Ex parte Hanson

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

Mar 28, 2001

08794337 (B.P.A.I. Mar. 28, 2001)

1
The opinion in support of the decision being entered today was
not written for publication and is not binding precedent of
the Board.
Paper No. 16
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
__________
BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES
__________
Ex parte SEAN P. HANSON
__________
Appeal No. 1999-2774
Application 08/794,337
___________
ON BRIEF
___________
Before McCANDLISH, Senior Administrative Patent Judge, and
FRANKFORT and JENNIFER D. BAHR, Administrative Patent Judges.
FRANKFORT, Administrative Patent Judge.
ON REQUEST FOR REHEARING
This is in response to appellant’s request for rehearing
of our decision mailed September 28, 2000, wherein we affirmed
the examiner's rejection of claims 1 through 6, 10 through 13,
22 and 23 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over
Kee in view of Law or Utterberg, and reversed the examiner’s
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rejection of claims 7 through 9 and 14 through 21 under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Kee in view of Law
or Utterberg considered further in view of either Oreopoulos
or Rugheimer.
In the request, appellant urges that our decision
regarding the combination of Utterberg with Kee as applied to
independent claims 1, 22 and 23 is based on a mistaken
interpretation of the structural characteristics of the Luer-
Lok joint seen in Utterberg. More specifically, in contrast
to our observations on page 8 of our earlier decision that
Utterberg discloses “a loose, freely rotatable mounting of the
sleeves once the connector is past the threaded portion of the
luer lock or the tangs of the retention device (34a),”
appellant argues that it is well known that such a Luer-Lok
joint operates by jamming the frustoconical sealing surfaces
of the joint together to create a seal (as seen at 46 in Fig.
5B of Utterberg), and that rotation at the sealing interface
would be inconsistent with the proper functioning of a Luer-
Lok device. Having again reviewed the Utterberg reference in
light of appellant’s points of argument, we must agree with
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appellant’s position as presented in the Request for Rehearing
(pages 3-4). Accordingly, we modify our earlier opinion by
now reversing the examiner’s rejection of claims 1 through 6,
10 through 13, 22 and 23 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Kee in view of Utterberg.
However, after having carefully considered each of the
points of argument raised by appellant in his Request for
Rehearing in relation to the combination of Kee and Law, we
remain of the view expressed in our earlier decision that
claims 1 through 6, 10 through 13, 22 and 23 would have been
obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art under 35 U.S.C. §
103(a) based on the collective teachings of Kee and Law.
Contrary to appellant’s assertions on page 2 of the request,
the clevis
set forth in independent claims 1, 22 and 23 on appeal is not
required to be “a cylindrical element structured to capture
the tang,” and nothing in the originally filed drawings or the
specification as originally filed requires that the clevis be
a cylindrical element, or requires that the clevis necessarily
provide “structural reinforcement completely around the tang
Appeal No. 1999-2774
Application 08/794,337

Webster’s Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the1
English Language, Portland House, 1989.
4
circumference,” as urged on page 2 of the request. In this
regard, we direct appellant to our discussion of this issue on
pages 6 through 8 of our decision mailed September 28, 2000,
and again point out that the originally filed disclosure of
the application does not even use the terminology “tang,”
“clevis,” or “tang and clevis connection.”
In further support of our determination in the decision
mailed September 28, 2000 regarding the combination of Kee and
Law, we observe that a “tang” is defined as “a long and1
slender
projecting strip, tongue, or prong forming part of an object,
such as a chisel, file, knife, etc., and serving as a means of
attachment for another part, as a handle or stock,” while a
“clevis” is defined as “a U-shaped yoke at the end of a chain
or rod, between the ends of which a lever, hook, etc., can be
pinned or bolted.” Thus, contrary to appellant’s argument in
both the brief and this Request for Rehearing, a clevis would
not be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art as
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requiring “a cylindrical element structured to capture a
tang,” as argued, for example, on page 2 of this request and
would not necessarily be required to provide structural
reinforcement completely around a tang circumference, or be
required to carry transverse loading diametrically, from side-
to-side of a joint, through a continuous span of material
arranged in a hoop direction, as argued on pages 2 and 3 of
the request.
Looking at Law, Figures 1-3, it remains our opinion that
the projecting portion (18, 40) of the conduit housing (12)
would have been viewed in its broadest reasonable
interpretation as constituting a “tang,” while the U-shaped
receiving portions defined by structures (42, 52, 60) of the
second conduit housing (20) would have been viewed as broadly
being a “clevis,” and that the “tang and clevis connection”
formed when these components are brought together to define a
raintight and oiltight swivel connection is “capable of low
friction rotation while maintaining a fluid tight seal at the
interface between the first and second parts,” as set forth,
for example, in independent claim 1 on appeal. As a further
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point, we observe that in Figure 4 of Law the rotatable
connection between the conduit housings (112) and (120)
likewise provides a “tang and clevis connection” as broadly
set forth in claim 1 on appeal.
Moreover, even if we were to accept appellant’s
assertions on pages 2 and 3 of the request concerning what
constitutes a “clevis,” we view the structure in Figure 4 of
Law to be responsive. In Figure 4 of Law the projecting
portion (118, 119) of the conduit housing (112) would have
been viewed as broadly constituting a “tang,” while the U-
shaped receiving portion defined on the second conduit housing
(120) would have been viewed as broadly being a “clevis.” In
this instance, the “clevis” includes (at annular channel 54) a
portion that is a
U-shaped, cylindrical element which provides structural
reinforcement completely around the tang circumference (at
119), but still provides for swivelling of the joint without
permitting unintended decoupling of the joint (col. 6, lines
1-8). In addition, the cylindrical portion of the “clevis” in
Figure 4 of Law would transfer transverse loads from one side
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to a diametrically opposite side of the joint through a
continuous span of material arranged in a hoop direction.
Thus, the structure in Law Figure 4 satisfies even appellant’s
more restrictive understanding of what constitutes a “clevis.”
In light of the foregoing, our affirmance of the
rejection of claims 1 through 6, 10 through 13, 22 and 23
under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) based on the collective teachings of Kee and Law set
forth in our decision mailed September 28, 2000 is maintained.
But our affirmance of the rejection of that same set of claims
based on Kee and Utterberg is now vacated and the examiner’s
rejection of claims 1 through 6, 10 through 13, 22 and 23
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) based on the collective teachings of
Kee and Utterberg is reversed.
As for appellant’s comments in the request concerning the
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proposed drawing corrections submitted with the Request for
Rehearing, we leave consideration of such drawing corrections
and the drawing corrections filed on February 23, 1998 to the
examiner, with the suggestion that the examiner carefully
review both of the proposed drawing corrections and the
amendments to page 8 of the specification (made in Paper Nos.
4 and 6) for any new matter.
Appellant’s request for rehearing is granted to the
extent that we have modified our earlier decision by now
reversing the examiner’s rejection of claims 1 through 6, 10
through 13, 22 and 23 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) based on the
collective teachings of Kee and Utterberg, but, in our
opinion, no further change in our decision mailed September
28, 2000, is warranted.
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No time period for taking any subsequent action in
connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 CFR
§ 1.136(a).
MODIFIED
)
HARRISON E. McCANDLISH, Senior)
Administrative Patent Judge )
)
)
) BOARD OF PATENT
CHARLES E. FRANKFORT )
Administrative Patent Judge ) APPEALS AND
)
) INTERFERENCES
)
JENNIFER D. BAHR )
Administrative Patent Judge )
Appeal No. 1999-2774
Application 08/794,337

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DAVID V. TRASK
TRASK BRITT & rOSSA
P. O. BOX 2550
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84110
CEF:caw