Ex Parte Gettemy

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jan 27, 2017

12011471 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 27, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
12/011,471 01/25/2008 Shawn R. Gettemy QLXX.P1001US.C1/11403543 8576
15757 7590 01/31/2017
Qualcomm /Norton Rose Fulbright US LLP
2200 Ross Avenue
Suite 3600
Dallas, TX 75201-7932
EXAMINER
SHAPIRO, LEONID
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2625
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
01/31/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
ocpat_uspto@qualcomm.com
doipdocket@nortonrosefulbright.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte SHAWN R. GETTEMY
Appeal 2016-004803
Application 12/011,4711
Technology Center 2600
Before BRADLEY W. BAUMEISTER, BRUCE R. WINSOR, and
MICHAEL J. ENGLE, Administrative Patent Judges.
ENGLE, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final rejection of
claims 9-11, 13, 14, and 16—21, which are all of the claims pending in the
application. Final Act. 2—3. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
Technology
The application relates to a “pliable sensor that is supported by the
housing” and “provides input from the hand of a user.” Abstract.
Illustrative Claim
Claim 9 is illustrative and reproduced below with the limitations at
issue emphasized:
1 Appellant states the real party in interest is Qualcomm Inc. App. Br. 2.
Appeal 2016-004803
Application 12/011,471
9. A cellular telephone comprising:
a housing;
cellular telephone electronics;
a processor; and
a sensor to provide signals to the processor based on a
force applied to the sensor by a user and to provide tactile
feedback to the user in response to the force, the tactile feedback
provided as a protrusion formed as a bump at a location of the
force detected by the sensor.
Rejections
Claims 9-11 and 16—17 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
obvious over the combination of Rafii et al. (US 6,512,838 Bl) and
Kombluh et al. (US 6,586,859 B2). Final Act. 3.
Claims 13, 14, and 18—21 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
obvious over the combination of Rafii, Kombluh, and Fishkin et al.
(US 6,160,540). Final Act. 7.
ISSUES
Did the Examiner err in finding the combination of Rafii and
Kombluh teaches or suggests the following limitations:
1. “a sensor ... to provide tactile feedback to the user in response
to the force, the tactile feedback provided as a protmsion
formed as a bump at a location of the force detected by the
sensor,” as recited in claim 9?
2. “the force sensor to ... in response to the sensing, provide at
least one protuberance of the force sensor in the form of a bump
formed by an electrical charge,” as recited in claim 16?
3. “the force sensor to provide a button in response to the tactile
input,” as recited in claim 17?
2
Appeal 2016-004803
Application 12/011,471
ANALYSIS
Claims 9—11, 13, 14, 16, and 18—21
Claim 9 recites “a sensor ... to provide tactile feedback to the user in
response to the force, the tactile feedback provided as a protrusion formed as
a bump at a location of the force detected by the sensor.”
The Examiner relies on Rafii for teaching a cellular phone with “a
bump at a location of the input” (specifically, a virtual keyboard) and relies
on Kombluh for teaching “to provide tactile feedback to the user in response
to the force, the tactile feedback provided as a protrusion at a location of the
force detected by the sensor” (such as a stuffed animal that wiggles its nose
when the nose is touched). Final Act. 4—5.
Appellant contends Raffi discloses only a “passive bump” that is
“permanently present” and Kombluh’s wiggling of the nose is not a bump.
App. Br. 8—9. However, we agree with the Examiner that “one cannot show
non-obviousness by attacking references individually where, as here, the
rejections are based on combinations of references.” In re Keller, 642 F.2d
413, 426 (CCPA 1981). Rafii is not used for tactile feedback in response to
a touch; Kombluh is. Conversely, Kombluh is not used for a bump; Rafii is.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that a combination of
Rafii and Kombluh would only teach “a sensor with permanent formed
bumps,” particularly given such permanent bumps would eliminate
Kombluh’s teaching that “the present invention provides tactile interaction
with its environment,” such as “a teddy bear that reactively pushes back
when its paw is pushed” or “the nose wiggles when touched.” Kombluh
26:1—17. We also are not persuaded the combination would change the
principle of operation of Rafii, as Appellant suggests. App. Br. 10. Merely
3
Appeal 2016-004803
Application 12/011,471
because there is a “difference” between two prior art references does not
necessarily affect the “principle of operation.” In reMouttet, 686 F.3d 1322,
1332 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
Independent claim 16 recites language commensurate with that of
claim 9 and further recites the bump is “formed by an electrical charge.”
The Examiner relies on Kombluh for this limitation. Final Act. 6 (citing
Kombluh 26:1—22). Kombluh teaches “haptic sensors may be arranged
under the skin in various places of the animated device” and “may then be
responsible for actuation in response to user interaction.” Kombluh 26:3—8.
“For example, a haptic electroactive polymer sensor may be placed in the
nose of the stuffed toy and the nose wiggles when touched (via actuation of
the electroactive polymer).” Id. at 26:8—11 (emphasis added). Thus, we are
unpersuaded by Appellant’s argument that Kombluh’s tactile feedback from
an electroactive actuator is not “formed by an electrical charge.”
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent
claims 9 and 16, as well as dependent claims 10 and 11, which Appellants
do not argue separately. App. Br. 14; See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv).
We likewise sustain the Examiner’s rejection of dependent claims 13,
14, and 18—21 over Rafii, Kombluh, and Fishkin. Appellants have not
particularly pointed out errors in the Examiner’s reasoning regarding the
additional teachings of Fishkin, and merely reiterate the same arguments set
forth for independent claims 9 and 16. See App. Br. 15.2
2 In the event of further prosecution, the Examiner may also wish to consider
prior art related to haptic feedback in mobile devices, such as Rosenberg et
al. (US 7,592,999; Sept. 22, 2009), Diederiks (US 2005/0030292; Feb. 10,
2005), or Tsuji et al. (JP 11-212725; Aug. 6, 1999), as well as haptic
displays, such as Newman (US 6,502,032; Dec. 31, 2002).
4
Appeal 2016-004803
Application 12/011,471
Claim 17
Claim 17 depends from claim 16 and further recites “the force sensor
to provide a button in response to the tactile input.”
Appellant argues “ Rafii teaches passive bumps which are permanently
formed on a virtual keyboard” and “such permanently formed [bumps]
cannot be provided in response to the tactile input.” App. Br. 14—15.
However, the feature relied on by Appellant comes from independent
claim 16, not dependent claim 17. As discussed above, for independent
claim 16, the Examiner relies on Kombluh for teaching “in response to the
sensing, provide at least one protuberance of the force sensor.” Final Act. 6.
For dependent claim 17, the Examiner further relies on Rafii for teaching a
button. Id. at 7 (citing Rafii 9:30—35). Thus, the feature relied upon by
Appellant (i.e., the protuberance “in response to the tactile input”) comes
from Kombluh, not Rafii. Yet Appellant attacks only Rafii, not Kombluh.
Just as with the independent claims, “one cannot show non-obviousness by
attacking references individually where, as here, the rejections are based on
combinations of references.” Keller, 642 F.2d at 426.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 17.
DECISION
For the reasons above, we affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting
claims 9-11, 13, 14, and 16—21.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.50(f).
AFFIRMED
5