Ex parte Grinkus

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

Jun 23, 1999

29008076 (B.P.A.I. Jun. 23, 1999)

Attorney Docket No. 02103/236001.1
THIS OPINION WAS NOT WRITTEN FOR PUBLICATION
The opinion in support of the decision being entered today (1) was not written
for publication in a law journal and (2) is not binding precedent of the Board.
Paper No. 31
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________
BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES
____________
Ex parte JOHN GRINKUS
____________
Appeal No. 96-2905
Application No. 29/008,0761
____________
HEARD: October 15, 1997
____________
Before STONER, Chief Administrative Patent Judge and
CAROFF, MEISTER, JOHN D. SMITH, GARRIS, HAIRSTON, STAAB,
FLEMING, PAK, NASE and CARMICHAEL, Administrative Patent Judges.
Majority opinion by Administrative Patent Judge NASE.
JOHN D. SMITH, Administrative Patent Judge, concurring.
FLEMING and PAK, Administrative Patent Judges, dissenting.
NASE, Administrative Patent Judge.
ON REQUEST FOR REHEARING
Appeal No. 96-2905
Application No. 29/008,076
Filed February 27, 1998. 2
2
This is in response to the appellant's request for
rehearing of our decision mailed December 23, 1997, wherein we2
affirmed the examiner's rejection of the appealed design claim
under 35 U.S.C.
§ 112, second paragraph.
We have carefully considered the arguments raised by the
appellant in the request for rehearing, however, those
arguments do not persuade us that our decision was in error in
any respect.
In the request, the appellant lists six points believed
to have been misapprehended or overlooked in rendering our
decision and other grounds upon which rehearing is sought. We
will address each of these points in the order they are
presented in the request.
First, the appellant argues that we overlooked or
misapprehended that the claim under appeal points out the
bounds between infringing and noninfringing conduct with
Appeal No. 96-2905
Application No. 29/008,076
Gorham Mfg. Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall) 511, 5283
(1872).
In an infringement action, both parties may present4
evidence on the issue of whether two designs are substantially
the same.
3
greater particularity by including "substantially" in the
claim because the settled rule is that a design patent is
infringed if the accused design is substantially the same as
the design shown in the drawings.
This is essentially a rehash of arguments previously made
in the brief, and has been treated on pages 22-24 of our
decision. It is not apparent to us how the presence of the
word "substantially" in the Gorham test for infringement of a3 4
design claim mandates that it is proper, within the meaning of
35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, for the appellant's design
claim to include the word "substantially" in the absence of
some standard or guideline in the specification apprising the
designer of ordinary skill just what that term encompasses.
Second, the appellant contends that we overlooked or
misapprehended the point that 37 CFR § 1.153(a), cited by us
on pages 12-15 of our decision in support of our position, is
Appeal No. 96-2905
Application No. 29/008,076
4
in exactly the same form as when adopted on December 22, 1959,
and in force when (1) the PTO issued the at least 18,537
design patents with "substantially" in the claim since 1971,
and (2) two court decisions were decided. The first point the
appellant is apparently attempting to make is that the
circumstance that numerous design patents issued with the word
"substantially" in the claims since the inception of the rule
establishes that the appellant's use of the word
"substantially" is consistent with the settled practice of the
PTO. The second point the appellant is apparently seeking to
make is that the two court cases establish that the
appellant's use of the word "substantially" does not render
the claim indefinite under the second paragraph of 35 U.S.C. §
112.
As pointed out on pages 20-22 of our decision, we
recognize that design patents have been issued with the word
"substantially" appearing in the claim. However, the
appellant has not cited any authority which holds that the
issuance of a patent has any significant precedential value.
In evaluating compliance with 35 U.S.C. §§ 112 and 171, each
Appeal No. 96-2905
Application No. 29/008,076
5
design application must be evaluated on the record developed
in the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO). See In re Gyurik,
596 F.2d 1012, 1018 n.15, 201 USPQ 552, 558 n.15 (CCPA 1979)
and In re Phillips, 315 F.2d 943, 945, 137 USPQ 369, 370 (CCPA
1963). To the extent any error has been made in the rejection
or issuance of claims in a particular application, the PTO and
its examiners are not bound to repeat that error in subsequent
applications. Accord, In re Donaldson Co., 16 F.3d 1189,
1194, 29 USPQ2d 1845, 1849 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ("The fact that
the PTO may have failed to adhere to a statutory mandate over
an extended period of time does not justify its continuing to
do so."); In re Cooper, 254 F.2d 611, 617, 117 USPQ 396, 401
(CCPA), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 840, 119 USPQ 501 (1958)
(decision in a trademark application in accordance with law is
not governed by possibly erroneous past decisions of the
Patent Office); In re Zahn, 617 F.2d 261, 267, 204 USPQ 988,
995 (CCPA 1980) ("[W]e are not saying the issuance of one
patent is a precedent of much moment."); Ex parte Tayama, 24
USPQ2d 1614, 1618 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1992) (prior issuance
of patents for designs referred to as icons has no significant
precedential value in evaluating compliance with 35 U.S.C. §
Appeal No. 96-2905
Application No. 29/008,076
In fact, our research has not uncovered any final court5
or Board decision in which the issue of how inclusion of the
word "substantially" in a design claim impacts upon the
requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, was decided.
This includes the cases cited by the examiner to support the
rejection. Thus, there is no binding precedent for this panel
of the Board to follow. See Ex parte Holt, 19 USPQ2d 1211,
1214 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1991).
6
171). Compliance with §§ 112 and 171 requires analysis of the
statutes and interpretation of case law. Mere reference to
possibly contrary decisions of an examiner in other
applications, applications in which the issue raised in this
case was not even addressed, are not helpful in this analysis.
Furthermore, as we noted on page 22 of our decision, it is
debatable whether or not this data establishes that for which
it is cited.
As pointed out on pages 15-19 of our decision, the cases
cited by the appellant are not controlling and do not support
the appellant's position because none of them addresses the
issue of how inclusion of the word "substantially" in a design
claim impacts upon the requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112, second
paragraph, that an inventor must particularly point out and
distinctly claim what he regards as his invention. 5
Appeal No. 96-2905
Application No. 29/008,076
7
Third, the appellant argues that we overlooked or
misapprehended that the PTO is acting arbitrarily and
capriciously to deprive the appellant of a property right
without due process of law in granting design patents to
others in "the ornamental design . . . substantially as shown
and described" while denying such protection to the
appellants.
We respectfully disagree with the appellant on this
point. In our view, the PTO in the present case has advanced
convincing reasoning in support of its position which has not
been rebutted by the appellants. Under these circumstances,
the PTO cannot be said to be acting arbitrarily and
capriciously in refusing to grant the appellant a patent.
Further, and as stated above, to the extent any error has been
made in the rejection or issuance of claims in a particular
application, the PTO and its examiners are not bound to repeat
that error in subsequent applications.
Fourth, the appellant contends that we overlooked or
misapprehended the impropriety of an MPEP ruling based on
Appeal No. 96-2905
Application No. 29/008,076
MPEP § 1504.04 has been revised to delete the reference6
to Sussman.
8
dictum in a footnote of a Board decision in conflict with
authoritative rulings of binding precedent for more than a
century.
This is apparently in regard to our reference on page 20
of our decision to MPEP § 1504.04, and/or to the examiner's
reliance on In re Sussman, 8 USPQ2d 1443 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int.
1988) in rejecting the claim. First, we did not rely on MPEP
§ 1504.04 in arriving at our decision. Second, we expressly
stated on page 20 of our decision that we did not rely on
Sussman in arriving at our conclusion that the standing
rejection is sustainable. Third, it is not clear what
"binding precedent" MPEP § 1504.04 or Sussman violate.6
Fifth, we simply disagree with the appellant's argument
that our decision, if correct, renders thousands of unexpired
design and utility patents having the word "substantially" in
the claim invalid. Our decision makes no such sweeping
holding. Rather, our decision stands for the proposition that
Appeal No. 96-2905
Application No. 29/008,076
9
the definiteness of a design claim including language such as
"substantially as shown and described" must be resolved in the
same way definiteness issues are resolved in any other
application involving words of degree, that is, on the basis
of the particular facts of the involved application (i.e., on
a case-by-case basis).
Finally, the appellant argues that we overlooked or
misapprehended the point that the office is acting arbitrarily
and capriciously to deprive the appellant of a property right
without due process of law by ordering that the decision be
rendered by eight additional members, none of which attended
the hearing, without notice to the appellant, to effectively
overturn a ruling by the majority of the three members who did
attend the hearing that the decision finally rejecting the
claims should be reversed.
This argument is based on the expansion of the three
member panel to eleven members as set forth in footnote 1 on
page 1 of our decision. Once again, we respectfully disagree
with the appellant on this point for the following reasons.
Appeal No. 96-2905
Application No. 29/008,076
Copy attached.7
10
In our view, the PTO in the present case had ample
justification in expanding the panel. In that regard, in
section (2) of the brief, the appellant identifies Application
No. 07/909,057 as containing an appeal that will directly
affect or have a bearing on the Board's decision in the
pending appeal. The appeal in Application No. 07/909,057
involved the same issue as raised in this appeal. The
decision of the examiner to reject the single design claim in
Application No. 07/909,057 under
35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, was affirmed by a three
member panel in a decision mailed December 19, 1996 (prior to
the hearing held on October 15, 1997 in this appeal) and the
appellant's request for reconsideration under 37 CFR § 1.197
in Application No. 07/909,057 was denied by that panel in a
decision mailed September 29, 1998.
Standard Operating Procedure 1 (Revision 6, April 1,
1997) sets forth in section V, part A, reasons for expanding7
a panel. One reason listed is conflicting decisions by
different panels of the Board.
Appeal No. 96-2905
Application No. 29/008,076
11
After the hearing held on October 15, 1997 in this
appeal, it became apparent to the original three member panel
that a decision conflicting with the decision rendered by
another panel of the Board in Application No. 07/909,057 might
result. In view of the possibility of issuing such a
conflicting decision, in accordance with Standard Operating
Procedure 1, section V, part B, second paragraph, the original
three member panel brought this matter to the attention of
Chief Administrative Patent Judge Stoner by suggesting the
need for an expanded panel. Thereafter, Chief Administrative
Patent Judge Stoner ordered that the original panel be
expanded to eleven Administrative Patent Judges. Thus, Chief
Administrative Patent Judge Stoner and Administrative Patent
Judges Caroff, Meister, John D. Smith, Garris, Hairston, Staab
and Carmichael were added to the panel for purposes of
rendering a decision concerning the rejection of the single
design claim under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph.
Furthermore, 35 U.S.C. § 7 (b) plainly and unambiguously
requires that the Commissioner designate "at least three"
Board members to hear each appeal. By use of the language "at
Appeal No. 96-2905
Application No. 29/008,076
As stated in Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1532, n. 3, 31 USPQ2d8
at 1548, n. 3, "The Commissioner has interpreted his authority
to convene an expanded panel as granting him the authority to
expand a three-member panel to include additional Board
members after oral hearing. See e.g., Ex parte Kuklo, 25
USPQ2d 1387, 1388 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1992) (five-member
panel); Larson v. Johenning, 17 USPQ2d 1610, 1610 (Bd. Pat.
App. & Inter. 1991) (five-member panel); Ex parte Lyell, 17
USPQ2d 1548, 1549 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1990) (five-member
panel); Ex parte Remark, 15 USPQ2d 1498, 1498 (Bd. Pat. App. &
Inter. 1990) (five-member panel); Ex parte Kumagai, 9 USPQ2d
1642, 1643 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1988) (five-member panel)."
12
least three," Congress expressly granted the Commissioner the
authority to designate expanded Board panels made up of more
than three Board members. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1532,
31 USPQ2d 1545, 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc). As set forth
by the court
There is no evidence in the legislative history of
Section 7, or Title 35 as a whole, clearly indicating
that Congress intended to impose any statutory
limitations regarding which Board members the
Commissioner may appoint to an expanded panel or when the
Commissioner may convene such a panel. [Alappat, 33 F.3d8
at 1532, 31 USPQ2d at 1548] [emphasis ours].
In Alappat the original three member panel of the Board
reversed the examiner's non-statutory subject matter
rejection. The examiner then requested reconsideration of
this decision, pursuant to section 1214.04 of the Manual of
Appeal No. 96-2905
Application No. 29/008,076
Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1532 n. 4, 31 USPQ2d at 1548 n. 4.9
13
Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP), stating that the panel's
decision conflicted with PTO policy. The examiner further
requested that such reconsideration be carried out by an
expanded panel. An expanded eight-member panel, acting as the
Board, granted both of the examiner's requests. The expanded
panel (five new members and the original three members) issued
a majority decision in which they affirmed the examiner's
section 101 rejection, thus ruling contrary to the decision of
the original three member panel. The three members of the
original panel dissented on the merits for the reasons set
forth in their original opinion, which they augmented in a
dissenting opinion.
While Alappat never raised a due process argument, it is9
our position that the expansion of the panel in this appeal
did not deprive the appellant of a property right without due
process of law. An appeal decided without an oral hearing
will receive the same consideration by the Board of Patent
Appeals and Interferences as appeals decided after oral
hearing. 37 CFR
Appeal No. 96-2905
Application No. 29/008,076
14
§ 1.194 (a). The eight new members of the panel gave the
issue presented in this appeal the same consideration as the
original three members.
In addition, as stated in Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1532, n. 2,
31 USPQ2d at 1547, n. 2,
Both this court and the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals (CCPA), one of this court's predecessors, have
reviewed Board decisions rendered by panels made up of
more than three Board members without questioning the
validity of such panels. See e.g., Hahn v. Wong, 892
F.2d 1028, 1031, 13 USPQ2d 1313, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 1989)
(seven-member panel because of significance of issues
raised); In re Lundak, 773 F.2d 1216, 1219, 227 USPQ 90,
92 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (eighteen-member panel); In re
Durden, 763 F.2d 1406, 1409 n.3, 226 USPQ 359, 360 n.3
(Fed. Cir. 1985) (sixteen-member panel); In re Henriksen,
399 F.2d 253, 254 n.1, 158 USPQ 224, 225 n.1 (CCPA 1968)
(nine-member panel because of "the nature of the legal
issues raised"). Other instances wherein the
Commissioner has convened an expanded panel include Ex
parte Alpha Indus. Inc., 22 USPQ2d 1851, 1852 (Bd. Pat.
App. & Inter. 1992) (five-member panel); Ex parte Fujii,
13 USPQ2d 1073, 1074 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1989)
(five-member panel because of significance of issue
raised); Ex parte Kristensen, 10 USPQ2d 1701, 1702 (Bd.
Pat. App. & Inter. 1989) (five-member panel); Ex parte
Kitamura, 9 USPQ2d 1787, 1788 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter.
1988) (five-member panel because of possible conflict in
case law); Lamont v. Berguer, 7 USPQ2d 1580, 1581 (Bd.
Pat. App. & Inter. 1988) (five-member panel because of
novelty of issue raised); Kwon v. Perkins, 6 USPQ2d 1747,
1748 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1988) (nine-member panel
because of novelty of issues raised); Ex parte Horton,
226 USPQ 697, 698 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1985)
(five-member panel); Ex parte Tytgat, 225 USPQ 907, 908
Appeal No. 96-2905
Application No. 29/008,076
15
(Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1985) (five-member panel); and Ex
parte Jackson, 217 USPQ 804, 806 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter.
1982) (nine-member panel because legal issue was one of
first impression).
Thus, under these circumstances, the PTO cannot be said
to be acting arbitrarily and capriciously to deprive the
appellant of a property right without due process of law.
In light of the foregoing, the appellant's request for
rehearing is granted to the extent of reconsidering our
decision, but is denied with respect to making any change
thereto.
No period for taking any subsequent action in connection
with this appeal may be extended under 37 CFR § 1.136(a).
REQUEST FOR REHEARING - DENIED
BRUCE H. STONER, Jr., Chief )
Administrative Patent Judge )
)
)
)
)
MARC L. CAROFF )
Administrative Patent Judge )
) BOARD OF PATENT
Appeal No. 96-2905
Application No. 29/008,076
16
) APPEALS
) AND
) INTERFERENCES
JAMES M. MEISTER )
Administrative Patent Judge )
)
)
)
)
BRADLEY R. GARRIS )
Administrative Patent Judge )
)
)
)
)
)
)
KENNETH W. HAIRSTON )
Administrative Patent Judge )
)
)
)
)
LAWRENCE J. STAAB )
Administrative Patent Judge )
)
)
)
) BOARD OF PATENT
JEFFREY V. NASE ) APPEALS
Administrative Patent Judge ) AND
) INTERFERENCES
)
)
)
JAMES T. CARMICHAEL )
Administrative Patent Judge )
Appeal No. 96-2905
Application No. 29/008,076
17
JOHN D. SMITH, Administrative Patent Judge, concurring.
I concur in the result reached by the majority, but I
write separately because I believe the majority's reliance on
Alappat is inapposite to the issue of concern to appellant,
i.e., that the expansion of this panel has deprived appellant
of a property right without due process of law. The relevant
issue confronted in Alappat was whether the Alappat Board's
reconsideration decision was statutorily valid under 35 U.S.C.
141 "over which the court could exercise subject matter
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (a)(4)(A) (1988) and
35 U.S.C. § 141 (1988)." See Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1530, 31
USPQ2d at 1546. The issue of due process of law was not
germane to the jurisdictional issue in Alappat. Thus, as
stated by Judge Rich in Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1536, 31 USPQ2d at
1551:
Amicus Curiae FCBA suggests that the Commissioner's
redesignation practices in this case violated Alappat's
due process rights, citing Utica Packing Co. v. Block,
781 F.2d 71 (6th Cir. 1986). In addition, an issue was
raised at oral argument as to whether the Commissioner's
designation practices are governed by any provisions of
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and if so,
whether the Commissioner's actions in this case violated
any of these provisions. We need not address either of
these issues.
The FCBA does not have standing to make a due
process argument, see Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S.
601, 610 (1973) ("constitutional rights are personal and
Appeal No. 96-2905
Application No. 29/008,076
18
may not be asserted vicariously") and United Parcel
Service, Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 60 n.2 (1981)
(amicus may not rely on new arguments not presented
below), and Alappat has waived any due process argument
by acquiescing to the Commissioner's actions in this
case. Thus, there is no case or controversy before this
court with respect to any alleged due process violation.
There also is no case or controversy as to whether the
Commissioner's actions in this case violated any
provision of the APA, given that Alappat does not contest
these actions, and this is not an issue which this court
may raise sua sponte. Moreover, neither of these issues
is germane to the jurisdictional issue this court raised
sua sponte, i.e., whether the Board's reconsideration
decision constituted a statutorily valid decision under
35 U.S.C. § 141 over which this court may exercise
subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1294(a)(4)(A).

Here, appellant has not waived any due process argument.
Nevertheless, I am not aware of any factual basis to assert
that appellant's due process rights were violated by the
expansion of the panel which was, to my knowledge, properly
effected pursuant to the Board's Standard Operating Procedure
1 (Revision 6, April 1, 1997) by the order of Chief
Administrative Patent Judge Stoner.
) BOARD OF PATENT
) APPEALS
JOHN D. SMITH ) AND
Administrative Patent Judge ) INTERFERENCES
Appeal No. 96-2905
Application No. 29/008,076
19
Appeal No. 96-2905
Application No. 29/008,076
20
FLEMING, Administrative Patent Judge, dissenting.
I continue to respectfully dissent for the reasons set
forth in our dissenting opinion.
) BOARD OF PATENT
) APPEALS
MICHAEL R. FLEMING ) AND
Administrative Patent Judge ) INTERFERENCES
Appeal No. 96-2905
Application No. 29/008,076
21
PAK, Administrative Patent Judge, dissenting.
I continue to respectfully dissent for the reasons set
forth in our dissenting opinion in the earlier decision. For
purposes of elucidation, however, I add the following comments
on the majority's opinion.
I initially observe that the majority's decision is
filled with contradictions. On the one hand, the majority
states at page 8 of this decision that:
[W]e simply disagree with the appellant's argument that
our decision, if correct, renders thousands of unexpired
design and utility patents having the word
"substantially" in the claim invalid. Our decision makes
no such sweeping holding. Rather, our decision stands
for the proposition that the definiteness of a design
claim including language such as "substantially as shown
and described" must be resolved in the same way
definiteness issues are resolved in any other application
involving words of degree, that is, on the basis of the
particular facts of the involved application (i.e., on a
case-by-case basis).
On the other hand, the majority takes the position that
the use of the "substantially" language in a design
application claim is per se indefinite. See the earlier
Appeal No. 96-2905
Application No. 29/008,076
22
decision, pages 13-15. This per se rule approach is apparent
from the majority’s reliance on Rule 1.153(a), which,
according to the majority, prohibits the use of
"substantially" in a design claim. See the earlier decision,
pages 13-15. If the majority is taking the per se
indefiniteness approach to the term "substantially" as
indicated supra, appellant is correct in stating that the
majority's earlier decision renders thousands of unexpired
design patents invalid. If the majority is taking a contrary
position, i.e., a case-by-case approach to determining the
definiteness of "substantially" in a design application, I do
not believe that the results, i.e., invalidation of thousands
of unexpired design patents, will be any different, since
most, if not all, of the design patents already issued consist
essentially of drawings, which, according to the majority, are
not sufficient to guide the designer of ordinary skill to
understand the meaning of the expression "substantially".
Thus, in my view, the majority's decision constitutes improper
taking of the property interests of a significant number of
patentees who have relied on the guideline set forth in Ex
Appeal No. 96-2905
Application No. 29/008,076
23
parte Owen referred to in the earlier dissenting opinion,
without providing any constitutionally required procedural
safeguards.
I also observe that the determination of indefiniteness
is a question of law which can be raised sua sponte by courts.
However, as indicated at pages 16 and 17 of the earlier
decision, all of the appellate and district courts confronted
with the expression "substantially" in the context of design
patent claims have not held that expression to be indefinite.
In my view, implicit in their decisions is that the expression
"substantially" recited in design claims does not violate the
second paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112.
Further, I take exception to the majority's reliance on
Alappat to justify the procedural due process associated with
the expansion of the original panel. I do not believe that
Alappat is relevant to the due process issue raised by
appellant for the reasons well articulated by Administrative
Patent Judge John D. Smith in his concurring opinion.
Appeal No. 96-2905
Application No. 29/008,076
24
Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1536, 31 USPQ2d at 1551. The Federal
Circuit in Alappat simply did not analyze the impact of Utica
Packing Co. v. Block, 781 F.2d 71 (6th Cir. 1986), which was
cited by Amicus Curiae FCBA, since due process was no longer
at issue before the court.
Finally, I take exception to what appears to be the
majority's reliance on the SOP (standing operating procedure)
to justify the procedural due process requirement raised by
appellant. The majority has not established that the SOP
itself complies with the procedural due process requirement,
i.e., does not deprive appellant of a property right without
due process of law.
) BOARD OF PATENT
) APPEALS
CHUNG K. PAK ) AND
Administrative Patent Judge ) INTERFERENCES
Appeal No. 96-2905
Application No. 29/008,076
25
CHARLES HIEKEN
FISH & RICHARDSON
225 FRANKLIN ST.
BOSTON, MA 02110-2804
ON REQUEST FOR REHEARING
APPEAL NO. 96-2905 - JUDGE NASE
APPLICATION NO. 29/008,076
APJ NASE
APJ CARMICHAEL
APJ PAK
APJ FLEMING
APJ STAAB
APJ HAIRSTON
APJ GARRIS
APJ JOHN D. SMITH
APJ MEISTER
APJ CAROFF
CAPJ STONER
DECISION: DENIED
Prepared By: Gloria
Henderson
DRAFT TYPED: 16 Oct 98
1st Rev. 28 Oct 98
FINAL TYPED:
Appeal No. 96-2905
Application No. 29/008,076
27