Ex Parte Hawthorne et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardSep 6, 201611104810 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 6, 2016) Copy Citation UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR 111104,810 04/13/2005 Jeffrey Scott Hawthorne 86462 7590 09/08/2016 STANLEY J. GRADISAR ATTORNEY AT LAW, LLC 1182 THATCH CIRCLE CASTLE ROCK, CO 80109 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www .uspto.gov ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 40510.0002USD2 1276 EXAMINER RAPILLO, KRISTINE K ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3626 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 09/08/2016 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address( es): stan@sjgaalpatentlaw.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte JEFFREY SCOTT HAWTHORNE, MICHAEL LEONARD IIAMS, GLENN CHARLES TUBB, RICHARD A. STOLL, GARY ALAN SHOFFNER, and BRIAN KIRBY PHILLIPS 1 Appeal2013-008302 Application 11/104,810 Technology Center 3600 Before STEVEN D.A. McCARTHY, DANIELS. SONG and MICHAEL L. HOELTER, Administrative Patent Judges. SONG, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL 1 The real party in interest is Alcohol Monitoring Systems, Inc. (Appeal Brief (hereinafter "App. Br.") 3). Appeal2013-008302 Application 11/104,810 STATEMENT OF THE CASE The Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134 the Examiner's final rejection of claims 1-6, 8-18, and 20-22 in the present application (App. Br. 9). We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. §§ 6(b) and 134. We AFFIRM. The claimed invention is directed to a bio-information monitoring system, and method for using a bio-information network (Abstract; Field of the Invention). Representative independent claim 11 reads as follows (App. Br. 38-39, Claims App'x, emphasis added): 11. A method for using a bio-information network to process raw data received via a bio-information modem from a continuous remote bio-information unit adapted to be attached to a human subject, the method comprising the steps of: (a) receiving in a communication server in the bio- information network the raw data over a communication link from the bio-information modem, wherein the raw data is gathered and stored by the continuous remote bio-information unit while the human subject goes about their normal activities and without active participation by the human subject, and the stored raw data is transmitted to the bio-information modem at a predetermined scheduled times without active participation by the human subject; (b) parsing with a situation analyzer said raw data through a predetermined set of rules into a plurality of messages; (c) determining with a wodiflow instructions and any historical data relating to similar messages an action to be applied to each of said plurality of messages; (d) storing in a treatment provider/subject database said raw data, an information on the human subject, an information 2 Appeal2013-008302 Application 11/104,810 on a treatment provider associated with the human subject, a predetermined notification method, from among a plurality of notification methods, for notifying a monitoring personnel of said treatment provider associated with the human subject; and ( e) when said action to be applied to a one of said messages requires an immediate notification of said monitoring personnel, executing with a notification server said predetermined notification method to communicate a one of said plurality of messages to said monitoring personnel. The Examiner rejects claims 1---6, 8-18, and 20-22 as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over the combination of Brown,2 Reuss, 3 and Linberg.4 (Ans. 3; Final Act. 2). ANALYSIS Only those arguments actually made by the Appellants have been considered in this decision. Arguments that the Appellants could have made but chose not to make have not been considered and are deemed to be waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(vii). The Examiner rejects claims 1---6, 8-18, and 20-22 as obvious over the combination of Brown, Reuss, and Linberg (Ans. 3). The Appellants disagree with the rejection, and in their Appeal Brief, present arguments asserting patentability of independent claim 11 first (App. Br. 10, et seq.). 2 U.S. Patent No. US 6,168,563 Bl issued January 2, 2001 to Brown. 3 U.S. Patent No. US 6,364,834 Bl issued April 2, 2002 to Reuss et al. 4 U.S. Patent No. US 6,497,655 Bl issued December 24, 2002 to Linberg et al. 3 Appeal2013-008302 Application 11/104,810 In response, the Examiner addresses claim 11 first (Ans. 3, 14--18). Thus, we likewise address claim 11 first herein. Claim 11 In rejecting claim 11, the Examiner cites to various portions of Brown as disclosing steps "(b )" and "( c )" recited in claim 11 (Final Act. 2-3; Ans. 3--4). The Appellants disagree that Brown discloses steps "(b )"and"( c )," and assert that the Examiner has failed to establish a prima facie case of obviousness (App. Br. 9, 21-22). Step "(b) " The Appellants argue that the portion of Brown cited by the Examiner (Brown, col. 16, 1. 32---col. 17, 1. 2), fails to disclose the step of "parsing with a situation analyzer said raw data through a predetermined set of rules into a plurality of messages" as recited in paragraph "(b )" of claim 11 (App. Br. 14). Specifically, the Appellants argue that while Brown does teach gathering raw data, as well as some processing of the raw data (App. Br. 14-- 15), the only data processing disclosed in Brown is the same as that performed by the self-care monitoring system of Figure 1, which merely processes blood glucose data for display on a screen (App. Br. 15-16). Hence, the basis of the Appellants' argument is that processing of blood glucose data would not require parsing. The Examiner disagrees with the Appellants, and finds that Brown does disclose the limitation at issue, stating: Figure 1 of Brown shows two additional monitoring devices connected for communication with data management unit; the 4 Appeal2013-008302 Application 11/104,810 monitoring devices may include glucose meters, respiratory flow meters, electronic weight scales, blood pressure cuffs, and pulse rate monitors (column 11, lines 40 - 66). As Brown discloses the use of at least one monitoring unit, the measurements will be parsed or categorized separately and analyzed separately (i.e. data from a blood glucose monitor, peak flow meter as shown in Figure 1 of Brown). The analysis of the results (along with the responses (i.e. messages)) or instructions (messages) from the physician are transmitted to the patient (column 16, lines 32 through column 17, line 2). (Ans. 14). We agree with the Examiner's findings. As even the Appellants concede (App. Br. 15), Brown discloses "additional monitors 22 to provide health monitoring for asthma and various other previously mentioned chronic conditions." (Brown, col. 12, 11. 25-29; Fig. 1). Data from such various monitoring devices are provided to data management unit 10 (Brown, Fig. 1 ). Brown discloses that such data from various monitoring devices are stored in clearinghouse 54, can be processed and analyzed by computer 62, and the analyzed data transmitted to a remotely located healthcare professional (Brown, col. 16, 11. 32-54). In order for such data from different monitoring devices to be stored, processed and analyzed as described in Brown, such data must be parsed based on rules such as programming utilized by the health monitoring system to distinguish data of one type of monitoring device from another type of monitoring device. Correspondingly, we agree with the Examiner that Brown reasonably discloses the step of "parsing with a situation analyzer said raw data through a predetermined set of rules into a plurality of messages" as recited in claim 5 Appeal2013-008302 Application 11/104,810 11. 5 The Appellants' argument based on the blood glucose monitor is unpersuasive to establish that the Examiner erred. The Appellants also argue that the Examiner failed to set forth a prima facie case of obviousness as to the recited step "(b )" under Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1968), because the Examiner has not: determined the scope and content of the prior art; or ascertained the difference between the claimed invention and the prior art; thereby "making it impossible to resolve the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art." (App. Br. 9; id. at 16-17). The Appellants' arguments are unpersuasive. Contrary to the Appellants' assertions, the Examiner clearly determined the scope and content of the prior art by identifying what Brown (Final Act. 2-3; Ans. 3--4, 16), Reuss (Final Act. 3; Ans. 4, 16), and Linberg (Final Act. 4; Ans. 5, 16), each disclose. In addition, the Examiner ascertained the difference between the claimed invention and the prior art, 5 The Appellants do not appear to define the term "parse" as used in claim 11, either in their Specification or their arguments. The Appellants do not provide any persuasive explanation why the Examiner's interpretation might be unreasonably broad. Even had the term "parse" been defined by the Appellants narrowly so as to require that a digital signal be resolved into component parts (see, e.g., IEEE, IEEE 100 THE AUTHORITATIVE DICTIONARY OF IEEE STANDARD TERMS (7th edition 2000) ("parse," def'n 2)), Brown's clearinghouse 54 necessarily would have parsed or resolved into component parts the "digitally encoded information [received] from a user 58" (Brown, col. 15, 11. 64---66), that is, the digital signal telephonically conveying the raw data, which originated at multiple monitoring devices, from storage in a user's health monitoring system 58 to the clearinghouse (see id., 11. 40--49), before "processing the information as required" (id., 11. 66). Any such parsing would have been performed on the basis of a predetermined set of rules for determining where each component part of the digitally encoded information began and ended. 6 Appeal2013-008302 Application 11/104,810 the Examiner identifying what Brown and Reuss fail to disclose (Final Act 3; Ans. 4). The Examiner did not identify any difference between the teachings of Brown and the step recited in paragraph (b) of claim 11 because there is no difference. Brown describes the step. Correspondingly, the Appellants' further argument that the Examiner's failure to determine the content of the prior art and the differences makes it impossible to resolve the level of ordinary skill (App. Br. 17) is also unpersuasive. Step "(c)" The Appellants argue that various portions of Brown (see Ans. 3) cited by the Examiner fails to disclose the step of "determining with a workflow instructions and any historical data relating to similar messages an action to be applied to each of said plurality of messages" as recited in step "( c )" of claim 11 (App. Br. 17-19). While conceding that Brown teaches a user using menus to communicate with clearinghouse 54, which "identifies the hand held unit 12 and determines if any messages need to be sent to this particular unit, and if so, sends the message," the Appellants argue that Brown does not disclose the limitation at issue (App. Br. 18). The Examiner disagrees with the Appellants, and finds that Brown satisfies this recited limitation because it discloses that the clearinghouse is programmed to generate a menu allowing the healthcare professional to select the manner in which information is sent to the clearinghouse, and to display past readings or trends for a patient, and further discloses forwarding such analysis to the healthcare professional in a report (Ans. 3, citing Brown, col. 7, 1. 59---col. 8, 1. 14; col. 9, 11. 2-19; col. 17, 1. 64---col. 18, 1. 35; col. 23, 7 Appeal2013-008302 Application 11/104,810 1. 65---col. 24, 1. 26; Ans. 17, citing Brown, col. 7, 1. 59---col. 8, 1. 14; col. 16, 11. 32--40, 55---63; col. 21, 1. 55---col. 22, 1. 44; col. 23, 1. 65---col. 24, 1. 26). We agree with the Examiner's findings. Brown discloses, inter alia, a method in which: the microprocessor-based unit used by the healthcare professional can be programmed and arranged to allow information to be stored in the cartridge for return to and retrieval by the user of the healthcare monitoring system. The stored information can include messages (e.g., instructions for changes in medication dosage) and/or program instructions for reconfiguring the program included in the cartridge so as to effect changes in the treatment regimen, the analyses or reports to be generated by the healthcare monitoring system ... (Brown, col. 9, 11. 8-17). In addition to providing analyses and reports to the remotely located healthcare professional (Brown, col. 16, 11. 42--45) as discussed above relative to step "(b );" Brown also discloses that the menu system can be utilized to provide messages or instructions to the patient, which are stored and then transmitted (col. 16, 11. 55---63; see also col. 17, 1. 64---col. 18, 1. 35; col. 18, 11. 40--46). Correspondingly, Brown reasonably discloses the pertinent limitation by applying an action to a message based on workflow instruction (i.e., programming or interface) and historical data (i.e., past readings/ data as required to determine trends). The Appellants' arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive to establish that the Examiner erred. The Appellants also argue that the Examiner failed to set forth a prima facie case of obviousness as to the recited step "( c )" under Graham because the Examiner has not: determined the scope and content of the prior art; or ascertained the difference between the claimed invention and the prior art; 8 Appeal2013-008302 Application 11/104,810 thereby "making it impossible to resolve the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art." (App. Br. 9; id. at 19-20). However, the Appellants' arguments are unpersuasive as to Examiner error as discussed supra relative to step "(b ). " Claims 12-18 and 20-22 The Appellants rely on the patentability of independent claim 11 for patentability of dependent claims 12-18 and 20-22 that ultimately depend from claim 11 (App. Br. 22). Because the Appellants have not persuaded us of Examiner error in rejecting independent claim 11, dependent claims 12-18 and 20-22 fall with claim 11. Claims 1---6 and 8-10 The issues raised and arguments presented by the Appellants with respect to the apparatus claim 1 are substantively identical to those raised with respect to the method claim 11 discussed supra (see App. Br. 23-34; Ans. 12, 18-19). We find the Appellants' arguments unpersuasive for reasons substantively identical to those discussed supra relative to claim 11. Moreover, because the Appellants rely on the patentability of independent claim 1 for patentability of dependent claims 2---6 and 8-10 that ultimately depend from claim 1 (App. Br. 34), dependent claims 2---6 and 8-10 fall with claim 1. 9 Appeal2013-008302 Application 11/104,810 ORDER The Examiner's rejection of claims 1-6, 8-18, and 20-22 is AFFIRMED. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv). AFFIRMED 10 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation