Ex Parte Ghuman et al

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

Oct 31, 2008

10253169 (B.P.A.I. Oct. 31, 2008)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES
____________

Ex parte ABID GHUMAN,
JAMES WAYNE LOWE, MARSHA J. ROSSO
and KIRK E. SANBORN
____________

Appeal 2008-2642
Application 10/253,169
Technology Center 3700
____________

Decided: October 31, 2008
____________

Before MURRIEL E. CRAWFORD, LINDA E. HORNER, and
MICHAEL W. O’NEILL, Administrative Patent Judges.

O’NEILL, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
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Ghuman, et al. (Appellants) seek our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134 of
the final rejection of claims 11, 12, 14-18, 20-25, and 27-33. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b) (2002).

SUMMARY OF DECISION
We AFFRIM.1

THE INVENTION
The claimed invention relates to a method of assembling a plurality of
discrete assemblies on a common process line. (Specification ¶ 0014.)
Claim 11, reproduced below, is representative of the subject matter on
appeal.
11. A method of assembling an assembly on a
common manufacturing process line, the method comprising
the steps of:
identifying at least one manufacturing process
comprising a set of discrete steps to be performed on a
workpiece;
identifying a plurality of standardized task stations,
each task station having at least one standardized workpiece
presenter that supports the workpiece in a predefined
spacial2 orientation and at least one standardized processing
tool for performing a manufacturing operation on the
workpiece;

1 Our decision will make reference to Appellants’ Appeal Brief (“App. Br.,”
filed May 1, 2007), Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed Sep. 20, 2007), and the
Examiner’s Answer (“Answer,” mailed Aug. 9, 2007).
2 Variation of the word “spatial.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary
1125 (10th ed. 1993).
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defining a manufacturing process line that includes a
plurality of templates organized in a defined sequence, each
template being defined by:
selecting a subset of the set of discrete steps to be
performed at a standardized task station and providing the
standardized task station for performing the subset of steps;
and
repeating the selecting step for additional subsets of
steps until each of the discrete steps is assigned to a
corresponding standardized task station chosen from the
plurality of standardized task stations; and
presenting a workpiece to be operated on by the
plurality of standardized task stations of at least one
template to form the assembly;
wherein for each task station at least a portion of the
at least one standardized workpiece presenter remains
stationary relative to the at least one standardized processing
tool when the workpiece is moved within and between each
task station.

THE PRIOR ART
The Examiner relies upon the following as evidence of
unpatentability:
Okabe US 3,763,344 Oct. 02, 1973
deCaussin US 3,955,267 May 11, 1976
Schafer US 4,621,516 Nov. 11, 1986
Genov US 5,007,784 Apr. 16, 1991
Moran US 5,014,901 May 14, 1991
Alborante US 5,115,115 May 19, 1992
Sekine US 5,127,569 Jul. 07, 1992
Babel US 5,225,650 Jul. 06, 1993
Akeel ‘739 US 5,239,739 Aug. 31, 1993
Helle US 5,738,564 Apr. 14, 1998
Bullen US 6,001,181 Dec. 14, 1999
Sato US 6,334,252 B1 Jan. 01, 2002
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Akeel ‘190 US 6,378,190 B2 Apr. 30, 2002
Ozaku US 6,467,675 B1 Oct. 22, 2002
Wind US 6,515,251 B1 Feb. 04, 2003
Stiers US 6,642,473 B2 Nov. 04, 2003
Okamoto JP 04084694 Mar. 17, 1992

THE REJECTIONS
The following rejections are before us for review:
Claims 11, 12, 14, 15, 28, and 30 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(b) as being anticipated by Sekine.
Claims 17, 18, 22-25, 29, and 31-33 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Sekine.
Claims 16 and 27 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Sekine, Babel, Akeel '190, Okabe, Ozaku, Genov, Helle,
Moran, Okamoto, Schafer, Sato, Alborante, Wind, Stiers, Akeel '739, and
Bullen.
Claim 20 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Sekine and Genov.
Claim 21 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Sekine, Genov, and deCaussin.

ISSUE
The issue before us is whether the Appellants have shown that the
Examiner erred in rejecting:
claims 11, 12, 14, 15, 28, and 30 as being anticipated by Sekine.
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claims 17, 18, 22-25, 29, and 31-33 as being unpatentable over
Sekine.
claims 16 and 27 as being unpatentable over Sekine, Babel, Akeel
'190, Okabe, Ozaku, Genov, Helle, Moran, Okamoto, Schafer,
Sato, Alborante, Wind, Stiers, Akeel '739, and Bullen.
claim 20 as being unpatentable over Sekine and Genov.
claim 21 as being unpatentable over Sekine, Genov, and deCaussin.
The issue of showing error in the Examiner’s rejections turns on the
issue of whether the Appellants have proven that the subject matter
described in Sekine does not inherently possess the step of identifying a set
of discrete steps to be performed on a workpiece and the step of identifying
a plurality of standardized task stations, where each task station has at least a
standardized workpiece presenter that supports a workpiece in a predefined
spatial orientation and at least one standardized processing tool for
performing a manufacturing operation on the workpiece.

FINDINGS OF FACT
We find that the following enumerated findings of fact are supported
by at least a preponderance of the evidence. Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg, 849
F.2d 1422, 1427 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (explaining the general evidentiary
standard for proceedings before the Office).
1. Sekine expressly discloses a plurality of standardized assembly
sublines (sublines) within a flexible manufacturing system having the
capability of assembling various vehicle bodies and parts therefor.
For example, sublines 1-6 in Sekine are used to assemble the left hood
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ridge structure (subline 1), the dash lower structure (subline 2), the
radiator core support (subline 3), the right hood ridge structure
(subline 4), the front floor structure (subline 5), and the rear floor
structure (subline 6). (Sekine, col. 3, l. 67 to col. 4, l. 5.) Each
subline is configured differently, e.g., subline 1 is configured for the
left hood ridge structure, subline 2 is configured for the dash lower
structure, subline 3 is configured for the radiator core support, etc.
2. A subline generally consists of a number of stages such as: type
switching stage, a workpiece pickup stage, an assembling stage, and a
transferring stage. (Sekine, col. 4, ll. 25-52.) Each subline has at least
one work presenter, e.g., carrier 25 (along with the associated
workpiece positioning device 26, base board 27, three dimensional
moving mechanism 29, workpiece holder 30 (the latter three parts
being standard structures for moving workpieces in a manufacturing
process)), that supports the workpiece, e.g., left hood structure,
radiator core support, front floor structure, etc., in a predefined spatial
orientation. (Sekine, col. 5, ll. 20-40.) For instance, as shown in
Figure 4, work presenter 25 is holding work piece 42 shown in
phantom. As shown in Figure 6, work presenter/carrier 25 is holding
right side body structure 74 for presentment to subline 16 (body main
structure assembly stage) that spot welds the body structure 74 with a
spot-welding robot 45 (a standardized processing tool in
manufacturing of car bodies) to the main floor structure 68, left side
body structure 73, roof panel structure 69, parcel shelf structure 70, air
box structure 71, and rear panel structure 72 in order to assemble a
body main structure, i.e., a vehicle closure. (Sekine, col. 10, ll. 47-
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57.) Each workpiece presenter is configured to accommodate the
different workpieces, e.g., the workpiece presenter shown in Figure 4
is configured to hold the rear floor structure, column 5, lines 31-33,
while the workpiece presenter shown in Figure 6 is configured to hold
a side body structure, column 10, lines 47-57. Other work presenters
would be the looped guideways (another standardized processing tool)
A-L that carriers 25 would move along. (Sekine, col. 4, ll. 53-56.) At
an assembling stage, for example stage 8, the floor main structure
assembling stage, multiple work presenter/carriers 25 will meet. The
meeting of the carriers 25 positions the separate vehicle structures so
that spot-welding robots can process or discretely step through spot-
welding the structures together to form one structure. This newly
formed structure is then moved to one of the final welding stages 9.
(Sekine, col. 9, ll. 27-49.)
3. Sekine expressly discloses a set of steps the work presenter 25
undertakes on a workpiece e.g., the left hood structure, the radiator
core support, the front floor structure, etc. This set of discrete steps is
disclosed as:
(a) moving the carrier together with the work piece
positioning device to a type switching stage, the type
switching stage being capable of actuating the work piece
positioning device by using a power source mounted on the
type switching stage, (b) connecting the power source on the
type switching stage to the work piece positioning device to
change the positions of the work piece holders in accordance
with a type of work piece which will be subsequently
handled by the positioning device, (c) disconnecting the
power source from the positioning device upon completion
of the position change of the work piece holders, (d) moving
the carrier together with the work piece positioning device to
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a work piece pick up stage, (e) picking up at least one
selected work piece from a work piece storing rack and
putting the selected work piece onto the work piece holders
of the positioning device; [sic] and (f) moving the carrier
together with the positioning device to the certain
assembling stage with the selected work piece kept held by
the work piece holders and positioned with respect to the
carrier.
(Sekine, col. 2, ll. 10-32.)
4. At some point in time prior to implementation of the process above,
Sekine first must necessarily identify this set of steps to be performed
on the workpiece and then identifies the sublines and the equipment,
i.e., the work presenters and processing tools, within each subline to
perform these steps within the set of sublines (subassembly lines 1
through 16) that are expressly disclosed within Sekine.
5. There is no difference between the claimed task stations and the work
presenters and processing tools of Sekine.

PRINCIPLES OF LAW
Claims define the subject matter Appellants regard to be their
invention. In re Moore, 439 F.2d 1232, 1235 (CCPA 1971). In addition,
claims are given the broadest reasonable construction consistent with the
specification. In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997). The
Appellants have the burden to precisely define the invention, not the PTO.
Id. at 1056. Appellants always have the opportunity to amend the claims
during prosecution; a broad interpretation by the Examiner reduces the
possibility that the claim, once issued, will be interpreted more broadly than
is justified. In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 1404-05 (CCPA 1969).
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Words in claims “are generally given their ordinary and customary
meaning” to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention.
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312-13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc)
(citing Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir.
1996)). How a person of ordinary skill in the art understands a claim term
“is based on the well-settled understanding that inventors are typically
persons skilled in the field of the invention and that patents are addressed to
and intended to be read by others of skill in the pertinent art.” Id. at 1313.
When interpreting a claim, unless the inventor has set forth a definition for a
term that term will be given its ordinary and customary meaning as
understood by one skilled in the pertinent art. In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475,
1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
“A claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in
the claim is found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior
art reference.” Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 814 F.2d 628,
631 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
Anticipation is a question of fact. In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473,
1477 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
It is well settled that in order for the Examiner to establish a prima
facie case of anticipation, each and every element of the claimed invention,
arranged as required by the claim, must be found in a single prior art
reference, either expressly or under the principles of inherency. See
generally, Schreiber, 128 F.3d at 1477; Diversitech Corp. v. Century Steps,
Inc., 850 F.2d 675, 677-78 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Lindemann Maschinenfabrik
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GMBH v. American Hoist and Derrick, 730 F.2d 1452, 1458 (Fed. Cir.
1984).
When relying upon the theory of inherency, the Examiner must
provide a basis in fact and/or technical reasoning to reasonably support the
determination that the allegedly inherent characteristic necessarily flows
from the teachings of the applied prior art. See Ex parte Levy, 17 USPQ2d
1461, 1464 (Bd. Patent App. & Int. 1990).
After the PTO establishes a prima facie case of anticipation based on
inherency, the burden shifts to the Appellants to prove that the subject matter
shown to be in the prior art does not possess the characteristics of the
claimed invention. See In re Thorpe, 777 F.2d 695, 697 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In
re King, 801 F.2d 1324, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
Appellants’ attorney’s arguments in a brief cannot take the place of
evidence. In re Pearson, 494 F.2d 1399, 1405 (CCPA 1974). See also In re
De Blauwe, 736 F.2d 699, 705 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
“Section 103 forbids issuance of a patent when ‘the differences
between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such
that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the
invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said
subject matter pertains.’” KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727,
1734 (2007). The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of
underlying factual determinations including (1) the scope and content of the
prior art, (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the
prior art, and (3) the level of skill in the art. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383
U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966). See also KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1734 (“While the
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sequence of these questions might be reordered in any particular case, the
[Graham] factors continue to define the inquiry that controls.”) The Court
in Graham further noted that evidence of secondary considerations “might
be utilized to give light to the circumstances surrounding the origin of the
subject matter sought to be patented.” 383 U.S. at 17-18.
In rejecting claims under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), the Examiner bears the
initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of obviousness. In re
Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992). See also In re Piasecki, 745
F.2d 1468, 1472 (Fed. Cir. 1984). It is incumbent upon the Examiner to
establish a factual basis to support the legal conclusion of obviousness. See
In re Fine, 837 F.2d 1071, 1074 (Fed. Cir. 1988). In addition to these
factual determinations, the Examiner needs to articulate an apparent reason
to combine the known elements in the fashion claimed. See KSR, 127 S. Ct
at 1740-41. Once the Examiner has established the prima facie case of
obviousness with a set of factual determination and an articulates a reason
for combining or modifying known elements in the fashion claimed,
Appellants have the burden on appeal to the Board to demonstrate error in
the Examiner’s position. See In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 985-86 (Fed. Cir.
2006) (“On appeal to the Board, an applicant can overcome a rejection
[under § 103] by showing insufficient evidence of prima facie obviousness
or by rebutting the prima facie case with evidence of secondary indicia of
nonobviousness.”) (Quoting In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir.
1998)).

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ANALYSIS
The term “standardized” is “readily apparent even to lay judges, and
[this] claim construction ... involves little more than the application of
widely accepted meaning of commonly understood words.” Phillips, 415
F.3d at 1314. As such, the term is understood to mean regularly and widely
used, available, or supplied equipment. On the other hand, the terms
“subline” and “task station” are terms of art. Accordingly, these terms will
be given their ordinary and customary meaning as understood by one skilled
in the pertinent art. Paulsen, 30 F.3d at 1480. To one of ordinary skill in the
art there appears to be no difference between the terms when claiming and
disclosing such an invention. (Finding of Fact 5.) Moreover, the Appellants
have not argued such a difference exists.
The Appellants argue claims 11, 12, 14, 15, 28, and 30 as a group.
We select claim 11 as representative of this group. Claims 12, 14, 15, 28,
and 30 will stand or fall with claim 11. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii) (2007).
We can dispose of the Appellants’ allegation that Sekine fails to
describe the step of defining a manufacturing process line having a plurality
of templates that were designed by first selecting a subset of discrete steps to
be performed and then providing standardized task stations for performing
those subsets by referring to Finding of Facts 1-3. Sekine provides a
plurality of process lines (the sublines 1-16) and each subline follows a
repetitive process, a template, selected from a subset of discrete steps. The
subset of discrete steps is part of the set of steps for assembling an overall
vehicle body. One example of a template would be the assembling of the
left hood ridge structure. The subset of discrete steps is the set of steps
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needed to assemble left hood ridge structure. The template within subline 1
occurs in four stages. A stage would be understood by one of ordinary skill
in the art as a task station because a particular task is performed at each
stage. For example, the work piece pick up stage 22 is the location where
the task of assembling the parts that will form the left hood ridge structure
from parts bins 44 occurs. As shown in Figure 2, a robot 43 places the parts
in the proper orientation on work presenter/carrier 25. Another example of a
task station is the assembling stage 23. The task for this stage is to spot-
weld the parts to form the left hood ridge structure that will become part of
the front-end vehicle assembly at the next stage of manufacturing. As such,
Sekine describes the step of defining a manufacturing process line having a
plurality of templates that were designed by first selecting a subset of
discrete steps to be performed and then providing standardized task stations
for performing those subsets.
The Examiner has found Sekine discloses a manufacturing process
line for vehicle closures constituting a set of discrete steps. (Answer 4 and
see also Finding of Fact 3.) The Examiner has found Sekine discloses a
plurality of standardized sublines having at least one work presenter holding
a workpiece in a predefined spatial orientation. (Answer 4 and see also
Finding of Facts 1 and 2.) The Examiner has found Sekine inherently
discloses the steps of identifying a set of discrete steps to be performed on a
workpiece and a plurality of standardized task stations as recited within
claim 11. (Answer 18.)
As stated supra, the Examiner has to provide a basis in fact and/or
technical reasoning to reasonably support the determination that the
allegedly inherent characteristic necessarily flows from the teachings of the
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applied prior art. In this case, in response to the Appellants’ Brief, the
Examiner provided the following technical reasoning:
A method of designing is inherent to the provision of not
only a manufacturing process line but any product or
apparatus unless it involves steps more substantial than mere
identification and provision of components. Methods of
designing only fall outside the realm of inherency when they
incorporate steps such as calculations or comparisons that
lead to a more ideal final product than would be produced
by simple identification of parts and selection of steps.
Appellant[s] cannot hardly be heard to argue that a
manufacturing process line can be manifested without the
preliminary steps of identifying a process of steps and
subsequently designing a process line of suitable work cells
having suitable workpiece presenters and suitable
processing tools. Such a method is necessary to the
provision of every manufacturing process line created. It
would be unreasonable to contend that the state of the art of
manufacturing lines involves anything less (e.g.[,]
indiscriminately picking and placing tools and work cells
without regard to a design or plan).
(Answer 18-19.) (Emphasis added.)
The Examiner’s technical reasoning is in accord with our finding of
facts. (See Finding of Fact 4.)
As stated supra, after the Examiner establishes a prima facie case of
anticipation based on inherency, the burden shifts to the Appellants to prove
that the subject matter shown to be in the prior art does not possess the
characteristics of the claimed invention. In this case, the Appellants have
provided a number of arguments. For instance, the Appellants have argued
that the Examiner’s reliance on the reference is misplaced because Sekine
concerns itself with implementation whereas the Appellants’ invention
relates to design of a manufacturing process line. (App Br. 9-10.)
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Moreover, the Appellants provide their understanding of the case law
associated with the doctrine of inherency. (App. Br. 10 and Reply Br. 2.)
With this understanding, the Appellants argue Sekine does not inherently
disclose identifying the subject matter disclosed in Sekine and argue a
manufacturer need not engage in the contended steps to implement the
assembly line of Sekine. (App. Br. 10.) Further, the Appellants contend the
Examiner has offered no evidence to support the conclusion of inherency
and that the Examiner has reached outside of Sekine. (Reply Br. 2.)
As stated supra, the Appellants’ attorney’s arguments cannot take the
place of evidence. As noted supra, the Appellants have provided only
arguments to rebut the Examiner’s finding of inherency.
In response to the Appellants’ contention that the Examiner has not
provided evidence of inherency. The Examiner need only provide a basis in
fact and technical reasoning to establish anticipation by inherency. The
Examiner’s technical reasoning has been given in response to the arguments
presented by the Appellants. (See Answer 18 and 19.) As such, the burden
shifts to the Appellants to provide evidence. The Appellants have instead
provided arguments. Again, arguments cannot take the place of evidence.
As such, the Appellants have failed to shift the burden back to the Examiner.
We can dispose of the Appellants’ contention both in the Appeal Brief
on page 11 and in the Reply Brief on pages 2-3 that the Sekine fails to
disclose “standardized” task stations and workpiece presenters by
referencing our findings. As we find supra, the term “standardized” would
be applicable to a piece of equipment that is used regularly or widely in the
vehicle manufacturing industry. In this case, Sekine discloses spot-welding
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robots 45 (Finding of Fact 2). The Appellants have not provided any
evidence that the spot-welding robots 45, components that move the carriers
25, or the sublines are not standard pieces of equipment or stations in a
manufacturing assembly line for vehicle bodies. Moreover, the law of
anticipation does not require that the prior art reference teach the Appellants’
purpose disclosed in the specification, but only that the claims on appeal
“read on” something disclosed in the prior art reference. See Kalman v.
Kimberly-Clark Corp., 713 F.2d 760, 772 (Fed. Cir. 1983). In this case, the
claimed subject matter of the standardized processing tool for performing a
manufacturing operation on a workpiece is satisfied by the disclosure of the
spot-welding robots 45 that perform the standard tasks of discretely placing
spot welds to weld the workpieces together. Likewise, the claimed subject
matter of the standardized workpiece presenter is satisfied by the disclosure
of the components that move the carriers 25, which in turn, move the
workpieces around to the different cells or task stations within the sublines.
Additionally, the claimed subject matter of the standardized task station
where the discrete steps of spot welding is performed is at least satisfied by
the disclosure of the locations where multiple structures come together that
have been carried by carriers 25 and are spot-welded together by spot-
welding robots 45 to make one structure that is moved to the next task
station.
In view of the foregoing reasons, we will sustain the Examiner’s
rejection of claims 11, 12, 14, 15, 28, and 30 as being anticipated by Sekine.
Appellants argue claims 17, 18, 22-25, 29, 31, and 33 as a group and
argue claim 32 separately against the § 103 rejection of these claims with
Sekine. For the group, we select claim 17 as representative. As such, claims
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18, 22-25, 29, 31, and 33 will stand or fall with claim 17. We will address
claim 32 separately, below.
The Appellants first rely on their arguments with respect to Sekine
failing to disclose the “identifying” steps because the “identifying” steps in
claim 17 are similar to the “identifying” steps in claim 11. (App. Br. 11-12.)
For the same reasons given supra with respect to claim 11, we concluded
that the Appellants have not shifted the burden back to the Examiner for the
finding that Sekine inherently discloses the step of “identifying” a set of
discrete steps to be performed on a workpiece and the step of “identifying” a
plurality of standardized task stations as these steps are claimed.
Next, the Appellants argue there is no teaching, suggestion, or
motivation to modify Sekine so that each member of the task station has a
different type of standardized workpiece presenter. (App. Br. 13.) It is not
necessary for the Examiner to base a modification on a motivation, teaching,
or suggestion within the references themselves, nature of the problem to be
solved, or within the general knowledge base of those skilled in the art.
What is required of the Examiner is to articulate a reason with rational
underpinning. In this case, the Examiner has done so, namely, “Sekine
teaches detachable workpiece holders 27 on each workpiece carrier (Col. 2,
lines 5-8; Col. 5[,] lines 21-24 & 36-39; Col. 11[,] lines 44-46). This teaches
that it is well known to use different types of adapters for holding different
types of workpieces as necessary.” (Answer 7.) In our view, the
Examiner’s reasoning is rational and permits the Examiner to conclude that
one of ordinary skill in the art would have been led to incorporate different
types of workpiece presenters for each work cell for the desirability to
arrange a manufacturing process cell (Answer 8). As such, the Appellants
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have not persuaded us that the Examiner erred in concluding that one of
ordinary skill in the art could make this modification to Sekine.
The Appellants then rely on their arguments presented earlier for
claim 11 with respect to how Sekine fails to describe “standardized”
workpiece presenters or task stations. (App. Br. 14.) Given that we find
those arguments unpersuasive as to error in the rejection of claim 11, we
reach the same conclusion with regard to the arguments as they apply to the
rejection of claim 17; that is, we find them unpersuasive as to error in the
rejection.
For the foregoing reasons, we will sustain the Examiner rejection of
claims 17, 18, 22-25, 29, 31, and 33 as being unpatentable over Sekine.
For claim 32, the Appellants rely on their previous argument for both
“identifying” and “standardized” claimed subject matter. (App. Br. 14.)
Again, given that we find those arguments unpersuasive as to error in the
rejection of claims 11 and 17, we reach the same conclusion with regard to
the arguments as they apply to the rejection of claim 32; that is, we find
them unpersuasive as to error in the rejection. Accordingly, we will sustain
the Examiner’s rejection of claim 32.
For claims 16 and 27, the Appellants rely on their previous argument
for both “identifying” and “standardized” claimed subject matter. (App. Br.
15.) Again, given that we find those arguments unpersuasive as to error in
the rejection of claims 11 and 17, we reach the same conclusion with regard
to the arguments as they apply to the rejection of claims 16 and 27; that is,
we find them unpersuasive as to error in the rejection. In addition, the
Appellants argue that none of the other fifteen references cures the
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deficiency in Sekine. (App. Br. 15.) Given that we find no deficiency in
Sekine to reach the claim subject matter, we are not persuaded by the
Appellants’ argument that none of the other fifteen references cures the
deficiency of Sekine. Accordingly, we will sustain the Examiner’s rejection
of claims 16 and 27.
For claim 20, the Appellants rely on their previous argument for both
“identifying” and “standardized” claimed subject matter. (App. Br. 15-16.)
Again, given that we find those arguments unpersuasive as to error in the
rejection of claim 17, we reach the same conclusion with regard to the
arguments as they apply to the rejection of claim 20; that is, we find them
unpersuasive as to error in the rejection. In addition, the Appellants argue
that Genov does not cure argued absences within Sekine. (App. Br. 16.)
Given that we find no deficiency in Sekine to reach the claimed subject
matter, we are not persuaded by the Appellants’ argument that Genov does
not cure the argued absences within Sekine. Accordingly, we will sustain
the Examiner’s rejection of claim 20.
For claim 21, the Appellants rely on their previous argument for both
“identifying” and “standardized” claimed subject matter. (App. Br. 16.)
Again, given that we find those arguments unpersuasive as to error in the
rejection of claim 17, we reach the same conclusion with regard to the
arguments as they apply to the rejection of claim 21; that is, we find them
unpersuasive as to error in the rejection. In addition, the Appellants argue
that neither Genov nor deCaussin provides the missing claimed subject
matter argued previously. Given that we find no deficiency in Sekine to
reach the claimed subject matter, we are not persuaded by the Appellants’
arguments that neither Genov nor deCaussin provides the missing claimed
Appeal 2008-2642
Application 10/253,169

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subject matter argued previously. Accordingly, we will sustain the
Examiner’s rejection of claim 21.

CONCLUSIONS
We conclude that the Appellants have not shown that the Examiner
erred in rejecting:
claims 11, 12, 14, 15, 28, and 30 as being anticipated by Sekine.
claims 17, 18, 22-25, 29, and 31-33 as being unpatentable over
Sekine.
claims 16 and 27 as being unpatentable over Sekine, Babel, Akeel
'190, Okabe, Ozaku, Genov, Helle, Moran, Okamoto, Schafer, Sato,
Alborante, Wind, Stiers, Akeel '739, and Bullen.
claim 20 as being unpatentable over Sekine and Genov.
claim 21 as being unpatentable over Sekine, Genov, and deCaussin.

DECISION
The decision of the Examiner to reject claims 11, 12, 14-18, 20-25,
and 27-33 is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv) (2007).

AFFIRMED

Appeal 2008-2642
Application 10/253,169

21
hh

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