Ex parte Henze

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

Aug 31, 1998

08168805 (B.P.A.I. Aug. 31, 1998)

Application for patent filed December 15, 1993.1
1
Paper No. 14
THIS OPINION WAS NOT WRITTEN FOR PUBLICATION
The opinion in support of the decision being entered today
(1) was not written for publication in a law journal and
(2) is not binding precedent of the Board.
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_______________
BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES
_______________
Ex parte RICHARD H. HENZE
______________
Appeal No. 96-1209
Application 08/168,8051
_______________
ON BRIEF
_______________
Before KRASS, FLEMING and TORCZON, Administrative Patent
Judges.
KRASS, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
This is a decision on appeal from the final rejection of
claims 1, 2, 4 through 18 and 20. Claims 3 and 19 have been
canceled.
Appeal No. 96-1209
Application 08/168,805
2
The invention pertains to minimizing damage to disk
drives if and when the disk drive is dropped. More
particularly, shock-induced damage to the disk drive is
minimized by sensing net acceleration of the drive to
determine if it is similar to a
free falling object and then, if the acceleration so
indicates, determining if the net acceleration event occurs
for a sufficient amount of time to indicate that the drive is
falling, rather than merely being subjected to some external
vibration. If both the acceleration and time period test are
affirmative, action is taken to prepare the disk for imminent
collision.
Representative independent claim 11 is reproduced as
follows:
11. A disk drive comprising:
a housing;
at least one storage disk rotatably connected to the
housing to spin about an axis of rotation;
at least one actuator arm operably connected to the
housing to move relative to the storage disk and radially
position a read/write head across the storage disk;
an accelerometer device mounted within the housing to
measure acceleration of the disk drive as it falls along three
Appeal No. 96-1209
Application 08/168,805
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mutually orthogonal axes x, y, and z and to resolve the
measurement into respective vectors a , a , and a ;x y z
computational means for deriving a net acceleration a ofnet
the disk drive from the vectors a , a , and a ;x y z
evaluation means for comparing the net acceleration anet
with a selected acceleration threshold level indicative of a
falling disk drive and for outputting a first signal when the
net acceleration a exceeds the threshold level;net
timing means for measuring duration of the first signal
output by the evaluation means and for outputting a second
signal when the measured duration exceeds a selected reference
time period; and
control means for preparing, in response to the second
signal output by the timing means, at least one of the storage
disk and the actuator arm for a shock induced when the disk
drive impacts a surface at the second elevation.
The examiner relies on the following reference:
Comerford 5,227,929 July
13, 1993
Claims 11 through 15 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§§ 102(a) or (e) as anticipated by Comerford. Claims 1, 2, 4
through 10, 15 through 18 and 20 stand rejected under 35
U.S.C.
§ 103 as unpatentable over Comerford.
Reference is made to the brief and answer for the
respective positions of appellant and the examiner.
Appeal No. 96-1209
Application 08/168,805
4
OPINION
Turning first to the rejection of claims 11 through 15
under 35 U.S.C. § § 102(a) or (e), we will sustain this
rejection.
Appellant does not deny that Comerford discloses a disk
drive having a housing, a storage disk, an actuator arm,
accelerometer device, computational means, evaluation means
and
a control means, as claimed. The only issue, as argued by
appellant, is whether Comerford discloses the claimed “timing
means.” It is appellant’s contention that Comerford does not
disclose such a means for measuring a duration that a fall of
the disk drive is in progress.
Comerford does teach, throughout the disclosure, that a
control is activated when a value of a calculated acceleration
falls within a preset range of accelerations, understandably
leading to appellant’s conclusion that Comerford parks the
disk head at the first hint of a predetermined acceleration,
i.e., 1g, without any consideration of a predetermined period
of time. However, to whatever extent that interpretation
might, at first, appear reasonable, the disclosure, by
Appeal No. 96-1209
Application 08/168,805
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Comerford, at column 4, lines 11-15, that
[w]hen the value of the calculated acceleration
falls within the range continuously for a period
suggesting a fall is in progress, the dedicated
processor 24 generates a high priority interrupt to
the CPU 26 [emphasis ours]
clearly suggests, in our view, that Comerford does take into
account, in the determination of whether to effect a control,
a time period during which the acceleration exceeds a
threshold level.
While appellant urges us to consider the disclosure of
Comerford as a whole, considering that a time period is never
mentioned in the summary of the invention or in the claims, we
cannot ignore the disclosure, supra, at column 4. While the
summary and/or the claims may only describe the invention of
Comerford broadly, the section of the specification, i.e.
column 4, setting forth the details of the invention, clearly
indicates that some time period, wherein the acceleration
value falls within a predetermined range, is measured. We
cannot find any other reasonable interpretation of the quoted
Appeal No. 96-1209
Application 08/168,805
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language in Comerford’s disclosure. There does not appear to
be any other meaning when one is informed that a value falls
within a range continuously for a period than that a time
period is measured. Thus, Comerford does not cause the
dedicated processor to generate the high priority interrupt to
the CPU unless the predetermined value of acceleration has
been exceeded continuously for a period, i.e., for some
predetermined time period.
Appellant compares the flowcharts of Figure 8 of the
instant disclosure and Figure 3 of Comerford in order to show
that whereas the latter goes directly to interrupt if the
acceleration value is within a predetermined range, the former
goes on to a step of measuring a duration after the
determination of an acceleration value exceeding a
predetermined value, concluding that Comerford takes immediate
action, viz., parking the heads, without waiting any
prescribed period of time.
We disagree. When coupled with the disclosure at column
4 in Comerford, one would reasonably conclude that question
box 33 in Comerford’s Figure 3, i.e. “ACCEL IN RANGE?”
inherently includes the unasked question, “Is the acceleration
Appeal No. 96-1209
Application 08/168,805
7
value within range continuously for a predetermined period of
time?” There is nothing within the disclosure of Comerford
that indicates that Comerford takes action immediately, as
contended by appellant. Moreover, there is always some
finite period of time between the sensing that some action
should be taken and the actual taking of that action. After
all, even in appellant’s preferred embodiment, with a time
period of 90msec, to the ordinary observer, that time period
may be considered to be immediate, for all intents and
purposes. Therefore, appellant’s arguments as to the
immediacy of Comerford’s actions are not persuasive.
We have weighed appellant’s arguments regarding a lack of
any time period measurement in Comerford against the
examiner’s
position that there is such a measurement in view of the
column
4 recitation and we find that the preponderance of the
evidence favors the examiner’s position.
With regard to the rejection of claims 1 and 17 based on
Appeal No. 96-1209
Application 08/168,805
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35 U.S.C. 103, we will also sustain these rejections.
Claims 1 and 17 specifically recite that the time period
is at least 90msec. While appellant argues that Comerford
discloses no such specific time period, and we agree, there is
nothing critical about this number. The critical thing is to
set a time period which is not so long that the disk drive
collides with the floor, etc., and not so short that a slight
vibration might set off the control means unnecessarily. The
choice of 90msec would appear to be an obvious choice, based
on the particular heights one might conclude the disk drive is
in danger of falling from.
Turning now to the rejection of claim 5, appellant argues
that Comerford’s processor does not perform the combined tasks
of (1) through (5) required by claim 5. While it is not clear
whether appellant is relying on any particular task, it
appears to us that Comerford clearly computes a net
acceleration, compares it with a selected acceleration
(Comerford determines whether the measured acceleration is
within a range of predetermined accelerations), inherently
measures a duration that the acceleration exceeds a
predetermined acceleration (column 4, lines 11-15), compares
Appeal No. 96-1209
Application 08/168,805
9
this to a predetermined time duration (after all, some
predetermined time period has been set) and outputs a signal
for action if the measured duration exceeds the reference time
period.
With regard to claim 6, although a specific “timer”
structure is not shown by Comerford, it is clear from the
column 4 disclosure that Comerford contemplates a timer. Some
timing operation, inherently performed by a “timer,” occurs in
order to determine if an acceleration is within a
predetermined “range continuously for a period . . . .”
With regard to claim 7, we will not sustain the rejection
of this claim under 35 U.S.C. § 103. This claim requires that
the control action to be taken upon the satisfaction of the
two step test is that the actuator arm is instructed to move
toward the inner circumference of the disk in preparation for
impact. While Comerford discloses parking the disk drive
heads and, optionally, braking the disk’s rotation, there is
no suggestion in Comerford of moving the actuator arm toward
the inner circumference of the disk in preparation for impact.
As appellant discloses at page 9 of the specification, this
action to initiate a seek to the inner radius landing zone of
Appeal No. 96-1209
Application 08/168,805
While claim 16 depends from claim 11 and not from claim 1 or 17,2
appellant obviously refers to the reasoning of the arguments regarding claims
1 and 17 because the time period of “at least 90msec” was a limitation argued
with regard to claims 1 and 17, that limitation not appearing in claim 11.
10
the disk causes the read/write head to move away from the
tracks, minimizing potential damage to the slider, head,
suspension and disk while simultaneously preventing write
errors. Accordingly, the choice of moving the actuator arm to
this location is more than a mere design choice but, rather,
has disclosed advantages. Therefore, the examiner’s reliance
on In re Kuhle, 526 F.2d 553, 554-55, 188 USPQ 7, 8-9 (CCPA
1975) in this regard is misplaced.
With regard to claim 16, although appellant reiterates
the claim recitation, at page 14 of the brief, there is no
separate argument regarding the merits of this claim,
appellant, instead, relying on “the reasons expressed above
with respect to claims 1 and 17" [brief - pages 14-15]. 2
Accordingly, claim 16 will fall with claim 11.
Dependent claims not specifically argued by appellant
will fall with the claims from which they depend.
We have sustained the rejection of claims 11 through 15
under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 (a) or (e) and we have sustained the
Appeal No. 96-1209
Application 08/168,805
11
rejection of claims 1, 2, 4 through 6, 8 through 10, 15
through
18 and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103. We have, however, not
sustained the rejection of claim 7 under 35 U.S.C. § 103. The
examiner’s decision is, accordingly, affirmed-in-part.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in
connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 CFR
§ 1.136(a).
AFFIRMED-IN-PART
ERROL A. KRASS )
Administrative Patent Judge )
)
Appeal No. 96-1209
Application 08/168,805
12
)
)
MICHAEL R. FLEMING ) BOARD OF
PATENT
Administrative Patent Judge ) APPEALS AND
) INTERFERENCES
)
)
RICHARD TORCZON )
Administrative Patent Judge )

Records Manager
Legal Dept. 20BO
Hewlett-Packard Co.
P. O. Box 10301
Palo Alto, CA 94303-0890
Appeal No. 96-1209
Application 08/168,805
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