Ex Parte Hamilton et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Feb 29, 2016

13188607 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 29, 2016)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
13/188,607 07/22/2011
113123 7590
Harrity & Harrity, LLP
11350 Random Hills Road
Suite 600
Fairfax, VA 22030
03/02/2016
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
Mary Hamilton
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
0095-0038Cl 8522
EXAMINER
HOLLAND, SHERYLL
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2164
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
03/02/2016 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address( es):
docket@harrityllp.com
mpick@harrity llp .com
jesterbrook@harrityllp.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte MARY HAMILTON, BEATA KORYTKOWSKI,
JOSHUA KAHN, and CHARLES NEBOLSKY
Appeal2014-002270
Application 13/188,607
Technology Center 2100
Before ERIC B. CHEN, BETH Z. SHAW, and
DANIEL J. GALLIGAN, Administrative Patent Judges.
CHEN, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
This is an appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the non-final
rejection of claims 1, 2, 4--9, and 11-16. Claims 3 and 10 have been
cancelled. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b ).
We affirm-in-part and enter new grounds of rejection pursuant to our
authority under 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b).
Appeal2014-002270
Application 13/188,607
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants' invention relates to a communication system, including
user terminals in communication with each other and in communication with
a controller via communication channels. (Abstract.)
Claims 1, 5, and 15 are exemplary, with disputed limitations in italics:
1. A method for use in a communication system comprising
a plurality of user terminals in communication with each other and a
controller via a plurality of communication channels, the method
compnsmg:
receiving, by the controller from a sender user terminal of the
plurality of user terminals, a message designated to be communicated
to a recipient associated with a recipient user terminal of the plurality
of user terminals;
posting, by the controller via a dashboard interface, the message
to a discussion to which it pertains; and
distributing, by the controller, the message to the recipient user
terminal based on a preferred communication channel, availability,
and workload for the recipient associated with the recipient user
terminal, the availability of the recipient associated with the recipient
user terminal being based on scheduling information for the recipient,
wherein:
if the scheduling information indicates that the recipient is
available, determining whether the workload for the recipient is
currently excessive; and
if the workload for the recipient is currently excessive,
excluding the recipient user terminal from receiving the message.
5. The method of claim 1, wherein distributing the message
to the recipient user terminal further comprises:
if the workload for the recipient is not currently excessive,
determining whether the recipient has designated a preferred
communication channel;
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if the recipient has not designated a preferred communication
channel, sending the message to the recipient user terminal via a
default communication channel; and
if the recipient has designated a preferred communication
channel, sending the message to the recipient user terminal via the
preferred communication channel.
15. A method for use in a communication system comprising
a plurality of user terminals in communication with each other and a
controller via a plurality of communication channels, the method
compnsmg:
receiving, by the controller from a sender user terminal of the
plurality of user terminals, a message designated to be communicated
to a recipient associated with a recipient user terminal of the plurality
of user terminals;
posting, by the controller via a dashboard interface, the message
to a discussion to which it pertains; and
distributing, by the controller, the message to the recipient user
terminal based on whether workload for the recipient associated with
the recipient user terminal is currently excessive, wherein determining
\~1hether the \~1orkload for the recipient is currently excessive fi.1rther
compnses:
assigning a score to the recipient based on specific tasks
assigned to the recipient per a project plan, previous messages sent to
the recipient and task alignment between subject matter of the
message and an assigned task of the recipient; and
comparing the score of the recipient with a threshold.
Claims 1, 2, 5, 8, 9, and 12 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Armstrong (US 2004/0039779 Al; Feb. 26, 2004) and
Horvitz (US 2004/0003042 Al; Jan. 1, 2004).
Claims 4, 11, 15, and 16 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Armstrong, Horvitz, Beaven (US 2004/0186762 Al;
Sept. 23, 2004), and Pather (US 2004/0002972 Al; Jan. 1, 2004).
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Claims 6, 7, 13 and 14 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Armstrong, Horvitz, and Beauchamp (US 2008/0046510
Al; Feb. 21, 2008).
