Ex Parte Glen

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Apr 22, 2014

11468887 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 22, 2014)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
________________

Ex parte DAVID I. J. GLEN1
________________

Appeal 2011-011441
Application 11/468,887
Technology Center 2600
________________

Before JASON V. MORGAN, DANIEL N. FISHMAN, and
CATHERINE SHIANG, Administrative Patent Judges.

MORGAN, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Introduction
This is an appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s Final
Rejection of claims 1, 3–11, 13, 17, 18, 20–27, 29, and 30. Claims 2, 12,
14–16, 19, and 28 are canceled or withdrawn. App. Br. 5. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 ATI Technologies ULC is the Real Party in Interest. App. Br. 3.
Appeal 2011-011441
Application 11/468,887

2
Invention
Appellant invented a method “for dynamically adjusting the refresh
rate of [a] display.” Spec. ¶ 0009.
Exemplary Claims
Claims 1 and 10, reproduced below with disputed limitations
emphasized, are representative:
1. In a device comprising an image rendering unit for
communication with a display, a method for dynamically
adjusting a frame rate of the display by the image rendering
unit, the method comprising:
receiving, from the display, information regarding
dynamic frame rate capabilities of the display;
determining an image frame rate of content to be
provided to the display based on a rate at which a content
source provides frames; and
providing the content to the display at a [sic] updated
frame rate based on the image frame rate and the dynamic
frame rate capabilities of the display.
10. In a device comprising an image rendering unit in
communication with a display, a method for dynamically
adjusting a frame rate of the display by the image rendering
unit, the method comprising:
determining an image frame rate of content to be
provided to the display based on a rate at which a content
source provides frames as indicated by a type of the content
source;
determining a power condition of the device; and
providing the content to the display at a [sic] updated
frame rate based on the image frame rate and the power
condition of the device.
Appeal 2011-011441
Application 11/468,887

3
Rejections
The Examiner rejects claims 1, 3–7, 9, 17, 18, 20–22, 24, 29, and 30
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Boireau (U.S. 2004/
0252115 A1, published December 16, 2004) and Marrin (U.S.
2005/0128220 A1, published June 16, 2005). Ans. 3–9.
The Examiner rejects claims 8 and 23 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Boireau, Marrin, and Fletcher (U.S. 2005/0068311
A1, published March 31, 2005). Ans. 9–10.
The Examiner rejects claims 10, 11, 13, and 25–27 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Fletcher and Marrin. Ans. 10–14.
ISSUES
1. Did the Examiner err in finding the combination of Boireau and
Marrin teaches or suggests “receiving, from the display, information
regarding dynamic frame rate capabilities of the display,” as recited in
claim 1?
2. Did the Examiner err in finding the combination of Fletcher and
Marrin teaches or suggests “determining an image frame rate of content to
be provided to the display based on a rate at which a content source provides
frames as indicated by a type of the content source,” as recited in claim 10.
ANALYSIS
Claims 1, 3–9, 17, 18, 20–24, 29, and 30
The Examiner finds the combination of Boireau and Marrin teaches or
suggests “receiving, from the display, information regarding dynamic frame
rate capabilities of the display,” as recited in claim 1. Ans. 3–5.
Specifically, the Examiner interprets Appellant’s receiving step to cover
Appeal 2011-011441
Application 11/468,887

4
direct and indirect receipt of frame rate information from storage embedded
in, or connected to, the display. Ans. 14. The Examiner finds Boireau
teaches both a manufacturer providing frame rate information, and testing
providing frame rate information, regarding the dynamic frame rate
capabilities of a display. Ans. 14–15 (citing Boireau, ¶ 0062). With respect
to manufacturer-providing frame rate information, the Examiner finds an
artisan of ordinary skill would interpret the teachings of Boireau to teach a
manufacturer providing said information in the device’s internal memory.
Ans. 15. The Examiner alternatively finds Boireau’s teaching of testing
display frame rates necessarily requires “receiving, from the display,
information regarding dynamic frame rate capabilities of the display.” Id. at
14–15
Appellant contends “the combination of Boireau in view of Marrin
does not teach receiving anything from the display, much less ‘information
regarding dynamic frame rate capabilities of the display.’” App. Br. 12.
Regarding the Examiner’s findings with respect to Boireau’s testing of
displays, Appellant contends Boireau teaches “a user’s perceptions of the
display being tested serve as the source of the ‘information’ establishing the
optimum refresh rates in the graph of FIG. 7.” App. Br. 13. Appellant
asserts Boireau’s teaching of “user perceptions obtained during testing” is
not equivalent to receiving frame rate information from the device. Reply
Br. 5 (internal quotations omitted). Regarding the Examiner’s findings with
respect to Boireau’s manufacturer-provided information, Appellant contends
there is no evidence explicitly within Boireau to suggest the manufacturer
provides the information electronically using storage embedded within the
display. Reply Br. 5. We disagree with Appellant.
Appeal 2011-011441
Application 11/468,887

5
First, we disagree with Appellant’s interpretation of the teachings of
Boireau with respect to the object of the display testing. Boireau states,
Such a graph (or indeed arithmetic function) could be provided
by either the manufacturer of the display device, or produced
through testing of the device to determine typical or worst-case
user perception levels for different flicker rates.
Boireau, ¶ 0062 (emphasis added). The Appellant incorrectly interprets
Boireau to describe user perceptions as the object of the testing. Instead,
Boireau clearly teaches testing displays to determine whether users will
perceive flicker. Therefore, we agree with the Examiner that Boireau’s
testing of a display device teaches receiving information from a display.
We also agree with the Examiner’s finding that Boireau’s teaching of
manufacturer-provided information suggests to a skilled artisan providing
such information electronically from a storage device embedded in the
display. “Prior art is not limited just to the references being applied, but
includes the understanding of one of ordinary skill in the art.” MPEP
§ 2141(III). The “mere existence of differences between the prior art and an
invention does not establish the invention’s nonobviousness.” Dann. v.
Johnston, 425 U.S. 219, 230 (1976). Thus, we agree with the Examiner that
even though Boireau does not explicitly describe how the manufacturer
provides the information, an artisan of ordinary skill would find Boireau’s
teaching to suggest providing the information in the display’s embedded
memory. Therefore, we agree with the Examiner that the combination of
Boireau and Marrin teaches or suggests “receiving, from the display,
information regarding dynamic frame rate capabilities of the display,” as
recited in claim 1.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 under
Appeal 2011-011441
Application 11/468,887

6
35 U.S.C. § 103(a), and of claims 3–9, 17, 18, 20–24, 29, and 30, which are
not argued separately. App. Br. 15.
Claims 10, 11, 13, and 25–27
The Examiner finds the combination of Fletcher and Marrin teaches or
suggests “determining an image frame rate of content to be provided to the
display based on a rate at which a content source provides frames as
indicated by a type of the content source,” as recited in claim 10. Ans. 10–
11. Specifically, the Examiner finds Marrin teaches dynamically adjusting
the frame rate of a display based on the complexity of the content while it is
played or, alternatively, based on the frame rate of the content as indicated
by the author. Ans. 17–18 (citing e.g., Marrin, ¶¶ 0105 and 0106).
Appellant insists the only applicable portion of Marrin cited by the
Examiner “is the determination of a frame rate based on the complexity of
the content (image) to be provided.” App. Br. 16. Appellant contends the
“semantic complexity of an image is clearly unrelated to a type of a content
source and therefore cannot read upon determining image frame rate based
on the type of content source.” Id. Appellant argues the Examiner has not
shown the prior art to cover “the rate at which a content source provides
frames,” as recited in claim 10. Id. at 17. In particular, Appellant argues
“the sole teaching of Marrin even arguably related to the instant limitation is
the determination of a frame rate based on the complexity of the content
(image) to be provided.” Id. at 16 (emphasis added).
We disagree. The Examiner correctly finds Marrin teaches an author
of content assigning frame rates to content segments or portions thereof.
Ans. 17 (citing Marrin, ¶ 0106). Appellant’s arguments do not persuasively
Appeal 2011-011441
Application 11/468,887

7
show error in the Examiner’s use of this teaching or suggestion. Thus, we
agree with the Examiner that this user-supplied suggested frame rate teaches
or suggests a rate at which a content source provides frames. Ans. 17.
Therefore, we agree with the Examiner that the combination of Fletcher and
Marrin teaches or suggests “determining an image frame rate of content to
be provided to the display based on a rate at which a content source provides
frames as indicated by a type of the content source,” as recited in claim 10.
Ans. 11.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 10 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a), and of claims 11, 13, and 25–27, which are not argued
separately. App. Br 18.
DECISION
We affirm the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1, 3–11, 13, 17,
18, 20–27, 29, and 30 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED

lp