Ex Parte Ghosh et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardJan 8, 201813410129 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 8, 2018) Copy Citation United States Patent and Trademark Office UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O.Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 13/410,129 03/01/2012 Chittabrata GHOSH 800.0850.U 1 (US) 1040 10948 7590 01/10/2018 Harrington & Smith, Attorneys At Law, LLC 4 Research Drive, Suite 202 Shelton, CT 06484 EXAMINER NGUYEN, THAI ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2469 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 01/10/2018 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): USPTO@hspatent.com Nokia. IPR @ nokia. com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte KLAUS F. DOPPLER, CHITTABRATA GHOSH, and ZHONG-YI JIN Appeal 2017-007213 Application 13/410,1291 Technology Center 2400 Before BRADLEY W. BAUMEISTER, BRUCE R. WINSOR, and NABEEL U. KHAN, Administrative Patent Judges. KHAN, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Final Rejection of claims 1, 2, 4—8, 10, 13, 14, 16—20 and 22.2 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. 1 Appellants identify Nokia Technologies Oy as the real party in interest. App. Br. 4. 2 Claims 3, 9, 11, 12, 15, 21, 23, and 24 are cancelled. Appeal 2017-007213 Application 13/410,129 BACKGROUND The Invention According to Appellants, the invention is “directed toward different periods for channel access contention for different groups of users.” Spec. 11. Exemplary independent claim 1 is reproduced below. 1. An apparatus comprising at least one processor; and at least one memory including computer program code; in which the at least one memory and the computer program code are configured, with the at least one processor, to cause the apparatus at least to: receive a message indicating a medium access interval for data transmissions during which interval only stations which are members of a group of stations are allowed to compete for medium access, wherein grouping is determined by parameters of non-Quality-of-Service and wherein the message comprises indications of start time and end time values which define the medium access interval for the group of stations; determine that the apparatus belongs to the group; and determine that the apparatus is allowed to compete for medium access at least during the medium access interval. References and Rejections 1. Claims 4, 5, 10, 17 and 22 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) or § 112, second paragraph (pre-AIA), as indefinite. Final Act. 6— 7. 2. Claim 1, 2, 4—8, 10, 13, 14, 16—20 and 22 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Liu “DCF Enhancements for Large 2 Appeal 2017-007213 Application 13/410,129 Number of STAs” (doc.: IEEE 802.11-11/I255r0 (filed Sept-2015)) in view of Park et al.(US 2009/0207769 Al, pub. Aug. 20, 2009). Final Act. 8—13. DISCUSSION Rejection Under 35 U.S.C. § 112 Claim 4 recites “in which a length of the medium access interval is based at least partly on a number of stations in the group.” App. Br. 39-40 (emphasis added). Claims 5, 10, 17, and 22 also use the phrase “at least partly.” See App. Br. 40, 42. The Examiner rejects claims 4, 5, 10, 17, and 22 as indefinite, finding the use of the term “partly” is unclear. Specifically, the Examiner finds: It is unclear whether “partly” is 10%, 30% 60% or equivalent thereof. [T]he term “partly” [renders it] unclear whether the length of the medium access is based at least 10% on a number of stations in the group OR the length of the medium access is based at least 90% on a number of stations in the group OR the length of the medium access is based at least 50% on a number of stations in the group. Final Act. 6. Appellants argue “the use of the term ‘partly’ is merely its standard English usage and so respectfully should be interpreted to mean ‘to some extent’ or ‘not completely.’” App. Br. 34. Thus, according to Appellants “a length of the medium access interval is based to a certain extent/degree or based somewhat, but not necessarily totally nor entirely, on a number of stations in the group.” App. Br. 35. We are persuaded of Examiner error. “A claim is indefinite when it contains words or phrases whose meaning is unclear.” Ex Parte McAward, 2017 Pat. App. LEXIS 8537 (PTAB Aug. 25, 2017) (precedential) (citing In re Packard, 751 F.3d 1310, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2014). We agree with 3 Appeal 2017-007213 Application 13/410,129 Appellants that the claim term “partly” is used consistent with its plain and ordinary meaning simply to indicate that the recited factor may not be the only factor in determining the length of the medium access interval. The fact that the claim does not explicitly recite to what degree the recited factor determines the time interval or what other factors, if any, also determine the time interval, goes to the breadth of the claim, not to whether the claim is indefinite. See In re Miller, 441 F.2d 689, 693 (CCPA 1971) (“breadth is not to be equated with indefiniteness”). Accordingly, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 4, 5, 10, 17 and 22 under 35 U.S.C. § 112 as indefinite. Rejection Under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) in light of Appellants’ arguments that the Examiner has erred. We disagree with Appellants’ arguments, and adopt as our own: (1) the findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner in the action from which this appeal is taken (Final Act. 8—13); and (2) the reasons set forth by the Examiner in the Examiner’s Answer in response to Appellants’ Appeal Brief (Ans. 6—11), and concur with the conclusions reached by the Examiner. We emphasize the following points. Claim 1 Findings and Contentions Claim 1 recites “receive a message indicating a medium access interval for data transmissions during which interval only stations which are members of a group of stations are allowed to compete for medium access.” 4 Appeal 2017-007213 Application 13/410,129 Claim 1 also recites “wherein grouping is determined by parameters of non- Quality-of-S ervice. ” The Examiner finds Liu discloses “Stations can be classified into several groups. Each group has different priority with its own (Q, T). By setting different value for different groups, AP can control the transmission groups at a period of time.'” Final Act. 8—9 (citing Liu, Slide 7). The Examiner further finds “z/Qn is set to 0, then the stations in n group [are] prohibitedFinal Act. 9 (citing Liu, Slide 8). While the Examiner acknowledges Liu does not explicitly disclose that parameters Q and T are non-Quality-of-Service parameters, the Examiner finds Park teaches non- Quality-of-Service parameters and thus, the combination of Liu and Park teaches “grouping is determined by parameters of non-Quality-of-Service.” Final Act. 9—10 (citing Park 134). Appellants argue “there is no indication that during the medium access interval for data transmission, only stations which are members of a group of stations are allowed to compete for the medium access.” App. Br. 15. According to Appellants, “Slide 7 only shows that stations belong to a group 1 have higher probability to win contention due to more favorable parameters Qi, Ti. But Slide 7 does not disclose that stations belonging to group 2 are not allowed at all to compete for medium access.” Id. Appellants point out that Park states “A carrier-sense multiple access (CSMA)-based medium access control (MAC) protocol, such as IEEE 802.11, is not practical for use in a wireless sensor network (WSN) due to high power consumption since nodes need to be active most of the time due to carrier sensing.” Park | 5. In light of the above, Appellants argue “Park explicitly teaches away from Liu” and therefore a “person 5 Appeal 2017-007213 Application 13/410,129 skilled in the art would not have considered combining Park with Liu.” App. Br. 16. Analysis Appellants’ arguments are unpersuasive. Liu discloses limiting the number of STAs that try to access the channel when the network is congested to only those STAs that satisfy certain parameters. See Liu Slide 3. At least in one embodiment, Liu limits the number of STAs with access to the channel by classifying the STAs into groups, each group having different priority and with its own set of parameters, Q and T. See Final Act. 8—9 (citing Liu Slide 7). By setting different values for Q and T, the access point in Liu can control the transmission groups that have access during a particular interval of time. Id. In a special case, Liu prohibits certain groups from access to the channel during a time interval by setting the parameter Q to 0 for those certain groups. Liu Slide 8. Thus, under Liu’s scheme, Liu can set Q to 0 for all groups except one particular group. Under this scenario, only that group, and no others, will have access to the channel during the relevant time interval. We, therefore, agree with the Examiner that Liu renders obvious “receiv[ing] a message indicating a medium access interval for data transmissions during which interval only stations which are members of a group of stations are allowed to compete for medium access.” We also disagree with Appellants that Park teaches away from Liu and that the two would not be combined. Park’s statement that the IEEE 802.11 protocal is not practical for use with wireless sensor networks is directed to the fact that the 802.11 protocol requires high power consumption (see Park | 5), and, at best, implies that techniques that require 6 Appeal 2017-007213 Application 13/410,129 high power consumption may not always wished to be used in wireless sensor networks where power is of greater concern. This, however, does not necessitate the opposite, i.e. that techniques used in wireless sensor networks (such as those described in Park) cannot be used in a system based on the 802.11 protocol (such as Liu). Further, Appellants have not shown that the use of non-Quality-of-Service parameters, which is what the Examiner is relying on Park for, leads to or is even related to high power consumption. Finally, we note that Park “relates to . . . scheduling timing for communication between a plurality of sensor nodes in a wireless sensor network (WSN) system, in which the sensor nodes are divided into several groups and time slots are respectively allocated to the groups, thereby preventing collision between the sensor nodes.” Park 13. This is nearly identical to the field of both Liu and the claimed invention. For example, Liu teaches a method for reducing the collision rate when the network becomes congested by grouping STAs and limiting the number of STAs accessing the channel. See Liu Slides 3,7. Likewise, Appellants’ own Specification describes a similar problem addressed by their invention: “When the number of devices within a wireless network increases, medium access competition may lead to increased collision rate, delays, and/or power consumption.” Spec. 14. Because Park is analogous art and addresses the same problem as both Appellants’ invention and Liu, we find one of ordinary skill would look to the teachings of Park, rather than be directed away from Park. Conclusion Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), and of independent claims 7, 13, and 19, 7 Appeal 2017-007213 Application 13/410,129 for which Appellants make the same arguments as those presented for claim 1. See App. Br. 27—30 and 33. Claim 2 Claim 2 depends from claim 1 and recites “The apparatus according to claim 1, wherein the said medium access interval is a first medium access interval for a first group of stations and the message indicates a second medium access interval for a second group of stations; and ... the apparatus at least further . . . determine [s] that the apparatus is not allowed to compete for medium access during the second medium access interval.” The Examiner finds Liu and Park teach or suggest these limitations for largely the same reasons found for claim 1. In particular, the Examiner finds Liu teaches setting parameters Q and T to control the transmission of groups of STAs during certain intervals of time, and that Q can be set to 0 to completely prohibit a group from accessing the channel during the relevant time period. See Final Act. 10. Appellants argue “the combination of Liu and Park does not teach or even suggest. . . that the medium access interval is a first medium access interval for a first group of stations and the message indicates a second medium access interval for a second group of stations and that the apparatus is not allowed to compete for medium access during the second medium access interval.” App. Br. 25. Appellants’ arguments are unpersuasive. First, other than summarily state that the Examiner’s combination does not teach or suggest the limitation at issue, Appellants do not provide an explanation as to why such a statement is true. Arguments such as these are conclusory and unpersuasive. See 37 C.F.R. §41.37(c)(l)(iv) (noting that an argument that 8 Appeal 2017-007213 Application 13/410,129 merely points out what a claim recites is unpersuasive); accord In re Lovin, 652 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (‘[T]he Board reasonably interpreted Rule 41.37 to require more substantive arguments in an appeal brief than a mere recitation of the claim elements and a naked assertion that the corresponding elements were not found in the prior art.”’). Second, to the extent Appellants rely on the same arguments made with respect to claim 1, we find those arguments unpersuasive for the reasons stated above. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 2 and of claims 8, 14, and 20 for which Appellants make the same arguments. See App. Br. 24—25 and 30—31. Claims 4 and 5 Claim 4 depends from claim 1 and recites “in which a length of the medium access interval is based at least partly on a number of stations in the group.” Similarly claim 5 recites “in which a length of the medium access interval is based at least partly on a priority of the group of stations.” The Examiner finds Liu teaches or suggests these limitations by disclosing “AP can set {Qn,Tn} according to . . . the number of STAs in group n and other factors (e.g., the priority of each group).” Final Act. 10- 11 (Tn denotes the interval of time during which a group is prohibited to access the channel). Regarding claim 4, Appellants argue Liu “does not state that it could be based in part on the number of stations. In other words, the proposed combination appears to demand an all or nothing basis rather than a basis in part.” App. Br. 26. Appellants make a similar argument regarding claim 5, namely that Liu “does not state that it could be based in part on the priority 9 Appeal 2017-007213 Application 13/410,129 of the group of stations. In other words, the proposed combination appears to demand an all or nothing basis rather than a basis in part.” App. Br. 26. Appellants’ arguments are unpersuasive. First, we do not agree that Liu “demands an all or nothing basis rather than a basis in part” for the factors listed that affect the length of the time interval. Instead, Liu simply lists several factors that can determine the length of the time interval during which access to the channel is given, including the two claimed factors of “number of stations” and “priority of the group of stations.” See Liu Slide 8. Liu does not disclose that any one of these factors is exclusive to all other factors or is “an all or nothing basis,” as Appellants allege. Second, Appellants’ argument is incommensurate with the scope of claims 4 and 5. Claims 4 and 5 both recite that the length of the medium access interval is based “at least partly” on either a number of stations in a group or priority of the group, respectively. The phrase “at least partly” is broad enough to encompass a given factor being the only factor that determines the length of the time interval. Thus, even if Liu “demands an all or nothing basis,” which we find it does not, Liu still would teach or suggest the claimed limitation. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 4 and 5 and of claims 10, 16, 17, and 22 for which Appellants make the same arguments. See App. Br. 25, 26, 31, 32. Claim 6 Claim 6 depends from claim 1 and recites “in which . . . the message comprises a beacon received from an access point.” The Examiner finds Liu teaches or suggests this limitation by disclosing “AP broadcast a beacon frame to guide stations to content.'1'’ Final Act. 11 (citing Liu Slide 3). 10 Appeal 2017-007213 Application 13/410,129 Appellants argue “those analogies are not valid for at least the fact that there is respectfully no beacon as claimed as the Examiner contends is shown in Liu.” App. Br. 27. Appellants’ arguments are unpersuasive. Liu explicitly discloses “AP [Access Point] broadcasts some parameters to guide STAs’ contention process. These parameters can be provided in Beacon Lrame.” Liu Slide 3. Liu further discloses that “In Beacon Lrame, a contention factor Q is provided.” Liu Slide 4. Thus, Liu clearly teaches or suggests a “message comprises a beacon received from an access point” as claimed. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 6 and of claim 18 for which Appellants make the same argument as for claim 6. See App. Br. 32—33. DECISION The Examiner’s rejection of claims 4, 5, 10, 17 and 22 under 35 U.S.C. § 112 is reversed. The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 2, 4—8, 10, 13, 14, 16—20 and 22 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) is affirmed. Because we affirm at least one rejection for each claim, we affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 2, 4—8, 10, 13, 14, 16—20 and 22. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.L.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.L.R. § 41.50(f). ALLIRMED 11 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation