Ex Parte Hamilton et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardFeb 29, 201613188607 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 29, 2016) Copy Citation UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE 13/188,607 07/22/2011 113123 7590 Harrity & Harrity, LLP 11350 Random Hills Road Suite 600 Fairfax, VA 22030 03/02/2016 FIRST NAMED INVENTOR Mary Hamilton UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www .uspto.gov ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 0095-0038Cl 8522 EXAMINER HOLLAND, SHERYLL ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2164 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 03/02/2016 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address( es): docket@harrityllp.com mpick@harrity llp .com jesterbrook@harrityllp.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte MARY HAMILTON, BEATA KORYTKOWSKI, JOSHUA KAHN, and CHARLES NEBOLSKY Appeal2014-002270 Application 13/188,607 Technology Center 2100 Before ERIC B. CHEN, BETH Z. SHAW, and DANIEL J. GALLIGAN, Administrative Patent Judges. CHEN, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL This is an appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the non-final rejection of claims 1, 2, 4--9, and 11-16. Claims 3 and 10 have been cancelled. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b ). We affirm-in-part and enter new grounds of rejection pursuant to our authority under 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b). Appeal2014-002270 Application 13/188,607 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellants' invention relates to a communication system, including user terminals in communication with each other and in communication with a controller via communication channels. (Abstract.) Claims 1, 5, and 15 are exemplary, with disputed limitations in italics: 1. A method for use in a communication system comprising a plurality of user terminals in communication with each other and a controller via a plurality of communication channels, the method compnsmg: receiving, by the controller from a sender user terminal of the plurality of user terminals, a message designated to be communicated to a recipient associated with a recipient user terminal of the plurality of user terminals; posting, by the controller via a dashboard interface, the message to a discussion to which it pertains; and distributing, by the controller, the message to the recipient user terminal based on a preferred communication channel, availability, and workload for the recipient associated with the recipient user terminal, the availability of the recipient associated with the recipient user terminal being based on scheduling information for the recipient, wherein: if the scheduling information indicates that the recipient is available, determining whether the workload for the recipient is currently excessive; and if the workload for the recipient is currently excessive, excluding the recipient user terminal from receiving the message. 5. The method of claim 1, wherein distributing the message to the recipient user terminal further comprises: if the workload for the recipient is not currently excessive, determining whether the recipient has designated a preferred communication channel; 2 Appeal2014-002270 Application 13/188,607 if the recipient has not designated a preferred communication channel, sending the message to the recipient user terminal via a default communication channel; and if the recipient has designated a preferred communication channel, sending the message to the recipient user terminal via the preferred communication channel. 15. A method for use in a communication system comprising a plurality of user terminals in communication with each other and a controller via a plurality of communication channels, the method compnsmg: receiving, by the controller from a sender user terminal of the plurality of user terminals, a message designated to be communicated to a recipient associated with a recipient user terminal of the plurality of user terminals; posting, by the controller via a dashboard interface, the message to a discussion to which it pertains; and distributing, by the controller, the message to the recipient user terminal based on whether workload for the recipient associated with the recipient user terminal is currently excessive, wherein determining \~1hether the \~1orkload for the recipient is currently excessive fi.1rther compnses: assigning a score to the recipient based on specific tasks assigned to the recipient per a project plan, previous messages sent to the recipient and task alignment between subject matter of the message and an assigned task of the recipient; and comparing the score of the recipient with a threshold. Claims 1, 2, 5, 8, 9, and 12 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Armstrong (US 2004/0039779 Al; Feb. 26, 2004) and Horvitz (US 2004/0003042 Al; Jan. 1, 2004). Claims 4, 11, 15, and 16 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Armstrong, Horvitz, Beaven (US 2004/0186762 Al; Sept. 23, 2004), and Pather (US 2004/0002972 Al; Jan. 1, 2004). 3 Appeal2014-002270 Application 13/188,607 Claims 6, 7, 13 and 14 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Armstrong, Horvitz, and Beauchamp (US 2008/0046510 Al; Feb. 21, 2008). § 103 Rejection-Armstrong and Horvitz Claims 1, 2, 8, and 9 We are unpersuaded by Appellants' arguments (App. Br. 11-13; see also Reply Br. 5) that the combination of Armstrong and Horvitz would not have rendered obvious independent claim 1, which includes the limitation "if the scheduling information indicates that the recipient is available, determining whether the workload for the recipient is currently excessive." The Examiner found that the expected cost of interruption, calculated by the event system of Horvitz, corresponds to the limitation "if the scheduling information indicates that the recipient is available, determining whether the workload for the recipient is currently excessive." (Ans. 4--5, 34--35.) We agree with the Examiner. Horvitz relates to computer systems that support "collaboration and communication by collecting data from one or more devices, and that learns predictive models that provide forecasts of users' presence and availability." (i-f 2.) Horvitz explains that "[t]he present invention considers in the models of attention both low- and high-level events" (i-f l 01 ), including calendar events (e.g., meetings) (i-f l 02) and desktop usage patterns (i-f l 03). Figure 18 of Horvitz is diagram 1800 "illustrating inferences about attentional states and expected cost of interruption over time." (i-f 104.) Additionally, from Figure 18 of Horvitz, output 1810 illustrates states of attention, including "High-Focus Solo Activity, Low-Focus Solo Activity, 4 Appeal2014-002270 Application 13/188,607 Conversation in Office, Presentation or Meeting, Driving, Private Personal Time, Sleeping, and Now Available." (Id.) Also from Figure 18 of Horvitz, output 1820 illustrates curves for "expected costs associated with six different interruptions, including a telephone call, a pager, a full visual alert with audio chime herald, a thumbnail display with audio chime, a full visual alert without the chime, and a thumbnail display without chime." (i-f 105.) Because Horvitz provides multiples states of attention (e.g., High-Focus Solo Activity) and calculates the cost of interruption associated with such states of attention, Horvitz teaches the limitation "if the scheduling information indicates that the recipient is available, determining whether the workload for the recipient is currently excessive." Appellants argue "[t]here is no teaching or suggestion [in Horvitz] ... that the user's 'attentional focus' is related, in any way, to a workload of the user" and Horvitz "is silent regarding any workload associated with the user." (App. Br. 11-12; see also Reply Br. 5.) Similarly, Appellants argue "a user's 'calendar events' and 'usage patterns' [in Horvitz] may be considered to infer an 'expected cost of interruption over time' and an 'expected cost of interruption over time for different disruptions'" but "[t]here is no teaching or suggestion ... that the user's 'calendar events' and 'usage patterns' are related, in any way, to a workload of the user." (App. Br. 13; see also Reply Br. 5.) Contrary to Appellants' arguments, Horvitz explains that both calendar events and usage patterns are used to determine states of attention, such that the cost of interruption is associated with such states of attention. (See i-fi-f 101-104, Fig. 18.) Thus, we agree with the Examiner that the combination of Armstrong and Horvitz would have rendered obvious independent claim 1, which 5 Appeal2014-002270 Application 13/188,607 includes the limitation "if the scheduling information indicates that the recipient is available, determining whether the workload for the recipient is currently excessive." We are also unpersuaded by Appellants' arguments (App. Br. 14; see also Reply Br. 6-7) that the combination of Armstrong and Horvitz would not have rendered obvious independent claim 1, which includes the limitation "if the workload for the recipient is currently excessive, excluding the recipient user terminal from receiving the message." The Examiner found that contactee data for the channel manager of Horvitz, in which the contactee can request no interruptions for a given time period, corresponds to the limitation "if the workload for the recipient is currently excessive, excluding the recipient user terminal from receiving the message." (Ans. 35.) We agree with the Examiner. Horvitz explains that contactee data 2850 contains preference data 2854 concerning the preferences of the contactee. (i-f 153.) Such preference data 2854 of Horvitz includes the time of day for communicating, the time of the week for communicating, identity of contactors, hardware availability, software, and "preferred interruptability (e.g., do not interrupt while focused on work, only interrupt while not focused)." (i-f 157.) As an example, Horvitz explains that "contactee 2850 may need to have no interruptions for the next hour (e.g., 'hold everything unless high critical on this task or an hour from now')." (i-f 160.) Because the contactee of Horvitz indicates a preference of no interruptions "while focused on work," Horvitz teaches or suggests the limitation "if the workload for the recipient is currently excessive, excluding the recipient user terminal from receiving the message." 6 Appeal2014-002270 Application 13/188,607 Appellants argue that "[w]hile [paragraph 160 ot] HORVITZ et al. discloses a contactee that 'may need to have no interruptions for the next hour,' there is no teaching or suggestion in [paragraph 160 of] HORVITZ et al. that a contactee' s desire to be uninterrupted is based on the contactee' s excessive workload." (App. Br. 14; see also Reply Br. 6-7.) Contrary to Appellants' arguments, Horvitz explains that the contactee indicates a "preferred interruptability (e.g., do not interrupt while focused on work, only interrupt while not focused)." (i-f 157.) Appellants further argue that "[w]hile HORVITZ et al. states that the contactee may want to 'hold everything unless high critical on this task or an hour from now,' there is no teaching or suggestion that holding tasks for a period of time corresponds to excluding a 'recipient user terminal from receiving the message."' (App. Br. 14; see also Reply Br. 6-7.) In particular, Appellants argue that "[i]n contrast, the contactee will receive the message, because the contactor 2820 is prevented 'from "ducking" the contactee 2830 by leaving an email or a voice mail"' and "[w]hile the contactee in HORVITZ et al. may not want to be interrupted, the contactee still receives the message based on the contactor leaving 'an email or a voicemail. "' (App. Br. 14.) However, Appellants' arguments are not commensurate in scope with claim 1, which does not expressly recite any time limitations. Thus, we agree with the Examiner that the combination of Armstrong and Horvitz would have rendered obvious independent claim 1, which includes the limitation "if the workload for the recipient is currently excessive, excluding the recipient user terminal from receiving the message." 7 Appeal2014-002270 Application 13/188,607 Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of independent claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Claim 2 depends from independent claim 1, and Appellants have not presented any substantive arguments with respect to this claim. Therefore, we sustain the rejection of claim 2 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) for the same reasons discussed with respect to independent claim 1. Independent claim 8 recites limitations similar to those discussed with respect to independent claim 1, and Appellants have not presented any substantive arguments with respect to this claim. We sustain the rejection of claim 8, as well as dependent claim 9, for the same reasons discussed with respect to claim 1. Claims 5 and 12 We are persuaded by Appellants' arguments (App. Br. 17) that the combination of Armstrong and Horvitz would not have rendered obvious dependent claim 5, which includes the limitation "sending the message to the recipient user terminal via a default communication channel." The Examiner found that the integration program of Armstrong, which transfers contacts from a chat contact manager to an electronic mail address book, corresponds to the limitation "sending the message to the recipient user terminal via a default communication channel." (Ans. 6-7, 39.) In particular, the Examiner found that "as a default a user may choose to have all email forwarded to a default account (personal account), or the user could change the default settings to have email forwarded to a work email address." (Ans. 39.) We do not agree. Armstrong relates to information and collaboration management systems having real-time chat. (i-f 3.) Figure 16B of Armstrong illustrates a 8 Appeal2014-002270 Application 13/188,607 contact manager interface such that "contacts may also be transferred in the opposite direction, from the chat contact manager 130 to the electronic mail address book." (i-f 103.) Armstrong explains that "[t]he integration program will either save the contact to the associated electronic mail address book with default settings that can be changed later on, if desired, or it will prompt the user for special contact settings when it saves the contact to the electronic mail address book." (Id.) However, because Armstrong explains that "default settings" for saving electronic mail contacts are set, rather than setting a default communication channel, the Examiner has provided insufficient evidence to support a finding that Armstrong teaches the limitation "sending the message to the recipient user terminal via a default communication channel." Accordingly, we are persuaded by Appellants' arguments that "[w]hile [paragraph 103 of] AMSTRONG et al. discloses adding a contact to an 'electronic mail address book,' there is no teaching or suggestion of distributing a message." (App. Br. 17.) Thus, we do not agree with the Examiner that the combination of Armstrong and Horvitz would have rendered obvious dependent claim 5, which includes the limitation "sending the message to the recipient user terminal via a default communication channel." Accordingly, we do not sustain the rejection of dependent claim 5 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Dependent claim 12 recites limitations similar to those discussed with respect to claim 5. We do not sustain the rejection of claim 12 for the same reasons discussed with respect to claim 5. 9 Appeal2014-002270 Application 13/188,607 § 103 Rejection-Armstrong, Horvitz, Beaven, and Pather We are unpersuaded by Appellants' arguments (App. Br. 23; see also Reply Br. 14) that the combination of Armstrong, Horvitz, Beaven, and Pather would not have rendered obvious independent claim 15, which includes the limitation "assigning a score to the recipient based on specific tasks assigned to the recipient per a project plan." The Examiner found that the graphical user interface (GUI) of Beaven for performing collaborative tasks corresponds to the limitation "assigning a score to the recipient based on specific tasks assigned to the recipient per a project plan." (Ans. 21, 41.) We agree with the Examiner. Beaven relates to "systems which are implemented by establishing a shared repository of information which is accessible to the collaborators via a network." (i-f 2.) Figure 46 of Beaven illustrates a GUI for a system that performs collaborative tasks (i-f 239) such that "[t]he graphical user interface ... is produced by the system for a specific collaborator, and what the user sees and may do in the interface is determined in part by the collaborator's group membership" (i-f 240). Beaven explains that GUI includes "navigator menu 4607, which provides an overview of the current model for the collaborative task and permits a user to select one or more hierarchy entities to work on." (i-f 242.) Because the GUI of Beaven for collaborative tasks controls "what the user sees and may do" to the collaborative task based on group membership, Beaven teaches the limitation "assigning a score to the recipient based on specific tasks assigned to the recipient per a project plan." Appellants argue that although Beaven "discloses an interface that displays information based on a 'collaborator's group membership,' there is no teaching or suggestion in this passage of BEA VEN et al. that the 10 Appeal2014-002270 Application 13/188,607 'collaborator's group membership' is related, in any way, to a 'project plan' associated with the collaborator or 'specific tasks' assigned to the collaborator." (App. Br. 23; see also Reply Br. 14.) Contrary to Appellants' arguments, the GUI of Beaven controls "what the user sees and may do" to the collaborative task based on group membership. (See i-f 240.) Thus, we agree with the Examiner that the combination of Armstrong, Horvitz, Beaven, and Pather would have rendered obvious independent claim 15, which includes the limitation "assigning a score to the recipient based on specific tasks assigned to the recipient per a project plan." We are further unpersuaded by Appellants' arguments (App. Br. 25; see also Reply Br. 15-16) that the combination of Armstrong, Horvitz, Beaven, and Pather would not have rendered obvious independent claim 15, which includes the limitation "assigning a score to the recipient based on ... previous messages sent to the recipient and task alignment between subject matter of the message and an assigned task of the recipient." The Examiner found that the prioritization for text files of Pather corresponds to the limitation "assigning a score to the recipient based on previous messages sent to the recipient and task alignment between subject matter of the message and an assigned task of the recipient." (Ans. 22, 41.) We agree with the Examiner. Pather relates to a subscription modeling system, in particular, modeling such notification data that is sent to subscribers. (Abstract.) Pather explains that an automatic classification system generates a priority for an e-mail. (i-f 451.) Figure 18 of Pather illustrates text/data classifier 1820 that performs classification based on priority. (i-f 452.) Pather also explains that "[i]n the case of text classification, attributes are words or 11 Appeal2014-002270 Application 13/188,607 phrases or other domain-specific attributes derived from the words (e.g., parts of speech, presence of key terms), and the classes are categories or areas of interest (e.g., levels of priorities)." (i-f 453.) Because Pather explains that e-mails are prioritized based on text classification, Pather teaches the limitation "assigning a score to the recipient based on previous messages sent to the recipient and task alignment between subject matter of the message and an assigned task of the recipient." Appellants argue that although "PA THER et al. discloses classifying the 'priority of a text,' there is no teaching or suggestion in this passage of P ATHER et al. of assigning any score" and "P ATHER et al. merely discloses a classification based on attributes." (App. Br. 25; see also Reply Br. 15-16.) Contrary to Appellants' arguments, Pather explains that e-mails are prioritized (i.e., assigned a score) based on text classification. (See i1453.) Thus, we agree with the Examiner that the combination of Armstrong, Horvitz, Beaven, and Pather would have rendered obvious independent claim 15, which includes the limitation "assigning a score to the recipient based on ... previous messages sent to the recipient and task alignment between subject matter of the message and an assigned task of the recipient." Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of independent claim 15 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Independent claim 16 and dependent claims 4 and 11 recite limitations similar to those discussed with respect to independent claim 15, and Appellants have not presented any substantive arguments with respect to these claims. We sustain the rejection of claims 4, 11, and 16 for the same reasons discussed with respect to claim 15. 12 Appeal2014-002270 Application 13/188,607 § 103 Rejection-Armstrong, Horvitz, and Beauchamp Although Appellants nominally argue the rejection of dependent claims 6, 7, 13, and 14 separately (App. Br. 27), the arguments presented do not point out with particularity or explain why the limitations of these dependent claims are separately patentable. Instead, Appellants argue that "the disclosure of BEAUCHAMP et al. does not remedy the deficiencies in the disclosures of AMSTRONG et al. and HORVITZ et al." with respect to independent claims 1 and 8. (Id.) We are not persuaded by these arguments for the reasons discussed with respect to claims 1 and 8, from which claims 6, 7, 13, and 14 depend. Accordingly, we sustain this rejection. NEW GROUND OF REJECTION UNDER 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) We enter the following new ground of rejection: Dependent claim 5 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over the combination of Armstrong and Horvitz. Claim 5 recites the following: (i) "if the workload for the recipient is not currently excessive, determining whether the recipient has designated a preferred communication channel"; (ii) "if the recipient has not designated a preferred communication channel, sending the message to the recipient user terminal via a default communication channel"; and (iii) "if the recipient has designated a preferred communication channel, sending the message to the recipient user terminal via the preferred communication channel" (emphases added). Accordingly, claim 5 recites a conditional limitation in which the step of "determining whether the recipient has designated a preferred communication channel" occurs only "if the workload for the recipient is not currently excessive." However, if the workload for the recipient is currently 13 Appeal2014-002270 Application 13/188,607 excessive, the remaining steps, including the limitation "sending the message to the recipient user terminal via a default communication channel" need not be performed. In other words, the broadest reasonable interpretation of claim 5 encompasses a method where the steps of "if the recipient has not designated a preferred communication channel, sending the message to the recipient user terminal via a default communication channel" and "if the recipient has designated a preferred communication channel, sending the message to the recipient user terminal via the preferred communication channel" are not performed if the workload for the recipient is currently excessive. Therefore, we conclude that dependent claim 5 is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over the combination of Armstrong and Horvitz. This decision contains a new ground of rejection pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b). 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) provides that a "new ground of rejection pursuant to this paragraph shall not be considered final for judicial review." 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) also provides that Appellants, WITHIN TWO MONTHS FROM THE DATE OF THE DECISION, must exercise one of the following two options with respect to the new ground of rejection to avoid termination of proceedings (37 C.F.R. § 1.197 (b)) as to the rejected claims: ( 1) Reopen prosecution. Submit an appropriate amendment of the claims so rejected or new evidence relating to the claims so rejected, or both, and have the matter reconsidered by the examiner, in which event the proceeding will be remanded to the examiner .... 14 Appeal2014-002270 Application 13/188,607 (2) Request rehearing. Request that the proceeding be reheard under 37 C.F.R. § 41.52 by the Board upon the same record .... DECISION The Examiner's decision to reject claims 1, 3, 4, 6-9, 11, and 13-16 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) is affirmed. The Examiner's decision to reject claims 5 and 12 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) is reversed. We reject claim 5 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Armstrong and Horvitz. AFFIRMED-IN-PART 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) 15 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation