Ex Parte Gaul et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardNov 13, 201713326019 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 13, 2017) Copy Citation United States Patent and Trademark Office UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O.Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 13/326,019 12/14/2011 Armin Gaul 508986 3579 53609 7590 11/15/2017 REINHART BOERNER VAN DEUREN P.C. 2215 PERRYGREEN WAY ROCKFORD, IL 61107 EXAMINER STIFTER JR, TERENCE E ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2865 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 11/15/2017 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): RockMail@reinhartlaw.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte ARMIN GAUL and THOMAS WIEDEMANN Appeal 2016-007797 Application 13/326,019 Technology Center 2800 Before BRADLEY R. GARRIS, WESLEY B. DERRICK, and JANE E. INGLESE, Administrative Patent Judges. INGLESE, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellants1 request our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of a final rejection of claims 1—11. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellants claim a device and method for determining a delivered energy quantity during charging of electric vehicles. App. Br. 2—3. Claims 1 and 3 illustrate the subject matter on appeal and are reproduced below: 1 Appellants identify the real party in interest as RWE AG. Appeal Brief filed January 5, 2016 (“App. Br.”), 2. Appeal 2016-007797 Application 13/326,019 1. A method for determining a delivered energy quantity during the charging of electric vehicles, comprising: connecting an electric vehicle to a charging station for obtaining electrical energy provided on a charging cable; feeding the desired energy quantity into a battery of the electric vehicle during a desired charging period; detecting of at least one electrical value required for the calculation of the energy quantity by an energy quantity meter, outputting the calculated energy quantity to a device; and outputting the at least one electrical value, required by the energy quantity meter for the calculation of the energy quantity, to a monitoring device for the operational monitoring of the charging station. 3. A device for determining a delivered electrical energy quantity when charging electric vehicles in a charging station, comprising: a detection means for detecting electrical values applied in the charging circuit of an energy supply network; a calculation means for calculating the energy quantity from the electrical values; a first output unit for the calculated energy quantity; and a further output unit for the output of at least one of the electrical values to a monitoring device for operational monitoring of the charging station. App. Br. 16 (Claims Appendix) (emphasis added). The Examiner sets forth the following rejections in the Final Office Action entered September 22, 2015 (“Final Act.”), and maintains the rejections in the Answer entered June 17, 2016 (“Ans.”): I. Claims 3—9 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter that the Appellants regard as the invention (Final Act. 5); 2 Appeal 2016-007797 Application 13/326,019 II. Claims 1—3 and 7—11 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Dunlap et al. (US 2009/0177595 Al, published July 9, 2009) in view of Chai (US 6,225,776 Bl, issued May 1, 2001) (Final Act. 6); and III. Claims 4—6 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Dunlap in view of Chai and Westbrock, JR. et al. (US 2006/0238932 Al, published October 26, 2006) (Final Act. 12). DISCUSSION Upon consideration of the evidence relied upon in this appeal and each of Appellants’ contentions, we reverse the Examiner’s rejection of claims 3—9 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph (Rejection I) for the reasons set forth in the Appeal Brief and below, but affirm the Examiner’s rejections of claims 1—11 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (Rejections II and III) for the reasons set forth in the Final Office Action, the Answer, and below. Rejection I As set forth above, independent claim 3 recites “a calculation means for calculating the energy quantity from the electrical values.” The Examiner finds that Appellants’ Specification fails to disclose any structure corresponding to the “calculation means” recited in claim 3 that calculates energy quantity from a detected electrical value. Final Act. 5. However, as Appellants point out, their Specification discloses that electricity meters are known in the art to determine the amount of electrical energy consumed by a customer by detecting the phase current and voltage provided, and calculating the energy quantity in kilowatt-hours from the phase current and voltage. App. Br. 7 (citing Spec. 3, 6.) With respect to Appellants’ invention, Appellants’ Specification further describes “energy 3 Appeal 2016-007797 Application 13/326,019 quantity meter” 16, illustrated in Appellants’ Figure 2. Spec. 120, Fig. 2. Appellants’ Specification indicates that meter 16 includes first detector 31 that detects the phase voltage applied, and second detector 32 that detects the phase current flowing into meter 16. Spec. 125, Fig. 2. Appellants’ Specification further indicates that the energy quantity delivered over a certain period of time is calculated from the output signals of detectors 31, 32, and is displayed on the meter’s display device 33. Spec. 25, 27, Fig. 2. Accordingly, although the Specification does not explicitly state that the “energy quantity meter” is a “calculation means” that calculates energy quantity from the detected phase voltage and phase current, one of ordinary skill in the art reasonably would have understood from the disclosures discussed above that the meter performs this function. Accordingly, the Specification implicitly indicates that the meter is the “calculation means” recited in claim 3. Atmel Corp. v. Information Storage Devices, Inc., 198 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (Explaining that the disclosure of structure corresponding to a means-plus-fimction limitation may be implicit in the written description if it would have been clear to those skilled in the art what structure must perform the function recited in the means-plus-fimction limitation.) Therefore, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 3—9 under 35U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph. Rejection II Appellants argue claims 1—3 and 7—11 as a group on the basis of claim 1, to which we limit our discussion. App. Br. 9—14; 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv). 4 Appeal 2016-007797 Application 13/326,019 Dunlap discloses a method for charging the power system of an electrical vehicle using a metering device that downloads electrical energy from a power grid and transfers it to the power system. Dunlap 2, 4, 28, 39, 40. Dunlap discloses that the metering device measures and records the amount of electric current transferred from the power grid to the vehicle power system (detecting at least one electrical value required for the calculation of the energy quantity by an energy quantity meter), and transmits this information to a CPU. Dunlap 30, 39, 40; Fig. 3. Dunlap discloses that the CPU sends the information to a database that charges the user’s account based on the amount of electrical energy downloaded from the grid (outputting the calculated energy quantity to a device). Id. The Examiner finds that Dunlap thus “teaches monitoring current in order to determine energy quantity,” which Appellants do not dispute. Compare Ans. 5, with Reply Br. 8—9. The Examiner finds that Donlap does not disclose outputting the electrical value (current) required by the metering device to calculate energy quantity to a monitoring device, for operational monitoring of the charging station, and the Examiner relies on Chai for disclosing this feature. Final Act. 7. Chai discloses a charging station for electric-powered vehicles that comprises a current monitoring unit 40 and a processing unit. Chai col. 1, I. 45—col. 2,1. 2; col 2,1. 43; Fig. 1. Chai discloses that the current monitoring unit includes a plurality of current sampling sets 41 and a plurality of current converters 42. Chai col. 2,11. 43—45. Chai discloses that each of the sampling sets is connected to a charging socket 30. Chai col. 2, II. 45^16. 5 Appeal 2016-007797 Application 13/326,019 Chai discloses sampling (detecting) the current flowing through the charging sockets (electrical value) with the current sampling sets. Chai col. 1,11. 59-62; col. 2,11. 45^49. Chai discloses outputting the sampled (detected) current to the current convertors (monitoring device), which convert the sampled (detected) current to discrete current value output signals. Chai col. 2,11. 45—65. Chai discloses that the processing unit receives the output signals, and ensures that the total amount of current flowing to the charging sockets does not exceed a rated current value for the charging station. Chai col. 1,1. 63—col. 2,1. 2. The Examiner finds that Chai’s disclosure of outputting the sampled (detected) current to the current convertors (monitoring device) corresponds to outputting the electrical value to a monitoring device for the operational monitoring of the charging station. Ans. 4—5. The Examiner concludes: It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention to modify the invention of Dunlap with Chai to include monitoring and outputting the measured current flow for the purposes of maintaining a proper operating range of current flow for the charging station motivated by a desire to operate the charging station at optimal efficiency and improve economical usage. Final Act. 7. Appellants argue that the plurality of current monitoring units 40 disclosed in Chai generate discrete outputs that cannot be used to calculate energy quantity. App. Br. 9-10. Appellants further argue that Chai does not disclose or suggest circuitry that would allow a signal from the current monitoring units 40 to be output to a monitoring device. App. Br. 10; Reply Br. 8—9. Appellants contend that “the Examiner suggests tapping into the circuitry of the Chai system in order to intercept an intermediate current 6 Appeal 2016-007797 Application 13/326,019 sense signal used by the current converter 42 to calculate the output signals despite the fact that nothing in Chai teaches, suggests, or discloses the use of these intermediate signals in such a manner.” App. Br. 10. However, Appellants’ arguments are improperly based on Chai alone, and do not take into consideration what the combined disclosures of Dunlap and Chai would have suggested to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. In re Merck & Co., Inc., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“Non-obviousness cannot be established by attacking references individually where the rejection is based upon the teachings of a combination of references.”); In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981) (The test for obviousness “is what the combined teachings of the references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art.” (citations omitted)). Chai’s disclosure of current sampling sets 41 that sample (or detect) current flowing to charging sockets in a charging station (an electrical value) and output the detected current to current convertors 42, and Chai’s disclosure of a processing unit that uses signals received from the current converters to ensure that the total amount of current flowing to the charging sockets is within operating range for the charging station, reasonably corresponds to outputting an electrical value to a monitoring device for the operational monitoring of a charging station, as recited in claim 1. In view of this disclosure in Chai of outputting the current sampled (detected) by the current sampling sets 41 to current converters for operational monitoring, one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that the current measured by Dunlap’s metering device to determine the quantity of energy transferred to an electrical vehicle (electrical value) could also be used for 7 Appeal 2016-007797 Application 13/326,019 operational monitoring of the charging station. In re Preda, 401 F. 2d 825, 826 (CCPA 1968) (In assessing the content of the applied prior art, “it is proper to take into account not only specific teachings of the reference but also the inferences which one skilled in the art would reasonably be expected to draw therefrom.” (citation omitted)). One of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that appropriate adaptations could be made to Dunlap’s charging station, such as providing circuitry, to allow the current measured and recorded by the metering device (electrical value) to be output to a device to allow operational monitoring of the charging station, as disclosed in Chai. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007) (an obviousness analysis “need not seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for [an examiner] can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.”). To the extent that Appellants argue that one of ordinary skill in the art would not have had sufficient skill to make such modifications, Appellants’ arguments do not demonstrate that the modifications would have been beyond the level of ordinary skill in the art. Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v. Fisher- Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2007) {citing KSR, 550 U.S. at 418—19). Therefore, Appellants’ arguments are unpersuasive of reversible error in the Examiner’s rejection. Appellants further argue that the Examiner’s stated rationale for combining the relied-upon disclosures in Dunlap and Chai—operating the charging station at optimal efficiency and improving economical usage— was taken from Appellants’ disclosure. App. Br. 11—12. Appellants contend that “Chai never once mentions ‘efficiency’ nor does Chai discuss how an 8 Appeal 2016-007797 Application 13/326,019 ‘economical design’ is achieved or what is even meant by ‘economical.’” App. Br. 12. Appellants further assert that “[t]he Examiner also has not provided any guidance as to how avoiding overload would contribute to efficiency or provide an economical design.” App. Br. 12; Reply Br. 9—10. However, as the Examiner correctly finds, Chai explicitly discloses that the object of Chai’s invention “is to provide a charging station capable of automatic control of charging current that is supplied to a plurality of loads so as to result in an economical design while preventing the occurrence of an overload.” Ans. 5; Chai col. 1,11. 40-44; col. 4,11. 18—23. One of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that modifying Dunlap’s charging station as suggested by Chai to utilize the current measured and recorded by Dunlap’s metering device (electrical value) for operational monitoring of the charging station would provide efficiency and economy by preventing the occurrence of an overload in the charging station. Appellants’ arguments are accordingly unpersuasive of reversible error in the Examiner’s basis for combining the relied-upon disclosures in Dunlap and Chai. Appellants further argue that Chai discloses monitoring current in a charging station that charges multiple vehicles, while Dunlap discloses a charging station for a single vehicle. App. Br. 13. Appellants assert that “Dunlap’s [single vehicle] charging station would not invoke the same concerns discussed in Chai of overloading the charging station by charging multiple vehicles simultaneously.” Id. Appellants contend that one of ordinary skill in the art, therefore, would not have had a “reason to apply the teachings of Chai to Dunlap for the articulated reasoning of preventing current overload of the charging station.” Id. 9 Appeal 2016-007797 Application 13/326,019 In response to Appellants’ arguments, the Examiner finds in the Answer that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been led to modify Dunlap’s charging station to allow charging of multiple vehicles as disclosed in Chai because doing so would “be an improvement to the technology of Dunlap” by “allowing] for better servicing of vehicles while requiring fewer standalone stations.” Ans. 6. Appellants argue in their Reply Brief that the Examiner’s findings are based on unfounded assumptions and lack factual basis. Reply Br. 10—11. Appellants contend that the “Examiner has essentially made a subjective value judgment about the invention of Dunlap and Chai.” Reply Br. 10. However, Appellants do not direct us to any disclosure in Dunlap, or to any other persuasive evidence, establishing that “Dunlap’s [single vehicle] charging station would not invoke the same concerns discussed in Chai of overloading the charging station by charging multiple vehicles simultaneously.” Reply Br. 10-11. Moreover, in view of Dunlap’s recognition of the limited availability of charging stations for electric vehicles (13), one of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized the benefit of a charging station capable of charging multiple vehicles simultaneously. As the Examiner correctly finds, one of ordinary skill in the art also would have recognized that multiple-vehicle charging stations would necessitate fewer standalone stations. Ans. 6. Accordingly, one of ordinary skill in the art reasonably would have been led to modify Dunlap’s charging station to allow it to charge multiple vehicles, as disclosed in Chai, to realize the advantages of a multiple-vehicle charging station. 10 Appeal 2016-007797 Application 13/326,019 Therefore, Appellants’ arguments are unpersuasive of reversible error in the Examiner’s rejection claims 1—3 and 7—11 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), and we accordingly sustain this rejection. Rejection III To address this rejection, Appellants rely on the arguments made for Rejection II (discussed above), and argue that the additional reference applied in this rejection (Westbrock) fails to cure the deficiencies of Dunlap and Chai. App. Br. 14. Because we are unpersuaded of reversible error in Rejection II for the reasons discussed above, Appellants’ position as to this rejection is also without merit. DECISION We affirm the Examiner’s rejections of claims 1—11 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) and reverse the Examiner’s rejection of claims 3—9 under 35 U.S.C. §112, second paragraph. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). AFFIRMED 11 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation