Ex Parte Hadzidedic et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardMay 24, 201612603496 (P.T.A.B. May. 24, 2016) Copy Citation UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR 12/603,496 10/21/2009 Darko Hadzidedic 134318 7590 05/26/2016 Baker Botts L.L.P./Lennox 2001 Ross Avenue, 6th Floor Dallas, TX 75201 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www .uspto.gov ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. P080134 6634 EXAMINER STEVENS, THOMAS H ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2126 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 05/26/2016 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address( es): PTOmaill@bakerbotts.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte DARKO HADZIDEDIC and WOJCIECH GROHMAN Appeal2014-007835 Application 12/603,496 Technology Center 2100 Before CARL W. WHITEHEAD JR., JON M. JURGOV AN, and ADAM J. PYONIN, Administrative Patent Judges. JURGOV AN, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellants 1 seek review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a rejection of claims 1-20. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We reverse. 2 1 Appellants identify the real party in interest as Lennox Industries Inc. 2 Our decision refers to the Specification filed Oct. 21, 2009 ("Spec."), the Final Office Action mailed Sept. 9, 2013 ("Final Act."), the Appeal Brief filed Mar. 6, 2014 ("App. Br."), the Examiner's Answer mailed May 9, 2014 ("Ans."), and the Reply Brief filed July 9, 2014 ("Reply Br."). Appeal2014-007835 Application 12/603,496 STATE~vfENT OF THE CASE The claims are directed to forming a network of system devices for heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC). (See Claims App'x, independent claims 1, 9, and 1 7.) At least one of the system devices includes an HV AC demand unit. (Id.) Claim 1, reproduced below with argued language emphasized, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter: 1. A method of manufacturing an HV AC data processing and communication network, comprising: forming an HVAC network by causing a plurality of HV AC system devices to be coupled to a data bus, at least one of said HVAC system devices constituting an HVAC demand unit having an integral network controller; configuring a first HVAC system device to receive an initial value of a specified first parameter that is dependent upon a value of a second parameter of either said first HV AC system device or of a second HV AC system device; configuring said integral network controller to: determine that a value of said second parameter has changed after said first HV AC system device receives said initial value; and send said first HV AC system device a message modifying said first parameter in view of said second parameter change. REJECTIONS Claims 1-16 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) based on Wolff (US 7,693,583 B2, Apr. 6, 2010) and Meyer (US 5,887,651, Mar. 30, 1999). (Final Act. 4--14.) Claims 17-20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) based on Wolff, Nixon (US 5,862,052, Jan. 19, 1999), and Meyer. (Final Act. 14-- 19.) 2 Appeal2014-007835 Application 12/603,496 APPELLANTS' ARGU~vfENTS § 103(a) Rejection of Claims 1-16 Appellants argue neither Wolff nor Meyer describes inclusion of a network controller as an integral component of an HV AC demand unit, as recited in claims 1 and 9. (App. Br. 5.) Appellants also argue Meyer's heating demand controller 65 is not an "HV AC demand unit" as claimed. (App. Br. 5-6.) § 103(a) Rejection of Claims 17-20 Appellants argue Wolff, Nixon, and Meyer fail to describe inclusion of a network controller as an integral component of an HV AC demand unit. (App. Br. 6.) Although Appellants acknowledge Meyer teaches a controller, they argue it is not one that is integral with an HVAC demand unit. (App. Br. 6.) ANALYSIS § 103(a) Rejection of Claims 1-16 In the Final Office Action, the Examiner states Wolff fails to teach the claimed "HV AC demand unit." (Final Act. 5.) Accordingly, the Examiner relies on Meyer to teach this feature. (Id.) In the Answer, however, the Examiner recants this position, stating that Wolff's control panel 14 may also be considered an "HVAC demand unit" as claimed. (Ans. 3.) We, thus, consider whether Wolff's control panel 10 and controller 14, or Meyer's heating demand controller 65, may be regarded as equivalent to the claimed "HVAC demand unit." We construe claim terms according to the broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the Specification. In re Am. A cad. of Sci. 3 Appeal2014-007835 Application 12/603,496 Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Appellants state that an HV AC demand unit, as understood by those skilled in the pertinent art, provides a service in response to a control unit, and may be an HVAC component such as an air handler, furnace, or compressor. (App. Br. 5, Reply Br. 2--4.) The Specification is consistent with Appellants' statement, and describes the HV AC demand unit as follows: [A] demand unit 155 is representative of the various units exemplified by the air handler 110, furnace 120, and compressor 140, and more generally includes an HVAC component that provides a service in response to control by the control unit 15 0. The service may be, e.g., heating, cooling, humidification, dehumidification, or air circulation. (Spec. i-f 27.) (Emphasis added.) Thus, according to Appellants' Specification, an "HV AC demand unit" provides a service in response to control by a control unit. In contrast, Meyer's heating demand controller 65 controls the unit that provides the seP1ice of dehumidification, namely, the heating unit 40 (see Meyer Figs. 1 and 2, 8:54---62.). The Examiner has not shown Meyer's controller 65 is responsive to another control unit to provide the service of dehumidification. Similarly, Wolff's controller 14 controls dampers in a damper purge, but there is no indication it, or Wolff's control panel 10, is controlled by another controller to provide the service of purging the dampers. (See Wolff 10:4--16, Fig. 14.) Thus, because the Examiner bases the rejection of claims 1-16 on an unreasonably broad interpretation of "HVAC demand unit" in light of how the terminology is used in the Specification, we do not sustain the rejection of claims 1-16. Because our 4 Appeal2014-007835 Application 12/603,496 ,..J • • 1 • • • ,..J" • • c 1 • 1 ,..J 1 ueciSwn on tl1is issue is uispositive 01 tl1is appea1, we uo not reac11 Appellants' remaining arguments. § 103(a) Rejection of Claims 17-20 The rejection of claims 17-20 also relies on Wolff and Meyer to teach an "HVAC demand unit." (Final Act. 17, Ans. 3.) Thus, for the stated reasons, we do not sustain the rejection of claims 17-20. CONCLUSION To support a rejection under§ 103(a), "there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness." KSR Int 'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007) (quoting In re Kahn, 441F.3d977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). In this case, we find the Examiner's interpretation of the term "HVAC demand unit" to be unreasonably broad, and therefore, the rejection lacks the reasoning and underpinning necessary to support the conclusion of obviousness. DECISION We reverse the rejection of claims 1-16 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) based on Wolff and Meyer. We reverse the rejection of claims 17-20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) based on Wolff, Nixon, and Meyer. REVERSED 5 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation