Ex Parte Gill

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

Mar 26, 2012

10403607 (B.P.A.I. Mar. 26, 2012)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
______________

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES
______________

Ex parte ANDREW M. GILL
______________

Appeal 2010-002937
Application 10/403,607
Technology Center 2600
______________

Before ROBERT E. NAPPI, KRISTEN L. DROESCH, and
JOHNNY A. KUMAR, Administrative Patent Judges.

KUMAR, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

Appeal 2010-002937
Application 10/403,607

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the final rejection of
claims 1-20, which are all of the pending claims. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm.

Background
Appellant’s application is directed to a timing device for determining
maintenance intervals of maintenance-sensitive equipment. The timing
device has a casing, an integrated circuit, a liquid crystal display connecting
to the integrated circuit, a light emitting diode connecting to the integrated
circuit, a power source connecting to the integrated circuit, a starting means,
and a fixing means. The device measures a predetermined period of time and
alerts a user when the predetermined period of time is achieved or soon to be
achieved. The invention also relates to a method of monitoring maintenance
intervals of maintenance sensitive equipment. (See Specification, Abstract.)
Claim 1 is exemplary, with disputed limitations in italics:
1. A timing device for determining maintenance intervals of
maintenance sensitive equipment, comprising:
a casing;
an integrated circuit;
a liquid crystal display connecting to the integrated
circuit;
a light emitting diode connecting to the integrated circuit;
a power source connecting to the integrated circuit;
a starting means; and
a fixing means,
wherein the device measures a predetermined period of
time and alerts a user of a time relative to the predetermined
Appeal 2010-002937
Application 10/403,607

3

period of time, and the device may not be reset or restarted
after initiation of the starting means.

The Examiner’s Rejections
The Examiner’s Answer cites the following references:
Castellano US 6,091,326 July 18, 2000
Rothschild US 6,026,060 February 15, 2000
Patella US 2002/0009018 Al January 24, 2002

Claims 1, 2, and 9-16 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Castellano in view of Rothschild.
Claims 3-8 and 17-20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Castellano in view of Rothschild as applied to the claims
above, and further in view of Patella.

ANALYSIS
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments (App. Br. 11-12) that
the combination of Castellano and Rothschild would not have rendered
obvious representative independent claim 1 (and method claim 15),
including the disputed limitation “the device may not be reset or restarted
after initiation of the starting means” recited in claim 1.
The Examiner has cited Rothschild for the disclosure of a timing
device that may not be reset or restarted after being initiated (Ans. 5).
Appellant argues that “Rothschild expressly indicates that the vehicle
sticker may in fact be reprogrammed, and therein, reset” (App. Br. 12).
Appellant points to column 6, lines 26-28 that states: “[b]oth LEDs, 12 and
20, will continue to blink until sticker 10 is reprogrammed or replaced, or
Appeal 2010-002937
Application 10/403,607

4

until battery 19 can no longer support the device” (App. Br. 12 (underlining
omitted, italics added)).
The Examiner finds that “one of ordinary skill in the art would have
recognized that the sticker may be thrown away at each expiration and a new
sticker starting a new timing period could be affixed to the vehicle
windshield. Vehicle stickers for indicating a renewal period in the art at the
time of the invention by the applicant were one-time-use stickers that were
thrown away and replaced at the expiration of a time period” (Ans. 8-9
(emphasis added)).
We agree with the Examiner. We find that the use of the term
replaced in Rothschild shows that Rothschild envisioned an embodiment
that was only capable of one time use, i.e., that reprogramming was
impossible in that embodiment.
The Examiner concludes that it would have been obvious to one of
ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention by the applicant to
combine a “one time use” timing arrangement, as taught by Rothschild with
the timing device disclosed by Castellano. We concur with this conclusion,
and agree with the Examiner’s rationale that “[t]his would have been
obvious because it would prevent device users from suppressing an alarm
indicating improper operation of a device after a predetermined period of
time had expired” (Ans. 5).
Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of representative independent
claim 1 (and method claim 15) under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Claims 2-14
directly or indirectly depend from independent claim 1 (and claims 16-20
directly or indirectly depend from independent claim 15) and the Appellant
has not presented any substantive arguments with respect to the dependent
Appeal 2010-002937
Application 10/403,607

5

claims. Therefore, we sustain the rejection of claims 2-14 and 16-20 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) for the same reasons discussed with respect to
independent claims 1 and 15.

CONCLUSION OF LAW
Based on the analysis above, we conclude that the Examiner did not
err in rejecting claims 1-20 as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).

DECISION
We affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1-20 under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a).
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv) (2011).

AFFIRMED

msc