Ex Parte Harris et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardJul 12, 201614469423 (P.T.A.B. Jul. 12, 2016) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/469,423 08/26/2014 Robert D. Harris HAI-55929 8882 26252 7590 07/12/2016 KELLY & KELLEY, LLP 6320 CANOGA AVENUE SUITE 1650 WOODLAND HILLS, CA 91367 EXAMINER COBURN, CORBETT B ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3714 MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE 07/12/2016 PAPER Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________________ Ex parte ROBERT D. HARRIS and BLAKE HARRIS ____________ Appeal 2016-005506 Application 14/469,423 Technology Center 3700 ____________ Before WILLIAM A. CAPP, BRANDON J. WARNER, and ARTHUR M. PESLAK, Administrative Patent Judges. CAPP, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellants seek our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134 of the final rejection of claims 1–3, 5–14, 29, 30, 32–41, and 43–47 as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Ranen (US 2010/0042555 Al, pub. Feb. 18, 2010) and Pollner (US 2005/0209887 Al, pub. Sept. 22, 2005) and claims 4, 31, and 42 over Ranen, Pollner, and Aragones (US 2012/0177891 A1, pub. Nov. 1, 2012). We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. Appeal 2016-005506 Application 14/469,423 2 THE INVENTION Appellants’ invention relates to exercise and fitness programs. Spec. ¶ 2. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the subject matter on appeal. 1. A personal training system, comprising: a computer generated personalized exercise regimen for a user; a plurality of booths within an exercise facility, each booth defining an enclosed space configured to be used by a single user at a time and provide privacy to the user within the booth, each booth being assigned a predetermined exercise to be performed by the user within the booth and the booths being arranged in a sequence in which the user is directed to perform different exercises corresponding to the computer generated exercise regimen for that user; and a hand held electronic device which the user carries from booth to booth during the exercise regimen and having a software application capable of displaying data relating to the computer generated exercise regimen for the user so as to direct the user to perform exercises within each booth according to the computer generated exercise regimen for the user, and inputting and storing user exercise performance results for each exercise of the exercise regimen performed by the user. OPINION Unpatentability of Claims 1–3, 5–14, 29, 30, 32–41, and 43–47 over Ranen and Pollner Claim 1 The Examiner finds that Ranen discloses a personal training system with a plurality of booths that provide privacy to a user. Final Action 2. The Examiner finds that each booth may be assigned a predetermined exercise to be performed by the user in the booth. Id. The Examiner further finds that the booths may be arranged in a sequence in which the user is Appeal 2016-005506 Application 14/469,423 3 directed to perform different exercises corresponding to a computer generated exercise regimen. Id. at 2–3. The Examiner finds that the arrangement of the booths is a matter of design choice. Id. at 3. The Examiner acknowledges that Ranen fails to teach a computer generated personalized exercise regimen. Id. The Examiner relies on Pollner as teaching a hand held electronic device that a user carries from place to place during exercise. Id. The Examiner concludes that it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention to have modified Ranen with the teachings of Pollner to achieve the claimed invention. Id. According to the Examiner, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have done this to allow ready access to fitness information, including graphics and video demonstration. Id. Appellants traverse the Examiner’s rejection by arguing that Ranen merely discloses a booth that is intended for use by a single individual. Appeal Br. 10–11. Appellants argue that a user of Ranen’s system rents a booth for a pre-set period of time and exercises within the single rented booth for the entire rented time. Id. Appellants argue that Ranen fails to disclose a plurality of booths where each booth is assigned a predetermined exercise and the booths are arranged in a particular sequence in accordance with an exercise regimen. Id. Appellants argue that there is no teaching in Ranen to support the Examiner’s finding that the arrangement of booths in a multi-booth exercise system is a matter of design choice. Id. at 12. In response, the Examiner states that it is well known in the art to use a handheld device to direct users from one exercise machine to another and direct a user’s workout in the manner claimed. Ans. 6 (referring to Pollner). The Examiner also states that it is known to place exercise equipment in a Appeal 2016-005506 Application 14/469,423 4 booth so that a user can exercise in privacy. Id. (referring to Ranen). The Examiner concludes that it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made to combine the two concepts so a user is provided with a directed workout, like that given by a personal trainer, without onlookers. Id. The Examiner further explains that combining known systems (Ranen’s booth and Pollner’s handheld device) by known methods yields the predictable result of placing each piece of exercise equipment in a separate booth. Id. The Examiner rebuts Appellants’ contention that combining Ranen and Pollner would result in booths that each contain a plurality of exercise equipment. Id. at 7. The Examiner emphasizes that practitioners are not automatons and that they have the ability to reason and exercise common sense. Id. The Examiner reasons that the economics of the fitness industry would naturally dictate that individual pieces of equipment would be disposed in individual booths as a matter of economic efficiency as opposed to duplication of numerous pieces of equipment in each booth. Id. In reply, Appellants argue that this case is about more than merely “putting exercise equipment into cubicles or booths.” Reply Br. 3. Appellants reiterate that the present invention provides booths that are used by a single user at a time so as to provide privacy. Id. Appellants reiterate that exercise equipment is disposed within the booths so that the user can perform assigned exercises in the booths. Id. Appellants also reiterate that the booths are arranged in a sequence in which the user is directed to perform the various exercises in accordance with the user’s computer generated exercise regimen. Id. Appeal 2016-005506 Application 14/469,423 5 Appellants assert that their invention provides many advantages over prior exercise facilities and personal training systems besides merely providing privacy. Id. at 3–4. Appellants contend that their invention creates an exercise regimen that is based on the user moving from one booth to another in a predetermined sequence in order to complete that user’s exercise regimen. Id. Thus, by moving from booth to booth and performing the assigned exercises therein, the user performs an entire exercise regimen or workout. Id. According to Appellants, the exercise equipment that is necessary for the next exercise to be performed within the regimen is “always available” because the booths are arranged in a predetermined sequence. Id. at 4. Appellants contrast this alleged advantage to prior art exercise systems where a particular exercise machine may or may not be available at a given time. Id. Another asserted advantage is that a user’s exercise regimen is simplified by moving from one booth to another which relieves the user of “attempting to figure out an exercise regimen or workout.” Id. Finally, Appellants fault the Examiner for misunderstanding and/or misconstruing the cited references. Reply Br. 4. Appellants point out that Ranen’s booth is erected in public areas where it serves as a substitute for a full gym. Id. Appellants reiterate the argument from their Appeal Brief that there is no teaching in Ranen of moving from one booth to another. Id. at 6. Appellants reiterate that a person of ordinary skill in the art, armed with the teaching of Ranen and Pollner, would only arrive at a system where a user would bring a hand-held device to a single exercise booth. Id. at 8. Appellants accuse the Examiner of improperly relying on his own assumptions and knowledge. Id. at 10. Appeal 2016-005506 Application 14/469,423 6 We think the Examiner has stated the better position. Essentially, the Examiner reasons that it was known to engage in an exercise regimen where a user moves from one piece of specialized exercise equipment to another in accordance with an exercise regimen and that it was known to use a hand held electronic device to guide and record an exercise session. As we understand and interpret the Examiner’s rejection, Appellants’ alleged improvement to known computer directed exercise regimens is to enclose individual pieces of exercise equipment so that the user can exercise in private. Ranen is relied on to show that it was known to allow users to exercise in private. Appellants’ argument that Ranen’s purpose is to provide an exercise booth away from a traditional gym and is used by a single user for a predetermined rental period is not persuasive. It is well-settled that “[a] reference may be read for all that it teaches, including uses beyond its primary purpose.” In re Mouttet, 686 F.3d 1322, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418–21 (2007)). Furthermore, it is common sense that familiar items may have obvious uses beyond their primary purposes, and a person of ordinary skill often will be able to fit the teachings of multiple patents together like pieces of a puzzle. KSR, 550 U.S. at 420. A person of ordinary skill in the art would readily recognize that Ranen’s booth is capable of providing privacy to users in a variety of exercise settings. Appellants’ argument that their invention provides a sequenced exercise regimen does not persuade us that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1. Common sense dictates that booths, walls, and doors are not required to provide a sequenced, exercise regimen. Users can just as easily Appeal 2016-005506 Application 14/469,423 7 rotate from one piece of exercise equipment to another in accordance with a schedule directed from a hand held computer device without the user passing from one booth to another through a closeable door.1 Contrary to Appellants’ position, we discern no error in the Examiner’s resort to common sense in proposing the combination of Ranen and Pollner. As persons of scientific competence in the fields in which they work, examiners are responsible for making findings, informed by their scientific knowledge, as to the meaning of prior art references to persons of ordinary skill in the art and the motivation those references would provide to such persons. Absent legal error or contrary factual evidence, those findings can establish a prima facie case of obviousness. In re Berg, 320 F.3d 1310, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Similarly, it is well-settled that a reason to modify a prior art reference may be found explicitly or implicitly in market forces; design incentives; the “interrelated teachings of multiple patents”; “any need or problem known in the field of endeavor at the time of invention and addressed by the patent”; and the background knowledge, creativity, and 1 We are not persuaded that placing individual pieces of equipment in privacy booths yields a particular advantage over more open fitness areas. Forcing a fixed rotation schedule such that every user must transition from one booth to another or one exercise machine to another may not be convenient or desirable for some users as some users may desire to spend a longer or shorter time interval with a particular piece of exercise equipment than what is allowed in Appellants’ privacy booth system regimen. See generally In re Urbanski, 809 F.3d 1237, 1243 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (discussing that a person of ordinary skill in the art is able to pursue the desirable properties of one reference while foregoing the benefits of other references). Similarly, users may prefer to use equipment in a different sequence than that dictated by Appellants’ arrangement of booths. See Fig. 16. Regardless of the relative advantages of booths versus an open fitness gym, we agree with the Examiner that the invention, as claimed, is unpatentable as obvious. Appeal 2016-005506 Application 14/469,423 8 common sense of the person of ordinary skill. Perfect Web Techs., Inc. v. InfoUSA, Inc., 587 F.3d 1324, 1328–29 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting KSR, 550 U.S. at 418–21)). Appellants’ Specification acknowledges that it was known in the prior art for a user to rotate among a variety of specialized pieces of exercise equipment. Spec. ¶¶ 6–7. Enclosing the specialized pieces of exercise equipment in privacy booths is merely a predictable variation of the prior art based on the combination of Ranen and Pollner. See KSR, 550 US at 417. (“When a work is available in one field of endeavor, design incentives and other market forces can prompt variations of it, either in the same field or a different one. If a person of ordinary skill can implement a predictable variation, § 103 likely bars its patentability”). In short, on the record before us, we are not persuaded that enclosing individual pieces of exercise equipment in privacy booths and then rotating a single user from booth to booth rises to the level of a patentable invention. “Among the inventions that the law deems obvious are those modest, routine, everyday, incremental improvements of an existing product or process . . . [that] do not involve sufficient inventiveness to merit patent protection.” Ritchie v. Vast Resources, Inc., 563 F.3d 1334, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2009). In view of the foregoing discussion, we determine that the Examiner’s findings of fact are supported by a preponderance of the evidence and that the Examiner’s legal conclusion of unpatentability is well-founded. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s unpatentability rejection of claim 1. Appeal 2016-005506 Application 14/469,423 9 Claims 2 and 5 Claim 2 depends from claim 1 and adds the limitation: “including a computer of a computerized system that periodically interfaces with the hand held electronic device.” Claims App. Claim 5 depends from claim 2 and adds the limitation, “wherein the computer coordinates the sequence of the user personalized exercise regimen with the exercises assigned to the plurality of booths.” Id. Appellants argue that there is no teaching in the prior art of a computer that coordinates the sequence of the user’s personalized exercise regimen with the exercises assigned to the plurality of booths. Appeal Br. 17. Appellants acknowledge that Pollner’s hand held device communicates with a computer, but contains no teaching that it is used with equipment that resides in a plurality of booths. Id. at 18. Appellants’ argument is, in essence, a reprise of their claim 1 argument concerning combining Pollner’s hand held device with Ranen’s exercise booth. We found that argument unpersuasive with regard to claim 1 and we find it equally unpersuasive here. For essentially the same reasons expressed above in connection with the claim 1, we sustain the rejection of claims 2 and 5. Claims 8 and 29 Claim 8 depends from claim 1 and adds the limitation: “wherein the user is directed to move from booth to booth according to a predetermined time limit for each booth.” Claims App. Claim 29 is an independent claim. Id. Appellants argue that Ranen teaches that the entirety of the user’s time and exercise regimen is spent within a single booth. Appeal Br. 20. In Appeal 2016-005506 Application 14/469,423 10 response, the Examiner states that Appellants’ argument fails to account for the combination of Ranen and Pollner. Ans. 11–12. The Examiner reiterates that Pollner teaches moving from device to device and Ranen teaches placing exercise equipment in a booth. Id. Thus, according to the Examiner, the combination teaches moving from exercise device to exercise device within a plurality of booths each with its own time limit. Id. at 12. Appellants’ argument essentially rehashes the same issue that we discussed and resolved adversely to Appellants in connection with the rejection of claim 1. Pollner teaches a computer directed exercise regimen where the user rotates from one device to another. Pollner ¶ 69.2 Appellants’ alleged improvement of surrounding exercise devices with a privacy booth is rendered obvious by the teachings of Ranen. On page 21 of the Appeal Brief, Appellants merely argue that “[i]ndependent claim 29 is patentably distinct from the cited references and should be allowable for the same reasons indicated above with respect to claims 1, 2, 5 and 8.” In view of the foregoing discussion, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 8 and 29. Claims 7 and 33 Claim 7 depends indirectly from claim 1 and directly from claim 6 and adds the limitation: “wherein at least a plurality of the booths have a single piece of exercise equipment disposed therein.” Claims App. Claim 33 depends from claim 29 and contains the identical limitation. Id. 2 “Workout report for a client 54 can include entries for date, day, technique, equipment, number of sets, number of repetitions[,] amount of weight and units of weight.” Pollner ¶ 69. Appeal 2016-005506 Application 14/469,423 11 The Examiner finds that the number of pieces of exercise equipment disposed in a booth is a matter of design choice. Final Action 4. Appellants argue that Ranen and Pollner do not teach providing a single piece of exercise equipment within a booth. Appeal Br. 19. Appellants, however, provide no evidence or persuasive technical reasoning that tends to show that placing only one piece of exercise equipment in a booth instead of two or more achieves any new, non-obvious, or unexpected result. See In re Rice, 341 F.2d 309, 315 (CCPA 1965). We agree with the Examiner that the number of pieces of exercise equipment to be placed in a booth is merely a matter of design choice. Id. . We sustain the rejection of claims 7 and 33. Claims 11 and 36 Claims 11 and 36 depend from claims 1 and 29, respectively, and each adds the limitation: “wherein the hand held electronic device directs the user to move from one booth to another in a predetermined sequence in order to complete the user personalized exercise regimen.” Claims App. Appellants argue that the applied art fails to teach moving from one booth to another in a predetermined sequence. Appeal Br. 20. Appellants acknowledge, however, that Pollner directs a user to move from one piece of exercise equipment to another. Id. The issue raised by Appellants is essentially the same issue that we have previously considered and resolved adversely to Appellants in connection with the rejection of claims 1, 2, and 8 above. Our reasoning to sustain the Examiner’s rejection of those claims applies with equal force to claims 11 and 36. In short, in view of the teachings of Pollner and Ranen, we see no patentable distinction between directing a user from device to Appeal 2016-005506 Application 14/469,423 12 device in an open gym environment and directing a user from device to device where the devices are disposed in booths. We sustain the rejection of claims 11 and 36. Claim 40 Claim 40 is an independent claim. Claims App. On page 21 of the Appeal Brief, Appellants’ argue that independent claim 40 is patentably distinct from the cited references and should be allowable for the same reasons indicated above with respect to claims 1, 2, 5, 6, 8, and 11. Elsewhere in their Appeal Brief, Appellants argue claim 40 in three separate paragraphs including: one paragraph traversing the rejection of claims 7, 33, and 40, a second paragraph traversing the rejection of claims 8, 29, and 40, and a third paragraph traversing the rejection of claims 11, 36, and 40. Appeal Br. 18–20.3 In these three paragraphs, Appellants raise no new arguments with respect to claim 40 that we have not previously addressed and resolved adversely to Appellants in connection with our discussion of claims 1, 7, 8, 11, 29, 33, and 36. Thus, for reasons previously discussed in connection with claims 1, 2, 5, 8, and 11, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 40. Claims 3, 6, 9, 10, 12, 30, 32, 34, 35, 37, 41, and 43–45 These claims depend, directly or indirectly, from either independent claim 1, independent claim 29, or independent claim 40. Claims App. Appellants do not argue for the separate patentability of these claims apart 3 Our rules require that claims or subgroups of claims that are argued separately shall be argued under a separate subheading that identifies the claims by number. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(iv). We take this opportunity to point out that Appellants’ Appeal Brief fails to comply with our rules in this regard. Appeal 2016-005506 Application 14/469,423 13 from arguments presented with respect to claims 1, 29, and 40 which we have previously considered. Consequently, we summarily sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 3, 6, 9, 10, 12, 30, 32, 34, 35, 37, 41, and 43– 45. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (2015), see also Hyatt v. Dudas, 551 F.3d 1307, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“When the appellant fails to contest a ground of rejection to the Board, . . . the Board may treat any argument with respect to that ground of rejection as waived”). Claims 13, 38, and 46 Claims 13, 38, and 46 depend, either directly or indirectly, from either claim 1, claim 29, or claim 40. Claims App. Each claim adds the limitation: “including a reaction test administered to the user before exercising, the computer or the software application of the hand held electronic device receiving the user reaction test results and adjusting the user personalized exercise regimen according to predetermined reaction test results parameters.” Id. Appellants argue that the applied art fails to disclose administration of a “reaction test” to users before exercising and adjusting the exercise regimen accordingly. Appeal Br. 21. The Examiner acknowledges that Pollner does not specify using a reaction test per se. Ans. 5; Final Action 5. However, the Examiner does find that Pollner contemplates administering other evaluation tests. Ans. 5; Final Action 5 (citing Pollner ¶¶ 59, 68, 87). The Examiner considers it obvious to use any standard test used by the fitness industry, including a reaction test and grip strength test. Ans. 5. In the Answer, the Examiner also points out that Appellants’ Specification does not describe a reaction test in detail and teaches that it is Appeal 2016-005506 Application 14/469,423 14 equivalent to other standard tests. Id. at 12. The Examiner concludes, based on Appellants’ Specification, that any standard test may be substituted for a reaction test. Id. Pollner discloses that its personal trainer processing system 18 can be used for personal trainers or coaches to enter fitness tests and create custom workouts for their clients. Pollner ¶ 59. It further explains that reports of a client’s fitness tests are available by using a dropdown menu on a handheld device which reports may include body composition test results and three minute step test results. Id. ¶ 68. Pollner adds that “other” fitness test reports can be generated and accessed. Id. Pollner explains that data from a 1-minute recovery heart rate can be entered and accessed. Id. ¶ 87. Pollner further explains that such test results can be used to assess a user or client’s progress over time. Id. Appellants’ Specification describes a process where a user performs an exemplary reaction test where the user taps a sequence of lighted icons in a given order. Spec. ¶ 110. Depending on the quickness of the user’s response, an algorithm determines whether the user is relatively alert and in good health and adjusts the user’s exercise regimen such as by altering the weight or resistance of various exercises to be performed. Id. Thus, both Pollner and Appellants disclose performing a pre-exercise assessment of the user and then tailoring the exercise regimen to the particular user/client. As we understand the Examiner’s position, administering a reaction test is merely one of a variety of possible pre- exercise assessment tests that can be administered to a user and concludes that no patentable significance should attach to the use of any particular test. Appeal 2016-005506 Application 14/469,423 15 Appellants do not dispute the Examiner’s finding that Pollner teaches administering a pre-exercise assessment test. See Appeal Br. 21. Appellants limit their contention to the absence of an express disclosure of a reaction test in Pollner. Id. Appellants provide neither evidence nor persuasive technical reasoning that tends to show that administering a reaction test to a user before he or she exercises results in a new, unexpected, or nonobvious outcome compared with the use of other pre-exercise assessment techniques. Thus, we are not apprised of error and, accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 13, 38, and 46. Claims 14, 39, and 47 Claims 14, 39, and 47 depend, either directly or indirectly, from either claim 1, claim 29, or claim 40. Claims App. Each claim adds the limitation: “including a device for administering a grip strength test, the results of which are used in generating the personalized exercise regimen for the user.” Id. Appellants argue that Pollner fails to disclose administration of a “grip strength test” for generating the personalized exercise regimen for the user. Appeal Br. 21. This argument falls short of articulating an argument for the separate patentability of these claims. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (statements that merely point out what a claim recites are not considered to present an argument for separate patentability of the claim); see also In re Lovin, 652 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Rule 41.37 requires more than recitation of the claim elements and a naked assertion that the elements are not found in the prior art). The Examiner acknowledges that Pollner does not specify using a grip strength test per se. Ans. 5; Final Action 5. However, the Examiner does Appeal 2016-005506 Application 14/469,423 16 find that Pollner contemplates administering other evaluation tests. Id. (citing Pollner ¶¶ 59, 68, 87). The Examiner considers it obvious to use any standard test used by the fitness industry, including a reaction test and grip strength test. Ans. 5. Appellants offer neither evidence nor persuasive technical reasoning in an attempt to rebut the Examiner’s position. Our previous discussion with respect to use of a reaction test in connection with claims 13, 38, and 46 applies with equal force to Appellants’ “grip strength test” limitations. We sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 14, 39, and 47. Unpatentability of Claims 4, 31, and 42 over Ranen, Pollner and Aragones Claims 4, 31, and 42 depend, either directly or indirectly, from either independent claims 1, 29, or 40, respectively. Claims App. Each claim adds the limitation: “wherein user performance results are transferred from the hand held electronic device to the computer which automatically adjusts the user exercise regimen according to an algorithm that analyzes the user performance results.” Id. The Examiner relies on Aragones as disclosing this limitation and concludes that it would have been obvious for a person of ordinary skill in the art to modify Ranen and Pollner by Aragones teaching of an algorithm. Final Action 5–6. According to the Examiner, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have done this to allow a user to have the benefit of a personal trainer without the expense. Id. In traversing the rejection of claims 4, 31, and 42, Appellants rely on the same arguments that we previously considered in connection with the rejection of claims 1, 29, and 40. Appeal Br. 22. For the reasons discussed with respect to claims 1, 29, and 40, we are not apprised of error in the Appeal 2016-005506 Application 14/469,423 17 Examiner’s rejection of claims 4, 31, and 42. Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claims 4, 31, and 42. DECISION The decision of the Examiner to reject claims 1–14 and 29–47 is affirmed. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation