Ex Parte Haynes et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardAug 23, 201714052547 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 23, 2017) Copy Citation United States Patent and Trademark Office UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O.Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/052,547 10/11/2013 James M. Haynes III 25TY-190875 6076 69849 7590 08/25/2017 SHEPPARD, MULLIN, RICHTER & HAMPTON LLP 379 Lytton Avenue Palo Alto, CA 94301 EXAMINER JEANTY, ROMAIN ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3623 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 08/25/2017 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): svpatents @ sheppardmullin.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte JAMES M. HAYNES III and ANTHONY W. ULWICK Appeal 2016-006575 Application 14/052,547 Technology Center 3600 Before JOSEPH L. DIXON, LINZY T. McCARTNEY, and JOHN P. PINKERTON, Administrative Patent Judges. McCARTNEY, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a rejection of claims 1—24. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. Appeal 2016-006575 Application 14/052,547 CLAIMED INVENTION Claim 1 illustrates the claimed subject matter: 1. A system comprising: one or more processors; memory; an outcome management engine coupled to the one or more processors; a securable market innovation engine coupled to the outcome management engine and to the one or more processors; a growth investment engine coupled to the securable market innovation engine and to the one or more processors; wherein, in operation, the outcome management engine determines, using the one or more processors, an outcome of a job; the securable market innovation engine identifies, based on the determined outcome and using the one or more processors, a securable market for the job; the securable market innovation engine determines, using the one or more processors, expected market share for the target solution in the securable market; the growth investment engine provides, using the one or more processors, a growth investment recommendation, the grown investment recommendation based at least in part on the expected market share, and the growth investment engine incorporates the growth investment recommendation into a growth investment data structure on the memory. Appeal Brief 16, filed February 23, 2016. (“App. Br.”).1 1 Claim 1 appears to lack antecedent basis for the term “the target solution.” App. Br. 16. If prosecution continues, the Examiner may consider whether this seeming lack of antecedent basis renders claim 1 and its dependent claims indefinite. 2 Appeal 2016-006575 Application 14/052,547 REJECTION Claims 1—24 stand rejected under 35U.S.C. § 101 as directed to nonstatutory subject matter. See Final Office Action 4—8, mailed September 25,2015 (“Final Act.”). ANALYSIS Appellants argue claims 1—24 together. See App. Br. 6—13; Reply Brief 2—9, filed June 15, 2016 (“Reply Br.”). We select claim 1 as representative of these claims and decide the appeal with respect to claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv) (“When multiple claims subject to the same ground of rejection are argued as a group . . ., the Board may select a single claim from the group . . . and may decide the appeal as to the ground of rejection with respect to the group ... on the basis of the selected claim alone.”). Appellants argue the Examiner did not adequately explain why claim 1 is directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. See App. Br. 6—8. According to Appellants, claim 1 is more akin to claims courts have concluded are not directed to an abstract idea than claims courts have concluded are. See App. Br. 9—11; Reply Br. 4—6. Appellants contend that even if claim 1 were directed to an abstract idea, claim 1 includes elements that transform the abstract idea into patent-eligible subject matter. See App. Br. 11-13; Reply Br. 7-9. We disagree. Section 101 of the Patent Act provides “[wjhoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this 3 Appeal 2016-006575 Application 14/052,547 title.” 35U.S.C. § 101. The Supreme Court has long held that this provision contains an implicit exception: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.” Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014) (quoting Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116 (2013)). The Court has set forth a two-part inquiry to determine whether this exception applies. First, we “determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts.” Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355. Second, if the claim is directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts, we consider “the elements of each claim both individually and ‘as an ordered combination’ to determine whether the additional elements ‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355 (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1297 (2012)). Put differently, we must search the claims for an “inventive concept,” that is, “an element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.’” Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355 (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294). We first consider whether the Examiner properly concluded the claims are directed to an abstract idea. The Examiner concluded claim 1 is directed to the abstract idea of “performing securable market analysis.” See Answer 4, mailed April 27, 2016 (“Ans.”). The Examiner explained the Federal Circuit has concluded similar claims are directed to an abstract idea and claim 1 does “not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception.” Ans. 8—9. 4 Appeal 2016-006575 Application 14/052,547 Although we characterize the recited abstract idea differently, Appellants have not persuaded us the Examiner erroneously concluded claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea. To determine whether claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea, we consider claim 1 “in [its] entirety to ascertain whether [its] character as a whole is directed to excluded subject matter.” Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015). See also Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[W]e have described the first-stage inquiry as looking at the ‘focus’ of the claims, their “‘character as a whole.”’”). Considered as a whole, claim 1 is on its face directed to the abstract idea of generating and storing “growth investment recommendations.” Claim 1 recites various computer components (“one or more processors,” “memory,” and various “engines”) but is functional in nature. Claim 1 essentially recites (1) determining a job outcome, (2) identifying a securable market based on the job outcome, (3) determining an expected market share for the target solution in the securable market, (4) providing a growth investment recommendation based in part on the expected market share, and (5) incorporating the recommendation into a data structure in memory. See App. Br. 16. Claim 1 does not recite how these functions are performed, beyond noting which engine performs each function and that certain functions rely on previously determined data. See App. Br. 16. Nor does claim 1 purport to improve how the recited computer components function. Claim 1 simply recites that the engines perform the functions described above using “one or more processors” and “memory.” App. Br. 16. Courts have concluded similar claims are directed to an abstract idea. See Affinity Labs of Tex., LLCv. DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1258 (Fed. 5 Appeal 2016-006575 Application 14/052,547 Cir. 2016) (concluding a claim that recited nothing “directed to how to” implement a recited idea “is drawn to the idea itself’); In re TLI Commc ’ns LLCPatent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 612 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (concluding claims “not directed to a specific improvement in computer functionality” but instead “directed to the use of conventional or generic technology in a nascent but well-known environment” are directed to an abstract idea); Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Graff/Ross Holdings, LLP, 604 F. App’x 930 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (summarily affirming district court decisions concluding claims reciting generating “financial analysis output” are directed to an abstract idea). And despite Appellants’ conclusory assertions to the contrary, see App. Br. 9—11; Reply Br. 4—6, we see no meaningful difference between claim 1 and claims directed to fundamental economic practices,2 methods a person can perform mentally or using pen and paper,3 and methods of collecting, analyzing, and displaying or storing data that courts have concluded are directed to abstract ideas.4 The similarities between claim 1 and the claims at issue in the cases noted above are sufficient to establish claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea. See Enflsh, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (explaining that when determining whether claims are directed to an abstract idea, “both this court and the Supreme Court have found it sufficient to compare [the] claims at issue to those claims already found to be directed to 2 See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010); Alice, 134 S. Ct. 2347. 3 See, e.g., CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 4 See, e.g., Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat 7 Ass ’n, 776 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d 1350; Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 850 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 6 Appeal 2016-006575 Application 14/052,547 an abstract idea in previous cases”). Despite these similarities, Appellants contend claim 1 is not directed to an abstract idea because, in Appellants’ view, claim 1 is similar to the claims the Federal Circuit concluded were not directed to an abstract idea in Enfish and DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014). See Reply Br. 6-7. In Enfish, the claims before the court focused on “an improvement to computer functionality itself, not on economic or other tasks for which a computer is used in its ordinary capacity.” Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1336. As discussed above, claim 1 does not purport to improve the functionality of a computer; rather, claim 1 recites using generic computer components to generate a growth investment recommendation. See App. Br. 16. And in DDR Holdings, the disputed claims solved an Internet-specific problem with an Internet-based solution that was “necessarily rooted in computer technology to overcome a problem specifically arising in computer network.” DDR Holdings, LLCv. Hotels,com L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1257-58 (Fed. Cir. 2014). That is not the case here. Although claim 1 recites various computer components, the claimed subject matter concerns generating a growth investment recommendation, not addressing a problem specifically arising in a computer network. See App. Br. 16. See also Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“The patent claims here do not address problems unique to the Internet, so DDR has no applicability.”). Because we agree with the Examiner that claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea, we next consider whether the Examiner correctly concluded claim 1 lacks an “inventive concept.” The Examiner concluded the elements recited in claim 1, considered individually and as a combination, do not 7 Appeal 2016-006575 Application 14/052,547 amount to “significantly more” than an abstract idea because the recited elements are generic computer components that perform routine functions. See Ans. 9—11. Here, too, Appellants have not persuaded us the Examiner erred. At this point in our analysis, we consider “the elements of [the] claim both individually and ‘as an ordered combination’ to determine whether the additional elements ‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355 (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1297 (2012)). Appellants contend “the computer systems involved in the claim[] requires at least a specialized device configured to analyze large volumes of market data” and therefore “[t]he invocation of the computer in the present case is not generic.” App. Br. 13. But Appellants’ written description makes clear that the computer components recited in claim 1—“one or more processors,” a “memory,” and various “engines”—are generic. The written description discloses “[t]he processor can include ... a general-purpose central processing unit (CPU) such as a microprocessor, or a special-purpose processor, such as a microcontroller.” Specification |25, filed October 11, 2013 (“Spec.”). The written description also explains “[t]he memory can include . . . random access memory (RAM)” and “[a]s used in this paper, an engine includes a dedicated or shared processor and, typically, firmware or software modules that are executed by the processor.” Spec. Tfl[ 25, 33. Indeed, the written description discloses “[t]he algorithms and displays presented herein are not inherently related to any particular computer or other apparatus” and that “terms such as . . . ‘determining’ ... or the like, refer to the action and processes of a computer system, or similar electronic computing device, that manipulates and transforms data.” Spec. 31—32. 8 Appeal 2016-006575 Application 14/052,547 See also Spec. 195 (“discussions utilizing terms such as . . . ‘determining,’ . . . ‘identifying,’ or the like refer to the action and processes of a computer system, or similar electronic computing device, that manipulates and transforms data”). Appellants also contend claim 1 “include[s] features that are related to using virtual tools” and therefore “amount[s] to significantly more than [an] abstract idea itself because the virtual tools [used in the claims] can only be achieved efficiently and optimally using computer technology.” App. Br. 12—13. Appellants argue “determining an outcome of a job is not what was considered when investment decisions were made in the past” and therefore claim 1 is “significantly more than the known techniques for making investment decisions.” App. Br. 13. We find these arguments unpersuasive. As an initial matter, claim 1 says nothing about “virtual tools.” See App. Br. 16. Assuming claim 1 did recite “virtual tools” that “can only be achieved efficiently and optimally using computer technology,” App. Br. 13, relying on “‘the improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer’ does not ‘provide a sufficient inventive concept.’” Intellectual Ventures ILLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). And even if Appellants are correct that “determining an outcome of a job is not what was considered when investment decisions were made in the past,” App. Br. 13, the novelty of this step is insufficient to transform the abstract idea recited in claim 1 into patent-eligible subject matter. See Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 716 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“That some of the eleven steps were not previously employed in this art is not 9 Appeal 2016-006575 Application 14/052,547 enough—standing alone—to confer patent eligibility upon the claims at issue.”); Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d at 1315 (“[T]he jury’s general finding that Symantec did not prove . . . that three particular prior art references do not disclose all the limitations of or render obvious the asserted claims does not resolve the question of whether the claims embody an inventive concept at the second step of Mayo/Alice.”) At bottom, claim 1 essentially recites a number of generic computer components that perform functions specified at high levels of generality. This is not enough to transform an abstract idea into patent-eligible subject matter. See, e.g., Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2360 (explaining that claims that “amount to ‘nothing significantly more’ than an instruction to apply the abstract idea . . . using some unspecified, generic computer .... is not ‘enough ’ to transform an abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention” (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1297, 1298)); Capital One Fin. Corp., 850 F.3d at 1342 (“[T]he claim language here provides only a result-oriented solution, with insufficient detail for how a computer accomplishes it. Our law demands more.”). We see nothing in claim l’s elements, considered individually or in an ordered combination, that transforms the claimed abstract idea into patent-eligible subject matter. DECISION We affirm the rejection of claims 1—24 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv). AFFIRMED 10 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation