Ex Parte Gonen

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jan 2, 2018

12041454 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 2, 2018)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
12/041,454 03/03/2008 RON GONEN REC006 1407
71136 7590
Maldjian Law Group LLC
106 Apple Street
Suite 200N
Tinton Falls, NJ 07724
EXAMINER
HAMILTON, MATTHEW L
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3682
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
01/04/2018 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
j maldj ian @ mlgiplaw. com
mlgdocketing @ mlgiplaw. com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte RON GONEN
Appeal 2016-005559
Application 12/041,454
Technology Center 3600
Before ALLEN R. MacDONALD, CHARLES J. BOUDREAU, and
AMBER L. HAGY, Administrative Patent Judges.
HAGY, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
Final Rejection of claims 12-20, which are all of the pending claims.2 We
have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.
1 Appellant identifies the real party in interest as RecycleBank LLC. (App.
Br. 3.)
2 Applicant withdrew claims 1-11, without prejudice, in an Amendment
dated May 6, 2011, in response to the Examiner’s Restriction Requirement
dated April 7, 2011.
Appeal 2016-005559
Application 12/041,454
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Introduction
According to Appellant, “[ejmbodiments of the present invention
generally relate to a recycling system and method thereof. More
specifically, embodiments of the present invention relate to a method of
implementing an incentive-based recycling system which rewards clients for
recycling recyclable goods via financial or other incentives.” (Spec. ^ 2.)
Exemplary Claim
Claim 12, reproduced below with the disputed limitation italicized, is
the sole independent claim and is exemplary of the claimed subject matter:
12. A method of implementing a system of incentive-based
recycling comprising the steps of:
receiving a quantity of recyclable material from a
customer by a recycling pickup vehicle;
ascertaining a quantitative measurement of the recyclable
material from the customer by a weighing mechanism;
downloading a series of data points from a local database
by use of a computer, wherein the series of data points
comprises the quantitative measurement of recyclable material
from the customer;
validating the series of data points;
uploading the series of data points to a user-specific data
table;
generating at least one report from the data points
uploaded to the user-specific data table; and
allocating rewards to the customer corresponding to a
unique set of identifying data points.
2
Appeal 2016-005559
Application 12/041,454
References
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on
appeal is:
Palik
Brewer et al. (“Brewer”)
Rendahl et al. (“Rendahl”)
Berry
Krupowicz
Honegger
US 4,949,528
US 2001/0047299 Al
US 2003/0040854 Al
US 2004/0167799 A1
US 2005/0038572 Al
US 2005/0216369 A1
Aug. 21, 1990
Nov. 29, 2001
Feb. 27, 2003
Aug. 26, 2004
Feb. 17, 2005
Sept. 29, 2005
Rejections3
Claims 12-20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C § 101 as being directed
to patent-ineligible subject matter. (Final Act. 2-7.)
Claims 12, 14-18, and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Krupowicz, Honegger, Rendahl, and Brewer. (Final
Act. 8-14.)
Claim 13 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Krupowicz, Honegger, Rendahl, Brewer, and Berry.
(Final Act. 14-15.)
Claim 19 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over
Krupowicz, Honegger, Rendahl, Brewer, and Palik. (Final Act. 15-16.)
3 All rejections are under the provisions of 35 U.S.C. in effect prior to the
effective date of the Feahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011. (Final Act.
2.)
3
Appeal 2016-005559
Application 12/041,454
Issues
(1) Whether the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 12-20 under
35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter.
(2) Whether the Examiner erred in finding that Rendahl teaches or
suggests “uploading the series of data points to a user-specific data table,” as
recited in independent claim 12.
ANALYSIS4
A. Section 101 Rejection
Patent eligibility is a question of law. Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674
F.3d 1315, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
The Supreme Court has set forth an analytical “framework for
distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible applications of those
concepts.” Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Infl, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014)
(citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66,
71-73 (2012)). In the first step of the analysis, we determine whether the
claims at issue are “directed to” a judicial exception, such as an abstract
idea. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355. If not, the inquiry ends. Thales Visionix Inc.
v. U.S., 850 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Enfish, LLCv. Microsoft
Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2016). If the claims are determined to
be directed to an abstract idea, then we consider under step two whether the
claims contain an “inventive concept” sufficient to “‘transform the nature of
4 Only those arguments made by Appellant have been considered in this
decision. Arguments Appellant did not make have not been considered and
are deemed to be waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv)(2015).
4
Appeal 2016-005559
Application 12/041,454
the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355
(quotations and citation omitted).
Noting that “the two stages involve overlapping scrutiny of the
content of the claims,” the Federal Circuit has described “the first-stage
inquiry” as “looking at the ‘focus’ of the claims, their ‘character as a
whole,”’ and “the second-stage inquiry (where reached)” as “looking more
precisely at what the claim elements add—specifically, whether, in the
Supreme Court’s terms, they identify an ‘inventive concept’ in the
application of the ineligible matter to which (by assumption at stage two) the
claim is directed.” Electric Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350,
1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016). In considering whether a claim is directed to an
abstract idea, we acknowledge, as did the Court in Mayo, that “all inventions
at some level embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural
phenomena, or abstract ideas.” Mayo, 566 U.S. at 71. We, therefore, look
to whether the claims focus on a specific means or method that improves the
relevant technology or are instead directed to a result or effect that itself is
the abstract idea and merely invoke generic processes and machinery. See
Enfish, 822 F.3dat 1336.
Step One: Whether the Claims Are Directed to a Patent-Ineligible
Concept (Abstract Idea)
Here, in rejecting the pending claims under § 101, the Examiner
analyzes the claims using the Mayo/Alice two-step framework, consistent
with the guidance set forth in the USPTO’s “2014 Interim Guidance on
Patent Subject Matter Eligibility,” 79 Fed. Reg. 74618 (Dec. 16, 2014), in
effect at the time the Final Office Action was mailed. (Final Act. 2-7.)
Addressing the first step, the Examiner finds claim 12 is directed to the
abstract idea of “incentivizing recycling” (Final Act. 4), and also finds the
5
Appeal 2016-005559
Application 12/041,454
actions being performed in the claim read upon “certain methods of
organizing human activities in terms of organizing how rewards or points are
provided to the user commensurate with the recycling material provided by
the user.” {Id. at 7.)
Appellant first argues that it is error for the Examiner to rely on the
rationale that the claims are directed to a method of “organizing human
activity” as a basis for concluding that the claims are directed to an abstract
idea. (App. Br. 7-8.) Although Appellant acknowledges that the category
of abstract ideas may include some methods of organizing human activity,
Appellant argues that “the Supreme Court did not say all methods of
organizing human activity are abstract ideas,” and thus insists that whether a
claim is directed to a method of organizing human activity is not
determinative of whether the claim is abstract. {Id. at 8.) We agree with
Appellant that the Court did not suggest in Alice that all methods of
organizing human activities are directed to an abstract idea. We further
note, however, that the Federal Circuit has repeatedly confirmed since Alice
that the category of abstract ideas embraces “fundamental economic
practice[s] long prevalent in our system of commerce,” including
“longstanding commercial practice[s]” and “method[s] of organizing human
activity.” E.g., Intellectual Ventures ILLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d
1307, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
In the Answer, the Examiner further refers to the July 2015 Interim
Eligibility Guidelines, which issued after the date of the Final Action. (Ans.
2.) The Examiner notes that those Guidelines use the phrase “certain
methods of organizing human activity” to “describe concepts relating to
interpersonal and intrapersonal activities, such as managing relationships or
6
Appeal 2016-005559
Application 12/041,454
transactions between people, social activities, and human behavior;
satisfying or avoiding a legal obligation; advertising, marketing, and sales
activities or behaviors; and managing human mental activity.” {Id. at 2-3.)
The Examiner also finds “Appellant’s invention falls under the abstract idea
of certain methods of organizing human activity because it relates to
advertising, marketing and sales activities or behaviors.” {Id. at 3.) In
particular, the Examiner finds:
In the Appellant’s invention, a user is rewarded based on the
amount of recyclable material provided and weighed. This is
consistent with the definition of advertising and marketing
under the abstract idea of certain methods of organizing human
activity. The Appellant’s invention promotes and incentivizes
users to provide recyclable material in exchange for a reward or
credit. The promotion of a product or service (e.g., exchanging
recyclable material for a reward or credit) is consistent with the
definition of the concepts of advertising and marketing.
Additionally, the Appellant’s invention tracks or monitors the
amount or recyclable material provided and weighed in
exchange for rewards, which, in turn is consistent with the
concept of tracking sales activities or behaviors (e.g., tracking
amount of rewards generated based on user recycling behavior
and tracking sales of redemption of the rewards).
{Id. at 3.) We agree with the Examiner’s analysis.
Appellant next argues that claim 12 cannot be directed to an abstract
idea because it recites use of a “weighing mechanism” to “ascertain[] a
quantitative measurement of the recyclable material.” (App. Br. 9-10.)
Appellant argues that because the weighing mechanism “interacts with
physical objects,” it “is an apparatus that clearly transforms the claim into
eligible subject matter.” {Id. at 9 (emphasis omitted).)
We disagree. Appellant does not purport to claim an innovative
weighing mechanism or an innovative manner of weighing material. This
7
Appeal 2016-005559
Application 12/041,454
much is also clear from Appellant’s Specification, which describes a
conventional manner of obtaining the weight of material by weighing the
material in a bin and then subtracting the weight of the bin to obtain the net
weight of the material. (See Spec. ^ 24.) We also note that, in claiming
steps of taking measurements, recording the data, and manipulating that
data, Appellant’s claims are similar to claims the Federal Circuit has
determined were directed to an abstract idea in Electric Power Group, 830
F.3d 1350. In that case, the claims recited steps of receiving measurements,
recording data pertaining to those measurements, and manipulating and
displaying that data. Id. at 1351-52. The Federal Circuit agreed that the
claims were directed to an abstract idea of “collecting information, analyzing
it, and displaying certain results of the collection and analysis,” even though
the claims required use of various devices to take the measurements, to
manipulate the data, and to display it. Id. at 1353-54. The court reasoned:
[T]he claims are clearly focused on the combination of those
abstract-idea processes. The advance they purport to make is a
process of gathering and analyzing information of a specified
content, then displaying the results, and not any particular
assertedly inventive technology for performing those functions.
They are therefore directed to an abstract idea.
Id. at 1354. Similarly, here, Appellant’s claiming the use of a generic
weighing mechanism for its ordinary purpose and in a conventional manner
to obtain weight of a material does not render Appellant’s claimed invention
less abstract.
Thus, at step one of the analysis, we are not persuaded that the
Examiner erred in determining that the claims are directed to a patent-
ineligible subject matter—that is, to an abstract idea.
8
Appeal 2016-005559
Application 12/041,454
Step Two: Whether Additional Elements Transform The Idea Into
Patent-Eligible Subject Matter
Having found that the claims are directed to an abstract idea, the
Examiner also finds that the additional elements or combinations of
elements beyond the abstract idea do not amount to “significantly more”
than the abstract idea itself. (Final Act. 4.)
Appellant challenges this finding by arguing, as noted above, that the
recitation of obtaining a “quantitative measurement of the recyclable
material... by a weighing mechanism” is a recitation of “significantly
more” than “just ‘applying an abstract idea on a general purpose computer’.”
(App. Br. 9.) We disagree. As noted above, the use of tools in a
conventional way for their ordinary purpose does not render patent-eligible a
claim that is directed to an abstract idea. See, e.g., Electric Power Group,
830 F.3d at 1353-56. The Federal Circuit’s analysis of the second step of
the Alice framework in Electric Power Group is also instructive here.
There, the court noted:
The claims in this case do not even require a new source or type
of information, or new techniques for analyzing it. . . . Asa
result, they do not require an arguably inventive set of
components or methods, such as measurement devices or
techniques, that would generate new data. They do not invoke
any assertedly inventive programming. Merely requiring the
selection and manipulation of information ... by itself does not
transform the otherwise-abstract processes of information
collection and analysis.
Electric Power Group, 803 F.3d at 1355. The court also noted, in terms of
“/?ow the desired result is achieved,” that the claims also “do not require any
nonconventional computer, network, or display components, or even a ‘non-
conventional and non-generic arrangement of known, conventional pieces,’
9
Appeal 2016-005559
Application 12/041,454
but merely call for performance of the claimed information collection,
analysis, and display functions ‘on a set of generic computer components’
and display devices.” Id. The same analysis applies here. As in Electric
Power Group, Appellant’s claims specify what information it is desirable to
gather, analyze, and manipulate, but they do not include any requirement for
performing the claimed functions of gathering, analyzing, and manipulating
that information by use of anything but entirely conventional, generic
technology. (See also Ans. 5-6.) The claims, therefore, merely link the use
of the abstract idea to a particular technological environment, which does
not amount to “significantly more.”
Appellant’s Reply Brief raises several additional arguments against
the Examiner’s § 101 rejection. (Reply Br. 3-7.) We find nothing in the
Examiner’s Answer that would have prompted these new arguments;
therefore, these new arguments are not entitled to our consideration. Optivus
Tech., Inc. v. Ion Beam Applications S.A., 469 F.3d 978, 989 (Fed. Cir.
2006) (argument raised for the first time in the reply brief that could have
been raised in the opening brief is waived); accord Ex parte Borden, 93
USPQ2d 1473, 1473-74 (BPAI 2010) (informative opinion) (absent a
showing of good cause, the Board is not required to address an argument
newly presented in the reply brief that could have been presented in the
principal brief on appeal).
Nevertheless, even considering Appellant’s new arguments, we are
not persuaded of Examiner error. Appellant argues the Examiner “failed to
analyze each and every element in their entirety.” (Reply Br. 3.) In
particular, Appellant argues the Examiner failed to properly analyze the
claims’ requirement of “downloading a series of data points” and “validating
10
Appeal 2016-005559
Application 12/041,454
the series of data points.” (Id.) Appellant argues, in particular, that the
recitation of downloading data points cannot be done by a human and also
accomplishes a specific objective that is not abstract. (Id. at 4.) These
arguments are not persuasive of error. As the Supreme Court has explained,
“the mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a patent-
ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Alice Corp., 134 S.
Ct. at 2358. Thus, automating the claimed data collection and validation
with the use of a generic computer performing generic computer operations
such as downloading data does not transform Appellant’s claims into patent-
eligible subject matter.
Appellant also argues error by asserting that the Examiner has failed
to provide “evidence . . . compelling the conclusion” the claims are directed
to an abstract idea. (Reply Br. 4.) We disagree that the Examiner was
required to provide such evidence as part of the Examiner’s prima facie case.
The Federal Circuit has repeatedly noted that “the prima facie case is merely
a procedural device that enables an appropriate shift of the burden of
production.” Hyatt v. Dudas, 492 F.3d 1365, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing
In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992)). The court has, thus,
held that the Office carries its procedural burden of establishing a prima
facie case when its rejection satisfies the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 132 by
notifying the applicant of the reasons for rejection, “together with such
information and references as may be useful in judging of the propriety of
continuing the prosecution of [the] application.” See In re Jung, 637 F.3d
1356, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Here, in rejecting the pending claims under
§ 101, the Examiner analyzed the claims using the Mayo/Alice two-step
framework, and notified Appellant that claims 12-20 are directed to
11
Appeal 2016-005559
Application 12/041,454
“incentivizing recycling” and also read upon “certain methods of organizing
human activities in terms of organizing how rewards or points are provided
to the user commensurate with the recycling material provided by the user.”
(Final Act. 4, 7.) In so doing, the Examiner notified Appellant of the
reasons for the rejection “together with such information and references as
may be useful in judging of the propriety of continuing the prosecution of
[the] application.” 35 U.S.C. § 132. We find, therefore, that the Examiner
set forth a prima facie case of patent-ineligibility such that the burden of
production then shifted to Appellant to demonstrate that the claims are
patent-eligible.
Finally, with regard to Appellant’s argument regarding preemption
(Reply Br. 5-6), we are also not persuaded of error. There is no dispute that
the Supreme Court has described “the concern that drives this exclusionary
principle [i.e., the exclusion of abstract ideas from patent eligible subject
matter] as one of pre-emption.” See Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2354.
However, characterizing preemption as a driving concern for patent
eligibility is not the same as characterizing preemption as the sole test for
patent eligibility. As our reviewing court has explained: “The Supreme
Court has made clear that the principle of preemption is the basis for the
judicial exceptions to patentability,” and “[f]or this reason, questions on
preemption are inherent in and resolved by the § 101 analysis.” Ariosa
Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(citing Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2354). Although “preemption may signal
patent ineligible subject matter, the absence of complete preemption does
not demonstrate patent eligibility.” Id. (See also Ans. 5-6.)
12
Appeal 2016-005559
Application 12/041,454
For the foregoing reasons, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in
rejecting independent claim 12 as directed to patent-ineligible subject matter
under 35 U.S.C. § 101, or in rejecting on the same basis dependent claims
13-20, which Appellant does not argue separately. (App. Br. 10.)
B. § 103(a) Rejections
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
in light of Appellant’s arguments the Examiner has erred. We disagree with
Appellant’s conclusions and we adopt as our own: (1) the findings and
reasons set forth by the Examiner in the action from which this appeal is
taken (Final Act. 8-17); and (2) the reasons set forth by the Examiner in the
Examiner’s Answer in response to Appellant’s Appeal Brief (Ans. 6). We
concur with the conclusions reached by the Examiner, and we highlight the
following points for emphasis.
The Examiner finds the combination of Krupowicz, Honegger,
Rendahl, and Brewer teaches or suggests the limitations of claim 12. (Final
Act. 8-12.) With regard to the recitation of a “user-specific data table,” the
Examiner relies particularly on Rendahl. {Id. at 10.) Rendahl discloses
gathering data (particularly, vehicle emissions data correlated with a
vehicle’s license plate) and creating a record of that data for forwarding to a
processing station, where the data may be displayed, validated, and
forwarded to a predetermined location (such as a law enforcement agency
that may issue a citation for an emissions violation). {E.g., Rendahl 21,
132.) Rendahl further discloses the collected and validated data may be
saved at a central collection facility, in which image data (such as vehicle
license plates) may be stored separately from emissions or other data. {Id. at
138.)
13
Appeal 2016-005559
Application 12/041,454
Appellant argues the Examiner’s findings are in error because
“Rendahl clearly fails to disclose any table let alone the ‘user-specific data
table’ as recited in claim 12.” (App. Br. 12 (bold emphasis omitted)). In
making that argument, Appellant takes issue with the Examiner’s construing
a “user-specific data table” as encompassing a “database.” (Reply Br. 7;
Ans. 6.) We are not persuaded of Examiner error. It is well settled that the
terms of a claim must be given the broadest reasonable interpretation,
consistent with Appellant’s Specification, as they would be interpreted by
one of ordinary skill in this art. In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054-55 (Fed.
Cir. 1997); In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319, 321-22 (Fed. Cir. 1989). Here,
Appellant’s Specification does not refer to a “user-specific data table,” but
consistently discloses that the data is uploaded “to a central database.” (E.g.,
Spec. 6-8, 18-19, 25, 27-29.) Appellant’s Specification also broadly
refers to generating a report of uploaded data in which the report “may
present the data points and/or analysis of such points in any format or
presentation medium suitable for embodiments of the present invention.”
{Id. ^ 29, emphasis included.) Thus, broadly but reasonably construed
consistent with Appellant’s Specification, the claimed “user-specific data
table” encompasses a database organized according to a user’s needs.
We further agree that the recited “user-specific data table”
encompasses the teachings of Rendahl, which discloses that data may be
output in a customized format: “An advantage of the data processing and
validation system is that it permits the production of a customized output
depending upon the needs of a particular user of the system.'''' (Rendahl
^ 132, emphasis included). Rendahl further discloses that processed data
may be imported into a variety of formats, including an Excel® spreadsheet
14
Appeal 2016-005559
Application 12/041,454
(Rendahl 43), which is a well-known database program that presents data
in tabular format. Thus, the ordinarily skilled artisan would understand from
Rendahl that the processed data may be uploaded to a “user-specific data
table,” as recited in claim 12.
We, therefore, agree the Examiner’s findings are supported by the
teachings of Rendahl. Appellant’s arguments, which are directed at an
incorrect characterization of the teachings of Rendahl, do not persuasively
rebut those findings.
For the foregoing reasons, we are not persuaded of error in the
Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection of independent claim 12, or of
dependent claims 14-18 and 20, which are argued collectively with claim
12. (App. Br. 11-12.) We, therefore, sustain the rejection of claims 12, 14-
18, and 20 as unpatentable over the combination of Krupowicz, Honegger,
Rendahl, and Brewer.
We likewise sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of
dependent claims 13 and 19 over Krupowicz, Honegger, Rendahl, Brewer,
and the additionally cited prior art listed above (Berry for claim 13 and Palik
for claim 19). Appellant has not particularly pointed out errors in the
Examiner’s reasoning regarding the additional teachings of the further cited
art as applied to these claims, but instead argues these claims collectively
with the other claims and contends only that Brewer, Berry, and Palik
collectively fail to cure the alleged deficiencies of Rendahl, Krupowicz, and
Honegger as applied to independent claim 12. (App. Br. 13.)
15
Appeal 2016-005559
Application 12/041,454
CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
Basis Referenee(s) Claims
Aft! rmed
Claims
Reversed
12-20 § 101 N/A 12-20 None
12, 14-18,
and 20
§ 103(a) Krupowicz,
Honegger, Rendahl,
and Brewer
12, 14-18,
and 20
None
13 § 103(a) Krupowicz,
Honegger, Rendahl,
Brewer, and Berry
13 None
19 § 103(a) Krupowicz,
Honegger, Rendahl,
Brewer, and Palik
19 None
Summary 12-20 None
DECISION
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 12-20 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is
affirmed.
The Examiner’s rejections of claims 12-20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
are affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED
16