Ex Parte GrossDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardJan 30, 201713384346 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 30, 2017) Copy Citation United States Patent and Trademark Office UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O.Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 13/384,346 01/17/2012 Brian D. Gross 2009P00739WOUS 9278 24737 7590 02/17/2017 PTTTT TPS TNTFT T FfTTTAT PROPFRTY fr STANDARDS EXAMINER 465 Columbus Avenue HUTTON, NAN Suite 340 Valhalla, NY 10595 ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2154 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 02/17/2017 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): marianne. fox @ philips, com debbie.henn @philips .com patti. demichele @ Philips, com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte BRIAN D. GROSS Appeal 2016-001136 Application 13/3 84,3461 Technology Center 2100 Before DEBRA K. STEPHENS, KEVIN C. TROCK, and JESSICA C. KAISER, Administrative Patent Judges. STEPHENS, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Introduction Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a Final Rejection of claims 1, 2, 4—7, and 9-20. Claims 3 and 8 have been cancelled. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM-IN-PART. STATEMENT OF THE INVENTION The claims are directed to a patient ID resolution which associates first patient ID information and second patient ID information with patient 1 According to Appellant, the real party in interest is Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V (App. Br. 1). Appeal 2016-001136 Application 13/384,346 data collected at different times (Abstract). Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter: 1. An apparatus comprising: a medical device configured to acquire patient data as a function of time and to receive patient ID entries associated with acquired patient data, the medical device including data memory that stores acquired patient data and timestamped patient ID entries associated with acquired patient data; and a patient identification (ID) resolution module comprising a digital processor configured to disambiguate patient ID for patient data acquired over a time interval by the medical device, the patient data having a time gap during which the medical device did not acquire patient data and including pre-gap patient data preceding the time gap and post-gap patient data succeeding the time gap and further having one or more timestamped patient ID entries associated with the patient data, the patient ID resolution module (i) associating first patient ID information with the pre-gap patient data and (ii) associating second patient ID information with the post-gap patient data, the associating (i), (ii) being based on the one or more timestamped patient ID entries associated with the patient data and employing a set of patient ID disambiguation rules operating on the timestamps of the one or more timestamped patient ID entries relative to the time gap. The prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on REFERENCES appeal is: Borthwick Monitzer US 6,523,019 B1 Feb. 18,2003 US 2005/0228238 A1 Oct. 13, 2005 US 2006/0217623 A1 Sept. 28, 2006 US 2009/0048865 A1 Feb. 19, 2009 US 2009/0116710A1 May 7, 2009 US 2009/0119124 A1 May 7, 2009 Morganroth Breazeale Futami Kambaloor 2 Appeal 2016-001136 Application 13/384,346 REJECTIONS The Examiner made the following rejections: Claims 1,2, and 7 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Morganroth and Breazeale (Final Act. 3—6). Claims 4—6, 9, and 10 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Morganroth, Breazeale, and Monitzer {id. at 7—11). Claim 11 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Morganroth, Breazeale, and Kambaloor {id. at 11—12). Claims 12 and 13 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Morganroth, Breazeale, and Borthwick {id. at 13—14). Claims 14—16 and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Morganroth and Futami {id. at 14—19). Claims 17—19 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Morganroth, Futami, and Monitzer {id. at 19—20). ISSUE 1 35 U.S.C. § 103(a): Claims 1, 2, 4—7, and 9—13 Issue 1: Did the Examiner err in finding Breazeale teaches “employing a set of patient ID disambiguation rules operating on the timestamps of the one or more timestamped patient ID entries relative to the time gap,” as recited in claim 1 and similarly recited in claim 4? ANALYSIS Appellant argues Breazeale does not teach “employing a set of patient ID disambiguation rules operating on the timestamps of the one or more timestamped patient ID entries relative to the time gap,” as recited in claim 1 and similarly recited in claim 4 (App. Br. 11—14; Reply Br. 9). Specifically, Appellant argues Breazeale does not teach “any patient ID ambiguity” that is 3 Appeal 2016-001136 Application 13/384,346 resolved (Reply Br. 9 (emphasis omitted); App. Br. 13). Appellant further argues Breazeale reads patient IDs from RFID tags, but obtaining a patient ID by reading an RFID tag does not involve the use of timestamps (Reply Br. 9). We are persuaded by Appellant’s argument. The Examiner finds Breazeale “disambiguates time relevant patient IDs” by scanning a patient’s RFID tag to record the patient ID and the time the patient ID was scanned (Ans. 5—6 (citing Breazeale 25, 75); Final Act. 5). Breazeale teaches a tracking system which “stores information about various objects that have been sensed in a facility, and times and locations associated with such sensing of the objects,” i.e., Breazeale “correlates objects to locations . .. and the times that the objects were sensed in the particular locations” (Breazeale 175). However, Breazeale’s recordation of scanned patient IDs and recordation of timestamps indicating when the patient ID is scanned are not rules for resolving ambiguous patient IDs using timestamps. Furthermore, the cited portion of Breazeale teaches scanning of patient IDs is not based on timestamps; rather, Breazeale teaches the scanning only records timestamps. The Examiner has not identified where Breazeale teaches rules using timestamps for resolving ambiguous patient IDs. Because we agree with at least one of the arguments advanced by Appellant, we need not reach the merits of Appellant’s other arguments (see App. Br. 9-11, 14—15; see also Reply Br. 4—7, 10). It follows, we do not sustain the Examiner’s § 103 rejection of independent claims 1 and 4 over Morganroth and Breazeale and dependent claims 2 and 7 which depend directly or indirectly from claims 1 and 4. 4 Appeal 2016-001136 Application 13/384,346 The Examiner has not shown Monitzer, Kambaloor, or Borthwick cure the deficiencies of Breazeale. Accordingly, dependent claims 5, 6, and 9—13 stand with their respective independent claims. Thus, we do not sustain the Examiner’s § 103 rejection of claims 5, 6, and 9-13. ISSUE 2 35 U.S.C. § 103(a): Claims 14—20 Issue 2a: Did the Examiner err in finding the combination of Morganroth and Futami teaches “patient data acquired . . . over a time interval comprising pre-gap patient data followed in time by a time gap during which no patient data are acquired followed in time by post-gap patient data,” as recited in claim 14 and similarly recited in claim 20? Issue 2b: Did the Examiner err in finding the combination of Morganroth and Futami teaches “associating operations are based on the temporal positions of the one or more timestamped patient ID entries associated with the patient data relative to the time gap,” as recited in claim 14 and similarly recited in claim 20? Issue 2c: Did the Examiner err in finding Monitzer teaches “associating operations are further based on strength measures,” as recited in claim 17? ANALYSIS Issue 2a Appellant argues Morganroth does not teach “patient data acquired . . . over a time interval comprising pre-gap patient data followed in time by a time gap during which no patient data are acquired followed in time by post-gap patient data,” as recited in claim 14 and similarly recited in claim 20 (App. Br. 17; see Reply Br. 6). Specifically, Appellant argues 5 Appeal 2016-001136 Application 13/384,346 Morganroth’s collected patient data are for “separate ECG sessions performed in the course of the clinical study” (App. Br. 17). Appellant further argues “there is no reason to expect that no patient data were acquired by that ECG machine in the time gap between those sessions” and “it is highly likely that the ECG machine would have been used to record numerous other ECG sessions in that time gap” (App. Br. 17; see Reply Br. 6). We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments. The Examiner finds, and we agree, Morganroth “collects patient ECG data from one or more ECG machines” (Ans. 4 (citing Morganroth 148—51); Final Act. 15 (citing Morganroth || 31, 51—54)). In particular, the Examiner finds that “[w]hen one ECG machine is used, the ECG machine used for the first session and the second session is the same ECG machine” and that “[tjhere are time gaps between different data collection sessions” where “patient ECG data collected for the first session is the pre-gap patient data” and “patient ECG data collected for the second session is the post-gap patient data” (Ans. 4). Appellant’s arguments that patient data collected by Morganroth are for “separate ECG sessions” and that Morganroth can record “numerous other ECG sessions” (App. Br. 17; see Reply Br. 6) are not persuasive because the claims do not preclude separate or multiple ECG sessions. The Examiner finds a break between ECG sessions teaches the claimed time gap and any ECG data captured before the break is pre-gap patient data and any ECG data captured after the break is post-gap patient data (Ans. 4). The claim does not recite language precluding pre-gap and post-gap data from being separate sessions and further does not recite language limiting from which particular ECG sessions pre-gap or post-gap data are collected. 6 Appeal 2016-001136 Application 13/384,346 Accordingly, Appellant is arguing limitations not recited in the claims. Therefore, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in finding Morganroth teaches “patient data acquired . . . over a time interval comprising pre-gap patient data followed in time by a time gap during which no patient data are acquired followed in time by post-gap patient data,” within the meaning of claims 14 and 20. Issue 2b Appellant argues Futami does not teach “associating operations are based on the temporal positions of the one or more timestamped patient ID entries associated with the patient data relative to the time gap,” as recited in claim 14 and similarly recited in claim 20 (App. Br. 18—19; Reply Br. 12). Specifically, Appellant argues “the cited patient IDs of Futami are not disclosed as being time-stamped patient IDs” (Reply Br. 12; App. Br. 18). Appellant further argues Futami “correlat[es] imaging sessions acquired during different ‘examination frames’” rather than “a time gap during which no patient data are acquired” (App. Br. 18 ). We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments. Appellant’s arguments against Futami individually are not persuasive because the Examiner’s rejection is based on the combination of Morganroth and Futami. While Appellant argues Futami’s patient IDs are not timestamped patient IDs (Reply Br. 12; App. Br. 18), the Examiner relies on Morganroth to teach timestamps (Final Act. 3 (citing Morganroth || 48—51), 15) , and finds the combination of Morganroth and Futami teaches associating timestamped patient IDs with patient data (Ans. 8; see Final Act. 16) . More specifically, we agree with the Examiner that Morganroth collects “multiple ECG tracing[s] [ ] taken at different times with time gaps 7 Appeal 2016-001136 Application 13/384,346 in between” the collected ECG tracings (Final Act. 15 (citing Morganroth H 31, 51—54)) and that Morganroth’s collected “patient data are stamped data with time/date data and patient demographic data (includ[ing] patient ID)” (Final Act. 3 (citing Morganroth || 48—51). Furthermore, while Appellant argues Futami does not teach on “a time gap during which no patient data are acquired” (App. Br. 19 (emphasis omitted)), the Examiner relies on Morganroth to teach time gaps between ECG sessions in which patient data is not acquired (Final Act. 15; see Ans. 4), and finds the combination of Morganroth and Futami teaches associating patient IDs based on times relative to time gaps (Ans. 8; see Final Act. 16). Accordingly, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in finding the combination of Morganroth and Futami teaches “the associating operations are based on the temporal positions of the one or more timestamped patient ID entries associated with the patient data relative to the time gap,” within the meaning of claims 14 and 20. Issue 2c Appellant argues Monitzer does not teach “associating operations are further based on strength measures,” as recited in claim 17 (App. Br. 21). Specifically, Appellant argues Monitzer “suggests that there are differences in the strength of different patient [IDs] (i.e., automatic patient ID association is more reliable than manual patient ID association), but does not disclose any quantitative measure of the strength of the patient ID” (id.). We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments. The Examiner finds, and we agree, Monitzer teaches manual or automatic association of patient data with patent IDs (Ans. 6—7 (citing Monitzer H 3—5)). The Examiner further finds, and we agree, Monitzer teaches “automatic patient ID 8 Appeal 2016-001136 Application 13/384,346 association is more reliable than manual patient ID association” and according teaches “that there are differences in the strength of different patient [IDs]” (id.). Contrary to Appellant’s argument that a strength measure must be quantitative (App. Br. 21), Appellant’s Specification teaches the “strength measure of a timestamped patient ID entry is a measure of the likelihood that it was a correct patient ID entry” (Spec. 8). In particular, Appellant’s Specification teaches “user interface 16 is considered a less reliable patient ID entry modality . . . accordingly timestamped patient ID entries generated by the user interface 16 are assigned a ‘weak’ strength measure” whereas automatic “‘RFID reader 18 is considered a more reliable patient ID entry modality, and so timestamped patient ID entries generated by the RFID reader 18 are assigned a ‘strong’ strength measure” (id. at 8—9). Similar to Appellant’s Specification teaching that the reliability of patient ID association is a strength measure (id.), Monitzer teaches the strength of patient ID association is measured based on reliability (Monitzer || 3—5), i.e., “the likelihood that it was a correct patient ID entry” (Spec. 8). Accordingly, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in finding “associating operations are further based on strength measures,” within the meaning of claim 17. Remaining Claims 15, 16, and 18—20 Dependent claims 15, 16, and 18—20 are not separately argued by Appellant and thus these claims fall with their respective independent claims (see App. Br. 20-21). Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejections of dependent claims 15, 16, and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being 9 Appeal 2016-001136 Application 13/384,346 unpatentable over Morganroth and Futami and dependent claims 18 and 19 as being unpatentable over Morganroth, Futami, and Monitzer. DECISION The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 2, and 7 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Morganroth and Breazeale is reversed. The Examiner’s rejection of claims 4—6, 9, and 10 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Morganroth, Breazeale, and Monitzer is reversed. The Examiner’s rejection of claim 11 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Morganroth, Breazeale, and Kambaloor is reversed. The Examiner’s rejection of claims 12 and 13 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Morganroth, Breazeale, and Borthwick is reversed. The Examiner’s rejection of claims 14—16 and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Morganroth and Futami is affirmed. The Examiner’s rejection of claims 17—19 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Morganroth, Futami, and Monitzer is affirmed. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv). AFFIRMED-IN-PART 10 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation