Ex Parte Hayes et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardMar 30, 201714323772 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 30, 2017) Copy Citation United States Patent and Trademark Office UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O.Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/323,772 07/03/2014 John Hayes P70479 1260US.1 5069 120626 7590 04/03/2017 Wnmhle Parlvle SanHriHae Rr Rioe T T P EXAMINER Attn: IP Docketing PO Box 7037 TRAN, TRI MINH Atlanta, GA 30357-0037 ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2494 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 04/03/2017 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): ipdocketing @ wcsr. com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte JOHN HAYES, PAR BOTES, and ETHAN MILLER Appeal 2016-005728 Application 14/323,772 Technology Center 2400 Before JASON V. MORGAN, NABEEL U. KHAN, and KAMRAN JIVANI, Administrative Patent Judges. JIVANI, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellants1 seek our review, under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), of the Examiner’s final decision rejecting claims 1—20, which are all the claims pending in the present patent application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM-IN-PART. 1 Appellants identify Pure Storage, Inc. as the real party in interest. Br. 1. Appeal 2016-005728 Application 14/323,772 STATEMENT OF THE CASE The present application relates to “securing data in a storage grid.” Abst. Claim 1 is reproduced below with disputed limitations emphasized and bracketed material added: 1. A method for securing data in a storage grid, comprising: generating a storage key from key shares of at least two storage clusters of a storage grid having at least three storage clusters; generating a grid key from at least one of the storage key and an external secret; encrypting data with the grid key to yield once encrypted data, wherein the grid key is applied to encrypt the data; encrypting the once encrypted data with the storage key to yield twice encrypted data; storing the twice encrypted data in a first storage cluster of the storage grid; and [LI] storing a replicated version of the twice encrypted data in a second storage cluster of the storage grid. The Rejections 1. Claims 1—6, 8, 10, 13, and 14 are rejected, under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), as being unpatentable over Shaw (US 8,457,317 B2; June 4, 2013), Loo (US 2007/0014403 Al; Jan. 18, 2007), and Humphrey (US 2010/0208889 Al; Aug. 19, 2010). Final Act. 3—11 (April 9, 2015). 2 Appeal 2016-005728 Application 14/323,772 2. Claims 7 and 9 are rejected, under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), as being unpatentable over Shaw, Loo, Humphrey, and Shankar (US 8,601,600 Bl; Dec. 3,2013). Final Act. 11-13. 3. Claim 11 is rejected, under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), as being unpatentable over Shaw, Loo, Humphrey, and Hiie (US 2010/0262714 Al; Oct. 14, 2010). Final Act. 13-14. 4. Claim 12 is rejected, under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), as being unpatentable over Shaw, Loo, Humphrey, and Zarfoss (US 2014/0082350 Al; Mar. 20, 2014). Final Act. 1^U15. 5. Claim 15—19 are rejected, under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), as being unpatentable over Shaw, Loo, Humphrey, and Funayama (US 2014/0044259 Al; Feb. 13, 2014). Final Act. 15-18. 6. Claim 20 is rejected, under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), as being unpatentable over Shaw, Loo, Humphrey, Funayama, and Shankar. Final Act. 18—19. CLAIMS 1-6: OBVIOUSNESS OVER SHAW, LOO, AND HUMPHREY (REJECTION 1) Appellants argue independent claim 1 and depending claims 2—6 together. Br. 15.2 Based on Appellants’ arguments, we decide the appeal of this rejection because on representative claim 1. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv). Appellants contend the applied prior art does not teach or suggest limitation LI. Br. 9—10. More specifically, Appellants contend, the 2 Appellants did not file a Reply Brief, but merely re-filed the Appeal Brief (originally filed October 5, 2015) on May 23, 2016. 3 Appeal 2016-005728 Application 14/323,772 Examiner errs because the cited art does not teach or suggest (i) a “storage grid” formed by “storage clusters” and (ii) “a replicated version of the twice encrypted data in a second storage cluster of the storage grid.” Id. With respect to Appellants’ first argument, the Examiner finds each claimed “‘storage cluster’ can be as simple as one storage node, [e.g.,] a single . . . storage server.” Ans. 3^4 (citing Spec. 124). The Examiner further finds the claimed “‘storage grid having at least three storage clusters’ is nothing more than just a group of clusters in a storage network.” Id. In turn, the Examiner finds Shaw’s storage nodes and network thereof respectively meet the claimed storage clusters and grid. Id. (citing Shaw col. 1,11. 44—65; Figs. 1—2). Appellants do not define explicitly in the Specification the terms “grid” and “clusters.” We apply the broadest reasonable interpretation of claim terms, consistent with the specification, as would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art. In re Am. Acad, of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Where, as here, the Specification does not explicitly define a term, the term should be given its ordinary meaning. In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319, 321 (Fed. Cir. 1989). Applying these principles and having the cited portions of the Specification and Shaw, we determine the Examiner’s finds are reasonable and supported, and unrebutted (e.g., by a conflicting, supported meaning of “cluster” or “grid”). Accordingly, we are unpersuaded by Appellants’ argument that the Examiner erred in finding Shaw teaches a “grid” of “storage clusters” within the claimed context. With respect to Appellants’ second argument, we are not persuaded that Shaw lacks “a replicated version of the twice encrypted data in a second 4 Appeal 2016-005728 Application 14/323,772 storage cluster of the storage grid.” The Examiner cites Shaw, Loo, and Humphrey as collectively suggesting this claim limitation, not Shaw alone as teaching the limitation. Ans. 2, 6. Where, as here, a rejection is based on a combination of references, one cannot show non-obviousness by attacking references individually. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 426 (CCPA 1981); In re Merck & Co., Inc., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986). The Examiner particularly finds (a) Shaw teaches generating of an encryption key from respective key shares supplied by the nodes, (b) Loo teaches generating of an encryption key from another encryption key, (c) Humphrey teaches double-key encrypting of data, and (d) Shaw teaches replicating of encrypted data within two nodes. Ans. 2, 5—7; Final Act. 3—5.3 The Examiner also finds these teachings collectively suggest performing these techniques, in series (a) to (d), and in turn suggest a resultant replication of double-key encrypted data within two storage clusters. Id. These findings are also reasonable and supported on the record before us. The findings present a collection of predictably chainable prior art techniques that generates two encryption keys for data (steps a and b), twice encrypts the data via two encryption keys (step c), and replicates the finally encrypted data (step d). See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 420 (2007) (“Common sense teaches . . . [that] in many cases a person of ordinary skill will be able to fit the teachings of multiple patents together like pieces of a puzzle.”). The Examiner’s findings additionally include 3 The Examiner’s Answer includes a statement analogizing Shaw’s and Loo’s cited encryption keys respectively to the claimed grid key and storage key. Ans. 6. However, the Final Rejection and the features of Shaw’s and Loo’s cited keys together indicate that the Examiner finds Shaw’s keys meet the claimed storage key and Loo’s keys meet the claimed grid key. 5 Appeal 2016-005728 Application 14/323,772 articulated, supported rationales for combining these techniques for their disclosed benefits. Ans. 6—7; Final Act. 4—5; see also KSR, 550 U.S. at 417 (“[I]f a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill.”). We note Appellants do not contend that the resulting arrangements were “uniquely challenging or difficult for one of ordinary skill in the art” or “represented an unobvious step over the prior art.” See Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing KSR, 550 U.S. at 418-19). Appellants further contend that Humphrey’s teaches away from the Examiner’s above combination of prior art techniques. Appellants particularly state: The Examiner has erred by citing Humphrey paragraph 17, selecting “only the teaching of double encryption to data for storage” from the cited passage (see Response to Arguments in the Office action), and ignoring the teaching away in the remainder of the same cited passage. Below is the original Appellant argument [within a prior Amendment:] . . . Humphrey specifies that the twice encrypted data be split and stored as separate portions for the two party storage mechanism. . . . Thus, Humphrey requires splitting the double encrypted data into two portions[.] . . . Humphrey cannot be modified from splitting the data into 2 portions as this would change the principle of operation[.] Br. 13 (Appellants’ blockquote indented). Appellants fail to identify in the record before us a teaching of Humphrey that would have discouraged an ordinarily skilled artisan from 6 Appeal 2016-005728 Application 14/323,772 attempting the cited combination, and cause the artisan to “be led in a direction divergent from the path that was taken by the applicant.” In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 990 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). Humphrey’s above-cited disclosure of splitting the storage of confidential information (e.g., splitting a credit card number) between a client and repository server is rather an improvement on the background art’s less secure storing of confidential information at only a central repository. See id. at || 2 (background art), 17 (client-server split). Thus, Humphrey’s client-repository split would be understood as an advantageous implementation of the art, but not as evidence that storing encrypted data within a singular storage node (i.e., no client-server split) was unobvious to artisans. See DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 567 F.3d 1314, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“A reference does not teach away ... if it merely expresses a general preference for an alternative invention.”). Accordingly, we are unpersuaded by Appellants’ argument that Humphrey teaches away from the Examiner’s applied combination of prior art. For the foregoing reasons, we sustain the rejection of claims 1—6. CLAIMS 8, 10, 13, AND 14: OBVIOUSNESS OVER SHAW, LOO, AND HUMPHREY (REJECTION 1) Independent claim 8 and depending claims 10, 13, and 14 stand rejected over Shaw, Loo, and Humphrey. Claims 1 and 8 recite similar methods; however, claim 8’s method plainly differs by “producing a replicated version of the twice encrypted data . . .from the once encrypted data,” (emphasis added) whereas claim 1 does not specify “from the once encrypted data.” 7 Appeal 2016-005728 Application 14/323,772 Appellants argue, and we agree, the rejection of claim 8 does not address this plain difference between claims 1 and 8; that is, does not state how the applied prior art teaches or suggests replicating of the double-key encrypted data “from the once encrypted data.” Br. 16—17; see also Final Act. 10 (stating “see rejection in claim 1” with respect to claim 8’s at-issue replicating step). The Answer neglects Appellants’ arguments for claim 8: “Applicant’s arguments concerning the other claims [2—20] under appeal are based on the arguments [for claim 1] discussed above.” Ans. 7. Accordingly, because the Examiner fails to address the above feature of the claimed replicating step, we do not sustain the rejection of claims 8, 10, 13, and 14. CLAIMS 7 AND 9: OBVIOUSNESS OVER SHAW, LOO, HUMPHREY, AND SHANKAR (REJECTION 2) Claims 7 and 9 respectively depend from claims 1 and 8, addressed above. Because Appellants advance no further arguments for claim 7, we sustain its rejection. Br. 13. Because the Examiner’s findings for claim 9 (Final Act. 12) do not cure the error for incorporated claim 8, we do not sustain the rejection of claim 9. CLAIM 11: OBVIOUSNESS OVER SHAW, LOO, HUMPHREY, AND HUE (REJECTION 3) Claim 11 depends from claim 8, addressed above. Because the Examiner’s findings for claim 11 (Final Act. 13—14) do not cure the error for incorporated claim 8, we do not sustain the rejection of claim 11. 8 Appeal 2016-005728 Application 14/323,772 CLAIM 12: OBVIOUSNESS OVER, SHAW, LOO, HUMPHREY, AND ZARFOSS (REJECTION 4) Claim 12 depends from claim 8, addressed above. Because the Examiner’s findings for claim 12 {id. at 14—15) do not cure the error for incorporated claim 8, we do not sustain the rejection of claim 12. CLAIMS 15-19: OBVIOUSNESS OVER SHAW, LOO, HUMPHREY, AND FUNAYAMA (REJECTION 5) Appellants contend, with respect to independent claim 15, “The Examiner has erred by repeating the errors discussed in sections A.l and A.3 regarding claims 1 and 8, and applying this to the rejection of claim 15. Claim 15 is hence allowable for similar reasons as discussed above regarding claims 1 and 8.” Br. 19. As to depending claims 16—19, Appellants contend only: “Claims 16—19 are thus allowable by virtue of dependency from claim 15.” Id. at 20. As reflected by Appellants’ arguments for claim 8, the independent claims vary in scope. Id. at 16. We will not unilaterally consider whether claim 15 requires the argued features of claims 1 and 8, much less unilaterally apply the corresponding arguments to claim 15. If Appellants view the arguments as applying to multiple claims, the perceived application must be meaningfully explained for each such claim. See, e.g., In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (affirming in part because appellant “merely argued that the claims differed from [the prior art], and chose not to proffer a serious explanation of this difference.”); In re Baxter Travenol Labs, 952 F.2d 388, 391 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“It is not the function of this court to examine the claims in greater detail than argued by an appellant[.]”). 9 Appeal 2016-005728 Application 14/323,772 We have, however, reviewed claim 15 for the unaddressed subject matter of claim 8 (see supra). Claim 15 requires a replication of the double-key encrypted data (claims 1 and 8), but not such a replication produced from the once encrypted data (only claim 8). Thus, Appellants’ argument for claim 8 does not apply to claim 15. Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we sustain the rejection of claims 15—19. CLAIM 20: OBVIOUSNESS OVER SHAW, LOO, HUMPHREY, FUNAYAMA, AND SHANKAR (REJECTION 6) Claim 20 depends from claim 15, addressed above. Because Appellants advance no further arguments for claim 20 (Br. 20), we sustain its rejection. DECISION We affirm the Examiner’s decisions rejecting claims 1—7 and 15—20. We reverse the Examiner’s decisions rejecting claims 8—14. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv). AFFIRMED-IN-PART 10 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation