Ex Parte Haight et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardMar 26, 201814229283 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 26, 2018) Copy Citation UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE 14/229,283 03/28/2014 51444 7590 03/28/2018 COOPER LEGAL GROUP I ORACLE 4700 Rockside Road Summit One, Suite 510 Independence, OH 44131 FIRST NAMED INVENTOR Ronald W. Haight UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www .uspto.gov ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. ORA130768 (0-395) 7109 EXAMINER FAROOQUI, QUAZI ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2491 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 03/28/2018 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address( es): MUthoff@CooperLegalGroup.com DDay@CooperLegalGroup.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte RONALD W. HAIGHT, BRETT J. LARSEN, TONY M. ZGARBA, and CHRISTIAN M. GREENE Appeal2017-009206 Application 14/229,283 Technology Center 2400 Before JEAN R. HOMERE, BETH Z. SHAW, and AARON W. MOORE, Administrative Patent Judges. HOMERE, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a Final Rejection of claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 9-15, 17, 19, 20, and 22-27, which constitute all claims pending in this application. Claims App'x. Claims 3, 6, 8, 16, 18, and 21 have been canceled. Id. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). 1 We affirm. 1 Appellants identify the real party in interest as Oracle International Corp. App. Br. 2. Appeal2017-009206 Application 14/229,283 Introduction According to Appellants, the claimed subject matter is directed to a method and system for allowing a client device (110) access to a point-of- service (POS) application via a web session. Spec. i-f 2, Figs. 1, 3. In particular, upon receiving from the client device (110) an access request including a device identifier uniquely identifying the client device, a computer system (105) compares the client device identifier with stored identifiers to determine whether the client device is authorized to access the POS application. Id. i-fi-136, 37, 45, 46. Upon determining that the client device (110) is authorized, the computer system (105) creates with the authorized client device (110) a web session that tracks and associates transaction information therewith to subsequently allow the client device (110) to access the POS application via the created web-session. Id. i-f 41. Representative Claim Independent claim 1 is representative, and reads as follows: 1. A method performed by a computer system including at least a processor and a memory, the method comprising: receiving, at the computer system of a commercial location, a network communication including a device identifier from a device requesting to access the computer system, wherein the device identifier uniquely identifies the device; in response to the receiving the device identifier, determining, by the processor, whether the device is authorized to access a point-of-service application by comparing the device identifier to authorized identifiers stored by the computer system, and determining if a match is found; and in response to determining that the match is found which indicates that the device is authorized, 2 Appeal2017-009206 Application 14/229,283 creating, by the computer system, a web session between the computer system and the device, wherein the web session tracks transaction information from the device and the web session associates the transaction information with the device; allowing the device access to the point-of-service application via the web session, and providing the device with application profile information for the point-of-service application, wherein the application profile information is specific to the device and is attached to the web session. Dua Hawkes Hruska Prior Art Relied upon US 2006/0165060 Al US 2013/0067552 Al US 2013/0282588 Al Rejections on Appeal July 27, 2006 Mar. 14, 2013 Oct. 24, 2013 Claims 1, 4, 5, 7, 11-14, 17, 19, 22, 26, and 27 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over the combination of Hawkes and Hruska. Final Act. 5-15. Claims 2, 9, 10, 15, 20, and 23-25 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over the combination of Hawkes, Hruska, and Dua. Final Act. 15-22. ANALYSIS We consider Appellants' arguments seriatim, as they are presented in the Appeal Brief, pages 9-15, and the Reply Brief, pages 2-7. 2 We are unpersuaded by Appellants' contentions. 2 Rather than reiterate all the arguments of Appellants and all the Examiner's findings, we refer to the Appeal Brief (filed February 3, 2017), the Reply Brief (filed June 13, 2017), and the Answer (mailed April 13, 2017) ("Ans.") for the respective details. We have considered in this Decision only those 3 Appeal2017-009206 Application 14/229,283 First, Appellants argue that the combination of Hawkes and Hruska does not teach or suggest generating a web session between a computer system and a user device in response to a match indicating the user device is authorized, as recited in independent claim 1. App. Br. 10-12. In particular, Appellants argue that Hruska discloses a first embodiment wherein a customer may set up a personal account with a financial institution (i-f 13), and a second embodiment wherein a merchant may setup a different account for a company with the financial institution (i-f 14). Id. at 10. According to Appellants, because the two embodiments disclosed by Hruska are intended to be used by separate and distinct entities, they are not related to each other. More particularly, Appellants argue that although Hruska discloses in both instances downloading a point of sale application by using a web session to open the financial account with the bank, the web session is not opened in response to a match of the client's device ID with a stored ID indicating that the client is authorized. Id. at 12. Additionally, Appellants argue the Examiner has relied in the Answer and for the first time during prosecution on lines 30-34 and 39-43 of paragraph 13 of Hruska instead of rebutting the arguments presented in the Appeal Brief. Reply Br. 3. These arguments are not persuasive. At the outset, we note Appellants' concern regarding the Examiner's alleged change of the rejection should have been addressed by way of a petition to the technology center Director overseeing the Examiner's art unit. Because Appellants have failed to timely file the petition, but have instead availed themselves of the arguments Appellants actually raised in the Briefs. Any other arguments Appellants could have made but chose not to make in the Briefs are deemed to be waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv) (2012). 4 Appeal2017-009206 Application 14/229,283 opportunity to fully address in the Reply Brief the newly cited portions of the Hruska reference, Appellants have waived any arguments regarding an improperly entered new ground of rejection. Second, we agree with the Examiner that because Appellants' arguments are directed to Hruska alone, whereas the rejection relies upon the combination of Hawkins and Hruska, Appellants' arguments are not responsive to the specific findings made by the Examiner. Ans. 3--4. As correctly noted by the Examiner, Appellants' arguments are tantamount to an individual attack against the references. One cannot show non- obviousness by attacking the references individually where the rejections are based on combinations of references. In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986); see also In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981). In particular, the Examiner relies upon Hawkes' backend authentication process to teach determining whether a client device is authorized to access resources by comparing the device ID with stored device ID information so as to authenticate the user thereof in response to a match. Ans. 4 (citing Hawkes i-fi-19, 35, Figs. 1, 8, 9). The Examiner further relies upon Hruska's teaching of opening a web session to complement Hawkes. Id. at 4--5 (citing Hruska i-f 13:1--4, 39--43). 3 Consequently, Appellants' attack on Hruska alone is misplaced because the Examiner relied upon the combined disclosures of Hawkes and Hruska to teach the disputed limitation. 3 We note in passing that one of ordinary skill in the art would have readily appreciated that Hawkes also teaches the web session between the user computer and the server following the authentication process authorizing the computer system to access requested data. Hawkes Fig. 10. 5 Appeal2017-009206 Application 14/229,283 Although the newly cited portions of Hruska discuss the backend generating a session specific log-in code for the mobile application unit upon the occurrence of a session log, we do not agree with Appellants that the Examiner is relying on the login code to teach the web session. Reply Br. 4. Instead, the proposed combination relied upon by the Examiner aims at combining the web session taught by Hruska with Hawkes' authentication system to teach the disputed limitations. Ans. 4--6. Further, we likewise do not agree with Appellants that because Hruska teaches establishing the web session before submitting the login code, the proposed combination of Hawkes and Hruska does not teach an authorization process followed by the establishment of the web session. Reply Br. 5. As noted above, the Examiner relies first upon Hawkes' authentication, followed by a reliance on Hruska's establishment of the web session. We find the Examiner's proposed combination of the cited teachings of Hawkes and Hruska is no more than a simple arrangement of old elements with each performing the same function it had been known to perform, yielding no more than one would expect from such an arrangement. KSR Int 'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416 (2007). The ordinarily skilled artisan, being "a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton," would be able to fit the teachings of the cited references together like pieces of a puzzle to predictably result in a financial transaction system wherein a user device is first authenticated before the user can be allowed to open a web session with the financial institution to perform a desired transaction. Id. at 420-21. Because Appellants have not demonstrated that the Examiner's proffered combination would have been "uniquely challenging or difficult for one of ordinary skill in the art," we agree with the Examiner that the proposed 6 Appeal2017-009206 Application 14/229,283 modification would have been within the purview of the ordinarily skilled artisan. Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing KSR, 550 U.S. at 418). Accordingly, we are not persuaded of error in the Examiner's obviousness rejection of claim 1. Regarding the rejection of claims 2, 4, 5, 7, 9--15, 17, 19, 20, and 22- 27, to the extent Appellants have either not presented separate patentability arguments or have reiterated substantially the same arguments as those previously discussed for patentability of claim 1 above, those claims fall therewith. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv). Further, to the extent Appellants have raised additional arguments for patentability of these claims, we find that the Examiner has rebutted in the Answer each and every one of those arguments by a preponderance of the evidence. Ans. 6-15. We adopt the Examiner's findings and underlying reasoning, which we incorporate herein by reference. Because Appellants have failed to persuasively rebut the Examiner's findings regarding the rejections of claims 2, 4, 5, 7, 9-15, 17, 19, 20, and 22-27, Appellants have failed to show error in the Examiner's rejection of these claims. DECISION For the above reasons, we affirm the Examiner's rejections of claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 9--15, 17, 19, 20, and 22-27. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a) (1) (iv). AFFIRMED 7 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation