deck consists of sixteen cards arranged to solve the puzzle (see
Werner, ll. 61-70):
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The drawing shows:
[T]he deck of playing cards consist[ing] of sixteen cards,
numbered consecutively from 1 to 16, and divided in sets or
suits, each set being formed of four cards, of which one is
provided on its face with the conventional figure of a star,
another contains the figure of a square, another that of a cross,
and the fourth the figure of a circle.

(Werner, ll. 42-50.)
10. Werner discloses:
Now four different colors are employed for coloring the
said designs, say one red, another green, another blue and
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another yellow, that is, the four stars are colored differently,
that is, one red, another blue, another green and the fourth
yellow; and in a like manner the four crosses, the four squares
and the four circles are colored red, green, blue and yellow, so
that the color is not repeated in the same geometrical figures.

(Werner, ll. 51-60.)
PRINCIPLES OF LAW
In proceedings before the Patent and Trademark Office,
the Examiner bears the burden of establishing a prima facie
case of obviousness based upon the prior art. “[The Examiner]
can satisfy this burden only by showing some objective
teaching in the prior art or that knowledge generally available to
one of ordinary skill in the art would lead that individual to
combine the relevant teachings of the references.”

In re Fritch, 972 F.2d 1260, 1265 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (citations omitted,
bracketed material in original). Thus, as the Supreme Court has pointed out,
“a patent composed of several elements is not proved obvious merely by
demonstrating that each of its elements was, independently, known in the
prior art.” KSR Int' l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1741 (2007).
While holding that some rationale must be supplied for a conclusion
of obviousness, in KSR the Court nonetheless rejected a “rigid approach” to
the obviousness question, and instead emphasized that “[t]hroughout this
Court’s engagement with the question of obviousness, our cases have set
forth an expansive and flexible approach . . . .” Id. at 1739. The Court also
rejected the use of “rigid and mandatory formulas” as being “incompatible
with our precedents.” Id. at 1741; see also 1742-43 (“Rigid preventative
rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense, however, are neither
necessary under our case law nor consistent with it.”).
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The Court thus reasoned that the analysis under 35 U.S.C. § 103 “need
not seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the
challenged claim, for a court can take account of the inferences and creative
steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.” Id. at 1741.
The Court further advised that “[a] person of ordinary skill is . . . a person of
ordinary creativity, not an automaton.” Id. at 1742.
Regarding hindsight reasoning, the Court stated that “[a] factfinder
should be aware, of course, of the distortion caused by hindsight bias and
must be cautious of arguments reliant upon ex post reasoning. Rigid
preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense, however,
are neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it.” Id. at 1742-
1743 (citations omitted).
ANALYSIS
We do not agree with Appellants that the Examiner failed to make a
prima facie case that one of ordinary skill in the art would have considered
claim 1 obvious in view of Werner and McMahon.
Rather, we agree with the Examiner that one of ordinary skill in the
art practicing Werner’s puzzle game, being a person of ordinary creativity
and common sense, see KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1742-43, would have reasonably
inferred that it would be desirable to include with the puzzle a board having
playing spaces to aid in arranging the cards in the configuration disclosed by
Werner as solving the puzzle (see FF 9). Because we agree with the
Examiner that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been prompted
to add a board, such as that disclosed by McMahon, to aid in playing
Werner’s game, we also agree that the Examiner has made a prima facie
case of obviousness with respect to claim 1.
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Appellant’s arguments do not persuade us of error. We note that
Werner’s game uses playing cards (see FF 7). However, it is well settled
that claims are to be given their broadest reasonable construction consistent
with the Specification. Morris, 127 F.3d at 1054. We do not agree with
Appellant that it is unreasonable to interpret the recitation “game piece” in
claim 1 as encompassing the playing cards of Werner since the cards are
single “pieces” utilized to play a “game.”
Nor do we agree that Werner fails to meet the limitations in claim 1
regarding the game pieces. Specifically, Werner discloses that, in its
embodiment using a sixteen card deck, a first predetermined characteristic,
shape (FF 9), is placed on each card, and a second predetermined
characteristic, color (FF 10), is also placed on each card. Moreover, because
the sixteen-card deck uses four different shapes along with four different
colors, Werner discloses that no card has the same combination of shape and
color on it (see FF 9, 10).
Thus, we agree with the Examiner that Werner meets claim 1’s
limitations that the individual game pieces comprise “at least a first
predetermined characteristic and a second predetermined characteristic such
that none of the individual game pieces comprise an identical first
predetermined characteristic and an identical second predetermined
characteristic as any other of the individual game pieces of the set.” Also,
because Werner uses predetermined characteristics that include color and
shape (FF 9, 10), we agree with the Examiner that Werner meets claim 1’s
limitation requiring the first predetermined characteristic and the second
predetermined characteristic to be “not of a same group.”
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Because we agree with the Examiner that one of ordinary skill would
have considered the game apparatus recited in claim 1 obvious in view of
Werner and McMahon, we affirm the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of
that claim over those references. Because they were not argued separately
from claim 1, we also affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 2, 3, 5-14,
and 16-22 over Werner and McMahon. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii).
SUMMARY
We affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1-3, 5-14, and 16-22
under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as being anticipated by McMahon.
We affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1-3, 5-14, and 16-22
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being obvious over Werner in view of
McMahon.

AFFIRMED

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