Ex Parte Gussen et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jul 7, 2017

14168433 (P.T.A.B. Jul. 7, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/168,433 01/30/2014 Uwe GUSSEN 83411653 1944
28395 7590 07/11/2017
RROOKS KTTSHMAN P C /FfTET EXAMINER
1000 TOWN CENTER BURGDORF, STEPHEN R
22ND FLOOR
SOUTHFIELD, MI 48075-1238 ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2684
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/11/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing @brookskushman.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte UWE GUSSEN, THOMAS RAMBOW, GOETZ-
PHILIPP WEGNER, and RAINER BUSCH
Appeal 2017-003818
Application 14/168,433
Technology Center 2600
Before JAMES R. HUGHES, ERIC S. FRAHM, and
MATTHEW J. McNEILL, Administrative Patent Judges.
HUGHES, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appeal 2017-003818
Application 14/168,433
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134 from a rejection of claims 1,
7—10, and 13. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.
The invention relates to monitoring a traction battery of an electric
drive or hybrid drive motor vehicle. Spec. 9. Specifically, a battery
monitoring system determines current basic data about the traction battery
and transmits this data to an external computer that determines a point in
time when a deeply discharged state of the traction battery is expected to
occur. Spec. 9—12. A warning signal is transmitted from the external
computer to a communication device associated with the motor vehicle upon
reaching a specified warning time in advance of the expected time of the
deeply discharged state. Spec. 113. Claim 1, reproduced below, is
illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A method comprising:
receiving, from a vehicle battery monitoring system, data
for prediction of a deep discharge state of a traction battery of the
vehicle at a computer remote from the vehicle; and
causing, by the computer, transmission of a warning signal
to the battery monitoring system in response to an expected deep
discharge time, that is derived from the data, falling before a
predetermined deep discharge warning time.
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on
appeal is:
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Appeal 2017-003818
Application 14/168,433
Patillon
Carr
Nallabelli
Millet
Christensen
McCrea
Hsu
US 5,936,385
US 2011/0288737 A1
US 2012/0256751 A1
US 2013/0257344 A1
US 8,631,448 B2
US 2014/0075464 A1
GB 2 455 160 A
Aug. 10, 1999
Nov. 24, 2011
Oct. 11,2012
Oct. 3,2013
Jan. 14, 2014
Mar. 13, 2014
June 3, 2009
REJECTIONS
The Examiner made the following rejections:
Claims 1,8, and 13 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Millet, Hsu, Patillon, and Nallabelli.
Claim 7 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Millet, Hsu, Patillon, Nallabelli, and Carr.
Claim 9 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Millet, Hsu, Patillon, Nallabelli, and Christensen.
Claim 10 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Millet, Hsu, Patillon, Nallabelli, and McCrea.
ANALYSIS
Appellants contend the Examiner’s combination is based on faulty
reasoning and improper hindsight. App. Br. 3. Specifically, Appellants
argue that a central monitoring arrangement is more complex than a
distributed processing arrangement, and the Examiner incorrectly reasons it
would have been simpler, and thus obvious, to use a central monitoring
arrangement in Millet. See id. Appellants also argue that a time parameter
for gauging battery life is not more useful than state-of-charge (SOC)
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Appeal 2017-003818
Application 14/168,433
information, and thus it would not have been obvious to determine the
amount of time remaining before reaching a critical SOC level in Millet.
See id. Finally, Appellants argue the Examiner improperly relied on the
Specification in reasoning that it would have been obvious to warn a user at
a reasonable time in advance of a critical discharge level. See id. We are
not persuaded by Appellants’ arguments.
First, Hsu discloses sending data from a vehicle to a remote
monitoring system. Hsu, p. 3,11. 10-26. We disagree with Appellants (App.
Br. 3) that a remote central monitoring arrangement would be more complex
and thus not an obvious alternative to Millet’s battery monitoring unit
(BMU) that monitors SOC at the vehicle. See Millet, || 33—34. We agree
with the Examiner that performing the monitoring remotely at a central
location would allow Millet’s vehicle BMU to be simpler, and would
provide for easier updating of the monitoring software. See Ans. 13. “[I]f a
technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary
skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the
same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is
beyond his or her skill.” KSR Inti Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417
(2007). Here, Appellants have not shown using Hsu’s remote monitoring
system in Millet would have been “uniquely challenging or difficult for one
of ordinary skill in the art.” Leapfrog Enterprises, Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc.,
485 F.3d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Accordingly, Appellants’ argument
against combining Hsu’s remote monitoring system with Millet is not
persuasive.
Second, Patillon discloses determining a time when a battery will
reach a critical level. Patillon, col. 2,11. 34^43, col. 3,11. 21—27.
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Application 14/168,433
Specifically, Patillon discloses “calculating and providing at each current
instant a predictive indication of the lapse of time that is left from this
current instant onwards till the instant at which the battery will reach the
predetermined critical discharge voltage threshold.” Patillon, col. 3,11. 23—
27. The Examiner asserts that the time until a critical level would be useful
to a user, for example, in the situation where a parked “car will reach an
alarm state if unattended for another week.” Ans. 14. We agree with the
Examiner that one of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized the
usefulness of a time to reach a critical level because this would give the user
notice of how much time the user has in which to take action to charge the
vehicle. SOC information in the abstract, without the time to reach a critical
level, is simply not as useful. Moreover, Appellants have not shown using
Patillon’s time prediction feature would have been “uniquely challenging or
difficult for one of ordinary skill in the art.” Leapfrog, 485 F.3d at 1162.
Accordingly, we are not persuaded by Appellants’ argument against
modifying Millet in view of Patillon’s prediction of time remaining before a
critical discharge voltage threshold is reached.
Finally, we agree with the Examiner that modifying Millet to include
a predetermined warning time is not merely a product of hindsight based on
Appellants’Specification. See Am,. 15. Rather, Nallabelli teaches
triggering an alarm, a predetermined period of time prior to entering a
standby mode based on battery charge level. See Nallabelli, || 6, 50. Thus,
the combined system of Millet, Hsu, Patillon, and Nallabelli discloses a
remote monitoring system triggering an alarm a predetermined period of
time prior to a determined time for reaching a critical discharge voltage
threshold. As the Examiner asserts, the time between triggering an alarm
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Application 14/168,433
and an actual critical discharge would allow a user time to schedule
maintenance, i.e., charging. See Ans. 15. The fact that Appellants allege
“Millet already can warn the user in advance of critical discharge thereby
allowing corrective action” does not change our finding. Reply Br. 2. If
Millet does indeed teach this feature, then Nallabelli’s teachings would be
merely cumulative and Appellants’ argument with respect to the obviousness
of the predetermined warning time feature would be moot.
We are, therefore, not persuaded the Examiner erred in rejecting claim
1, and claims 7—10 and 13 not specifically argued separately.
CONCLUSION
The Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 1, 7—10, and 13 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
DECISION
For the above reasons, the Examiner’s rejections of claims 1, 7—10,
and 13 are affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED
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