Ex Parte Grodsky et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardFeb 28, 201712846559 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 28, 2017) Copy Citation United States Patent and Trademark Office UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O.Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 12/846,559 07/29/2010 Mark Grodsky 92900-787403 2207 20350 7590 03/02/2017 KILPATRICK TOWNSEND & STOCKTON LLP Mailstop: IP Docketing - 22 1100 Peachtree Street Suite 2800 Atlanta, GA 30309 EXAMINER NORTON, JOHN J ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3742 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 03/02/2017 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): ipefiling@kilpatricktownsend.com jlhice@kilpatrick.foundationip.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte MARK GRODSKY, RICHARD NEILL, and ALICIA THOMPSON Appeal 2015-005695 Application 12/846,559 Technology Center 3700 Before CHARLES N. GREENHUT, MICHAEL L. HOELTER, and ANNETTE R. REIMERS, Administrative Patent Judges. REIMERS, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Mark Grodsky et al. (Appellants) appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s decision to reject under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a): (1) claims 1, 3, 4, 6, 11, 17, 18, 21, and 23 as unpatentable over Smith (US 2008/0253755 Al; pub. Oct. 16, 2008), Wefler (US 6,853,801 B2; iss. Feb. 8, 2005), Majerowski (US 7,665,238 B2; iss. Feb. 23, 2010), Chao (US 5,928,858; iss. July 27, 1999), and Wingo (US 2008/0056691 Al; pub. Mar. 6, 2008); (2) claims 2 and 20 as unpatentable over Smith, Wefler, Majerowski, Chao, Wingo, and DeWitt (US 2008/0226269 Al; pub. Appeal 2015-005695 Application 12/846,559 Sept. 18, 2008); and (3) claim 22 as unpatentable over Smith, Wefler, Majerowski, Chao, Wingo, and Kim (US 5,021,275; iss. June 4, 1991). Claims 5, 7—10, 12—16, and 19 have been canceled. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We REVERSE. CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER The claimed subject matter relates “generally to the field of fragrance dispensers, and in particular to customizable fragrance dispensers.” Spec. 11, Figs. 1, 8. Claims 1 and 17 are independent. Claim 1 is illustrative of the claimed subject matter and recites: 1. A fragrance dispenser, comprising: a dispenser body having a top end, a bottom end, an interior, a front, a back, a left side and a right side, wherein the front side includes a window to permit at least a portion of the interior of the dispenser body to be viewed from without, and wherein the top end includes at least one opening for emitting a fragrance, wherein the dispenser body further comprises a top portion and a bottom portion that are separable from each other to provide access to the interior of the dispenser body, wherein the top portion comprises at least four walls corresponding to the front, the back, the left side and the right side, and a base that is perpendicular to the four walls, wherein the bottom portion includes at least three walls that correspond to the front, the left side and the right side, and wherein the container is deposited in the bottom portion; a container disposed within the dispenser body and accessible within the interior of the dispenser body when the top portion and the bottom portion are separated from each other, the container being adapted to hold a liquid fragrance that is to be dispensed, wherein the container is viewable through the window; and a dispensing mechanism disposed within the dispenser body that is configured to dispense the liquid fragrance from the container, wherein the dispensing mechanism comprises a 2 Appeal 2015-005695 Application 12/846,559 ceramic heater that is disposed in the top portion, wherein the dispensing mechanism further comprises an electrical plug that is electrically connected to the ceramic heater, and wherein the top portion includes an extension that extends vertically below the base of the top portion, and wherein the electrical plug laterally extends from the extension such that the electrical plug is vertically below the base of top portion; a bottom skin with a protective backing that is configured to be removably adhered to an outside surface of the bottom portion of the dispenser body by removing the protective backing and placing the bottom skin adjacent the outside surface using a human hand, wherein the skin is configured to extend across the left side, the front and the right side and includes an opening that is aligned with the window; a top skin that is configured to be removably adhered to the outside surface of the top portion of the dispenser body, wherein the top skin is configured to extend across the left side, the front and the right side, and wherein the top skin extends across the outer surface and vertically above the electric plug such that there is no buckling of the skin; a container covering with a protective backing that is configured to be placed onto the container and removably adhered to the container by placing the container covering adjacent the container using a human hand to change the visual appearance of the container when viewed through the window. ANALYSIS Independent claim 1 calls for “wherein the dispenser body further comprises a top portion and a bottom portion that are separable ̂from each 1 We construe the term “separable” in a manner consistent with Appellants’ Specification that permits subsequent replacement or reinstallation, i.e., the components are not destroyed, broken or otherwise rendered inoperable when separated. See Fig. 8 (illustrating “one method for disassembling” the dispenser) and Fig. 17 (illustrating “the step of connecting the bottom portion of the fragrance dispenser back together with the top portion”). Spec, 18, 27 (emphasis added); see also Spec. 1 40 (discussing tabs 56, 58 and mating 3 Appeal 2015-005695 Application 12/846,559 other to provide access to the interior of the dispenser body” and “a container disposed within the dispenser body and accessible within the interior of the dispenser body when the top portion and the bottom portion are separated from each otherAppeal Br. 12, Claims App. (emphasis added). The Examiner finds that Smith discloses several of the limitations of claim 1 but not top and bottom portions that are separable from each other. Final Act. 2; see also Ans. 6. For that teaching, the Examiner relies upon Wingo, stating: “Wingo discloses top (housing 22) and bottom (reservoir 32) portions separable from each other (see fig. 2), the container deposited in the bottom portion (reservoir 32).” Final Act. at 2—3. Despite failing to provide a rationale for combining Wingo with Smith in the Final Action (see Final Act. 3), the Examiner finds and concludes in the Answer: Wingo’s reservoir 32 is, by itself, enough to qualify as a removable bottom portion (absent the other limitations), and one of ordinary skill in the art would have been willing to employ a separability mechanism to enable access to the container just as Smith permits access to its container 60 via a door in light of how Wingo uses a separable container. Ans. 6. Appellants argue that “[rjeservoir 32 of Wingo is not a bottom portion of a dispenser body as presently claimed. Rather, reservoir 32 is a container configured to hold a liquid, much like the container disposed within the top portion and the bottom portion of claim 1.” Appeal Br. 6. Appellants further contend that “reservoir 32 of Wingo is not separable from a top portion of a dispenser body to provide access to a container disposed within the interior when the top portion and the bottom portion are separated from holes 60 that enable repeated assembly and disassembly). 4 Appeal 2015-005695 Application 12/846,559 each other” (Appeal Br. 7) and “[ijnstead, reservoir 32 [of Wingo] is accessible while coupled to housing 22 and does not need to be separated to become accessible” (id.). Appellants additionally contend that “removal of reservoir 32 of Wingo eliminates the container itself, and does not provide access to an interior of a dispenser body.” Reply Br. 2. Appellants conclude that “reservoir 32 of Wingo does not qualify as a bottom portion as recited in claim 1.” Appeal Br. 7. We agree. Reservoir 32 of Wingo is simply a fragrance container that is releasably attachable to housing 22. See Wingo, 147, Fig. 2. It is not nor is it suggestive of a bottom portion of a dispenser body that is separable from a top portion to provide access to a fragrance container disposed within the interior of the dispenser body when the top portion and the bottom portion are separated from each other, as claimed. See Appeal Br. 6—7; see also Reply Br. 1—2. Additionally, the Examiner acknowledges that the top and bottom portions of the Smith device are not separable from one another. See Final Act. 2; see also Ans. 6. The Smith fragrance dispenser permits access to its fragrance container 60 via hinged door 67, which is not disclosed as being separable from the dispenser. See Smith || 10, 11, 37, Figs. 1, 2, 4, 5, 8. A releasable fragrance container, such as that taught by Wingo, without more, does not overcome the deficiencies of the Smith device in meeting the dispenser body top and bottom portion separability limitations of claim 1. Furthermore, Appellants contend that the Examiner engages in impermissible hindsight reconstruction in order to produce the invention called for in Appellants’ claims. Reply Br. 2. In particular, Appellants contend that 5 Appeal 2015-005695 Application 12/846,559 the only teaching of a bottom portion of a dispenser body being separable from a top portion to provide access to a container within an interior of a body is within Appellants’ own disclosure. Thus, the only way a person of skill in the art would seek to make a bottom portion of Smith separable from a top portion would be to use Appellants’ claims as a roadmap, which constitutes impermissible hindsight reconstruction. Reply Br. 2. At the outset, Appellants correctly point out that the Examiner acknowledges that “Smith already has its own mechanism for providing access to a container 60 positioned within an interior of the device.” See Reply Br. 2; see also Ans. 6 (“Smith permits access to its container 60 via a door.”). In this case, the Examiner fails to provide any evidence or technical reasoning as to why the top and bottom portions of the Smith fragrance dispenser would need to be separable since access to fragrance container 60 of Smith is effectively achieved via hinged door 67. See Reply Br. 2; see also Ans. 6. As such, the Examiner fails to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the combined teachings of Smith, Wefler, Majerowski, Chao, and Wingo render obvious the dispenser of independent claim 1. Independent claim 17 calls for a fragrance dispense system including the same limitations directed to the dispenser body having separable top and bottom portions (see Appeal Br. 14, Claims App.), and thus, the Examiner’s findings with respect to Smith, Wefler, Majerowski, Chao, and Wingo are deficient for claim 17 as well. See Final Act. 4—5; see also Ans. 5—8. Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent claims 1 and 17 and their respective dependent claims 3, 4, 6, 11, 18, 21, and 23 as unpatentable over Smith, 6 Appeal 2015-005695 Application 12/846,559 Wefler, Majerowski, Chao, and Wingo. In addition to Smith, Wefler, Majerowski, Chao, and Wingo, the Examiner further relies on DeWitt to reject claims 2 and 20 and on Kim to reject claim 22. See Final Act. 5. However, the Examiner does not rely on DeWitt or Kim to overcome the deficiencies of Smith and Wingo discussed above in connection with independent claims 1 and 17. Accordingly, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 2 and 20 as unpatentable over Smith, Wefler, Majerowski, Chao, Wingo and DeWitt; nor do we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 22 as unpatentable over Smith, Wefler, Majerowski, Chao, Wingo, and Kim. DECISION We REVERSE the decision of the Examiner to reject claims 1—4, 6, 11, 17, 18, and 20-23. REVERSED 7 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation