Ex Parte GeorgeDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardSep 27, 201612708372 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 27, 2016) Copy Citation UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE 121708,372 02/18/2010 15757 7590 09/29/2016 Qualcomm /Norton Rose Fulbright US LLP 2200 Ross A venue Suite 3600 Dallas, TX 75201-7932 FIRST NAMED INVENTOR Moses Lynn George UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www .uspto.gov ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. QLXX.P0713US/ll 403354 4318 EXAMINER MUMMALANENI, MRUNALINI YERNENI ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2699 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 09/29/2016 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address( es): ocpat_uspto@qualcomm.com doipdocket@nortonrosefulbright.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte MOSES LYNN GEORGE 1 Appeal2015-004527 Application 12/708,372 Technology Center 2600 Before KRISTEN L. DROESCH, JOYCE CRAIG, and SCOTT E. BAIN, Administrative Patent Judges. DROESCH, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellant seeks review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner's Final Rejection of claims 1-24, which constitute all the claims pending in this application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b ). We AFFIRM. BACKGROUND The disclosed invention relates to systems and methods for providing location data to users of mobile devices during wireless communications. 1 Appellant indicates the real party-in-interest is QUALCOMM Incorporated. App. Br. 2. Appeal2015-004527 Application 12/708,372 Spec. i11, Abstract. Representative claim 1, reproduced from the Claims Appendix of the Appeal Brief, reads as follows (disputed limitations in italics): 1. A mobile computing device, comprising: a housing; a display; and a processmg circuit coupled with the display, the processing circuit to: initiate a wireless telephone communication with a second mobile device, wirelessly transmit a current location of the mobile computing device to at least one server based at least in part on initiation of the wireless telephone communication when an opt- out preference is not set to the current location, receive location data for the second mobile computing device, the location data for the second mobile computing device being determined based at least in part on a current location of the second mobile computing device, and display the location data for the second mobile computing device, wherein the location data for the second mobile compitting de-vice inclitdes: a street address corresponding to the current location of the second mobile computing device; and at least one of a business name associated with the street address or a point of interest name associated with one of the street address or the current location of the second mobile computing device. REJECTIONS Claims 1, 2, 4--20, 23, and 24 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Sheha et al. (US 2008/0188246 Al; published Aug. 7, 2008) ("Sheha") and Tsuchiya (US 2008/0090592 Al; published Apr. 17, 2008). 2 Appeal2015-004527 Application 12/708,372 Claim 3 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Sheha, Tsuchiya, and Scott et al. (US 2010/0203874 Al; published Aug. 12, 2010) ("Scott"). Claim 21 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Sheha, Tsuchiya, and Book (US 2009/0197621 Al; published Aug. 6, 2009). Claim 22 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Sheha, Tsuchiya, and Van Os et al. (US 2009/0325603 Al; published Dec. 31, 2009). ANALYSIS We have reviewed the Examiner's rejections in light of Appellant's arguments in the Appeal Brief, the Examiner's Answer, and the arguments in the Reply Brief. We disagree with Appellant's conclusions. Specific findings and arguments are highlighted and addressed below for emphasis. Claims 1. 2. 4-10. and 12-24 Appellant argues that Sheha fails to disclose "displaying a street address corresponding to the current location of the second mobile computing device," as recited in claim 1. See App. Br. 7-10, 12. Appellant contends Sheha's Figure 5, item 32 and paragraph 42, relied upon by the Examiner, discloses that identification information 32 identifies the caller by the name and billing address of the telephone account holder, as with traditional Caller-ID. See id. at 7, 9, 12; Reply Br. 4--5. Appellant further asserts the name of the street provided in the identification information 32 is missing from the driving route 29 and driving directions 35 depicted in Figure 5, and other street names are instead provided. See App. Br. 7, 9-10, 12. Appellant contends the identification information 32 "cannot possibly 3 Appeal2015-004527 Application 12/708,372 correspond to" the map location 34 of the destination telephone number. Id. at 7, 10, 12. Appellant also argues that "the 'driving directions 35' depicted in Figure 5 only display street names and [a] final driving direction such as 'tum right on S[.] Madison Ave[.] and go North for 400 feet."' Reply Br. 4 (citing Sheha Fig. 5, element 35). Appellant contends "a street name alone, however, is not the same as a 'street address corresponding to the current location of the second mobile computing device."' Id. Appellant also argues that the Examiner relies improperly on Tsuchiya to teach or suggest "a point of interest name associated with one of the street address or the current location of the second mobile computing device," as recited in claim 1. See App. Br. 8. Appellant contends that Tsuchiya's teaching that the name of a nearby tram stop, which is transmitted to avoid displaying the actual location or address of the device, as disclosed by Tsuchiya, may not be fairly characterized as the claimed "point of interest name associated with one of the street address or the current location of the second mobile computing device." Id. at 8, 10, 12-13; see Reply Br. 6. Appellant contends transmitting a point of interest name together with the address of the current location of the mobile terminal is directly contrary to the purpose of Tsuchiya, and fails to accomplish ensuring privacy of the user as taught by Tsuchiya. See App. Br. 10, 13; Reply Br. 6. Appellant's arguments focus on the description of the location data of claim 1. The location data recited in claim 1 as including a street address corresponding to the current location of the second mobile computing device; and at least one of a business name; and at least one of a business name associated with the street address or a point of interest name associated with one of 4 Appeal2015-004527 Application 12/708,372 the street address or the current location of the second mobile computing device merely describes the content type of the location data. Similar to claim 1, the similar recitations in claims 9 and 15 merely describe the content type of the additional location data. Our reviewing court has held that nonfunctional descriptive material cannot lend patentability to an invention that would have otherwise been unpatentable over the prior art. In re Ngai, 367 F.3d 1336, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2004); cf In re Gulack, 703 F.2d 1381, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (noting that when descriptive material is not functionally related to the substrate, the descriptive material will not distinguish the invention from the prior art in terms ofpatentability); King Pharms., Inc. v. Eon Labs, Inc., 616 F.3d 1267, 1279 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ("[T]he relevant question is whether 'there exists any new and unobvious functional relationship."') (citations omitted). The descriptions of the location data and additional location data recited in claims 1, 9, and 15 are not functionally related to the display of the mobile computing device recited in claim 1, the computer system executable instructions recited in claim 9, and the server of the system recited in claim 15. The display of claim 1 and the server of claim 15 remain the same structures regardless of the specific content type of the location data or additional location data. Likewise, the computer system executable instructions recited in claim 9 (i.e., "determine additional location data for the first and second mobile devices based at least in part on the second location data") are performed the same way regardless of the specific content type of the additional location data. In this regard, claims 1, 9, and 15 are similar to the claim in Ngai. That the location data or additional location data includes a street address and at least one of a business name or 5 Appeal2015-004527 Application 12/708,372 a point of interest does not change the display recited in claim 1, the computer system executable instructions recited in claim 9, and the server recited in claim 15. It merely describes a new, non-functional feature for the device, system, and computer system executable instructions that already exist. To find that the disputed limitations of claims 1, 9, and 15 are entitled to patentable weight would mean that each novel type of location data is sufficient to warrant a separate patent even if the remainder of the claimed invention is unchanged. This would result not only in Appellant's types of location data distinguishing over the prior art, but would mean equally that other types of location data would distinguish over the prior art. The King and Ngai decisions, however, preclude such repeated patenting of a known device, system, and executable computer system instructions by the mere inclusion of novel non-functional descriptive material. See King Pharms., 616 F.3d at 1279 ("The rationale behind this line of cases is preventing the indefinite patenting of known products by the simple inclusion of novel, yet functionally unrelated limitations."); cf In re Ngai, 367 F.3d at 1339 ("If we were to adopt Ngai's position, anyone could continue patenting a product indefinitely provided that they add a new instruction sheet to the product."). We agree with, and adopt as our own, the Examiner's findings that the combination of Sheha and Tsuchiya teach or suggest the subject matter of independent claims 1, 9, and 15. See Final Act. 3-6; Ans. 2-11. We are not persuaded by Appellant's arguments that the non-functional descriptive material of the location data and additional location data distinguishes these claims over the prior art. We further observe that, based on providing driving directions of varying resolution 35, and depicting a final driving 6 Appeal2015-004527 Application 12/708,372 direction "tum right on S[.] Madison Ave[.] and go North for 400 feet," (see Sheha i-f 42, Fig. 5), one with ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have recognized that Sheha's teaching of providing driving directions of varying resolution would include providing an indication of the house/building number with the street name (i.e., Madison Ave.) in place of, or in addition to, the street name and "go ... 400 feet" in order to provide additional resolution. We also observe that Appellant's argument that transmitting a point of interest name together with the address of the current location of the mobile terminal is directly contrary to the purpose of Tsuchiya, and fails to accomplish ensuring privacy of the user as taught by Tsuchiya is misplaced. See App. Br. 10, 13; Reply Br. 6. The intended purpose of the secondary reference need not be preserved. Rather, the proper question is whether the proposed modification would render the prior art invention being modified (i.e., Sheha) unsatisfactory for its intended purpose. See In re Gordon, 733 F.2d 900, 902 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of independent claims 1, 9, and 15. Dependent claims 2, 4--8, 10, 12-14, and 16-24 are not separately argued (see App. Br. 13, 15-16). Therefore, for the same reasons as claims 1, 9, and 15, we sustain the rejections of claims 2, 4--8, 10, 12-14, and 16- 24. Claim 3 Appellant contends Scott does not teach the additional limitation recited in dependent claim 3. App. Br. 15. Appellant's argument, however, is conclusory, merely reciting the claim limitation, the teachings of Scott, and stating that the two are not the same. Id. Nowhere does Appellant explain why Scott's teaching of adding extended contact information, such 7 Appeal2015-004527 Application 12/708,372 as a street address, to an address book does not teach or suggest the limitation "save at least a portion of the location data to a contacts application," recited in claim 3. Rule 41.37 "require[s] more substantive arguments in an appeal brief than a mere recitation of the claim elements and a naked assertion that the corresponding elements were not found in the prior art." In re Lovin, 652 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Appellant instead contends Scott's teaching of adding extended information to an address book does not teach or suggest the claimed "location data for the second mobile computing device," recited in claim 1. See App. Br. 15; Reply Br. 10-11. The Examiner, however, did not rely on Scott in rejecting claim 1. The Examiner relied on the combination of Sheha and Tsuchiya. See Final Act. 3. Thus, Appellant's argument does not address the Examiner's rejection. For these reasons, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 3. Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claim 3. Claim 11 Claim 11 depends from independent claim 9 and recites "accessing a database to identify the street address that corresponds to the current location of the first mobile device and accessing the database to identify the street address that corresponds to the current location of the second mobile device." Appellant's arguments addressing the limitations of claim 11, are nearly identical to the arguments presented for claims 1, 9, and 15. Compare App. Br. 14, with App. Br. 7-13. Appellant also argues that the online database and application server (ODAS) 3 position information for the MAP caller-ID is disclosed to be a "map location 34 of the destination telephone number. See Reply Br. 9 8 Appeal2015-004527 Application 12/708,372 (citing Sheha il 42). Appellant contends Sheha contains no disclosure indicating the map location 34 is anything more than map coordinates, and one skilled in the art would not be led to conclude that a street address of the remote caller is looked up in a database in the course of generating driving directions 35 because a destination street address is not actually displayed in Sheha's driving directions. See id. Similar to claims 1, 9, and 15, Appellant's arguments focus on the description of the location data as a street address. The street addresses recited in claim 11 merely describe the content type that that is accessed in the database. For similar reasons as those explained above with respect to claims 1, 9, and 15, we are not persuaded by Appellant's arguments that the non-functional descriptive material of street addresses distinguishes these claims over the prior art. We agree with, and adopt as our own, the Examiner's findings that Sheha further teaches or suggests the limitations of claim 11. See Final Act. 12; Ans. 8-9. We further observe that, based on Sheha's additional teachings that the ODAS periodically updates each mobile device with the other's position information to provide real time driving directions and route information so the data is always accurate and reliable (see Sheha i-fi-150-51, 55), one with ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have further recognized that Sheha's real time driving directions of varying resolution 35 (i.e., including a house/building number and street) are obtained by accessing the ODAS to identify the house/building number and street corresponding to the position information of the first mobile device and the second mobile device. 9 Appeal2015-004527 Application 12/708,372 For the foregoing reasons, in addition to those reasons discussed above addressing claims 1, 9, and 15, Appellant does not persuade us of error in the Examiner's rejection of claim 11. Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claim 11. DECISION We AFFIRM the rejections of claims 1-24. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal maybe extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv). AFFIRMED 10 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation