Ex Parte Gryce

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Feb 20, 2018

11238999 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 20, 2018)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
11/238,999 09/30/2005 David Gryce 902906-00065 8710
4372 7590 02/22
ARENT FOX LLP
1717 K Street, NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20006-5344
EXAMINER
ARAQUE JR, GERARDO
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3689
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
02/22/2018 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
patentdocket @ arentfox. com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte DAVID GRYCE
Appeal 2016-0064041
Application 11/238,999
Technology Center 3600
Before LARRY J. HUME, JUSTIN BUSCH, and JOYCE CRAIG,
Administrative Patent Judges.
HUME, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
This is a decision on appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the Final
Rejection of claims 1—3, 5—13, 16—28, and 30-35, which are all claims
pending in the application. Appellant has canceled claims 4, 14, 15, and 29.
We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
1 According to Appellant, the real party in interest is Arent Fox PLLC.
App. Br. 4.
Appeal 2016-006404
Application 11/238,999
STATEMENT OF THE CASE2
The Invention
Appellant's disclosed embodiments and claimed invention relate "to a
method of and system for managing legal services, and in particular to a
method of and system for billing packaged trademark services associated
with product and service brand management." Spec. 12.
Exemplary Claim
Claim 1, reproduced below, is representative of the subject matter on
appeal (emphasis added to contested limitations):
1. A method for managing brands for products and
services internationally, the method implemented on a suitably
programmed computer comprising a processor, a data
repository and a user interface, the method comprising:
receiving, via the user interface, identification of a
package of legal services prior to performance of the legal
services, wherein the package of legal services includes one or
more portfolio management activities associated with
management of a brand portfolio to be performed for at least
one brand item, each brand-item having a type;
receiving a selection for membership of a core team
associated with the one or more portfolio management
activities;
determining a subscription for the package of legal
services, wherein the subscription includes a subscription term
and, for each brand item type, a subscription rate, the
2 Our decision relies upon Appellant's Appeal Brief ("Br.," filed
Oct. 16, 2015); Examiner's Answer ("Ans.," mailed Feb. 25, 2016); Final
Office Action ("Final Act.," mailed June 16, 2015); and the original
Specification ("Spec.," filed Sept. 30, 2005). We note Appellant did not file
a Reply Brief in response to the factual findings and legal conclusions in the
Examiner's Answer.
2
Appeal 2016-006404
Application 11/238,999
subscription being billed at periodic intervals during the
subscription term based on the subscription rate, wherein the
subscription is determined in advance of a performance of the
portfolio management activities;
determining, via the processor, a subscription fee
determined by the subscription rate multiplied by a current
number of brand items for each brand item type; and
generating, via the processor, a bill for at least a portion
of the subscription term for the package of legal services based
on the subscription fee.
Prior Art
The Examiner relies upon the following prior art as evidence in
rejecting the claims on appeal:
Bedell et al. ("Bedell")
Sobalvarro et al. ("Sobalvarro")
Baker et al. ("Baker")
US 6,622,128 B1
US 7,092,892 B1
US 7,634,415 B2
Sept. 16, 2003
Aug. 15, 2006
Dec. 15,2009
Rejections on Appeal
Rl. Claims 1—3, 5—13, 16—28, and 30-35 stand rejected under 35
U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Final
Act. 2; Ans. 2.
R2. Claims 1—3, 5—12, 16—28, and 30-35 stand rejected under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over the combination of Sobalvarro,
Baker, Bedell, and the Examiner's taking of Official Notice. Final Act. 4;
Ans. 2.3
3 We note the Examiner omitted reference to Bedell in the restatement of
the explicit statement of Rejection R2 in the Answer. Compare Ans. 2 with
3
Appeal 2016-006404
Application 11/238,999
CLAIM GROUPING
Based on Appellant's arguments (Br. 12—24), we decide the appeal of
statutory subject matter Rejection R1 of claims 1—3, 5—13, 16—28, and 30-35
on the basis of representative claim 1; and we decide the appeal of
obviousness Rejection R2 of claims 1—3, 5—12, 16—28, and 30-35 on the
basis of representative claim l.* * 4
ISSUES AND ANALYSIS
In reaching this decision, we consider all evidence presented and all
arguments actually made by Appellant. We do not consider arguments
Appellant could have made but chose not to make in the Briefs, and we
deem any such arguments waived. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv).
We disagree with Appellant's arguments with respect to claims 1—3,
5—13, 16—28, and 30-35 and, unless otherwise noted, we incorporate by
reference herein and adopt as our own: (1) the findings and reasons set forth
by the Examiner in the action from which this appeal is taken, and (2) the
reasons and rebuttals set forth in the Examiner's Answer in response to
Appellant's arguments. We highlight and address specific findings and
arguments regarding claim 1 for emphasis as follows.
Final Act. 4 and Ans. 14. Although not noted by Appellant, we find this to
be harmless administrative error.
4 "Notwithstanding any other provision of this paragraph, the failure of
appellant to separately argue claims which appellant has grouped together
shall constitute a waiver of any argument that the Board must consider the
patentability of any grouped claim separately." 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv).
In addition, when Appellant does not separately argue the patentability of
dependent claims, the claims stand or fall with the claims from which they
depend. In re King, 801 F.2d 1324, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
4
Appeal 2016-006404
Application 11/238,999
1. $ 101 Rejection R1 of Claims 1—3, 5—13, 16—28, and 30-35
Issue 1
Appellant argues (Br. 12—17) the Examiner's rejection of claim 1
under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter is
in error. These contentions present us with the following issue:
Did the Examiner err in concluding claim 1 is patent-ineligible by
being directed to fundamental economic/business practices and methods of
organizing human activity without providing an improvement to the
underlying technology or functioning of the computer?
Analysis
Alice Framework
Section 101 provides that anyone who "invents or discovers any new
and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any
new and useful improvement thereof' may obtain a patent. 35 U.S.C. § 101.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that patent protection should
not extend to claims that monopolize "the basic tools of scientific and
technological work." Gottschalkv. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972); Mayo
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 71 (2012);
Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLSBanklnt'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014).
Accordingly, laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not
patent-eligible subject matter. Id.
The Supreme Court's two-part Mayo!Alice framework guides us in
distinguishing between patent claims that impermissibly claim the "building
blocks of human ingenuity" and those that "integrate the building blocks into
something more." Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2354. First, we "determine whether
5
Appeal 2016-006404
Application 11/238,999
the claims at issue are directed to a patent-ineligible concept." Id. at 2355.
If so, we "examine the elements of the claim to determine whether it
contains an 'inventive concept' sufficient to 'transform' the claimed abstract
idea into a patent-eligible application." Id. at 2357 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S.
at 72, 79). While the two steps5 of the Alice framework are related, the
"Supreme Court's formulation makes clear that the first-stage filter is a
meaningful one, sometimes ending the § 101 inquiry." Elec. Power Grp.,
LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016). We note the
Supreme Court "has not established a definitive rule to determine what
constitutes an 'abstract idea'" for the purposes of step one. Enfish, LLC v.
Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing Alice, 134 S.
Ct. at 2357).
Alice Step 1 —Abstract Idea
Our reviewing court has held claims ineligible as being directed to an
abstract idea when they merely collect electronic information, display
information, or embody mental processes that could be performed by
humans. Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1353—54 (collecting cases). At the
same time, "all inventions at some level embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or
apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas." Mayo, 566 U.S.
at 71. Under this guidance, we must therefore ensure at step one that we
articulate what the claims are directed to with enough specificity to ensure
the step one inquiry is meaningful. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2354 ("[W]e tread
5 Applying this two-step process to claims challenged under the abstract
idea exception, the courts typically refer to step one as the "abstract idea"
step and step two as the "inventive concept" step. Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC
v. DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
6
Appeal 2016-006404
Application 11/238,999
carefully in construing this exclusionary principle lest it swallow all of
patent law.").
Appellant contends, "none of independent claims 1,16, and 17
constitute an abstract idea, and even if independent claims 1,16, and 17
were to constitute an abstract idea (not admitted), elements of the claims
transform the nature of the claims into the realm of patent eligibility."
Br. 13—14. Appellant further argues:
[T]he Office Action has not indicated the framework it
implemented in determining that any of claims 1,16, and 17
constitutes an abstract idea, nor has it provided any coherent
application of such a framework. Instead, without citing
authority for doing so, the Office Action essentially ignores the
explicit language and detailed subject matter of the claims and
concludes that each of the claims constitute an abstract idea
based on an unreasonably broad, high-level summary of the
claims by somehow parsing the claims down to merely
claiming "providing legal services."
The claims []do not recite a mathematical algorithm. Nor
do they recite a fundamental economic or longstanding
commercial practice. Although the claims address a business
challenge (generating a bill for legal services), they specifically
include generating the bill based on a subscription to a package
of legal services.
Br. 14.
In addition, Appellant contends:
The claimed solution presented in claims 1,16, and 17 is
different than the conventional function, which does not
provide the ability to subscribe to a package of legal services,
"wherein the subscription includes a subscription term and, for
each brand item type, a subscription rate, the subscription being
billed at periodic intervals during the subscription term based
7
Appeal 2016-006404
Application 11/238,999
on the subscription rate, wherein the subscription is determined
in advance of a performance of the portfolio management
activities," as in the independent claims. This is not a
"fundamental economic or longstanding commercial practice,"
as evidenced by the failure of any references to disclose or
suggest the subject matter of claims 1,16, and 17, as discussed
in further detail below in connection with the rejections of each
of the independent and dependent claims under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a).
Br. 15.
In response, the Examiner concludes the appealed claims are directed
to a judicial exception, i.e., an abstract idea without significantly more
because:
Claims 1—3, 5-13,16-28, and 30-35 are directed towards
providing legal services for a fee which is considered to be an
abstract idea inasmuch as providing legal services is an activity
that is considered both a fundamental economic and business
practices and methods of organizing human activity, which is
(i) a fundamental economic practice, (ii) a method of organizing
human activities, (iii) an idea of itself, or (iv) a mathematical
relationship or formula.
Ans. 3. The Examiner summarizes by finding the claimed invention is
directed to the abstract idea of providing legal services for a fee. Ans. 4.
Under the "abstract idea" step we must evaluate "the 'focus of the
claimed advance over the prior art' to determine if the claim's 'character as a
whole' is directed to excluded subject matter." Affinity Labs, 838 F.3d at
1257 (citation omitted).
Turning to the claimed invention, claim 1 recites:
A method for managing brands for products and services
internationally, the method implemented on a suitably
8
Appeal 2016-006404
Application 11/238,999
programmed computer comprising a processor, a data
repository and a user interface ....
Claim 1 (preamble).
Method claim l's limitations also require the steps of
"receiving. . . . identification of a package of legal services";
"receiving a selection for membership of a core team"; "determining a
subscription for the package of legal services"; "determining ... a
subscription fee ... ; and generating, via the processor, a bill for at
least a portion of the subscription term for the package of legal
services."
The Examiner concludes:
Independent claims 1,16, and 17 are directed towards the well-
understood, routine, and conventional activities of identifying
legal services, identifying information that corresponds to the
legal services (portfolio management, core team, cost
information, subscription information), and calculating a cost to
provide the legal services based on the relationship between the
subscription rate, the specifics of the subscription, and time. As
a result, the Examiner asserts that the claimed invention is,
indeed, directed towards a judicial exception of an abstract idea
and is, therefore, not eligible for the "streamlined analysis".
Ans. 4—5.
Under step one, we agree with the Examiner that the inventions
claimed in each of independent claims 1,16, and 17 are directed to an
abstract idea, i.e., fundamental economic and business practices and methods
of organizing human activity. See Ans. 3^4.
As the Specification itself observes, "[t]he present invention is
directed to a method of and system for managing legal services, and in
9
Appeal 2016-006404
Application 11/238,999
particular to a method of and system for billing packaged trademark services
associated with product and service brand management." Spec. 12.6 We
find this type of activity, i.e., managing and identifying a package of legal
services, selecting membership in a core team, and generating a bill, for
example, includes longstanding conduct that existed well before the advent
of computers and the Internet, and could be carried out by a human with pen
and paper. See CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366,
1375 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ("That purely mental processes can be unpatentable,
even when performed by a computer, was precisely the holding of the
Supreme Court in Gottschalk v. Benson.").* 1
Our reviewing court has previously held other patent claims ineligible
for reciting similar abstract concepts. For example, while the Supreme
Court has enhanced the § 101 analysis since CyberSource in cases like Mayo
and Alice, they continue to "treat[ ] analyzing information by steps people go
through in their minds, or by mathematical algorithms, without more, as
essentially mental processes within the abstract-idea category." Synopsys,
Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1146-47 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(alteration in original) (quoting Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1354).
6 See also Spec. 23 ("Abstract"):
A method of and system for managing brands for
products and services internationally. The method includes
receiving identification of a package of legal services, receiving
a selection for membership of a core team, determining a
subscription for the package of legal services, and generating a
bill based on the package of legal services, any legal services
performed, the subscription, and a subscription rate[.]
1 CyberSource further guides that "a method that can be performed by
human thought alone is merely an abstract idea and is not patent-eligible
under § 101." CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1373.
10
Appeal 2016-006404
Application 11/238,999
In this regard, the claims are similar to claims our reviewing court has
found patent ineligible in Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1353—54 (collecting
information and "analyzing information by steps people go through in their
minds, or by mathematical algorithms, without more, [are] essentially
mental processes within the abstract-idea category").
Therefore, in agreement with the Examiner, we conclude claim 1
involves nothing more than identifying, collecting, storing, comparing, and
generating data, without any particular inventive technology — an abstract
idea. See Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1354. We further refer to Content
Extraction, where the Federal Circuit has provided additional guidance on
the issue of statutory subject matter by holding claims to collecting data,
recognizing certain data within the collected data set, and storing that
recognized data in memory were directed to an abstract idea and therefore
unpatentable under § 101. Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A., 776 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
Accordingly, on this record, and under step one of Alice, we agree
with the Examiner's conclusion the claims are directed to an abstract idea.
Alice Step 2 —Inventive Concept
If the claims are directed to a patent-ineligible concept, as we
conclude above, we proceed to the "inventive concept" step. For that step
we must "look with more specificity at what the claim elements add, in order
to determine 'whether they identify an "inventive concept" in the application
of the ineligible subject matter' to which the claim is directed." Affinity
Labs, 838 F.3d at 1258 (quoting Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1353).
11
Appeal 2016-006404
Application 11/238,999
In applying step two of the Alice analysis, our reviewing court guides
we must "determine whether the claims do significantly more than simply
describe [the] abstract method" and thus transform the abstract idea into
patentable subject matter. Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709,
715 (Fed. Cir. 2014). We look to see whether there are any "additional
features" in the claims that constitute an "inventive concept," thereby
rendering the claims eligible for patenting even if they are directed to an
abstract idea. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2357. Those "additional features" must be
more than "well-understood, routine, conventional activity." Mayo, 566
U.S. at 79.
Evaluating representative claim 1 under step 2 of the Alice analysis,
we agree with the Examiner that it lacks an inventive concept that
transforms the abstract idea of managing legal services into a patent-eligible
application of that abstract idea. See Ans. 8.8
The Examiner concludes:
The claim(s) does not include additional element that are
sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial
exception because the claim recited generically computer
elements (e.g. terminal and processor) which do not add a
meaningful limitation to the abstract idea because they would
be routine in any computer implementation.
The Examiner asserts that the claimed invention does not
further or improve upon the technology or the technical field as
merely having a general purpose device to perform the steps of
the abstract idea is nothing more than having the general
purpose device perform the well-understood, routine, and
conventional activities already known in providing legal
services for a fee, which results in the claimed invention not
amounting to being significantly more than the judicial
exception.
12
Appeal 2016-006404
Application 11/238,999
We agree with the Examiner because, as in Alice, we find the
recitation of managing legal services on a subscription basis using "a
suitably programmed computer comprising a processor" (claim 1), "a non-
transitory computer usable medium having control logic stored therein for
causing a computer to provide interactive assistance with managing brands
for products and services internationally" (claim 16), or "wherein a
subscription for the package of legal services is determined via the
processor" (claim 17) is simply not enough to transform the patent-ineligible
abstract idea here into a patent-eligible invention. See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at
2357 ("[CJlaims, which merely require generic computer implementation,
fail to transform [an] abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.").* 9
Accordingly, based upon the findings above, on this record, we are
not persuaded of error in the Examiner's conclusion that the appealed claims
Ans. 8.
9 Appellant merely alleges:
Similar to DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, LP,
Appeal No. 2013-1505 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 5, 2015), the present
claims are unlike the claims in Alice, Ultramercial, buySAFE,
Accenture, and Bancorp that were found to be 'directed to' little
more than an abstract concept. The present claims do not recite
a commonplace business method aimed at processing business
information, applying a known business process to the
particular technological environment of the Internet, or creating
or altering contractual relations using generic computer
functions and conventional network operations, such as the
claims DDR HOLDINGS, 24 LLC v. HOTELS.COM, L.P. in
Alice, Ultramercial, buySAFE, Accenture, and Bancorp. The
claimed system, though it may be used by businesses, is patent
eligible under § 101.
Br. 15-16.
13
Appeal 2016-006404
Application 11/238,999
are directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Therefore, we sustain the
Examiner's § 101 rejection of independent claim 1, and grouped claims 2, 3,
5—13, 16—28, and 30-35, not argued separately, and which fall therewith.
See Claim Grouping, supra.
2. $ 103 Rejection R2 of Claims 1—3, 5—12, 16—28, and 30-35
Issue 2
Appellant argues (Br. 19—24) the Examiner's rejection of claim 1
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being obvious over the combination of
Sobalvarro, Baker, Bedell, and the Examiner's taking of Official Notice is in
error. These contentions present us with the following issue:
Did the Examiner err in finding the cited prior art combination teaches
or suggests "[a] method for managing brands for products and services
internationally, the method implemented on a suitably programmed
computer comprising a processor, a data repository and a user interface,"
that includes, inter alia, the steps of "receiving . . . identification of a
package of legal services prior to performance of the legal services," and
"determining a subscription for the package of legal services," as recited in
claim 1 because, allegedly, the Examiner engaged in impermissible
hindsight in combining Sobalvarro and Baker in Rejection R2 under § 103?
Analysis
Appellant contends "the combination of Sobalvarro and Baker is
improper because the Office Action relies on information gleaned solely
from Appellant's specification." Br. 22.
We disagree with Appellant's contention because, first, as explained in
In re McLaughlin'.
14
Appeal 2016-006404
Application 11/238,999
Any judgment on obviousness is in a sense necessarily a
reconstruction based upon hindsight reasoning, but so long as it
takes into account only knowledge which was within the level
of ordinary skill at the time the claimed invention was made
and does not include knowledge gleaned only from applicant's
disclosure, such a reconstruction is proper.
In re McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392, 1395 (CCPA 1971).
Our review of the record establishes that the Examiner's case for
obviousness is based on knowledge which was within the level of ordinary
skill at the time of Appellant's invention and does not include knowledge
gleaned only from the Appellant's disclosure.
Second, the Examiner identifies the relevant portions of each of the
references relied on throughout the Final Action and Examiner's Answer.
See Final Act. 4—12; Ans. 11—16. To the extent that the Examiner relies on
the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the art to combine the teachings of
the references, this practice is consistent with current case law. For
example, the Supreme Court explains:
Often, it will be necessary for a court to look to interrelated
teachings of multiple patents; the effects of demands known to
the design community or present in the marketplace; and the
background knowledge possessed by a person having ordinary
skill in the art, all in order to determine whether there was an
apparent reason to combine the known elements in the fashion
claimed by the patent at issue. To facilitate review, this analysis
should be made explicit. See In re Kahn, 441 F.3d977,988
(C.A.Fed.2006) ("[Rejections on obviousness grounds cannot
be sustained by mere conclusory statements; instead, there must
be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning
to support the legal conclusion of obviousness"). As our
precedents make clear, however, the analysis need not seek out
precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the
challenged claim, for a court can take account of the inferences
15
Appeal 2016-006404
Application 11/238,999
and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art
would employ.
KSRInt'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007).
In this case, the Examiner's conclusions of obviousness are clearly
articulated and are based on detailed factual findings that are supported by
the references of record. See Ans. 11—16.
We find the Examiner provided sufficient articulated reasoning with
some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.
Ans. 12.10 See KSR 550 U.S. at 418.
Moreover, Appellant has not demonstrated that the Examiner's
proffered combination of references would have been "uniquely challenging
or difficult for one of ordinary skill in the art." See Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v.
Fisher-Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing KSR, 550
U.S. at 418). Nor has Appellant provided objective evidence of secondary
considerations which our reviewing court guides "operates as a beneficial
10 The Examiner concludes:
[I]t would have been obvious to try, by one of ordinary skill in
the art at the time of the invention was made, to pick the
business practice of billing at periodic intervals and incorporate
it into the system and method of the combination of
Sobalvarro, Baker, and Bedell since there are a finite number
of identified, predictable potential solutions (i.e. types of
methods to receive payment) to the recognized need (receiving
payment for a service/product) and one of ordinary skill in the
art could have pursued the known potential solutions with a
reasonable expectation of success (the cost and benefits are
known).
Ans. 16.
16
Appeal 2016-006404
Application 11/238,999
check on hindsight." Cheese Sys., Inc. v. Tetra Pak Cheese and Powder
Sys., 725 F.3d 1341, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
Therefore, based upon the unrebutted findings above, on this record,
we are not persuaded of error in the Examiner's reliance on the cited prior art
combination to teach or suggest the disputed limitations of claim 1, nor do
we find error in the Examiner's resulting legal conclusion of obviousness.
Therefore, we sustain the Examiner's obviousness rejection of independent
claim 1, and grouped claims 2, 3, 5—12, 16—28, and 30-35 which fall
therewith. See Claim Grouping, supra.
CONCLUSIONS
(1) The Examiner did not err with respect to ineligible subject
matter Rejection R1 of claims 1—3, 5—13, 16—28, and 30-35 under 35 U.S.C.
§101, and we sustain the rejection.
(2) The Examiner did not err with respect to obviousness Rejection
R2 of claims 1—3, 5—12, 16—28, and 30-35 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over
the cited prior art combination of record, and we sustain the rejection.
DECISION
We affirm the Examiner's decision rejecting claims 1—3, 5—13, 16—28,
and 30—35.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv). See 37
C.F.R. § 41.50(f).
AFFIRMED
17