11856785 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 23, 2013)

Ex Parte Gerber

Patent Trial and Appeal BoardSep 23, 2013

11856785 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 23, 2013)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 11/856,785 09/18/2007 Raymond Gerber BPCCR0017CC 9705 27939 7590 09/23/2013 PHILIP H. BURRUS, IV 460 Grant Street SE Atlanta, GA 30312 EXAMINER ZIEGLE, STEPHANIE M ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3694 MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE 09/23/2013 PAPER Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte RAYMOND GERBER ___________ Appeal 2011-010125 Application 11/856,785 Technology Center 3600 ____________ Before MEREDITH C. PETRAVICK, NINA L. MEDLOCK, and JAMES A. TARTAL, Administrative Patent Judges. PETRAVICK, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appeal 2011-010125 Application 11/856,785 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Raymond Gerber (Appellant) seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134 of the final rejection of claims 1-20. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). SUMMARY OF DECISION We REVERSE. 1 THE INVENTION Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the subject matter on appeal. 1. A method of post offer borrower query for an on-line lending system, the method comprising the steps of: receiving an electronic loan application over a network from a client terminal, the electronic loan application comprising applicant credential data; presenting electronically, over the network, on the client terminal, at least one loan offer; waiting at least a predetermined time for an electronic signal from the client terminal comprising an acceptance indication of the at least one loan offer; upon failing to receive the electronic signal from the client terminal within the at least a 1 Our decision will make reference to the Appellant’s Appeal Brief (“Br.,” filed Jan. 25, 2011) and the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed Feb. 28, 2011). Appeal 2011-010125 Application 11/856,785 3 predetermined time, electronically transmitting the at least one loan offer and the applicant credential data to a call center terminal; and generating electronically a prompt on the call center terminal for a customer service representative to initiate communication with a prospective borrower. THE REJECTIONS The Examiner relies upon the following as evidence of unpatentability: Meiri Lebda Lee Baumeister Loving US 2002/0169816 A1 US 6,611,816 B2 US 2005/0055231 A1 US 2005/0148338 A1 US 2008/0126244 A1 Nov. 14, 2002 Aug. 26, 2003 Mar. 10, 2005 Jul. 7, 2005 May 29, 2008 The following rejections are before us for review: 1. Claims 1-4 and 12-17 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Lebda, Loving, and Lee. 2. Claims 5, 9-11, and 18-20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Lebda, Loving, Lee, and Baumeister. 3. Claims 6-8 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Lebda, Loving, Lee, Baumeister, and Meiri. Appeal 2011-010125 Application 11/856,785 4 ISSUE The issue is whether the combination of Lebda, Loving, and Lee teaches the step of: upon failing to receive a loan acceptance indication, “electronically transmitting the at least one loan offer and the applicant credential data to a call center terminal.” FINDINGS OF FACT We find that the findings of fact, which appear in the Analysis below, are supported by at least a preponderance of the evidence. Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422, 1427 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (explaining the general evidentiary standard for proceedings before the Office). ANALYSIS The rejection of claims 1-4 and 12-17 under §103(a) as being unpatentable over Lebda, Loving, and Lee We are persuaded by the Appellant’s arguments that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Lebda, Loving, and Lee. Br. 11-18. At issue is claim 1’s step of upon failing to receive a loan acceptance indication, “electronically transmitting the at least one loan offer and the applicant credential data to a call center terminal.” In the rejection, the Examiner admits that Lebda fails to teach this limitation and relies upon paragraph [0033] of Loving for the necessary teaching. Ans. 4-5. Loving’s paragraph [0033] teaches a system that, after a fixed period of time, automatically initiates follow-up contacts with customers of a car dealership. However, nothing in Loving’s paragraph [0033] teaches that “at least one loan offer and the applicant credential data” should be transmitted to the call center, and the Examiner provides no Appeal 2011-010125 Application 11/856,785 5 explanation as to why one of ordinary skill in the art, when combining Lebda’s loan application process (for example, see Lebda Abstract) with Loving’s teaching of initiating follow-up contact, would have been led to specifically include the “at least one loan offer and the applicant credential data” in the transmission to the call center. See Ans. 4-6. See also Ans. 11- 12. We note that the Examiner does not rely upon Lee to teach this limitation. Therefore, we find that the Examiner fails to establish a prima facie showing of obviousness. Independent claim 14 recites a similar limitation and was similarly rejected. Accordingly, the rejection of claims 1 and 14, and claims 2-4, 12, 13, and 15-17, dependent thereon, under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Lebda, Loving, and Lee is reversed. The rejection of claims 5, 9-11, and 18-20 under §103(a) as being unpatentable over Lebda, Loving, Lee, and Baumeister and the rejection of claims 6-8 under §103(a) as being unpatentable over Lebda, Loving, Lee, Baumeister, and Meiri These rejections are directed to claims dependent on claims 1 and 14, whose rejection we have reversed above. For the same reasons, we will not sustain the rejections of these claims over the cited prior art. Cf. In re Fritch, 972 F.2d 1260, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“[D]ependent claims are nonobvious if the independent claims from which they depend are nonobvious.”). Appeal 2011-010125 Application 11/856,785 6 DECISION The decision of the Examiner to reject claims 1-20 is reversed. REVERSED mls