Ex Parte Henderson et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardApr 10, 201411864235 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 10, 2014) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte DAVID HENDERSON, SEAN P. CORTRIGHT, CALVIN KRUG, and RYAN KELLEY ____________ Appeal 2012-001857 Application 11/864,235 Technology Center 2800 ____________ Before BRADLEY R. GARRIS, JAMES C. HOUSEL, and GEORGE C. BEST, Administrative Patent Judges. BEST, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appeal 2012-001857 Application 11/864,235 2 On September 3, 2010, the Examiner finally rejected claims 1-5, 7, 13-17, and 23-27 of Application 11/864,235 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious. The Examiner also rejected claims 23-27 under 35 U.S.C. § 112 for failing to comply with the written description requirement and as indefinite. Appellants1 seek reversal of these rejections pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a). We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). For the reasons set forth below, we REVERSE. BACKGROUND The ’235 application describes devices for use in systems that test electronic circuits. Spec. ¶ 0002. Claim 1 is the only independent claim in the ’235 application and is reproduced below: 1. A module for use in a test system, said module comprising: a first portion for allowing electrical connection with a particular device to be tested (DUT), said electrical connection using electrical terminals specific to said particular DUT; a second portion for allowing for electrical connection to a test station having universal electrical terminals for use with a plurality of DUTs each having a different corresponding connector configuration; and a third portion for maintaining a personality of said particular DUT, said personality comprising conditioning information for controlling parameters used by said test station for testing said particular DUT. (App. Br. 22 (Claims App’x).) 1 Agilent Technologies, Inc. is identified as the real party in interest. (App. Br. 1.) Appeal 2012-001857 Application 11/864,235 3 REJECTIONS On appeal, the Examiner maintains the following rejections: 1. Claims 23-27 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 for failing to comply with the written description requirement. (Ans. 3.) 2. Claims 23-27 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2 as indefinite. (Ans. 4.) 3. Claims 1-5, 13-17, and 23-27 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over the combination of Akar2 and McConnell.3 (Ans. 4.) 4. Claim 7 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over the combination of Akar, McConnell, and Mallory.4 (Ans. 7.) DISCUSSION Rejection 1. The Examiner rejected claims 23-27 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 because “[t]he newly introduced term ‘connectorized’ in claims 23-37 does not occur anywhere in the specification originally submitted with the application and therefore constitutes new matter.” (Ans. 3.) We reverse this rejection largely for the reasons set forth in Appellants’ Appeal Brief and add the following for emphasis. Appearance of a claim in the specification in ipsis verbis does not guarantee that the written description requirement is satisfied, see, e.g., Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 968 (Fed. Cir. 2002), nor 2 U.S. Patent No. 5,216,361, issued June 1, 1993. 3 U.S. Patent No. 6,608,399 B2, issued Aug. 19, 2003. 4 U.S. Patent No. 4,964,018, issued Oct. 16, 1990. Appeal 2012-001857 Application 11/864,235 4 does a failure to meet that standard require a finding that a claim does not comply with the written description requirement, In re Edwards, 568 F.2d 1349, 1351-52 (Fed. Cir. 1978). All that is required is that the specification demonstrate to a person of ordinary skill in the art that the inventor was in possession of the invention. Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Hoffmann-La Roche Inc., 541 F.3d 1115, 1122 (Fed. Cir. 2008). In this case, the ’235 application’s Specification demonstrates that Appellants possessed a module for use in a test system comprising a connectorized cable. As Appellants point out (App. Br. 4-5), the Specification describes and Figure 6 depicts a connectorized cable, Spec. ¶ 0032, Fig. 6. We, therefore, reverse the rejection of claims 23-27 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1. Rejection 2. The Examiner rejected claims 23-27 as indefinite. (Ans. 4.) The Examiner concluded that the claim term “connectorized” is unclear. (Id.) The Examiner points to two possible meanings of the term in the ’235 application’s Specification and also asserts that the term cannot be found in any available dictionary. (Id.) The Examiner concluded that “[f]or examination purposes, the term ‘connectorized’ is treated as an arbitrary adverb [sic, adjective] without any specific definition.” (Id.) During prosecution, a claim is examined for compliance with 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2 by determining whether the claim meets threshold requirements of clarity and precision. In re Skvorecz, 580 F.3d 1262, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting M.P.E.P. § 2173.02). A claim is not indefinite merely because more suitable language or modes of expression are available. Id. In determining whether a particular claim is definite, the claim’s language must be analyzed in light of the content of the particular application, the prior art’s teaching, and the interpretation that would be Appeal 2012-001857 Application 11/864,235 5 given to the claim’s language by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made. Id. We cannot sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 23-27 as indefinite. Our review of the ’235 application’s Specification convinces us that a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand the term “connectorized cable” to mean a cable that has been provided with a connector.5 Rejection 3. The Examiner rejected claims 1-5, 13-17, and 23-27 as obvious over the combination of Akar and McConnell. (Ans. 4.) We begin by addressing the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1, the ’235 application’s sole independent claim. Appellants argue that the Examiner erred in finding that the cited prior art describes a portion of a module that maintains the personality of the device being tested, where the personality comprises conditioning information for controlling parameters used by the test station for testing that device. (App. Br. 11-15.) The Examiner concedes that Akar does not describe this element of the claimed invention and relies upon McConnell’s description. (Ans. 5 (citing McConnell Fig. 1; col. 4, ll. 10-25; col. 6, ll. 1-15; col. 8, ll. 15-30; col. 9, ll. 40-60; col. 11, ll. 15-60).) In particular, the Examiner states: McConnell from the same field of endeavor teaches a common personality module (17, Fig. 1 and col. 6, line 1-15, and col. 4, line 10-25) comprising conditioning information for controlling parameters including device identification (col. 9, line 40-60) 5 We note that Appellants have adopted this definition. (App. Br. 8.) Appeal 2012-001857 Application 11/864,235 6 and signal level setting (col. 8, line 15-30) and power supply data (col. 11, line 15-60) as in claims 2, 14. (Id. at 5-6.) We agree with Appellants that McConnell does not describe the personality portion of the claimed module. McConnell describes a personality module comprising a portable rack and one or more feature modules. Col. 4, ll. 7-12. This arrangement “allows an entire personality module to be removed from a vehicle for security reasons, as well as to be easily moved . . . from one vehicle to another, to provide immediate customization of a particular vehicle’s available features.” Id. at col. 4, ll. 23-28. McConnell does not describe the interaction of its personality module with test equipment and therefore does not describe the use of its personality module to control parameters used by a test station for testing a device. Furthermore, the Examiner has not provided an explanation supported by a rational underpinning as to why the combination of Akar and McConnell would have suggested the claimed invention to a person of ordinary skill in the art. We, therefore, reverse the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 as obvious over the combination of Akar and McConnell. In addition to arguing for the reversal of this rejection based upon the limitations of independent claim 1, Appellants also present separate arguments for the patentability of dependent claims 3,6 17, and 23-27. (App. 6 We note that claims 3, 4, and 7 depend directly or indirectly from claim 2, which has been cancelled and is not included in the Claims Appendix. Claims 8-12, which the Examiner has indicated contain allowable subject matter (Ans. 8), also depend directly or indirectly from cancelled claim 2. If prosecution of the ’235 application continues, these errors should be corrected. Appeal 2012-001857 Application 11/864,235 7 Br. 19-20.) Because we have reversed the rejection of claim 1 as obvious, we need not address these arguments. The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1-5, 13-17, and 23-27 as obvious is reversed. Rejection 4. The Examiner rejected claim 7 as obvious over the combination of Akar, McConnell, and Mallory. (Ans. 7.) Appellants argue for the reversal of this rejection based upon the arguments advanced in support of the patentability of claim 1. (App. Br. 20- 21.) Because we have reversed the rejection of claim 1, we also reverse this rejection. CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above, we have reversed the Examiner’s rejections of claims 23-27 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶¶ 1, 2. We also reverse the § 103 rejections of claims 1-5, 7, 13-17, and 23-27 of the ’235 application. REVERSED lp Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation