Ex Parte Garner et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardSep 6, 201311255622 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 6, 2013) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________________ Ex parte GRANT K. GARNER and MASOUD K. ZAVAREHI1 ____________________ Appeal 2011-003169 Application 11/255,622 Technology Center 2600 ____________________ Before CAROLYN D. THOMAS, ELENI MANTIS MERCADER, and LARRY J. HUME, Administrative Patent Judges. HUME, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL This is a decision on appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the Final Rejection of claims 1-32, all pending claims in the application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM-IN-PART. 1 The Real Party in Interest is Hewlett-Packard Development Company, LP. (App. Br. 1.) Appeal 2011-003169 Application 11/255,622 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE2 The Invention Appellants’ invention relates to methods for luminance adjustment in display systems. Spec. ¶ [0001]. Exemplary Claims Claims 1, 21, 27, and 29, reproduced below, are exemplary claims representing various aspects of the invention: 1. A method comprising: adjusting a luminance value of a first pixel using the different reflectivities of adjacent screen regions. 21. The method of Claim 1 further comprising applying a low pass filter to different reflectivities of adjacent screen regions. 27. An apparatus comprising: a controller configured to adjust a luminance value of a first pixel using different reflectivities of adjacent screen regions. 29. A method comprising: providing screen regions with different reflectivities; and a step for blending display brightnesses of pixels proximate boundaries of adjacent regions. 2 Our decision refers to Appellants’ Appeal Brief (“App. Br.,” filed Apr. 23, 2010); Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed Sep. 23, 2010); Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed Jul. 23, 2010); Final Office Action (“FOA,” mailed Dec. 2, 2009); and the original Specification (“Spec.,” filed Oct. 21, 2005). Appeal 2011-003169 Application 11/255,622 3 Prior Art The Examiner relies upon the following prior art in rejecting the claims on appeal: Cruz-Uribe US 2004/0012849 A1 Jan. 22, 2004 (hereinafter “Cruz”) Bathiche US 2006/0289760 A1 Dec. 28, 2006 Rejections on Appeal 1. Claims 1-20 and 24-32 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as being anticipated by Cruz. Ans. 3. 2. Claims 21-23 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over the combination of Cruz and Bathiche. Ans. 7. ISSUES AND ANALYSIS 1. Anticipation Rejection of Claims 1-20, 24-26, and 31 Issue 1 Appellants argue (App. Br. 10-15; Reply Br. 2-5) that the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as being anticipated by Cruz is in error. These contentions present us with the following issue: Did the Examiner err in finding that Cruz discloses the step of “adjusting a luminance value of a first pixel using the different reflectivities of adjacent screen regions,” as recited in method claim 1? Appeal 2011-003169 Application 11/255,622 4 Analysis We agree with Appellants’ conclusions with respect to claim 1, and we disagree with (1) the findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner in the action from which this appeal is taken and (2) the reasons and rebuttals set forth by the Examiner in the Examiner’s Answer in response to Appellants’ arguments. We highlight and address specific findings and arguments regarding claim 1 for emphasis as follows. Appellants contend “Cruz-Uribe fails to disclose a method, computer- readable medium or controller that includes adjusting a LUMINANCE value of a first pixel using different reflectivities of adjacent screen regions. In contrast, Cruz-Uribe merely discloses a projection screen having individual elements 24 for which the reflectivity is adjusted.” App. Br. 10. The Examiner states that Cruz discloses “display controller 28 configured to alter the reflectivity of display surface 14 in coordination with the image displayed thereon, by selectively altering the reflectivity of individual display elements 22 to correspond with the content of the projected image incident upon that individual pixel element.” Ans. 9 (citing Cruz ¶¶ [0021], [0023], [0025], and [0026]). We agree that Cruz provides the above-cited disclosure as identified by the Examiner, but we disagree with the Examiner (Ans. 4 and 9-10) that this teaching anticipates the limitation in dispute, i.e., “adjusting a luminance value of a first pixel using the different reflectivities of adjacent screen regions.” Claim 1 (emphasis added). Although not dispositive to our Decision, we also agree with the Examiner (Ans. 10) that luminance and Appeal 2011-003169 Application 11/255,622 5 reflectivity, while not the same optical concept, are related concepts, particularly in the context of Appellants’ disclosed and claimed invention, as well as Cruz’s disclosure. Cruz ¶ [0021]. However, we have reviewed Cruz and find no disclosure, teaching, or suggestion related to using the different reflectivities of adjacent screen regions to adjust a luminance value of an individual (first) pixel. As cited by the Examiner (Ans. 10), Cruz also teaches that the reflectivity of a surrounding bias region may be fixed at time of manufacture or adjusted to one or more constant values (see Cruz ¶ [0019]). However, we find no disclosure in Cruz that this bias region or any adjacent screen region is used in any way to adjust a luminance value of an individual pixel. Accordingly, Appellants have provided sufficient evidence or argument to persuade us of reversible error in the Examiner’s characterization of the cited art and related claim construction. Therefore, we cannot sustain the Examiner’s anticipation rejection of independent claim 1. For essentially the same reasons as discussed above with respect to independent claim 1, we reverse the Examiner's rejection of independent claim 25, which recites the disputed limitation in commensurate form. For the same reasons, we also reverse the rejections of claims 2-20, 24, 26, and 31 that variously depend therefrom. Appeal 2011-003169 Application 11/255,622 6 2. Anticipation Rejection of Claims 29, 30, and 32 Issue 2 Appellants argue (App. Br. 18; Reply Br. 7-8) that the Examiner’s rejection of claim 29 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as being anticipated by Cruz is in error. These contentions present us with the following issue: Did the Examiner err in finding that Cruz discloses the step of “blending display brightnesses of pixels proximate boundaries of adjacent regions,” as recited in method claim 29? Analysis We agree with Appellants’ conclusions with respect to claim 29, and we disagree with the findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner in the action from which this appeal is taken. We highlight and address specific findings and arguments regarding claim 29 for emphasis as follows. Appellants contend, Cruz-Uribe fails to disclose a method in which display brightness is a [sic] pixels are blended adjacent boundaries of adjacent screen regions . . . Cruz-Uribe merely discloses adjusting the reflectivity of screen regions, not display brightness is [sic] a pixels . . . [and] Cruz-Uribe fails to disclose anything about ‘blending’ such display brightnesses. App. Br. 18. In the Answer, the Examiner does not specifically respond to Appellants’ specific contentions regarding claim 29, but instead merely Appeal 2011-003169 Application 11/255,622 7 states that claims 29, 30, and 32 are rejected on the same basis as claim 25. Ans. 4. We find that the Examiner has not met his burden in establishing a prima facie case for anticipation. Not only has the Examiner failed to respond to Appellants’ specific contentions regarding claim 29, the Examiner ignores the fact that independent claim 29 recites different subject matter than independent claim 25, i.e., claim 29 recites, inter alia, “blending display brightnesses of pixels proximate boundaries of adjacent regions.” We find no disclosure, teaching, or suggestion in Cruz of blending display brightnesses of pixels in adjacent regions, as recited by claim 29. Accordingly, Appellants have provided sufficient evidence or argument to persuade us of reversible error in the Examiner’s characterization of the cited art and related claim construction. Therefore, we cannot sustain the Examiner’s anticipation rejection of independent claim 29. For the same reasons, we also reverse the rejections of claims 30 and 32 that depend from claim 29. Appeal 2011-003169 Application 11/255,622 8 3. Anticipation Rejection of Claims 27-28 Issue 3 Appellants argue3 (App. Br. 10-11; Reply Br. 2-4) that the Examiner’s rejection of claim 27 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as being anticipated by Cruz is in error. These contentions present us with the following issue: Did the Examiner err in finding that Cruz discloses the limitation of “a controller configured to adjust a luminance value of a first pixel using different reflectivities of adjacent screen regions,” as recited in claim 27? Analysis We disagree with Appellants’ conclusions with respect to claim 27, and we agree with and adopt as our own (1) the findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner in the action from which this appeal is taken and (2) the reasons and rebuttals set forth by the Examiner in the Examiner’s Answer in response to Appellants’ arguments. However, we highlight and address specific findings and arguments regarding claim 27 for emphasis as follows. Appellants contend “Cruz-Uribe fails to disclose a . . . controller that includes adjusting a LUMINANCE value of a first pixel using different reflectivities of adjacent screen regions. In contrast, Cruz-Uribe merely discloses a projection screen having individual elements 24 for which the reflectivity is adjusted.” App. Br. 10. 3 Appellants’ arguments against the rejection of independent claim 27 is grouped in a general argument concerning the patentability of independent claims 1, 25, and 27. Appeal 2011-003169 Application 11/255,622 9 The Examiner finds that Cruz discloses a controller configured to adjust a luminance value of a first pixel. Ans. 4 (citing Cruz ¶¶ [0018], [0021], [0024]; and Fig. 3, element 28). We first note that the first and only limitation of claim 27 recites “a controller configured to adjust a luminance value of a first pixel using different reflectivities of adjacent screen regions.” The claim does not positively recite that the controller adjusts the luminance value of a first pixel. Rather, the claim calls for only a controller configured to (i.e., capable of) making such adjustments to a pixel’s luminance value, such that we do not give any patentable weight to this limitation of claim 27. This limitation in dispute in independent claim 27 merely expresses an intended use of the recited “controller.” Under a broad but reasonable interpretation of claim 27, we conclude that the disputed limitation of “adjust[ing] a luminance value of a first pixel using different reflectivities of adjacent screen regions” is not positively recited as actually occurring, given that the claim merely requires that the “controller is configured to adjust a luminance value of a first pixel . . . .” Although “[s]uch statements often . . . appear in the claim’s preamble,” In re Stencel, 828 F.2d 751, 754 (Fed. Cir. 1987), a statement of intended use or purpose can appear elsewhere in a claim. Id. “An intended use or purpose usually will not limit the scope of the claim because such statements usually do no more than define a context in which the invention operates.” Boehringer Ingelheim Vetmedica, Inc. v. Schering-Plough Corp., 320 F.3d 1339, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Furthermore, in the context of anticipation of a claimed apparatus, our reviewing court has held that the absence of disclosure relating to function Appeal 2011-003169 Application 11/255,622 10 does not defeat a finding of anticipation if all the claimed structural limitations are found in the reference. In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473, 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1997). In this case, claim 27 merely recites the structure as being “a controller,” and the cited art clearly discloses a controller. See Cruz Fig. 3, display controller 28, and ¶ [0023]. Accordingly, Appellants have not provided sufficient evidence or argument to persuade us of any reversible error in the Examiner’s characterization of the cited art and related claim construction. Therefore, we sustain the Examiner’s anticipation rejection of independent claim 27. As Appellants have not provided separate arguments with respect to dependent claim 28, we similarly sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 28 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). 4. Unpatentability Rejection of Claim 21-23 In addition to depending from claim 1 for which the anticipation rejection was reversed, we provide the following additional analysis with respect to the unpatentability rejection of claim 21: Issue 4 Appellants argue (App. Br. 19; Reply Br. 8-9) that the Examiner’s rejection of claim 21 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over the combination of Cruz and Bathiche is in error. These contentions present us with the following issue: Appeal 2011-003169 Application 11/255,622 11 Did the Examiner err in finding that the combination of Cruz and Bathiche teaches or suggests the limitation of “applying a low pass filter to different reflectivities of adjacent screen regions,” as recited in claim 21? Analysis Appellants contend “[n]either Cruz-Uribe nor Bathiche, alone or in combination, disclose applying a low pass filter to different reflectivities of adjacent screen regions.” App. Br. 19. Appellants further contend, Bathiche says nothing about applying a low pass filter to different reflectivities of adjacent screen regions. In contrast, Paragraph [0056] a [sic] Bathiche merely discloses the use of a bandpass mirror 382 which is used as a low pass filter that includes red light. The only thing that Paragraph [0056] of Bathiche has in common with the actual claim limitations is the words “low pass filter”. App. Br. 19 (citing Bathiche ¶ [0056]). In response, the Examiner asserts, Paragraph [0056] of Bathiche shows that the low pass filter is configured to pass certain wavebands of visible light. It would be obvious to one of an ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made to put Bathiche low pass filter to every screen regions of Cruz’s projection screen. This response is valuable for claims 22 and 23 of Appellant’s arguments . . . . Ans. 11 (citing Bathiche ¶ [0056]). We agree with Appellants’ contentions, as discussed below. Bathiche is directed to a system for selectively redirecting and/or filtering spectral components of a light source used to generate images in which the same light source and lensing device can be used both to project images on the Appeal 2011-003169 Application 11/255,622 12 display surface, and to evenly distribute IR light to detect potential user inputs. Bathiche ¶ [0006]. We agree with Appellants, since bandpass mirror 382 is used to pass certain wavebands of light, while redirecting other wavebands of light. Even when bandpass mirror 382 is configured as a low pass filter which passes red light (id.), Bathiche does not teach or suggest “applying a low pass filter to different reflectivities of adjacent screen regions.” Instead, Bathiche teaches applying the output of bandpass mirror 382 to first spatial light modulator 388a, and then to collimator 390 to produce a modulated visible light 392. Modulated visible light 392 passes through a hot mirror 395 to reach a lensing device 397. Lensing device 397 focuses modulated visible light 392 to project a focused visible light 398 on display surface 64a. Bathiche ¶ [0057]. Accordingly, Appellants have provided sufficient evidence or argument to persuade us of reversible error in the Examiner’s characterization of the cited art and related claim construction. Since claim 21 depends from claim 1, for which the anticipation rejection has been reversed, as well as the above-cited alternative reasoning, we cannot sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of dependent claim 21. For essentially the same reasons argued by Appellants (App. Br. 20-21), as well as their dependence on claim 1, we reverse the Examiner's rejection of dependent claims 22 and 23, which variously recite applying a low pass filter to a number of pixels, in a similar fashion as recited in dependent claim 21. Appeal 2011-003169 Application 11/255,622 13 CONCLUSIONS (1) The Examiner erred with respect to the anticipation rejection of claims 1-20, 24-26, and 29-32 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), and the rejection is not sustained. (2) The Examiner did not err with respect to the anticipation rejection of claims 27-28 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), and the rejection is sustained. (3) The Examiner erred with respect to the unpatentability rejection of claims 21-23 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), and the rejection is not sustained. DECISION The decision of the Examiner to reject claims 27 and 28 is affirmed, and the decision of the Examiner to reject claims 1-26 and 29-32 is reversed. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv) (2011). AFFIRMED-IN-PART msc Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation