Ex Parte GUZMAN

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

May 25, 2018

14221360 (P.T.A.B. May. 25, 2018)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
14/221,360 03/21/2014
28395 7590 05/30/2018
BROOKS KUSHMAN P.C./FG1L
1000 TOWN CENTER
22NDFLOOR
SOUTHFIELD, MI 48075-1238
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
Christian Castro GUZMAN
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
83418812 7267
EXAMINER
CHOWDHURY, NIGAR
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2484
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
05/30/2018 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@brookskushman.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte CHRISTIAN CASTRO GUZMAN 1
Appeal2017-009599
Application 14/221,3 60
Technology Center 2400
Before MICHAEL J. STRAUSS, JOSEPH P. LENTIVECH, and
MICHAEL M. BARRY, Administrative Patent Judges.
STRAUSS, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
1 According to Appellant, the real party in interest is Ford Global
Technologies, LLC. See App. Br. 1.
Appeal2017-009599
Application 14/221,3 60
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § I34(a) from a rejection of claims
1-24. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b ).
We affirm. 2
THE INVENTION
The claims are directed to vehicle-based media content capture and
remote service integration. Spec., Title. Claim 1, reproduced below with a
disputed limitation emphasized in italics, is illustrative of the claimed
subject matter:
1. A vehicle comprising:
at least one media content capture device; and
a controller, in communication with the at least one media
content capture device, configured to:
responsive to a user request, capture a media content
instance using the at least one media content capture device
according to media content capture settings of the vehicle, and
post the media content instance to a social media service account
linked to a unique identifier of the vehicle.
REFERENCES
The following prior art is relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the
claims on appeal:
Davidson
Muetzel et al.
Kim et al.
US 2013/0297175 Al
US 2014/0375807 Al
US 2015/0221142 Al
Nov. 7, 2013
Dec. 25, 2014
Aug. 6, 2015
2 We refer to the Specification filed Mar. 21, 2014 ("Spec."); the Final
Office Action, mailed Aug. 22, 2016 ("Final Act."); Appeal Brief, filed Jan.
23, 2017 ("App. Br."); the Examiner's Answer, mailed Mar. 4, 2017
("Ans."). The Reply Brief filed July 5, 2017 is noted but it is not cited
herein.
2
Appeal2017-009599
Application 14/221,3 60
REJECTIONS
The Examiner made the following rejections:
Claims 1---6, 8-12, and 14--18 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102( a)( 1) as being anticipated by Kim. Final Act. 4--9.
Claims 7, 13, 19, and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
being unpatentable over Kim and Davidson. Final Act. 9-13.
Claims 21-24 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Kim and Muetzel. Final Act. 14--16.
APPELLANT'S CONTENTION
Kim's notification to a user in a social media services format fails to
describe posting media content to a social media service account linked to a
unique identifier of the vehicle as recited by claim 1. App. Br. 6.
ANALYSIS
Appellant's contention is unpersuasive of reversible Examiner error.
Except as otherwise discussed herein 3, we adopt as our own ( 1) the findings
and reasons set forth by the Examiner in the action from which this appeal is
taken (Final Act. 2-18, Ans. 4--16) and (2) the reasons set forth in the
Examiner's Answer in response to Appellant's Appeal Brief (Ans. 17-19)
and concur with the conclusions reached by the Examiner. We highlight the
following for emphasis.
Appellant argues Kim's notification to a user in various formats is
3 Notably, the Examiner responds to Appellant's arguments concerning the
anticipation rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(l ), contending the
argument is an improper attack against the references individually, this
reasoning being inapplicable to an anticipation rejection.
3
Appeal2017-009599
Application 14/221,3 60
deficient in disclosing the disputed limitation because claim 1 requires ( 1)
posting to a social media account which is different than sending a
notification using a social media services format as disclosed by Kim, and
(2) posting to a social media service account linked to a unique identifier of
the vehicle, not to an account of Kim's user. App. Br. 6. The Examiner
responds, asserting Appellant's argument is an improper attack on the
"references individually where the rejections are based on combinations of
references." Ans. 17 ( citation omitted.)
We note at the outset the Examiner's assertion addressing Appellant's
argument in connection with the anticipation rejection of claim 1 is itself
improperly based on law only applicable to obviousness rejections under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a), not the argued rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(l). See
id. Nevertheless, we agree with the Examiner in finding Kim discloses
every element of the invention arranged as in claim 1 and, therefore,
anticipates that claim. See Microsoft Corp. v. Biscotti, Inc., 878 F .3d 1052,
1069 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
Although Kim does not disclose the recited limitation in haec verba, it
is well established that for anticipation under 35 U.S.C. § 102, "the reference
need not satisfy an ipsissimis verbis test." In re Gleave, 560 F.3d 1331,
1334 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citing In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831, 832-33 (Fed. Cir.
1990)). Prior art references are to be "considered together with the
knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the pertinent art." In re Paulsen, 30
F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). In that regard, "it is
proper to take into account not only specific teachings of the reference but
also the inferences which one skilled in the art would reasonably be
expected to draw therefrom." In re Preda, 401 F.2d 825, 826 (CCPA 1968).
4
Appeal2017-009599
Application 14/221,3 60
As the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit explained, for anticipation,
the dispositive question is "whether one skilled in the art would reasonably
understand or infer from a prior art reference that every claim element is
disclosed in that reference." Eli Lilly and Co. v. Los Angeles Biomedical
Res. Inst. at Harbor-UCLA Medical Center, 849 F.3d 1073, 1074--75 (Fed.
Cir. 2017) ( citation omitted).
As to whether the recited posting to a social media service account is
different than Kim's sending of a notification using a social media services
format, Appellant does not distinguish between the two. That is, we find no
explanation of what is required of the claimed posting action that would not
have been understood to be the same as and/or included in sending a
notification to a user using a social media services format as disclosed by
Kim.
Appellant's Specification discloses a vehicle-based computing system
(VCS) "may be configured to automatically upload the captured media
content instances 202 to the remote service 208" (Spec. ,r 36) and "user
interface 500 may include a post control 508 that, when selected, may be
configured to cause the VCS[] to provide the media content instance 202
displayed in the presentation 502 to an account of the remote service 208"
(Spec. 54). Thus, the requirement to post media content is satisfied by
uploading (i.e., sending) the content to an account for viewing. Therefore,
we find one skilled in the art would have understood or reasonably inferred
that using a social media services format to provide a notification as
disclosed by Kim includes posting to a social media services account.
Addressing the second portion of Appellant's argument, i.e., that
posting to a user's account is not equivalent to posting to an account linked
5
Appeal2017-009599
Application 14/221,3 60
to a unique identifier of the vehicle, we disagree. Appellant does not explain
what is required of an account linked to a unique identifier of a vehicle that
would meaningfully differ from an account of the user of the vehicle.
Appellant neither provides nor directs attention to a definition of the term
"linked", nor are we able to identify such a definition in Appellant's
Specification. Instead, Appellant's Specification discloses "vehicles 31 may
post their captured media content instances 202 to an account of the remote
service 208 associated with an identifier of the vehicle 31 ( e.g., to an
account identified at least in part by the vehicle 31 VIN, to a user telematics
account of the driver associated with the VCS 1, etc.)." Spec. ,r 38
( emphasis added). Therefore, an account of a driver using a particular
vehicle is associated with or "linked to" that vehicle because it is identified
by the person driving or using the vehicle, i.e., linked to a unique identifier
of the vehicle (the driver). Accordingly, under a broad but reasonable
interpretation of the disputed limitation, in view of Appellant's
Specification, Kim's notification to a user of a vehicle using a social media
services format would have been understood or inferred to encompass
posting to a social media account linked to a unique identifier of the vehicle
(i.e., an account of a user associated with the user of the vehicle).
For the reasons discussed above, Appellant's arguments are
unpersuasive of reversible Examiner error. Accordingly, we sustain the
rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(l) together with the rejection
of independent claims 8 and 14, argued on the same basis as claim 1, and the
rejection of dependent claims 2---6, 9-12, and 15-18, which are not argued
separately with particularity. App. Br. 6-7. For similar reasons, we also
sustain the rejection of dependent claims 21-24 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a),
6
Appeal2017-009599
Application 14/221,3 60
these claims also not argued separately with particularity. App. Br. 7.
DECISION
We affirm the Examiner's decision to reject claims 1-20 under 35
U.S.C. § 102(a)(l).
We affirm the Examiner's decision to reject claims 21-24 under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a).
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv). See 37
C.F.R. § 41.50(±).
AFFIRMED
7