§ 103 Rejection-Armstrong and Horvitz
Claims 1, 2, 8, and 9
We are unpersuaded by Appellants' arguments (App. Br. 11-13; see
also Reply Br. 5) that the combination of Armstrong and Horvitz would not
have rendered obvious independent claim 1, which includes the limitation "if
the scheduling information indicates that the recipient is available,
determining whether the workload for the recipient is currently excessive."
The Examiner found that the expected cost of interruption, calculated
by the event system of Horvitz, corresponds to the limitation "if the
scheduling information indicates that the recipient is available, determining
whether the workload for the recipient is currently excessive." (Ans. 4--5,
34--35.) We agree with the Examiner.
Horvitz relates to computer systems that support "collaboration and
communication by collecting data from one or more devices, and that learns
predictive models that provide forecasts of users' presence and availability."
(i-f 2.) Horvitz explains that "[t]he present invention considers in the models
of attention both low- and high-level events" (i-f l 01 ), including calendar
events (e.g., meetings) (i-f l 02) and desktop usage patterns (i-f l 03).
Figure 18 of Horvitz is diagram 1800 "illustrating inferences about
attentional states and expected cost of interruption over time." (i-f 104.)
Additionally, from Figure 18 of Horvitz, output 1810 illustrates states of
attention, including "High-Focus Solo Activity, Low-Focus Solo Activity,
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Conversation in Office, Presentation or Meeting, Driving, Private Personal
Time, Sleeping, and Now Available." (Id.) Also from Figure 18 of Horvitz,
output 1820 illustrates curves for "expected costs associated with six
different interruptions, including a telephone call, a pager, a full visual alert
with audio chime herald, a thumbnail display with audio chime, a full visual
alert without the chime, and a thumbnail display without chime." (i-f 105.)
Because Horvitz provides multiples states of attention (e.g., High-Focus
Solo Activity) and calculates the cost of interruption associated with such
states of attention, Horvitz teaches the limitation "if the scheduling
information indicates that the recipient is available, determining whether the
workload for the recipient is currently excessive."
Appellants argue "[t]here is no teaching or suggestion [in Horvitz] ...
that the user's 'attentional focus' is related, in any way, to a workload of the
user" and Horvitz "is silent regarding any workload associated with the
user." (App. Br. 11-12; see also Reply Br. 5.) Similarly, Appellants argue
"a user's 'calendar events' and 'usage patterns' [in Horvitz] may be
considered to infer an 'expected cost of interruption over time' and an
'expected cost of interruption over time for different disruptions'" but
"[t]here is no teaching or suggestion ... that the user's 'calendar events' and
'usage patterns' are related, in any way, to a workload of the user." (App.
Br. 13; see also Reply Br. 5.) Contrary to Appellants' arguments, Horvitz
explains that both calendar events and usage patterns are used to determine
states of attention, such that the cost of interruption is associated with such
states of attention. (See i-fi-f 101-104, Fig. 18.)
Thus, we agree with the Examiner that the combination of Armstrong
and Horvitz would have rendered obvious independent claim 1, which
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includes the limitation "if the scheduling information indicates that the
recipient is available, determining whether the workload for the recipient is
currently excessive."
We are also unpersuaded by Appellants' arguments (App. Br. 14; see
also Reply Br. 6-7) that the combination of Armstrong and Horvitz would
not have rendered obvious independent claim 1, which includes the
limitation "if the workload for the recipient is currently excessive, excluding
the recipient user terminal from receiving the message."
The Examiner found that contactee data for the channel manager of
Horvitz, in which the contactee can request no interruptions for a given time
period, corresponds to the limitation "if the workload for the recipient is
currently excessive, excluding the recipient user terminal from receiving the
message." (Ans. 35.) We agree with the Examiner.
Horvitz explains that contactee data 2850 contains preference
data 2854 concerning the preferences of the contactee. (i-f 153.) Such
preference data 2854 of Horvitz includes the time of day for communicating,
the time of the week for communicating, identity of contactors, hardware
availability, software, and "preferred interruptability (e.g., do not interrupt
while focused on work, only interrupt while not focused)." (i-f 157.) As an
example, Horvitz explains that "contactee 2850 may need to have no
interruptions for the next hour (e.g., 'hold everything unless high critical on
this task or an hour from now')." (i-f 160.) Because the contactee of Horvitz
indicates a preference of no interruptions "while focused on work," Horvitz
teaches or suggests the limitation "if the workload for the recipient is
currently excessive, excluding the recipient user terminal from receiving the
message."
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Appellants argue that "[w]hile [paragraph 160 ot] HORVITZ et al.
discloses a contactee that 'may need to have no interruptions for the next
hour,' there is no teaching or suggestion in [paragraph 160 of] HORVITZ et
al. that a contactee' s desire to be uninterrupted is based on the contactee' s
excessive workload." (App. Br. 14; see also Reply Br. 6-7.) Contrary to
Appellants' arguments, Horvitz explains that the contactee indicates a
"preferred interruptability (e.g., do not interrupt while focused on work, only
interrupt while not focused)." (i-f 157.)
Appellants further argue that "[w]hile HORVITZ et al. states that the
contactee may want to 'hold everything unless high critical on this task or an
hour from now,' there is no teaching or suggestion that holding tasks for a
period of time corresponds to excluding a 'recipient user terminal from
receiving the message."' (App. Br. 14; see also Reply Br. 6-7.) In
particular, Appellants argue that "[i]n contrast, the contactee will receive the
message, because the contactor 2820 is prevented 'from "ducking" the
contactee 2830 by leaving an email or a voice mail"' and "[w]hile the
contactee in HORVITZ et al. may not want to be interrupted, the contactee
still receives the message based on the contactor leaving 'an email or a
voicemail. "' (App. Br. 14.) However, Appellants' arguments are not
commensurate in scope with claim 1, which does not expressly recite any
time limitations.
Thus, we agree with the Examiner that the combination of Armstrong
and Horvitz would have rendered obvious independent claim 1, which
includes the limitation "if the workload for the recipient is currently
excessive, excluding the recipient user terminal from receiving the
message."
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Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of independent claim 1 under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a). Claim 2 depends from independent claim 1, and Appellants
have not presented any substantive arguments with respect to this claim.
Therefore, we sustain the rejection of claim 2 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) for
the same reasons discussed with respect to independent claim 1.
Independent claim 8 recites limitations similar to those discussed with
respect to independent claim 1, and Appellants have not presented any
substantive arguments with respect to this claim. We sustain the rejection of
claim 8, as well as dependent claim 9, for the same reasons discussed with
respect to claim 1.
Claims 5 and 12
We are persuaded by Appellants' arguments (App. Br. 17) that the
combination of Armstrong and Horvitz would not have rendered obvious
dependent claim 5, which includes the limitation "sending the message to
the recipient user terminal via a default communication channel."
The Examiner found that the integration program of Armstrong,
which transfers contacts from a chat contact manager to an electronic mail
address book, corresponds to the limitation "sending the message to the
recipient user terminal via a default communication channel." (Ans. 6-7,
39.) In particular, the Examiner found that "as a default a user may choose
to have all email forwarded to a default account (personal account), or the
user could change the default settings to have email forwarded to a work
email address." (Ans. 39.) We do not agree.
Armstrong relates to information and collaboration management
systems having real-time chat. (i-f 3.) Figure 16B of Armstrong illustrates a
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contact manager interface such that "contacts may also be transferred in the
opposite direction, from the chat contact manager 130 to the electronic mail
address book." (i-f 103.) Armstrong explains that "[t]he integration program
will either save the contact to the associated electronic mail address book
with default settings that can be changed later on, if desired, or it will
prompt the user for special contact settings when it saves the contact to the
electronic mail address book." (Id.)
However, because Armstrong explains that "default settings" for
saving electronic mail contacts are set, rather than setting a default
communication channel, the Examiner has provided insufficient evidence to
support a finding that Armstrong teaches the limitation "sending the
message to the recipient user terminal via a default communication channel."
Accordingly, we are persuaded by Appellants' arguments that "[w]hile
[paragraph 103 of] AMSTRONG et al. discloses adding a contact to an
'electronic mail address book,' there is no teaching or suggestion of
distributing a message." (App. Br. 17.)
Thus, we do not agree with the Examiner that the combination of
Armstrong and Horvitz would have rendered obvious dependent claim 5,
which includes the limitation "sending the message to the recipient user
terminal via a default communication channel."
Accordingly, we do not sustain the rejection of dependent claim 5
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
Dependent claim 12 recites limitations similar to those discussed with
respect to claim 5. We do not sustain the rejection of claim 12 for the same
reasons discussed with respect to claim 5.
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§ 103 Rejection-Armstrong, Horvitz, Beaven, and Pather
We are unpersuaded by Appellants' arguments (App. Br. 23; see also
Reply Br. 14) that the combination of Armstrong, Horvitz, Beaven, and
Pather would not have rendered obvious independent claim 15, which
includes the limitation "assigning a score to the recipient based on specific
tasks assigned to the recipient per a project plan."
The Examiner found that the graphical user interface (GUI) of Beaven
for performing collaborative tasks corresponds to the limitation "assigning a
score to the recipient based on specific tasks assigned to the recipient per a
project plan." (Ans. 21, 41.) We agree with the Examiner.
Beaven relates to "systems which are implemented by establishing a
shared repository of information which is accessible to the collaborators via
a network." (i-f 2.) Figure 46 of Beaven illustrates a GUI for a system that
performs collaborative tasks (i-f 239) such that "[t]he graphical user interface
... is produced by the system for a specific collaborator, and what the user
sees and may do in the interface is determined in part by the collaborator's
group membership" (i-f 240). Beaven explains that GUI includes "navigator
menu 4607, which provides an overview of the current model for the
collaborative task and permits a user to select one or more hierarchy entities
to work on." (i-f 242.) Because the GUI of Beaven for collaborative tasks
controls "what the user sees and may do" to the collaborative task based on
group membership, Beaven teaches the limitation "assigning a score to the
recipient based on specific tasks assigned to the recipient per a project plan."
Appellants argue that although Beaven "discloses an interface that
displays information based on a 'collaborator's group membership,' there is
no teaching or suggestion in this passage of BEA VEN et al. that the
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'collaborator's group membership' is related, in any way, to a 'project plan'
associated with the collaborator or 'specific tasks' assigned to the
collaborator." (App. Br. 23; see also Reply Br. 14.) Contrary to Appellants'
arguments, the GUI of Beaven controls "what the user sees and may do" to
the collaborative task based on group membership. (See i-f 240.)
Thus, we agree with the Examiner that the combination of Armstrong,
Horvitz, Beaven, and Pather would have rendered obvious independent
claim 15, which includes the limitation "assigning a score to the recipient
based on specific tasks assigned to the recipient per a project plan."
We are further unpersuaded by Appellants' arguments (App. Br. 25;
see also Reply Br. 15-16) that the combination of Armstrong, Horvitz,
Beaven, and Pather would not have rendered obvious independent claim 15,
which includes the limitation "assigning a score to the recipient based on ...
previous messages sent to the recipient and task alignment between subject
matter of the message and an assigned task of the recipient."
The Examiner found that the prioritization for text files of Pather
corresponds to the limitation "assigning a score to the recipient based on
previous messages sent to the recipient and task alignment between subject
matter of the message and an assigned task of the recipient." (Ans. 22, 41.)
We agree with the Examiner.
Pather relates to a subscription modeling system, in particular,
modeling such notification data that is sent to subscribers. (Abstract.)
Pather explains that an automatic classification system generates a priority
for an e-mail. (i-f 451.) Figure 18 of Pather illustrates text/data classifier
1820 that performs classification based on priority. (i-f 452.) Pather also
explains that "[i]n the case of text classification, attributes are words or
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phrases or other domain-specific attributes derived from the words (e.g.,
parts of speech, presence of key terms), and the classes are categories or
areas of interest (e.g., levels of priorities)." (i-f 453.) Because Pather
explains that e-mails are prioritized based on text classification, Pather
teaches the limitation "assigning a score to the recipient based on previous
messages sent to the recipient and task alignment between subject matter of
the message and an assigned task of the recipient."
Appellants argue that although "PA THER et al. discloses classifying
the 'priority of a text,' there is no teaching or suggestion in this passage of
P ATHER et al. of assigning any score" and "P ATHER et al. merely
discloses a classification based on attributes." (App. Br. 25; see also Reply
Br. 15-16.) Contrary to Appellants' arguments, Pather explains that e-mails
are prioritized (i.e., assigned a score) based on text classification. (See
i1453.)
Thus, we agree with the Examiner that the combination of Armstrong,
Horvitz, Beaven, and Pather would have rendered obvious independent
claim 15, which includes the limitation "assigning a score to the recipient
based on ... previous messages sent to the recipient and task alignment
between subject matter of the message and an assigned task of the recipient."
Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of independent claim 15 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
Independent claim 16 and dependent claims 4 and 11 recite limitations
similar to those discussed with respect to independent claim 15, and
Appellants have not presented any substantive arguments with respect to
these claims. We sustain the rejection of claims 4, 11, and 16 for the same
reasons discussed with respect to claim 15.
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§ 103 Rejection-Armstrong, Horvitz, and Beauchamp
Although Appellants nominally argue the rejection of dependent
claims 6, 7, 13, and 14 separately (App. Br. 27), the arguments presented do
not point out with particularity or explain why the limitations of these
dependent claims are separately patentable. Instead, Appellants argue that
"the disclosure of BEAUCHAMP et al. does not remedy the deficiencies in
the disclosures of AMSTRONG et al. and HORVITZ et al." with respect to
independent claims 1 and 8. (Id.) We are not persuaded by these arguments
for the reasons discussed with respect to claims 1 and 8, from which
claims 6, 7, 13, and 14 depend. Accordingly, we sustain this rejection.
NEW GROUND OF REJECTION UNDER 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b)
We enter the following new ground of rejection:
Dependent claim 5 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over the combination of Armstrong and Horvitz.
Claim 5 recites the following: (i) "if the workload for the recipient is
not currently excessive, determining whether the recipient has designated a
preferred communication channel"; (ii) "if the recipient has not designated a
preferred communication channel, sending the message to the recipient user
terminal via a default communication channel"; and (iii) "if the recipient has
designated a preferred communication channel, sending the message to the
recipient user terminal via the preferred communication channel" (emphases
added). Accordingly, claim 5 recites a conditional limitation in which the
step of "determining whether the recipient has designated a preferred
communication channel" occurs only "if the workload for the recipient is not
currently excessive." However, if the workload for the recipient is currently
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excessive, the remaining steps, including the limitation "sending the
message to the recipient user terminal via a default communication channel"
need not be performed.
In other words, the broadest reasonable interpretation of claim 5
encompasses a method where the steps of "if the recipient has not designated
a preferred communication channel, sending the message to the recipient
user terminal via a default communication channel" and "if the recipient has
designated a preferred communication channel, sending the message to the
recipient user terminal via the preferred communication channel" are not
performed if the workload for the recipient is currently excessive.
Therefore, we conclude that dependent claim 5 is unpatentable under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over the combination of Armstrong and Horvitz.
This decision contains a new ground of rejection pursuant to
37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b).
37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) provides that a "new ground of rejection
pursuant to this paragraph shall not be considered final for judicial review."
37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) also provides that Appellants, WITHIN TWO
MONTHS FROM THE DATE OF THE DECISION, must exercise one of
the following two options with respect to the new ground of rejection to
avoid termination of proceedings (37 C.F.R. § 1.197 (b)) as to the rejected
claims:
( 1) Reopen prosecution. Submit an appropriate
amendment of the claims so rejected or new evidence relating
to the claims so rejected, or both, and have the matter
reconsidered by the examiner, in which event the proceeding
will be remanded to the examiner ....
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(2) Request rehearing. Request that the proceeding be
reheard under 37 C.F.R. § 41.52 by the Board upon the same
record ....
DECISION
The Examiner's decision to reject claims 1, 3, 4, 6-9, 11, and 13-16
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) is affirmed.
The Examiner's decision to reject claims 5 and 12 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) is reversed.
We reject claim 5 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over
Armstrong and Horvitz.
AFFIRMED-IN-PART
37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b)
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