Ex Parte Goodman et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Oct 27, 2014

11841490 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 27, 2014)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte BRIAN GERARD GOODMAN, PAUL MERRILL
GRECO, and GLEN ALAN JAQUETTE
____________________

Appeal 2012-000542
Application 11/841,4901
Technology Center 2600
____________________

Before ST. JOHN COURTENAY III, THU A. DANG, and
LARRY J. HUME, Administrative Patent Judges.

HUME, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
This is a decision on appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the Final
Rejection of claims 1–32. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 According to Appellants, the real party in interest is International Business
Machines Corporation. App. Br. 3.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE2
The Invention
Appellants' "invention relates to automated data storage libraries, and
more particularly, to the bulk data erase of data stored on removable media
of a removable media cartridge." Spec. ¶ 1 ("FIELD OF THE
INVENTION").
Exemplary Claims
Claims 1, 3, and 5, reproduced below, are representative of the subject
matter on appeal (emphases and formatting added):
1. A system for eliminating access to data on
removable storage media of a removable storage media
cartridge comprising:
a data storage drive, wherein said data storage drive is
configured to:
store at least one key on said removable storage media
cartridge on a writable cartridge memory thereof and/or on a
non-user portion of the removable storage media, wherein said
removable storage media contains data that is accessible with
said at least one key;
receive a command to eliminate access to said data on
said removable storage media; and
shred said at least one key in response to said command,
wherein shredding said at least one key eliminates access to
said data on said removable storage media.

2 Our decision relies upon Appellants' Appeal Brief ("App. Br.," filed
June, 24, 2011); Reply Brief ("Reply Br.," filed Oct. 3, 2011); Examiner's
Answer ("Ans.," mailed Aug. 5, 2011); Final Office Action ("Final Act.,"
mailed Jan. 31, 2011); and the original Specification ("Spec.," filed
Aug. 20, 2007).
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3. The system of claim 2, wherein said data storage
drive is configured to store said at least one key on said non-
user portions of said removable storage media.
5. The system of claim 1, wherein said data storage
drive is further configured to store said at least one key by
storing said at least one key on said cartridge memory of said
removable storage media cartridge,
wherein said shredding said at least one key comprises
overwriting or erasing at least a portion of said cartridge
memory the cartridge memory being of a different type than the
removable storage media.
Prior Art
The Examiner relies upon the following prior art as evidence in
rejecting the claims on appeal:
Maple et al.
("Maple")
US 2003/0028715 A1 Feb. 6, 2003
Garfinkel US 6,993,661 B1 Jan. 31, 2006
Molaro et al.
("Molaro")
US 2008/0141041 A1 June 12, 2008
Rejections on Appeal3
R1. Claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 9, 11, 12, 14, 15, 17, 19, 21, 22, 24, 30, and
32 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as being anticipated by
Garfinkel. Ans. 5.

3 We note the Examiner has withdrawn the rejection of claims 6 and 16
under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written
description requirement. Ans. 4.
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R2. Claims 3, 13, and 25 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over the combination of Garfinkel and Maple. Ans. 13.
R3. Claims 6 and 16 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over the combination of Garfinkel and Molaro. Ans. 14.
R4. Claims 8, 10, 18, 20, 23, 29, and 31 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Garfinkel. Id.
R5. Claims 1–32 are provisionally rejected on the ground of
nonstatutory double patenting over unpatented claims 1–15 of copending
Application No. 11/841,473. Ans. 17.
R6. Claims 1–32 are provisionally rejected on the ground of
nonstatutory double patenting over unpatented claims 1–38 of copending
Application No. 11/840,907. Ans. 18.
R7. Claims 1–32 are provisionally rejected on the ground of
nonstatutory double patenting over unpatented claims 1–32 of copending
Application No. 11/840,911. Ans. 19.
R8. Claims 1–32 are provisionally rejected on the ground of
nonstatutory double patenting over unpatented claims 1–20 of copending
Application No. 11/470,807. Ans. 20.
GROUPING OF CLAIMS
Appellants propose several claim groupings in the Appeal Brief for
the various prior art rejections, with at least nominal arguments directed to
each identified claim group. See App. Br. 12, 14, 15, 17, 19, 21, and 23–29.
However, we note the arguments presented for most of the proposed claim
groups merely rely upon arguments presented with respect to the
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anticipation rejection of claim 1, infra. While using an argument for
patentability of a first claim as a cut-and-paste argument for a second claim
might outwardly appear to be a separate argument for patentability of the
second claim, such a cut-and-paste argument is not, in fact, an argument for
"separate patentability."
Accordingly, based on Appellants' arguments (App. Br. 12–29), we
decide the appeal of the various rejections R1–R8 on the basis of the
following claim groupings:
Claims 1, 2, 4, 7, 9, 11, 12, 14, 15, 17, 19, 21, 22, 24, 30, and 32 in
Rejection R1 stand or fall on the basis of representative claim 1; and claim 5
in Rejection R1 stands or falls alone.
Claims 3, 13, and 25 in Rejection R2 stand of fall on the basis of
representative claim 3.
We address remaining rejections R3 through R8 of claims 1–32, not
argued separately, infra.
ISSUES AND ANALYSIS
We only consider those arguments actually made by Appellants in
reaching this decision, and we do not consider arguments which Appellants
could have made but chose not to make in the Briefs so that any such
arguments are deemed to be waived. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii).
We have reviewed the Examiner's rejections in light of Appellants'
arguments that the Examiner has erred. We disagree with Appellants'
contentions with respect to claims 1–32, and we adopt as our own (1) the
findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner in the action from which this
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appeal is taken and (2) the reasons and rebuttals set forth by the Examiner in
the Examiner's Answer in response to Appellants' Arguments. However, we
highlight and address specific findings and arguments regarding claims 1, 3,
and 5 for emphasis as follows.
1. Rejection R1: Claims 1, 2, 4, 7, 9, 11, 12, 14, 15, 17, 19, 21, 22, 24,
30, and 32
Issue 1
Appellants argue (App. Br. 12–22; Reply Br. 2–6) the Examiner's
rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as being anticipated by
Garfinkel is in error. These contentions present us with the following issue:
Did the Examiner err in finding the cited prior art discloses a data
storage drive configured to, inter alia, "store at least one key on said
removable storage media cartridge on a writable cartridge memory thereof
and/or on a non-user portion of the removable storage media," as recited in
claim 1?
Analysis
Appellants first contend Garfinkel does not disclose storing at least
one key on a removable storage media cartridge on a writable cartridge
memory thereof and/or non-user portion of the removable storage media, as
recited in claim 1. App. Br. 13. Instead, Appellants argue, the only
disclosure in Garfinkel of the key actually being on a hard disk drive is
found by the key being stored in an integrated circuit (IC) of the hard disk
drive, where the only way to render the key unreadable is to remove the
entire IC chip or otherwise damage it. Id. Appellants further contend, with
respect to the "writable cartridge memory" limitation, Garfinkel only
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discloses an IC chip, "which is clearly not writable," because the IC chip is
either removed or destroyed, as such removal or destruction would not be
necessary if the IC chip were writable. App. Br. 13 (citing Garfinkel col. 3,
ll. 6–8).
In response, the Examiner finds Garfinkel at column 2, lines 40–66
discloses the use of an IC chip with a non-volatile random access memory
(NVRAM) used to store the key. Ans. 25. Garfinkel "discusses that to
make the key unavailable for use, the NVRAM may be destroyed, the
NVRAM may be discarded, or the NVRAM may be erased." Id. The
Examiner further finds the IC chip disclosed in Garfinkel is necessarily
writable because writing to the chip is required to erase the IC chip/
NVRAM. Id. We agree with the Examiner's findings.
Second, Appellants contend:
The onus is first on the Examiner to make a prima facie case of
anticipation by showing all parts of the identical invention, not
on the Appellant to speculate as to what the IC on the hard disk
drive is or is not. From the description, the IC appears to be an
unwritable chip, thus requiring its removal or destruction to
nullify the key, i.e., if the IC were writable, it could merely he
erased.
App. Br. 14.
We disagree with Appellants' argument regarding the purported lack
of a prima facie case of anticipation by noting the Federal Circuit has held,
"the prima facie case is merely a procedural device that enables an
appropriate shift of the burden of production." Hyatt v. Dudas, 492 F.3d
1365, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2007). The Federal Circuit stated that this burden is
met by "adequately explain[ing] the shortcomings it perceives so that the
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applicant is properly notified and able to respond." Id. at 1370. It is only
"when a rejection is so uninformative that it prevents the applicant from
recognizing and seeking to counter the grounds for rejection" that the prima
facie burden has not been met and the rejection violates the minimal
requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 132. Chester v. Miller, 906 F.2d 1574, 1578
(Fed. Cir. 1990). In this Appeal, the Examiner has clearly identified the
bases for rejection, and we find the burden of production has properly
shifted to Appellants to rebut the Examiner's findings.
Appellants also contend the recited "non-user portion of the
removable storage media" limitation of claim 1 is not disclosed by Garfinkel
(see col. 5, ll. 58 to col. 6, ll. 19), allegedly because that cited portion
discusses storing a bit pattern on the disk storage unit, and not an encryption
key. App. Br. 14.
In response, the Examiner points out:
[T]he rejection of claim 1 referred to either Garfinkel's key or
the bit pattern as equivalent to the claimed key . . . [and a]s
appellant points out, the bit pattern is used to further generate
another key which is then used in the encryption and decryption
of data, but nothing in the claim prohibits the claimed key from
being used in such a manner.
Ans. 28 (citing Final Act. 7–8). The Examiner finds the term "key" is not
explicitly defined in the Specification, which instead only provides
exemplary, non-limiting descriptions of a "key," e.g., "data keys (DKs) or
encryption encapsulated data keys (or externally encrypted data keys)
(EEDKs) [stored] on or about the removable media cartridge . . . [and
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which] may be referred to herein simply as keys." Spec. ¶ 15.4 The
Examiner concludes "[a] key, in the broadest, reasonable sense of the term in
the art, is merely a piece of data which allows access to information and/or is
used to protect information . . . [thus, the Examiner finds] it would have
been reasonable to view the bit pattern [in Garfinkel] as a key." Ans. 28.
During examination, a claim must be given its broadest reasonable
interpretation consistent with the Specification, as it would be interpreted by
one of ordinary skill in the art. Because the applicant has the opportunity to
amend claims during prosecution, giving a claim its broadest reasonable
interpretation will reduce the possibility that the claim, once issued, will be
interpreted more broadly than is justified. In re Yamamoto, 740 F.2d 1569,
1571 (Fed. Cir. 1984); In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319, 321 (Fed. Cir. 1989)
("During patent examination the pending claims must be interpreted as
broadly as their terms reasonably allow.").
We agree with the Examiner's interpretation, and note there is no
evidence of record that would preclude the Examiner's broad but reasonable

4 By way of other, non-limiting examples, Appellants' Specification at
paragraph 18 further discloses,
When data is to be encrypted and stored on the
removable storage medium, the data is encrypted with a data
key, such as by performing an AES (Advanced Encryption
Standard) encryption with a randomly generated 256-bit data
key. In one embodiment, the data key(s) or encrypted data
key(s) are stored in multiple places on a removable media
cartridge. Further, the keys in one embodiment may be stored
outside of the user data area (such as in the cartridge memory
and/or in specially designated non-user data areas of the storage
medium that are designed for holding this type of information).
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interpretation that the recited "key" reads on either Garfinkel's key or the
stored bit pattern.
In the Reply Brief, Appellants contend, inter alia, "[i]f 'erasing' and
'destroying' were truly interchangeable, the under the Examiner's logic,
Garfinkel would teach destroying the disk . . . [and therefore,] the
Examiner's arguments have no merit and should be rejected by the Board."
Reply Br. 4–5. We disagree with Appellants' arguments because the
Examiner did not find "erasing" and "destroying" to be "interchangeable,"
but instead found them to be alternative approaches useful in making the key
unavailable.
Appellants further contend:
Clearly, the NVRAM is not the same as the IC chip, else why
would Garfinkel discuss the NVRAM as storing a key that is
used by a host retrieving data from the disk storage unit, and
immediately thereafter refer to an alternate embodiment where
the key is stored "on the disk storage unit itself" ("Alternatively,
some or all of the description key can be stored on the disk
storage unit itself")?
Reply Br. 5.
We are not persuaded by Appellants' argument because in addition to
the other relevant disclosure in Garfinkel at column 2, lines 40–56, Garfinkel
discloses:
Alternatively, some or all of the decryption key can be stored
on the disk storage unit itself, and another portion provided in,
for example, an integrated circuit ("IC") chip, and the key
obtained by performing a selected processing operation in
connection with the portion of the key stored on the disk
storage unit and the portion stored on the IC chip. For example,
the decryption key can be formed by concatenating the portion
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stored on the IC chip with the portion stored on the disk storage
unit.
Garfinkel col. 2, ll. 57–65. In addition, as pointed out by the Examiner
(Ans. 25), we note an NVRAM is an integrated circuit. Thus, we find the
Examiner's interpretation that Garfinkel anticipates claim 1 to be reasonable,
particularly in light of the alternative language of claim 1 identified by the
Examiner in the Answer, i.e.,
[B]ecause of the way the limitation is written, if just one of
three conditions is met by Garfinkel, Garfinkel would teach this
limitation. These conditions are:
1. store at least one key on said removable storage media
cartridge on a writeable cartridge memory thereof;
2. store at least one key on a non-user portion of the removable
storage media; or
3. store at least one key on said removable storage media
cartridge on a writeable cartridge memory thereof and on a non-
user portion of the removable storage media.
Ans. 23–24. Based upon the analysis above, we find Garfinkel discloses at
least two of the above arrangements.
Accordingly, Appellants have not provided sufficient evidence or
argument to persuade us of any reversible error in the Examiner's reading of
the contested limitations on the cited prior art. Therefore, we sustain the
Examiner's anticipation rejection of independent claim 1. As Appellants
have not provided separate arguments with respect claims 2, 4, 7, 9, 11, 12,
14, 15, 17, 19, 21, 22, 24, 30, and 32, which fall with claim 1, we similarly
sustain the Examiner's rejection of these claims under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).
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§ 103(a) Rejection R3 of Claims 6 and 16
In view of the lack of any separate, substantive arguments directed to
the obviousness rejection of claims 6 and 16 under § 103 (see App. Br. 26–
27; Reply Br. 19–21), we sustain the Examiner's rejection of these claims, as
they fall with their respective independent claims 1 and 11. Arguments not
made are considered waived. See Hyatt v. Dudas, 551 F.3d 1307, 1314
(Fed. Cir. 2008) ("When the appellant fails to contest a ground of rejection
to the Board, section 1.192(c)(7) [(now section 41.37(c)(1)(vii))] imposes no
burden on the Board to consider the merits of that ground of rejection . . . .
[T]he Board may treat any argument with respect to that ground of rejection
as waived.").
§ 103(a) Rejection R4 of Claims 8, 10, 18, 20, 23, 29 and 31
In view of the lack of any separate, substantive arguments directed to
the obviousness rejection of claims 8, 10, 18, 20, 23, 29, and 31 under § 103
(see App. Br. 27–28; Reply Br. 21–23), we sustain the Examiner's rejection
of these claims, as they fall with their respective independent claims 1, 11,
21, and 24. Arguments not made are considered waived. See Hyatt, 551
F.3d at 1314.
2. Rejection R1: Claim 5
Issue 2
Appellants argue (App. Br. 14–15; Reply Br. 6–7) the Examiner's
rejection of claim 5 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as being anticipated by
Garfinkel is in error. These contentions present us with the following issue:
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Did the Examiner err in finding the cited prior art discloses the
limitation of "wherein said shredding said at least one key comprises
overwriting or erasing at least a portion of said cartridge memory the
cartridge memory being of a different type than the removable storage
media," as recited in claim 5?
Analysis
Appellants contend:
In sharp contrast [to claim 5], Garfinkel relies on erasure of
memory on the computer system, as there is no secondary
memory on the disk drive. This is a far cry from showing the
identical invention in as much detail as contained in the claims,
as required . . . [such that] the rejection is improper.
App. Br. 15.
In response, the Examiner finds, as discussed, supra, with respect to
Issue 1, Garfinkel column 2, lines 57–69 disclose "the key can be stored on
the disk storage unit itself OR on another portion provided in an integrated
circuit ('IC') chip . . . [and t]he IC chip can be considered equivalent to the
claimed cartridge memory of said removable storage media cartridge." Ans.
30–31. We agree with the Examiner's findings of anticipation because, in
addition to disk storage, Garfinkel's storage unit can alternatively be a tape
medium (see Garfinkel col. 6, ll. 64–67), and the Examiner finds a person
with skill in the art would know that tape media can be provided in the form
of a removable tape cartridge, and that hard drives can be removable storage
units, thus meeting the limitation in dispute. Ans. 31.
In further support of the Examiner's position, the Examiner finds, and
we agree,
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[B]ecause Garfinkel's disk storage unit used to store user data
could either be a disk drive or a tape drive while the key used to
encrypt/decrypt the user data is stored on an IC chip associated
with the disk storage unit, the limitation being argued by
appellant is met since an IC chip is a memory of different type
than either a disk drive or tape cartridge . . . [and] one type of
IC chip Garfinkel taught for use . . . was NVRAM, which . . . is
of a different type than either a hard disk drive or tape storage.
Id. Thus, we find Garfinkel's disclosure meets the shredding limitation in
dispute, including the portion of the limitation "the cartridge memory being
of a different type than the removable storage media."
Accordingly, Appellants have not provided sufficient evidence or
argument to persuade us of any reversible error in the Examiner's reading of
the contested limitations on the cited prior art. Therefore, we sustain the
Examiner's anticipation rejection of dependent claim 5.
3. Rejection R2: Claims 3, 13 and 25
Issue 3
Appellants argue (App. Br. 23–24; Reply Br. 15–18) the Examiner's
rejection of claim 3 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being obvious over the
combination of Garfinkel and Maple is in error. These contentions present
us with the following issues:
(a) Did the Examiner err in finding the cited prior art combination
teaches or suggests the limitation of "wherein said data storage drive is
configured to store said at least one key on said non-user portions of said
removable storage media," as recited in claim 3?
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(b) Did the Examiner err by not providing a reasonable motivation
to combine Garfinkel with Maple to render claim 3 unpatentable under
§ 103?
Analysis
Issue 3(a)
Appellants contend, "neither Garfinkel nor Maple teach or suggest
storing a key on a tape medium [and] Maple is silent as to storing a key.
Likewise Garfinkel is very specific about where his key is stored, and that is
in the IC chip and/or on some remote computer." App. Br. 23.
In response, the Examiner finds, and we agree,
Garfinkel discloses tape medium being used for storage units
(col 6, lines 64–67) and the key being stored on the storage unit
itself (col 2, lines 57–58). Additionally, Maple teaches use of a
tape medium to store both user data and non-user data.[5] The
examiner explained earlier why key data is considered non-user
data.[6] As such, based on Garfinkel's teachings alone or
additionally with Maple's teachings, storing a key on a tape
medium would at the very least be obvious for the reasons
stated [in the Final Action].
Ans. 33–34 (citing Final Act. 15). In the Reply Brief (Reply Br. 15–18),
Appellants provide no rebuttal to the Examiner's findings, cited supra.
Thus, we find Garfinkel in combination with Maple teaches or at least
suggests the disputed limitation of claim 3.

5 See Maple ¶¶ 2, 3, and 18.
6 "One skilled having common sense would recognize that since Garfinkel's
invention utilizes a key to encrypt user data thereby making it secure,
Garfinkel's key can be considered non-user data." Final Act. 5. See also
Ans. 13.
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Issue 3(b)
Appellants contend, "the Examiner [has not] provided a reasonable
motivation based on knowledge generally available to those skilled in the art
and not provided by Appellant in the present disclosure." App. Br. 23.
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that "[t]he obviousness analysis
cannot be confined by a formalistic conception of the words teaching,
suggestion, and motivation, or by overemphasis on the importance of
published articles and the explicit content of issued patents." KSR Int'l Co.
v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 419 (2007). Instead, the relevant inquiry is
whether the Examiner has set forth "some articulated reasoning with some
rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness." In re
Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (cited with approval in KSR, 550
U.S. at 418).
Appellants appear to contend the Examiner's basis for motivation to
combine Garfinkel with Maple in the manner suggested is that:
Here, the Examiner has indicated that the motivation to write an
encryption key into a non-user portion of tape media is based
on keeping the data secure. However, as noted above, placing
the key with the data it is meant to protect actually introduces
more vulnerability than if the key is stored where Garfinkel
explicitly discloses it. Thus, the only conclusion that can be
drawn is that the combination of features proposed in the
rejection has been impermissibly drawn from Appellant's
disclosure, in violation of Ex parte Clapp, supra.
App. Br. 23–24. We have searched the record, and do not find that the
Examiner set forth the basis for motivation as argued by Appellants.
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In the present appeal, the Examiner's stated basis for motivation to
combine Garfinkel with Maple in rejecting claim 3 under § 103 is that:
[I]t would have been obvious to store non-user data such as a
key in non-user portions of a tape media because it is nothing
more than use of a technology for the purpose for which it was
invented. Further, as evidenced by Maple, tape storage contain
only user data portions and non-user data portions, thus given a
finite number of locations that non-user data can be stored, it
would have been obvious to try to store non-user data in the
non-user portion.
Ans. 13. In addition, the Examiner also provided a similar, if not identical
rationale for combining Garfinkel with Maple in the Final Action. See Final
Act. 15. Therefore, as required by KSR, we find the Examiner has provided
articulated reasoning with a rational underpinning to support combining
Garfinkel with Maple in the rejection of claims 3, 13, and 25.
Accordingly, Appellants have not provided sufficient evidence or
argument to persuade us of any reversible error in the Examiner's reading of
the contested limitations on the cited prior art, or in the legal conclusion of
obviousness. Therefore, we sustain the Examiner's obviousness rejection of
dependent claim 3, and claims 13 and 25 which fall with claim 3.
4. Rejections R5 – R8: Claims 1–32
In view of the lack of any arguments directed to the Provisional
Obviousness-Type Double Patenting Rejections R5–R8 of claims 1–32, we
pro forma sustain the Examiner's rejections of these claims because
arguments not made are considered waived. See Hyatt, 551 F.3d at 1314.
Appellants have shown no error in the rejection, such that we affirm
Rejections R5–R8.
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REPLY BRIEF
To the extent Appellants advance new arguments in the Reply Brief
(Reply Br. 2–24) not in response to a shift in the Examiner's position in the
Answer, we note that "[a]ny bases for asserting error, whether factual or
legal, that are not raised in the principal brief are waived." Ex parte Borden,
93 USPQ2d 1473, 1474 (BPAI 2010) (informative). Cf. with Optivus Tech.,
Inc. v. Ion Beam Appl'ns. S.A., 469 F.3d 978, 989 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ("[A]n
issue not raised by an appellant in its opening brief . . . is waived."). We
further note, no new or non-admitted affidavit or other evidence may be
submitted in a Reply Brief. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.41.
CONCLUSIONS
(1) The Examiner did not err with respect to the anticipation
rejection R1 of claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 9, 11, 12, 14, 15, 17, 19, 21, 22, 24, 30,
and 32 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) over the prior art of record, and we sustain
the rejection.
(2) The Examiner did not err with respect to the obviousness
rejections R2–R4 of claims 3, 6, 8, 10, 13, 16, 18, 20, 23, 25, 29, and 31
under § 103 over the various combinations of the prior art of record, and we
sustain the rejections.
(3) The Examiner did not err with respect to the Obviousness-Type
Double Patenting rejections R5–R8 of claims 1–32 over the cited claims of
the cited prior art of record, and we sustain the rejections.
DECISION
We affirm the Examiner's decision rejecting claims 1–32.
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No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv) (2011).
AFFIRMED

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