Ex Parte Grant et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Sep 29, 2016

11758638 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 29, 2016)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
111758,638 0610512007
99292 7590 10/03/2016
Medler Ferro Woodhouse & Mills PLLC
8201 Greensboro Drive, Suite 1060
McLean, VA 22102
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
Danny A. Grant
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
IMM254 4835
EXAMINER
CRAWLEY, KEITH L
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2696
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
10/03/2016 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address( es):
tmedler@medlerferro.com
docketing@medlerferro.com
eofficeaction@appcoll.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte DANNY A. GRANT, JUAN MANUEL CRUZ-HERNANDEZ,
and CHRISTOPHE RAMSTEIN
Appeal 2015-004818
Application 11/758,638
Technology Center 2600
Before KAL YANK. DESHPANDE, DAVID M. KOHUT, and
JUSTIN T. ARBES, Administrative Patent Judges.
DESHPANDE, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF CASE 1
Appellants seek review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the Examiner's
final rejection of claims 1-7, 9-24, and 28-37. 2 We have jurisdiction over
the appeal pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 6(b ).
We AFFIRM.
1 Our Decision makes reference to Appellants' Reply Brief ("Reply Br.,"
filed March 26, 2015) and Appeal Brief ("App. Br.," filed October 21,
2014), and the Examiner's Answer ("Ans.," mailed January 27, 2015) and
Final Office Action ("Final Act.," mailed May 2, 2014).
2 Claims 8 and 25-27 were canceled previously.
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Application 11/758,638
fNVENTION
Appellants' invention is directed to electronic interface devices that
provide haptic feedback. Spec. i-f 1.
An understanding of the invention can be derived from a reading of
exemplary claim 1, which is reproduced below:
1. An electronic interactive device comprising:
a flexible touch sensitive surface configured to receive and
locate a touch input during gross deformations of the flexible
touch sensitive surface relative to a flat configuration of the
flexible touch sensitive surface;
a flexible screen coupled to said flexible touch sensitive
surface and configured for gross deformation with the flexible
touch sensitive surface, the flexible screen configured to display
an image across a deformed portion thereof during gross
deformations of the flexible screen relative to a flat configuration
of the flexible screen; and
a flexible actuator layer configured for gross deformation
with the flexible touch sensitive surface and said flexible screen,
the flexible actuator layer comprising thin strips or fibers of
flexible actuators extending substantially parallel to the flexible
touch sensitive surface and configured to provide haptic
feedback to the flexible touch sensitive surface during gross
deformations thereof in response to said input.
REFERENCES
Pelrine US 2002/0130673 Al Sept. 19, 2002
Daniels US 2004/0041800 Al Mar. 4, 2004
Nakajima US 2004/0056876 Al Mar. 25, 2004
Snibbe US 6,803,924 Bl Oct. 12, 2004
Kokonaski US 2004/0217877 Al Nov. 4, 2004
Branson US 6,819,304 B2 Nov. 16, 2004
Kleen US 2005/0057528 Al Mar. 17, 2005
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Application 11/758,638
Perkins US 2007/0211036 Al Sept. 13, 2007 3
REJECTIONS
Claims 1--4, 7, 9, 11, 12, 19, 28-34, 36, and 37 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Daniels, Nakajima, and Pelrine.
Final Act. 3-8; Ans. 3-8.
Claims 5, 6, 14, 15, and 17 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Daniels, Nakajima, Pelrine, and Branson. Final Act. 8-
11; Ans. 8-10.
Claims 10 and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Daniels, Nakajima, Pelrine, and Kleen. Final Act. 11-12;
Ans. 10-12.
Claims 13, 16, and 21-24 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Daniels, Nakajima, Pelrine, and Perkins. Final Act. 13-
18; Ans. 12-17.
Claim 18 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over Daniels, Nakajima, Pelrine, and Snibbe. Final Act. 18-19; Ans. 18.
Claim 35 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over Daniels, Nakajima, Pelrine, and Kokonaski. Final Act. 19; Ans. 19.
ISSUE
The issue of whether the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1-7, 9-
24, and 28-37 turns on whether the combination of Daniels, Nakajima, and
Pelrine teaches "a flexible actuator layer configured for gross deformation
3 Application filed March 3, 2006.
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Application 11/758,638
with the flexible touch sensitive surface," as recited in independent claim 1,
and similarly recited in independent claims 11, 21, 28, and 30.
ANALYSIS
Claims 1-4, 7, 9, 11, 12, 19, 28-34, 36, and 37 rejected under 35 US.C.
§ 103(a) as unpatentable over Daniels, Nakajima, and Pelrine
Independent claim 1 recites "a flexible actuator layer configured for
gross deformation with the flexible touch sensitive surface." Independent
claims 11, 21, 28, and 30 recite similar limitations.
Appellants argue that the Examiner erred because Nakajima does not
teach a "flexible actuator layer." App. Br. 9 (citing Nakajima i-f 62, Fig. 2);
Reply Br. 2-3. We disagree with Appellants. Appellants misinterpret the
Examiner's findings. The Examiner does not rely upon Nakajima to teach a
flexible actuator layer. See Final Act. 4--5; see also Ans. 21. Rather, the
Examiner relies upon Pelrine to teach a flexible actuator layer. Final Act. 4--
5; Ans. 21. Thus, Appellants' argument that Nakajima fails to teach a
"flexible actuator layer" does not persuade us of Examiner error because it
fails to address the specific findings of the Examiner based upon Pelrine.
Appellants additionally argue that Nakajima fails to teach "a flexible
actuator layer configured for gross deformation" because raising Nakajima's
pistons does not grossly deform a flexible actuator layer. App. Br. 9; Reply
Br. 2-3. We do not find Appellants' argument persuasive because
Appellants argue against Nakajima individually, rather than against the
combination of Nakajima and Pelrine as proposed by the Examiner. See
Final Act. 4--5; see also Ans. 22-23; see In re Merck & Co., Inc., 800 F.2d
1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986); In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 426 (CCPA 1981).
The Examiner relies upon Nakajima to teach a non-flexible "actuator layer
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Application 11/758,638
configured for gross deformation with the flexible touch sensitive surface."
Final Act. 4; Ans. 20-21. Specifically, the Examiner finds that Nakajima
teaches an actuator layer comprising pistons; the actuator layer is positioned
adjacent to a flexible visual display layer such that when the display layer is
touched by a user, the pistons are actuated to deform the display layer. Ans.
20-21 (citing Nakajima i-f 30, Fig. 5). Accordingly, the Examiner finds
Nakajima's actuator layer is configured to grossly deform with the flexible
display layer. Final Act. 4; Ans. 20-21. As discussed above, the Examiner
finds Pelrine teaches a "flexible" actuator layer. Final Act. 4--5; Ans. 21. In
combining the teachings of Nakajima and Pelrine, the Examiner finds it
would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of
Appellants' invention to modify the actuator layer of Nakajima that is
configured for gross deformation with a flexible visual display layer to be a
flexible actuator layer as in Pelrine. See Final Act. 4--5; Ans. 22-23. As
such, we do not find Appellants' argument persuasive, because the Examiner
relies on the combined teachings of Nakajima and Pelrine to teach a
"flexible actuator layer configured for gross deformation with the flexible
touch sensitive surface." Final Act. 4--5; Ans. 22-23.
Appellants also argue that the Examiner erred because Pelrine fails to
teach a "flexible actuator configured for gross deformation." App. Br. 10.
Specifically, Appellants contend that Pelrine fails to teach the claimed
flexible actuator layer because only portions of the actuator layer of Pelrine
are flexible and the remaining portions of the layer are not disclosed as being
flexible. App. Br. 10 (citing Pelrine i-fi-1115-116, Figs. 5D, 5E); Reply Br. 3.
We do not find Appellants' argument persuasive. The Examiner finds
Pelrine teaches a flexible actuator layer. Final Act. 4--5 (citing Pelrine i-fi-1 6,
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Application 11/758,638
94, 100, Figs. 5D, 5E); Ans. 22-23 (citing Pelrine ilil 6, 100, 153). Pelrine
discloses an embodiment in which a portion of the flexible actuator layer is
restrained from movement and describes the layer as comprising
electroactive polymer. Pelrine i-fi-194, 100, 115, Figs. 5D, 5E. The fact that
Pelrine provides an exemplary embodiment in which portions of the actuator
layer are restrained does not negate the fact that the actuator layer is flexible.
Additionally, one of ordinary skill in the art would understand that if the
electroactive polymer actuator layer is flexible at its unrestrained points, the
entire electroactive polymeric actuator layer of Pelrine is flexible because
the entire layer is made of electroactive polymer having the same properties
throughout the actuator layer. See id. i-fi-f 115-17, Figs. 5D, 5E (depicting
"monolithic" polymer 131 with "portions" designated as 131 a and 131 b ).
Thus, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in finding the actuator
layer of Pelrine is flexible.
Appellants further contend that the Examiner erred in combining
Daniels, Nakajima, and Pelrine because modifying Nakajima's actuator
layer comprising pistons with Pelrine's flexible actuator layer would remove
Nakajima's pistons, thereby removing the "gross deformation" feature of
Nakajima from the combination. See App. Br. 10; Reply Br. 3.
We do not find Appellants' argument persuasive. "The test for
obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be
bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference .... Rather,
the test is what the combined teachings of the references would have
suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art." In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413,
425 (CCPA 1981). See also In re Sneed, 710 F.2d 1544, 1550 (Fed. Cir.
1983) ("[I]t is not necessary that the inventions of the references be
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physically combinable to render obvious the invention under review."); In re
Nievelt, 482 F.2d 965, 968 (CCPA 1973) ("Combining the teachings of
references does not involve an ability to combine their specific structures.").
Rather, "if a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of
ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar
devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual
application is beyond his or her skill." KSR Int 'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550
U.S. 398, 417 (2007). Here, the Examiner has not physically replaced one
layer for another, but instead combined the teachings of Pelrine's flexible
actuator layer and the actuator of Nakajima with the motivation of creating a
flexible actuator layer that is not limited in its geometric application. See
Ans. 22-23 ("It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art
at the time the invention was made to modify the actuator layer of Nakajima
to include the flexible actuator of Pelrine since such a modification, in
addition to providing a fibrous design that is well suited for detecting
bending and deflection, provides an actuator that is not limited to any
particular shape, geometry, or type of transducer deflection and may be
flexibly arranged in a variety of ways, e.g., when the required device size is
small or when the environment does not permit complex mechanical
designs." (citations omitted)). As such, the Examiner provides an articulated
reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the conclusion of
obviousness, and Appellants have not explained sufficiently why the
Examiner's analysis is incorrect. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 418 (quoting In re
Kahn, 441F.3d977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).
Additionally, even ifthe actuator layer of Pelrine was physically
incorporated into the teachings of Nakajima and replaced the pistons of the
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tactile actuator layer, one of ordinary skill in the art would reasonably
conclude that the Pelrine actuator layer is flexible and configured for gross
deformation because the polymer actuator layer of Pelrine is flexible and
deformed during actuation. See Pelrine i-f 115, Figs. 5D, 5E.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner's rejections of independent
claims 1, 11, 28, and 30. Appellants argue that dependent claims 2--4, 7, 9,
12, 19, 29, and 31-34, 36, and 37 are patentable for the same reasons as their
respective independent claims. App. Br. 10, 11, 13, 14. As such, we sustain
the Examiner's rejection of these claims for the reasons discussed above in
our analysis of claims 1, 11, 28, and 30.
Claims 5, 6, 14, 15, and 17 rejected under 35 US.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Daniels, Nakajima, Pelrine, and Branson
Appellants argue that dependent claims 5, 6, 14, 15, and 17, which
depend from claims 1 and 11, respectively, are patentable for the same
reason as claims 1 and 11. App. Br. 14--15. Accordingly, we sustain the
Examiner's rejections of these claims for the reasons discussed above in our
analysis of claims 1 and 11.
Claims 10 and 20 rejected under 35 US.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over
Daniels, Nakajima, Pelrine, and Kleen
Appellants argue that dependent claims 10 and 20, which depend from
claims 1 and 11, respectively, are patentable for the same reason as claims 1
and 11. App. Br. 15. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner's rejections of
these claims for the reasons discussed above in our analysis of claims 1 and
11.
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Claims 13, 16, and 21-24 rejected under 35 USC§ 103(a) as unpatentable
over Daniels, Nakajima, Pelrine, and Perkins
Appellants argue that dependent claims 13 and 16, which depend from
claim 11, are patentable for the same reason as claim 11. App. Br. 15-16.
Appellants also argue that claims 21-24 are patentable for the same reason
as claim 11. Id. at 16-17. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner's
rejections of these claims for the reasons discussed above in our analysis of
claim 11.
Claim 18 rejected under 35 USC§ 103(a) as unpatentable over
Daniels, Nakajima, Pelrine, and Snibbe
Appellants argue that dependent claim 18, which depends from claim
11, is patentable for the same reason as claim 11. App. Br. 17. Accordingly,
we sustain the Examiner's rejection of this claim for the reasons discussed
above in our analysis of claim 11.
Claim 35 rejected under 35 USC§ 103(a) as unpatentable over
Daniels, Nakajima, Pelrine, and Kokonaski
Appellants argue that dependent claim 35, which depends from claim
30, is patentable for the same reason as claim 30. App. Br. 18. Accordingly,
we sustain the Examiner's rejection of this claim for the reasons discussed
above in our analysis of claim 30.
CONCLUSION
The Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 1--4, 7, 9, 11, 12, 19, 28-
34, 36, and 37 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Daniels,
Nakajima, and Pelrine.
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The Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 5, 6, 14, 15, and 17 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Daniels, Nakajima, Pelrine, and
Branson.
The Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 10 and 20 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Daniels, Nakajima, Pelrine, and
Kleen.
The Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 13, 16, and 21-24 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Daniels, Nakajima, Pelrine, and
Perkins.
The Examiner did not err in rejecting claim 18 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as unpatentable over Daniels, Nakajima, Pelrine, and Snibbe.
The Examiner did not err in rejecting claim 35 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as unpatentable over Daniels, Nakajima, Pelrine, and Kokonaski.
DECISION
To summarize, the rejections of claims 1-7, 9-24, and 28-37 are
affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv).
AFFIRMED
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