Ex Parte Grez et al

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

Feb 29, 2012

11397072 (B.P.A.I. Feb. 29, 2012)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES
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Ex parte JOSEPH W. GREZ, JEFFREY R. GUEBLE, JERRY C. WOOD,
DEVIN M. NELSON, KEVIN A. MILLER, CRAIG D. HANELA,
BRUCE E. TABER, RICHARD K. TAYLOR, WILLAM BRYANT,
SCOTT E. HALL, ANDREAS LOIBNEGGER, PIET C.J. VAN RENS,
KURT SADEK, PAULUS L.W.M. BARTEN, and
D.I. STEPHEN LEITNER
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Appeal 2009-014393
Application 11/397,072
Technology Center 2800
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Before JASON V. MORGAN, ERIC B. CHEN, and BRUCE R. WINSOR,
Administrative Patent Judges.

MORGAN, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appeal 2009-014393
Application 11/397,072

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Introduction
This is an appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s final
rejection of claims 30 – 39 and 41. Claims 1 – 29 and 40 are canceled. We
have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.
Invention
The invention relates to a method for tuning a spring structure in small
appliances, such as toothbrushes, to a selected natural resonant frequency or
amplitude during manufacture (Spec. p. 1, ll. 8 – 14). Claim 30 is the only
independent claim.
Exemplary Claim
30. A method for tuning a spring member used in a resonant
driving system for a handheld personal care appliance which
includes a workpiece and which has a driving frequency, the
method being part of a manufacturing process of the appliance,
comprising the steps of:
determining the resonant frequency of the spring member,
following manufacture of the spring member, as part of a
manufacturing process of a handheld personal care appliance,
wherein the determined frequency is either above or below the
driving frequency of the appliance;
changing the spring rate of the spring member, and hence its
resonant frequency, sufficiently that its resonant frequency is
closer to the driving frequency of the appliance than previously
if the determined frequency is not within a pre-selected
tolerance relative to the driving frequency;
determining again the resonant frequency of the spring member
to determine whether the changed frequency is within the pre-
selected tolerance; and
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repeating the steps of changing and determining again until the
frequency of the spring member is within the preselected
tolerance, the spring member being thereafter incorporated in
the appliance as part of the manufacturing process thereof.
(Emphases added).
Evidence and Rejection
The Examiner rejects claims 30, 31, and 41 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as being obvious over Giuliani (US 5,263,218) and Davis (US 6,594,902
B1) (Ans. 4 – 5).
The Examiner rejects claim 32 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
obvious over Giuliani, Davis, and Stearns (US 5,285,890) (Ans. 5).
The Examiner rejects claims 33 – 39 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being obvious over Giuliani, Davis, and Spurlin (US 3,258,111) (Ans. 6).
ISSUES
1. Did the Examiner err in finding that Giuliani and Davis collectively
teach or suggest the recitations of claim 30?
2. Did the Examiner err in relying further on Spurlin as teaching or
suggesting additional recitations in claim 33?
ANALYSIS
Issue 1 — Claim 30
The Examiner relies on Giuliani as teaching or suggesting “a personal
care toothbrush having a spring selected to be part of a magnetic resonance
device to provide effective cleaning with [a] minimum amount of electrical
input” (Ans. 4). The Examiner relies on Davis, which is directed to a method
of controlling a spring rate (Davis Abstr.), as teaching or suggesting
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adjusting a spring member’s spring rate to tune the spring member’s
resonant frequency (Ans. 4 – 5).
Appellants contend that the Examiner erred because “Davis teaches
only the determination and comparison of [a] spring rate relative to a
selected tolerance value” (Br. 10), but that in Appellants’ “invention, it is the
resonant frequency of the spring member which is determined and then
compared against a tolerance range of resonant frequency [sic]” (Br. 11).
However, the Examiner correctly finds that Davis teaches that its method of
adjusting the spring rate can be used to tune the spring member’s resonant
frequency (see Ans. 6 – 7; see also Davis col. 5, ll. 39 – 42 and col. 6, ll. 40
– 67). Therefore, we agree with the Examiner. Davis teaches that the
disclosed method of adjusting a spring member’s spring rate “may be used
to ‘tune’ the first torsional resonant frequency, if desired, rather than be
directed to spring rate variability reduction” (Davis col. 5, ll. 39 – 42).
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 30 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being obvious over Giuliani and Davis.
Appellants provide no additional arguments with respect to claims 31,
32, and 41. Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, we find that the
Examiner did not err in rejecting these claims under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
Issue 2 — Claim 33
Claim 33 recites “wherein the spring assembly is a leaf spring
assembly and wherein said portion of the spring member is removed by
cutting a part of the leaf spring away from one edge thereof.” The Examiner
relies on Spurlin, which is directed to an adjustable feed angle parts feeder,
as teaching or suggesting these additional recitations (see Ans. 6 and 7 – 8).

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Appellants do not dispute that Spurlin teaches or suggests a spring
leaf assembly and cutting a part of the leaf spring away from one edge
thereof. Instead, Appellants contend that “Spurlin is remote art relative to the
claimed invention” (Br. 11) because “Spurlin is a heavy-duty device . . .
completely unlike the structure of hand-held electric toothbrushes” (Br. 12).
However, Appellants do not present evidence or arguments that persuasively
show that “handheld personal care appliance and heavy-duty vibratory
feeders are sufficiently different in purpose, scale and function that the
reference to Spurlin is not within the realm of the inventor’s endeavor” (Br.
11 – 12). Appellants’ attorney arguments do not take the place of evidence
in the record. See In re Pearson, 494 F.2d 1399, 1405 (CCPA 1974).
Appellants further contend that the “problem which was the subject of
. . . Spurlin . . . is quite different than the problem addressed by applicant”
(Br. 12). However, the Examiner finds that, like Davis, Spurlin is “directed
to the . . . problem of adjusting the resonance frequency” (Ans. 7)—the same
problem addressed by the claimed invention. We agree with the Examiner’s
finding. See In re Klein, 647 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Spurlin
teaches that “spring units 4 may be varied in structure to provide variable
ranges of change in . . . the natural frequency” (Spurlin col. 10, ll. 3 – 5).
Spurlin depicts one of those variations in structure in Figure 22, where “one
or both sides of [a leaf] spring are curved inwardly” (Spurlin col. 9, ll. 48 –
49; see also Spurlin col. 10, ll. 5 – 8).
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 33 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being obvious over Giuliani, Davis, and Spurlin.
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Appellants provide no additional arguments with respect to claims 34
– 39. Accordingly, for the same reasons discussed above, we find that the
Examiner did not err in rejecting these claims under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).

DECISION
We affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 30 – 39 and 41.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED
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