Ex Parte Gerken

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Feb 7, 2018

13526713 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 7, 2018)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/526,713 06/19/2012 John Kenyon Gerken III AUS920120089US1 7106
40412 7590 02/09/2018
IBM CORPORATION- AUSTIN (JVL)
C/O LESLIE A. VAN LEEUWEN
6123 PEBBLE GARDEN CT.
AUSTIN, TX 78739
EXAMINER
GEBREMICHAEL, BRUK A
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3715
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
02/09/2018 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
leslie@vl-patents.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte JOHN KENYON GERKEN III1
Appeal 2016-007689
Application 13/526,713
Technology Center 3700
Before JENNIFER D. BAHR, DANIEL S. SONG, and
SEAN P. O’HANLON, Administrative Patent Judges.
O’HANLON, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
1 The Appeal Brief identifies International Business Machines Corporation
as the real party in interest. Appeal Br. 2.
Appeal 2016-007689
Application 13/526,713
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
John Kenyon Gerken III (Appellant) appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a)
from the Examiner’s June 3, 2015, non-final decision rejecting claims 16—
41.2 We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION
Appellant’s disclosure is directed to the recognition of a subject’s
emotions through facial and vocal cues. Spec. 11. Claim 16, reproduced
below from page 24 (Claims Appendix) of the Appeal Brief, is illustrative of
the claimed subject matter:
16. An information handling system comprising:
one or more processors;
a memory coupled to at least one of the processors;
a plurality of receivers accessible by at least one of the
processors, wherein the plurality of receivers includes a video
camera and a microphone;
a feedback component accessible by at least one of the
processors; and
a set of instructions stored in the memory and executed
by at least one of the processors, wherein the set of instructions
perform actions of:
receiving, from a human subject, a set of real-time inputs
at one or more of the receivers, wherein the human subject is
interacting with a user of the information handling system;
comparing the received set of real-time inputs to one or
more predefined sets of emotional characteristics stored in the
memory;
identifying an emotion being displayed by the human
subject in response to the comparisons;
2 Claims 1—15 are canceled. Appeal Br. 24 (Claims App.).
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receiving, from the user, a response corresponding to the
human subject, wherein the received response is an emotion
identification by the user corresponding to the human subject;
comparing the received response with the identified
emotion; and
in response to the comparing, providing, via the feedback
component, feedback to the user regarding the identified
emotion, wherein the feedback indicates whether the user
correctly identified the emotion.
REJECTIONS
Claims 16—18, 21—33, and 35—41 stand rejected as being directed to
patent ineligible subject matter under the judicial exception to 35 U.S.C.
§ 101.3
Claims 16—18, 21—33, and 35—41 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Cunnington (US 2011/0295392 Al,
published Dec. 1, 2011) and Cohen (US 2008/0254419 Al, published Oct.
16, 2008).
Claims 19 and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Cunnington, Cohen, and Tartz (US 2013/0063256 Al,
published Mar. 14, 2013).
Claim 34 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Cunnington, Cohen, and Miller (US 2003/0068057 Al,
published Apr. 10, 2003).
3 The rejection of claims 19, 20, and 34 as directed to patent ineligible
subject matter was withdrawn. Ans. 2.
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ANALYSIS
Non-Statutory Subject Matter
The Examiner rejects claims 16—18, 21—33, and 35—41 as being
directed to a judicially excepted subject matter—namely, an abstract idea of
“a process for managing interactions.” Ans. 2-4; Non-Final Act. 2—3. In
rejecting the claims, the Examiner determines:
The elements recited in [claim 16] (e.g. information handling
system that comprises one or more receivers, one or more
processors, etc.) amount[] to no more than recitation of generic
computer structure that serves to perform generic computer
functions (i.e. generic computer functions that are well-
understood, routine, and conventional activities previously
known to the pertinent industry).
Non-Final Act. 3. The Examiner further determines that “the claimed
process[es] have similarities with one or more examples discussed in the
[July 2015 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility] guideline, for example, the
process of collecting and comparing known information, or the process of
comparing new and stored information and using rules to identify options,
etc.” Ans. 3. The Examiner further determines that “the dependent claims
... are directed to a further manipulation of data that a generic computer
system serves to perform,” and, “[consequently, ... do not amount to
significantly more than the abstract idea itself.” Id. at 4; see also Non-Final
Act. 3.
Independent Claims 16, 25, and 35
Appellant contests the rejection of independent claims 16, 25, and 35
collectively. Appeal Br. 7—15. We select claim 16 as representative,
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treating claims 25 and 35 as standing or falling with representative claim 16.
See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv).
In contesting the rejection, Appellant argues that the claimed subject
matter is not abstract and the Examiner’s characterization of claim 16 as
abstract is conclusory and lacks sufficient evidentiary support. See Appeal
Br. 7—13; see also id. at 7 (“The present Office Action cites no references
whatsoever, but merely concludes that Appellant’s claims, as a whole, are
directed to an abstract idea.”), 8 (“rather than seeking to tie up the entire
subject matter providing feedback regarding a subject’s emotions,
Appellant’s claims are directed to a specific, unique, and non-obvious
method, information handling system, and computer program product”); and
Reply Br. 2—7.
Appellant further argues that even if the claims are directed to a
patent-ineligible abstract idea, the additional claim elements—namely the
receiving and comparing an emotional identification with an identified
emotion and the providing feedback regarding the comparison—amount to
significantly more than the abstract idea. Appeal Br. 13—15.
Section 101 provides that a patent may be obtained for
“any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. The Supreme Court has long
recognized, however, that § 101 implicitly excludes “laws of
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” from the realm
of patent-eligible subject matter, as monopolization of these
“basic tools of scientific and technological work” would stifle
the very innovation that the patent system aims to promote.
Alice Corp. v. CLSBanklnt’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014)
(quoting Ass ’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics,
Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116 (2013)); see also Mayo
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Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289,
1294-97 (2012); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981).
The Supreme Court has instructed us to use a two-step
framework to “distinguish[] patents that claim laws of nature,
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim
patent-eligible applications of those concepts.” Alice, 134 S.
Ct. at 2355. At the first step, we determine whether the claims
at issue are “directed to” a patent-ineligible concept. Id. If
they are, we then “consider the elements of each claim both
individually and ‘as an ordered combination’ to determine
whether the additional elements ‘transform the nature of the
claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” Id. (quoting Mayo,
132 S. Ct. at 1298). This is the search for an “inventive
concept”—something sufficient to ensure that the claim
amounts to “significantly more” than the abstract idea itself.
Id. (quoting Mayo, 132 S.Ct. at 1294).
Starting at step one, we must first examine the . . .
“claimed advance” to determine whether the claims are directed
to an abstract idea. Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. DIRECTV,
LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2016). In cases involving
software innovations, this inquiry often turns on whether the
claims focus on “the specific asserted improvement in computer
capabilities ... or, instead, on a process that qualifies as an
‘abstract idea’ for which computers are invoked merely as a
tool.” Enfish, LLCv. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335—36
(Fed. Cir. 2016).
Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Systems, Inc., No. 2016-2520 slip op. 4—5 (Fed.
Cir. Jan. 10, 2018).
Alice Step One
Turning to Alice step 1, instead of using a definition of an abstract
idea, “the decisional mechanism courts now apply is to examine earlier cases
in which a similar or parallel descriptive nature can be seen—what prior
cases were about, and which way they were decided.” Amdocs (Isr.) Ltd. v.
Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing Elec.
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Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353—54 (Fed. Cir. 2016)).
Our reviewing court has said that abstract ideas include the concepts of
collecting data, recognizing certain data within the collected data set, and
storing the data in memory. Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v.
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 776 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(“The concept of data collection, recognition, and storage is undisputedly
well-known.”). Additionally, the collection of information and analysis of
information (e.g., recognizing certain data within the dataset) are also
abstract ideas. Elec. Power, 830 F.3d at 1353. Similarly, “collecting,
displaying, and manipulating data” is an abstract idea. Intellectual Ventures
I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 850 F.3d 1332, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Our
reviewing court has also held that “analyzing information by steps people
[can] go through in their minds, or by mathematical algorithms, without
more [are] mental processes within the abstract-idea category.” Synopsys,
Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1146 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(quoting Elec. Power, 830 F.3d at 1354).
Here, claim 16 recites an “information handling system” including a
memory, a plurality of receivers, and a feedback component connected to
one or more processors. Appeal Br. 24 (Claims App.). Appellant’s
Specification describes these as components of a general purpose computer.
See, e.g., Spec. 143 (“the various methods described are conveniently
implemented in a general purpose computer selectively activated or
reconfigured by software”). Claim 16 further requires “a set of instructions”
to perform the following steps:
“receiving, from a human subject, a set of real-time
inputs”;
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“comparing the received set of real-time inputs to one or
more predefined sets of emotional characteristics”;
“identifying an emotion being displayed by the human
subject in response to the comparisons”;
“receiving, from the user, a response”;
“comparing the received response with the identified
emotion”; and
“in response to the comparing, providing . . . feedback to
the user.”
Appeal Br. 24 (Claims App.). In other words, claim 16 merely requires
collecting (receiving inputs and a response), analyzing (comparing inputs to
predefined data sets, identifying an emotion, and comparing the response
with the emotion), and transmitting (providing feedback) information or data
using a generic computer. As with the cases cited above, claim 16,
therefore, is directed to an abstract idea.
Alice Step Two
For the second step of our analysis, we determine
whether the limitations present in the claims represent a patent-
eligible application of the abstract idea. Alice, 134 S.Ct. at
2357. For the role of a computer in a computer-implemented
invention to be deemed meaningful in the context of this
analysis, it must involve more than performance of “well-
understood, routine, [and] conventional activities previously
known to the industry.” Id. at 2359 (quoting Mayo, 132 S.Ct. at
1294 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)). Further,
“the mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a
patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.”
Id. at 2358.
Content Extraction, 776 F.3d at 1347-48.
As noted above, claim 16 merely requires collecting, analyzing, and
transmitting information using a generic computer. There are no additional
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elements to transform the nature of the claim into a patent-eligible
application. See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2359 (“Considered ‘as an ordered
combination,’ the computer components of petitioner’s method ‘ad[d]
nothing ... that is not already present when the steps are considered
separately.’”).
Nor are we persuaded by Appellant’s argument that claim 16 is
“directed to improvements in the technical field of communications.”
Appeal Br. 14; see also Reply Br. 6—7 (regarding an alleged “improv[ement
in] the field of computer-assisted communications”). Contrary to
Appellant’s assertion (see Reply Br. 6—7), claim 16 merely uses a generic
computer as a tool to perform the steps of collecting, analyzing, and
transmitting information. Claim 16 is unlike the claims at issue in Enfish.
In that case, the court “relied on the distinction made in Alice between, on
one hand, computer-functionality improvements and, on the other, uses of
existing computers as tools in aid of processes focused on ‘abstract ideas.’”
Elec. Power, 830 F.3d at 1354. For the reasons provided above, claim 16
falls into the latter category.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we sustain the rejection of
claims 16, 25, and 35 as being directed to non-statutory subject matter.
Dependent Claims 17, 18, 21—24, 26—33, and 36-41
Appellant contests the rejection of dependent claims 17, 18, 21—24,
26—33, and 36-41 collectively. Appeal Br. 15—17. Per 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(l)(iv), we select claim 21 as representative of the group. Claim
21 recites:
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21. The information handling system of claim 16 wherein the
feedback component is a speaker output that provides an
audible feedback to the user, wherein the set of instructions
performs additional actions comprising:
indicating the identified emotion as a higher pitched tone
using the speaker output in response to a positive emotion being
identified; and
indicating the identified emotion as a lower pitched tone
using the speaker output in response to a negative emotion
being identified.
Appeal Br. 25—26 (Claims App.).
Appellant argues that “providing audio feedback in the form of
‘higher pitched’ tones and Tower pitched’ tones” is not an abstract idea. Id.
at 16.
A speaker is a component of a generic computer system. See, e.g.,
Spec. 143. The recited “indicating” steps are merely the categorization and
transmission of information regarding such categorization using the generic
computer system component as a tool to perform such transmission. Thus,
for the same reasons as discussed above regarding the rejection of claim 16,
we agree with the Examiner that claim 21 is “directed to a further
manipulation of data that a generic computer system serves to perform” and,
“[cjonsequently, . . . do[es] not amount to significantly more than the
abstract idea itself.” Ans. 4. Furthermore, we note that indicating positive
and negative emotions using higher and lower pitched tones, respectively,
appears to be a conventional manner of expressing such emotions, and
Appellant does not persuasively apprise us otherwise.
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Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we sustain the rejection of
claims 17, 18, 21—24, 26—33, and 36-41 as being directed to non-statutory
subject matter.
Obviousness over Cunnington and Cohen
Claims 16-18. 21-23. 25-30. 32. 33. and 35^10
Appellant contests the rejection of claims 16—18, 21—23, 25—30, 32,
33, and 35—40 collectively. Appeal Br. 17—21. Per 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(l)(iv), we select claim 16 as representative of the group.
The Examiner finds that Cunnington discloses an information
handling system substantially as recited in claim 16, but “does not explicitly
describe . . . comparing the received set of real-time inputs to one or more
predefined sets of emotional characteristics stored in the memory.” Non-
Final Act. 5—6 (citing Cunnington H 23, 42, 44, 55). The Examiner finds
that Cunnington teaches that the system stores predetermined thresholds and
other factors, thereby enabling the system to identify one or more relevant
emotions related to an audience member and to generate relevant feedback
to the presenter. Id. at 6 (citing Cunnington | 60). Thus, the Examiner
reasons, Cunnington “suggests, at least implicitly, the implementation of an
algorithm that compares the audience member’s input with a relevant
threshold(s) of emotional characteristics, thereby identifying one or more
emotions based on the comparison and generating a relevant feedback(s) in
response to the comparisons.” Id. The Examiner also reasons that it would
have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to modify Cunnington’s
system to incorporate
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functionality that involves one or more algorithms for
evaluating one or more emotional attributes of the participant(s)
according to one or more corresponding emotional thresholds,
in order to enable the system to easily and accurately identify
the emotional state(s) of one or more participants and generate
the most appropriate feedback(s) to the presenter, so that the
presenter would modify his/her interaction style to mend the
comforts of one or more of the participants; thereby making the
system more comprehensive and efficient to all users.
Id.
The Examiner also finds that Cunnington does not explicitly disclose
receiving a user response, comparing the response with an identified
emotion, and providing feedback to the user regarding the identified
emotion. Id. at 7. The Examiner finds that Cohen discloses a system that
prompts a user to input responses regarding perceived feelings or emotions
related to a participant, and reasons that it would have been obvious to one
of ordinary skill in the art to modify Cunnington’s system to incorporate
functionality that presents one or more questions to the user
regarding a given interaction (e.g. observed feelings or
emotions of the participant during the interaction, etc.) and
evaluates the user’s responses, thereby generating one or more
performance data to the user (and/or facilitator, etc.), in order to
help the user to develop/improve one or more skills that allow
him/her to easily and accurately identify one or more
characteristics of other user(s) during interactions so that the
user would be more successful; thereby making the system
more beneficial to the user.
Id. (citing Cohen H 133, 136, 137, 141, 144); see also Ans. 39-40 (citing
Cohen 11 113, 133, 137, 141, 144).
Appellant traverses the Examiner’s rejection, first arguing that
“[wjhile Cunnington does discuss detecting ‘emotions and dispositions,’
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Cunnington does not teach or suggest that ‘the human subject is interacting
with a user of the information handling system.”’ Appeal Br. 18. Appellant
also asserts that, in Cunnington, “[t]he audience is not interacting with the
presenter, but rather, is passively receiving the presentation from the
presenter.” Reply Br. 8—9. We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments.
A claim under examination is given its broadest reasonable
interpretation consistent with the underlying specification. See In re
American Acad, of Science Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
In the absence of an express definition of a claim term in the specification or
a clear disclaimer of scope, the claim term is interpreted as broadly as the
ordinary usage of the term by one of ordinary skill in the art would permit.
See In re ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 496 F.3d 1374, 1379 (Fed. Cir.
2007); see also In re Morris, 111 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
Appellant does not direct us to, nor does our review reveal, any
specialized definition of “interacting” in the Specification. Appellant’s
arguments fail to apprise us of error in the Examiner’s determination that
Cunnington discloses presenter-audience interaction. Indeed, Cunnington
explicitly discloses such interaction: “The technologies described herein are
generally directed towards detecting reactions of one or more participants
during interaction with others to provide feedback for improving
communication.” Cunnington 122 (emphasis added).
Appellant next argues that “there is nothing in the cited sections of
Cohen that discloses receiving ‘an emotion identification by the user.’”
Appeal Br. 19. Continuing, Appellant asserts that “identifying an error or
repeating guideline language, as disclosed by Cohen, is not the same as
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receiving ‘an emotion identification.’” Id. at 20. See also Reply Br. 9-10.
Similarly, Appellant argues that Cohen does not disclose comparing a
received user response with an identified emotion. Appeal Br. 20.
According to Appellant, “Cohen is not concerned with a user correctly
identifying emotions being displayed by a human subject with whom the
user is interacting.” Id.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments. As correctly noted
by the Examiner (see Ans. 40), Cohen discloses testing a user for listening
mastery and listening comprehension, which “can enhance emotional
intelligence (the ability to understand and assess what someone is feeling
and to deal with those feelings).” Cohen 1141. Thus, by testing for
emotional intelligence, Cohen at least suggests receiving an emotion
identification from the user.
Moreover, the Examiner’s rejection does not rely on Cohen to teach
the recited emotion identification; rather, the rejection relies on Cohen to
teach querying a user and providing feedback. See Non-Final Act. 7; Ans.
40. The rejection combines such teaching of Cohen with Cunnington, which
Appellant describes as “teach[ing] sensing and analyzing reaction
information of participants to an interaction.” Appeal Br. 18. The rejection
relies on Cunnington to disclose identifying an emotion displayed by a
human subject. See Non-Final Act. 5. Appellant’s attacks on Cohen,
individually, fail to apprise us of error in the Examiner’s determination that
the combination of Cunnington and Cohen discloses the subject matter of
claim 16. See In re Merck & Co., Inc., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
(“Nonobviousness cannot be established by attacking references individually
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where the rejection is based upon the teachings of a combination of
references.”).
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we sustain the rejection of
claims 16—18, 21—23, 25—30, 32, 33, and 35—40 as being unpatentable over
Cunnington and Cohen.
Claims 24, 31, and 41
Appellant contests the rejection of claims 24, 31, and 41 collectively.
Appeal Br. 21—22. Per 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv), we select claim 24 as
representative of the group. Claim 24 recites:
24. The information handling system of claim 16 wherein the
set of instructions performs additional actions comprising:
storing the received response and the received set of real­
time inputs in a data store, wherein a plurality of sets of real­
time inputs and a plurality of received responses related to the
interactions between the user and a plurality of human subjects
are stored in the data store over a period of time;
generating a trend analysis based on a plurality of
comparisons between the plurality of received responses and
the identified emotions corresponding to the plurality of sets of
real-time inputs; and
identifying, based on the trend analysis, one or more
emotion types that are difficult for the user to identify.
Appeal Br. 26—27 (Claims App.).
The Examiner finds that Cohen’s system “prompts the user to input
one or more responses regarding perceived feelings or emotions related to
the participant. . ., and wherein the system generates the user’s performance
data accordingly.” Non-Final Act. 10 (citing Cohen || 133, 136, 137, 141,
144). The Examiner further finds that Cohen discloses generating
cumulative scores based on responses to multiple presented scenarios. Ans.
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42^43 (citing Cohen || 113, 117, 125, 222, 223). According to the
Examiner, “[i]t is also understood that one or more of the scores or the report
shows areas of weaknesses and/or strengths with respect to the trainee’s
ability to identify emotions or feelings, for example, when responding to
questions related to emotions/feelings.” Id. at 43 (citing Cohen || 141, 144).
The Examiner reasons that it would have been obvious to one of ordinary
skill in the art to modify Cunnington’s system to include these teachings of
Cohen for the same reasons as discussed above regarding the rejection of
claim 16. Non-Final Act. 11.
Appellant traverses, arguing:
There is nothing in the cited sections of Cohen pertaining to
storing real-time inputs and received responses “related to the
interactions between the user [and] a plurality of human
subjects . . . over a period of time,” as taught and claimed by
Appellant. Nor does Cohen teach or suggest “generating a
trend analysis” based on comparing “received responses and the
identified emotions corresponding to the plurality of sets of
real-time inputs.”
Appeal Br. 22; see also Reply Br. 11—12.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments, which again attack
Cohen individually. As correctly noted by the Examiner (see Ans. 42-43),
Cohen discloses that a cumulative score of a user’s responses to queries
regarding a human subject’s body language can be “calculated, stored, and
reported.” Cohen 1222. Appellant does not persuasively apprise us of error
in the Examiner’s determination that Cohen’s “cumulative score” is a trend
analysis. We note that the prior art does not have to disclose a claimed
invention ipsissimis verbis by using the same terms to disclose the claimed
subject matter. Additionally, as noted above, the rejection relies on
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Cunnington, not Cohen, to disclose identifying an emotion displayed by a
human subject. See Non-Final Act. 5. Appellant’s arguments fail to apprise
us of error in the Examiner’s determination that the combination of
Cunnington and Cohen discloses the subject matter of claim 24.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we sustain the rejection of
claims 24, 31, and 41 as being unpatentable over Cunnington and Cohen.
Obviousness over Cunnington, Cohen, and Tartz
With respect to the rejection of claims 19 and 20, Appellant relies on
the arguments discussed above in regard to the rejection of claim 16.
Appeal Br. 22. Accordingly, for the same reasons as discussed above, we
also sustain the rejection of claims 19 and 20 as being unpatentable over
Cunnington, Cohen, and Tartz.
Obviousness over Cunnington, Cohen, and Miller
With respect to the rejection of claim 34, Appellant relies on the
arguments discussed above in regard to the rejection of claim 16. Id. at 23.
Accordingly, for the same reasons as discussed above, we also sustain the
rejection of claim 34 as being unpatentable over Cunnington, Cohen, and
Miller.
DECISION
The Examiner’s decision to reject claims 16-41 is affirmed.
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No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED
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