Ex Parte Gray et alDownload PDFBoard of Patent Appeals and InterferencesJul 25, 200509798287 (B.P.A.I. Jul. 25, 2005) Copy Citation The opinion in support of the decision being entered today was not written for publication and is not binding precedent of the Board. UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS AND INTERFERENCES ____________ Ex parte FORREST CLIFTON GRAY, MICHAEL ANTHONY PEREZ and MARK WALZ WENNING ____________ Appeal No. 2005-1361 Application No. 09/798,287 ____________ ON BRIEF ____________ Before JERRY SMITH, SAADAT, and MACDONALD, Administrative Patent Judges. JERRY SMITH, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL This is a decision on the appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134 from the examiner’s rejection of claims 1-40, which constitute all the claims in the application. The disclosed invention pertains to a method and apparatus for determining corrective measures in a data processing system. Representative claim 1 is reproduced as follows: 1. A method for determining of corrective measures in a data processing system, the method comprising the steps of: (a) reading status values from a plurality of status registers; (b) combining the status values to form a new value; and (C) using the new value to search a set of corrective measures for at least one corrective measure. The examiner relies on the following references: Appeal No. 2005-1361 Application No. 09/798,287 2 Dow et al. (Dow) 5,351,247 Sep. 27, 1994 Brichta et al. (Brichta) 5,790,780 Aug. 04, 1998 The following rejections are on appeal before us: 1. Claims 1-4, 6-11, 13, 16-20, 22-27, 29 and 32 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as being anticipated by the disclosure of Dow. 2. Claims 5, 12, 14, 15, 21, 28, 30 and 31 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over the teachings of Dow taken alone. 3. Claims 33, 34 and 38-40 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as being anticipated by the disclosure of Brichta. 4. Claims 35-37 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over the teachings of Brichta taken alone. Rather than repeat the arguments of appellants or the examiner, we make reference to the briefs and the answer for the respective details thereof. OPINION We have carefully considered the subject matter on appeal, the rejections advanced by the examiner and the evidence of anticipation and obviousness relied upon by the examiner as support for the rejections. We have, likewise, reviewed and taken into consideration, in reaching our decision, the appellants’ arguments set forth in the briefs along with the Appeal No. 2005-1361 Application No. 09/798,287 3 examiner’s rationale in support of the rejections and arguments in rebuttal set forth in the examiner’s answer. It is our view, after consideration of the record before us, that the evidence relied upon supports each of the examiner’s rejections. Accordingly, we affirm. We consider first the rejection of claims 1-4, 6-11, 13, 16- 20, 22-27, 29 and 32 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as being anticipated by the disclosure of Dow. Anticipation is established only when a single prior art reference discloses, expressly or under the principles of inherency, each and every element of a claimed invention as well as disclosing structure which is capable of performing the recited functional limitations. RCA Corp. v. Applied Digital Data Systems, Inc., 730 F.2d 1440, 1444, 221 USPQ 385, 388 (Fed. Cir.); cert. dismissed, 468 U.S. 1228 (1984); W.L. Gore and Associates, Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1554, 220 USPQ 303, 313 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 851 (1984). The examiner has indicated how he finds the claimed invention to be fully met by the disclosure of Dow [answer, pages 6-12]. With respect to independent claim 1, appellants argue that Dow fails to teach reading status values from a plurality of status registers as claimed, but instead, teaches reading the status values of one UUT at a time. Appellants also argue that Appeal No. 2005-1361 Application No. 09/798,287 4 Dow fails to teach combining the status values to form a new value, where the status values are from a plurality of status registers that are associated with a plurality of components as claimed because the information in the recall data pattern in Dow is not status values from a plurality of status registers. Finally, appellants argue that Dow fails to teach using the new value to search a set of corrective measures for at least one corrective measure because there is no new value in Dow which is a combination of status values from a plurality of status registers [brief, pages 5-7]. The examiner responds that Dow discloses a plurality of status registers which each contains a status value in the form of the stored state values of the system. Essentially, the examiner finds that each 32-bit machine state in Dow is stored in a separate status register. The examiner also points out that Dow teaches that these stored state values are processed into a recall data pattern. The examiner finds that this recall data pattern meets the combining step of claim 1. Finally, the examiner points out that the recall data pattern in Dow is used to return an ordered recommendation list which includes suggested corrective actions which may repair a fault [answer, pages 18- 21]. Appeal No. 2005-1361 Application No. 09/798,287 5 Appellants respond that the claim terminology must be interpreted in light of the disclosure. Based on this, appellants argue that the status registers of the claimed invention should be interpreted as being associated with each of the components that stores a status code corresponding to the status of the component. Based on this interpretation, appellants argue that Dow does not meet the claimed invention because the machine states in Dow are outputs of a single UUT and the status values of a plurality of components. Thus, appellants argue that neither the machine states nor the recall patterns of Dow are a status code corresponding to the status of the component [reply brief, pages 2-6]. We will sustain the examiner’s rejection of independent claim 1 and the rejection of claims 2, 7, 8, 11, 13, 16-18, 23, 24, 27, 29 and 32 which have not been separately argued by appellants. We decline to interpret the claimed invention in the manner proposed by appellants in the reply brief. Claims are to be given their broadest reasonable interpretation during prosecution. In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319, 321, 13 USPQ2d 1320, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 1989); In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 1404, 162 USPQ 541, 550 (CCPA 1969). It is improper to narrow the scope of the claim by implicitly reading in disclosed limitations from the specification which have no express basis in the claims. See Id. Appeal No. 2005-1361 Application No. 09/798,287 6 The claim interpretation proposed by appellants is based on a disclosure of the preferred embodiment. Yet, appellants’ specification also states that the preferred embodiment is not to be taken as limiting the claimed invention. We will follow the general rule that the preferred embodiment will not be read into the claim, and the terms in the claims will be given the broadest reasonable interpretation. When this interpretation is followed, we agree with the examiner that the state patterns in Dow are stored in a plurality of registers, these state values are processed into a recall data pattern (new value), and that this new value is used to search a set of corrective measures as explained by the examiner. Since appellants’ arguments are essentially all based on an interpretation of the claims which we find to be too narrow, we find that appellants have failed to establish that the examiner’s rejection is erroneous. With respect to separately argued claims 3 and 19, appellants broadly argue that Dow fails to teach where the new value is a search key used to query the database. Appellants also repeat the arguments considered above with respect to claim 1 [brief, page 7]. The examiner responds that the search tool 18 of Dow returns an ordered recommendation list of the stored data patterns in the production database based on the recall data Appeal No. 2005-1361 Application No. 09/798,287 7 pattern [answer, pages 21-23]. Appellants respond that the recall data pattern of Dow does not represent status values indicating the state of a component stored in a status register [reply brief, pages 6-7]. We will sustain the examiner’s rejection of claims 3 and 19 for the reasons argued by the examiner in the answer. Each of appellants’ arguments with respect to these claims has been considered above and decided adversely to appellants. With respect to separately argued claims 4 and 20, appellants argue that Dow fails to teach wherein the plurality of status registers are associated with a plurality of components. Appellants also repeat the arguments considered above with respect to claim 1 [brief, page 8]. The examiner responds that the claim recitation “associated with†is broad enough to be met by the plural components of the system disclosed by Dow [answer, page 23]. Appellants respond that the status registers of the claimed invention should be interpreted in light of the specification [reply brief, pages 7-8]. We will sustain the examiner’s rejection of claims 4 and 20 for the reasons argued by the examiner in the answer and for the reasons discussed above with respect to claim 1. With respect to separately argued claims 6 and 22, appellants argue that Dow fails to teach where the plurality of Appeal No. 2005-1361 Application No. 09/798,287 8 components includes at least one software component. Appellants assert that the software component in Dow is not within a plurality of components associated with a plurality of status registers where status values are read from [brief, pages 8-9]. The examiner responds that the claim recitation “associated with†is broad enough to be met by the self-test program disclosed by Dow [answer, page 23]. Appellants respond that the status of the built-in self test is not a status code corresponding to a change in the status value of he component that is stored in a status register and read [reply brief, pages 8-9]. We will sustain the examiner’s rejection of claims 6 and 22 for the reasons argued by the examiner in the answer and for the reasons discussed above with respect to claim 1. With respect to separately argued claims 9, 10, 25 and 26, appellants argue that Dow fails to teach bitwise operations on the strings of binary digits to form the new value, which may include concatenating the strings of binary digits. Appellants assert that the portions of Dow relied on by the examiner fail to disclose the claimed invention [brief, pages 9-10]. The examiner responds by explaining how the operations performed in Dow can be considered to be bitwise operations as claimed and how the combined state values can be considered to be a concatenation of binary strings [answer, pages 23-25]. Appellants respond that Appeal No. 2005-1361 Application No. 09/798,287 9 Dow does not teach status registers as set forth in appellants’ specification [reply brief, pages 9-10]. We will sustain the examiner’s rejection of claims 9, 10, 25 and 26 for the reasons argued by the examiner in the answer and for the reasons discussed above with respect to claim 1. We now consider the rejection of claims 5, 12, 14, 15, 21, 28, 30 and 31 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over the teachings of Dow taken alone. In rejecting claims under 35 U.S.C. § 103, it is incumbent upon the examiner to establish a factual basis to support the legal conclusion of obviousness. See In re Fine, 837 F.2d 1071, 1073, 5 USPQ2d 1596, 1598 (Fed. Cir. 1988). In so doing, the examiner is expected to make the factual determinations set forth in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17, 148 USPQ 459, 467 (1966), and to provide a reason why one having ordinary skill in the pertinent art would have been led to modify the prior art or to combine prior art references to arrive at the claimed invention. Such reason must stem from some teaching, suggestion or implication in the prior art as a whole or knowledge generally available to one having ordinary skill in the art. Uniroyal, Inc. v. Rudkin-Wiley Corp., 837 F.2d 1044, 1051, 5 USPQ2d 1434, 1438 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 825 (1988); Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Delta Resins & Refractories, Inc., 776 F.2d 281, 293, 227 USPQ 657, 664 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. Appeal No. 2005-1361 Application No. 09/798,287 10 denied, 475 U.S. 1017 (1986); ACS Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Montefiore Hosp., 732 F.2d 1572, 1577, 221 USPQ 929, 933 (Fed. Cir. 1984). These showings by the examiner are an essential part of complying with the burden of presenting a prima facie case of obviousness. Note In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445, 24 USPQ2d 1443, 1444 (Fed. Cir. 1992). If that burden is met, the burden then shifts to the applicant to overcome the prima facie case with argument and/or evidence. Obviousness is then determined on the basis of the evidence as a whole and the relative persuasiveness of the arguments. See Id.; In re Hedges, 783 F.2d 1038, 1039, 228 USPQ 685, 686 (Fed. Cir. 1986); In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d 1468, 1472, 223 USPQ 785, 788 (Fed. Cir. 1984); and In re Rinehart, 531 F.2d 1048, 1052, 189 USPQ 143, 147 (CCPA 1976). Only those arguments actually made by appellants have been considered in this decision. Arguments which appellants could have made but chose not to make in the brief have not been considered and are deemed to be waived [see 37 CFR § 41.37(c)(1)(vii)(2004)]. The examiner has indicated how he finds the claimed invention to be unpatentable over the teachings of Dow [answer, pages 16-17]. The examiner’s analysis and explanation are sufficient to have at least established a prima facie case of obviousness. Appellants have not specifically responded to this Appeal No. 2005-1361 Application No. 09/798,287 11 rejection. In fact, appellants have indicated that these claims should be grouped with claim 1 [brief, page 4]. Since the examiner has established a prima facie case of the obviousness of claims 5, 12, 14, 15, 21, 28, 30 and 31, and since appellants have not presented any additional arguments with respect to these claims, then we sustain the examiner’s rejection of these claims based upon the rejection and the comments made above with respect to claim 1. We now consider the rejection of claims 33, 34 and 38-40 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as being anticipated by the disclosure of Brichta. The examiner has indicated how he finds the claimed invention to be fully met by the disclosure of Dow [answer, pages 12-15]. With respect to independent claim 33, appellants argue that Brichta fails to teach combining values from a plurality of status registers to form a vector and searching a database to find at least one corrective measure associated with the vector [brief, pages 10-12]. The examiner responds that the claim recitation of “associated with†is much broader than the arguments presented by appellants. The examiner finds that the term “vector†as used in claim 33 is broad enough to be met by Brichta. The examiner also explains how the disclosure of Brichta can be interpreted to meet the claimed corrective action [answer, pages 25-26]. Appeal No. 2005-1361 Application No. 09/798,287 12 Appellants repeat the argument considered above that the term status registers must be interpreted in a manner consistent with the described preferred embodiment [reply brief, pages 10- 12]. We will sustain the examiner’s rejection of independent claim 33 and the rejection of claims 34, 38 and 40 which have not been separately argued by appellants. We decline to interpret the claimed invention in the manner proposed by appellants in the reply brief for reasons discussed above. We agree with the examiner that the claimed vector can be broadly interpreted in a manner that is met by Brichta. We also agree with the examiner that Brichta teaches taking a corrective measure associated with the vector as explained by the examiner. With respect to separately argued claims 39, appellants argue that Brichta fails to teach where the central processing unit sorts the at least one corrective measure in order of decreasing desirability [brief, pages 12-13]. The examiner responds by explaining how the results in Brichta can be considered to meet the language of claim 39 [answer, pages 26- 28]. Appellants respond that the examiner’s position can be reached only through an improper use of hindsight [reply brief, pages 12-13]. Appeal No. 2005-1361 Application No. 09/798,287 13 We will sustain the examiner’s rejection of claim 39 for the reasons argued by the examiner in the answer. We agree with the examiner that the flow chart shown in Figure 7 of Brichta provides a series of potential corrective measures in the order of decreasing desirability. Appellants have failed to specifically rebut the examiner’s explanation as to why Figure 7 of Brichta meets the claimed invention. We now consider the rejection of claims 35-37 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over the teachings of Brichta taken alone. The examiner has indicated how he finds the claimed invention to be unpatentable over the teachings of Brichta [answer, pages 17-18]. The examiner’s analysis and explanation are sufficient to have at least established a prima facie case of obviousness. Appellants have not specifically responded to this rejection. In fact, appellants have indicated that these claims should be grouped with claim 33 [brief, page 4]. Since the examiner has established a prima facie case of the obviousness of claims 35-37, and since appellants have not presented any additional arguments with respect to these claims, then we sustain the examiner’s rejection of these claims based upon the rejection and the comments made above with respect to claim 33. Appeal No. 2005-1361 Application No. 09/798,287 Page 14 In summary, we have sustained each of the examiner’s rejections of the claims on appeal. Therefore, the decision of the examiner rejecting claims 1-40 is affirmed. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 CFR § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED JERRY SMITH ) Administrative Patent Judge ) ) ) ) ) BOARD OF PATENT MAHSHID D. SAADAT ) APPEALS Administrative Patent Judge ) AND ) INTERFERENCES ) ) ) ALLEN R. MACDONALD ) Administrative Patent Judge ) Appeal No. 2005-1361 Application No. 09/798,287 Page 15 JS/kis Appeal No. 2005-1361 Application No. 09/798,287 Page 16 IBM CORP (YA) C/O YEE & ASSOCIATES, P.C. P. O. BOX 802333 DALLAS, TX 75380 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation