Ex Parte Gschweng et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardOct 23, 201412509353 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 23, 2014) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ________________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ________________ Ex parte JOERG GSCHWENG, ANDREAS HEBERER, PETER EDUARD SCHUESSLER, THORSTEN LUEDTKE, and WINFRIED LANGENDORF ________________ Appeal 2012-007837 Application 12/509,353 Technology Center 3600 ________________ Before: EDWARD A. BROWN, MICHAEL L. HOELTER, and LEE L. STEPINA, Administrative Patent Judges. HOELTER, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE This is a decision on appeal, under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), from a final rejection of claims 1‒14. App. Br. 4. Claims 15‒17 have been withdrawn while claim 7 is indicated as containing allowable subject matter. App. Br. 4; Ans. 6. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We REVERSE. Appeal 2012-007837 Application 12/509,353 2 THE CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER The disclosed subject matter relates “to a side door of a motorized vehicle and comprises a latch mechanism being adapted to cooperate with a latch member disposed at a door frame.” Spec. para. 2. Claim 1, the only independent claim, is reproduced below: 1. A vehicle door of a motorized vehicle, comprising: a latch mechanism configured to cooperate with a latch member disposed at a door frame; an actuator configured to unlatch the latch mechanism, the actuator being disposed at a distance from the latch mechanism; a coupling configured to mechanically couple the actuator and the latch mechanism and to transfer an unlatching motion from the actuator to the latch mechanism; and an impact member configured to deform the coupling in such a way that a deformation of the coupling is adapted to counteract the unlatching motion. REFERENCE RELIED ON BY THE EXAMINER Fisher GB 2 361 675 A Oct. 31, 2001 THE REJECTIONS ON APPEAL1 Claims 1‒6, 8‒10, and 12‒14 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102 (b) as being anticipated by Fisher. Ans. 5. Claim 11 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Fisher. Ans. 5. 1 The Examiner’s rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph has been withdrawn. Ans. 6. Appeal 2012-007837 Application 12/509,353 3 ANALYSIS The rejection of claims 1‒6, 8‒10, and 12‒14 as being anticipated by Fisher As indicated, claim 1 is the only independent claim on appeal such that claims 2‒6, 8‒10, and 12‒14 depend, either directly or indirectly, from claim 1. Parent claim 1 includes the limitation of an impact member “configured to deform the coupling” and further that such “deformation of the coupling is adapted to counteract the unlatching motion.” The Examiner finds that Fisher discloses these limitations. Ans. 5. Fisher is directed to a latch for a vehicle door having a rod that is designed to be “disconnected” (i.e., disconnected from the corresponding latch mechanism and/or actuator) upon “impact on the exterior side of the door.” Fisher Abstract. Fisher teaches that [a] side impact on the door can cause the rod to be deformed inwardly relative to the vehicle whereupon the rod is tensioned such that it actuates the latch and allows the door to open whilst the inside door handle remains unoperated. Fisher 1.2 Fisher discloses that an open door during an accident is to be avoided because “an open door allows the passenger to fall out, increasing the chance of injury.” Fisher 1. Fisher further discloses that “the structural rigidity of a passenger cell of a vehicle is enhanced if all doors remain shut.” Fisher 1. Hence, to maintain the door shut during an accident, Fisher teaches a rod that “includes a failure point for disconnecting the inside release handle from the latch prior to potential opening of the latch by deformation of the rod as a result of an impact on the door.” Fisher 1. The embodiment referenced by the Examiner (Fig. 2) accomplishes this 2 Fisher does not provide line or paragraph numbering and, accordingly, reference will only be made to the page number. Appeal 2012-007837 Application 12/509,353 4 disconnection via a shearing of rod 136, but Fisher also recognizes that “shear abutments may not be necessary” because “simply notching the rod” may be sufficient to provide “a failure point which disconnects the inside release handle from the latch” thereby avoiding any “potential opening of the latch by deformation of the rod.” Fisher 4. Appellants challenge the Examiner’s interpretation of the claim term “deform” contending that it “does not describe or imply shearing a component or disengaging a component.” App. Br. 13. When construing claim terms, we first look to, and primarily rely on, the intrinsic evidence, including the specification—which is usually dispositive. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). We are further instructed that when interpreting the claims, the written description is of particular import, and it is “entirely appropriate for a court, when conducting claim construction, to rely heavily on [it] for guidance as to the meaning of the claims.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317. See also In re ICON Health and Fitness, Inc., 496 F.3d 1374, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“the PTO must give claims their broadest reasonable construction consistent with the specification” (emphasis added)). In this regard, Appellants’ Specification provided guidance as to the meaning of the claim term “deform.” Paragraph 18 of Appellants’ Specification describes an embodiment where “it is not intended to disassemble or to disengage the coupling between the latch-releasing actuator and the latch mechanism.” While a description directed to one embodiment would not generally be dispositive, Fisher also declares that “since the coupling means are only to be mechanically deformed or distorted, their functionality may remain intact even after the crash Appeal 2012-007837 Application 12/509,353 5 occurred” so as to possibly enable the door to be opened providing “an easy way for evacuating passengers of the vehicle.” Spec. para. 18. Hence, Appellants are making a distinction between a rod that is “deformed or distorted” but possibly still functional after the event and a rod that disassembles or disengages the coupling altogether with no further functionality possible. We conclude that one skilled in the art upon reading Appellants’ Specification would be aware of this construction, or this distinction, when deciphering the meaning of the claim terms “deform” and “deformation.” In short, Appellants’ Specification assigns or suggests to a person of ordinary skill in the art a particular scope or definition of these terms such that, in order to resolve the matter at hand, resort to a broader or a general dictionary definition of these terms for guidance is not justified. See Comaper Corp. v. Antec, Inc., 596 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2010).3 In view of the above, we agree with Appellants that as used, the claim terms “deform” and “deformation” do not encompass or imply a complete shearing, a disconnecting, or a disengagement (i.e., a loss of functionality) of the rod as argued. App. Br. 13. We instead agree with Appellants that “[a] deformed thing would be understood by those of ordinary skill in the art [after a review of the Specification] to be a damaged thing, but an intact thing; not a severed thing or one that has been disengaged so that it cannot produce a motion to unlatch.” App. Br. 13. 3 In Comaper, “[t]he patent specification [did] not assign or suggest a particular definition to the term ‘case’. Therefore, in determining the meaning of the claim term as viewed by a person of ordinary skill in the art, it is appropriate to consult a general dictionary definition of the word for guidance.” Comaper, 596 F.3d at 1348. Appeal 2012-007837 Application 12/509,353 6 Accordingly, as Fisher clearly discloses a disconnection or shearing of the rod (see Fisher 1, 3, 4), we agree with Appellants that Fisher does not teach or disclose “an impact member configured to deform the coupling” (and also “deformation”) as would have been understood by one skilled in the art upon a reading of Appellants’ Specification. App. Br. 13. As a consequence, we agree with Appellants that the Examiner failed to make a prima facie case of anticipation. App. Br. 13. We reverse the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1‒6, 8‒10, and 12‒14. Regarding claim 11, the Examiner finds that the additional limitations recited therein are obvious over Fisher. In this matter, Appellants argue that there are structural differences such that the Examiner’s reliance on “design consideration” has been overcome. Reply Br. 3; Ans. 5, 7. This contention by Appellants is due to the Examiner’s failure to show that a “receptacle being configured for receiving and securing the coupling,” as claimed, is not a structural limitation. Reply Br. 3. While we find no flaw in Appellants’ position on this point, we reverse the Examiner’s rejection of claim 11 on other grounds, i.e., on the basis that claim 11 depends from claim 1 and the Examiner’s separate rejection of claim 11 does not alter the reversal of the rejection of parent claim 1. DECISION The Examiner’s rejections of claims 1‒6 and 8‒14 are reversed. REVERSED mls Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation