Ex Parte Garay et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardFeb 11, 201410976353 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 11, 2014) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 10/976,353 10/27/2004 Juan A. Garay Garay 12-4 7711 46303 7590 02/12/2014 RYAN, MASON & LEWIS, LLP 1175 Post Road East 2nd Floor Westport, CT 06880 EXAMINER TRAN, TONGOC ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2434 MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE 02/12/2014 PAPER Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________________ Ex parte JUAN A. GARAY and LORENZ FRANCIS HUELSBERGEN ____________________ Appeal 2011-007350 Application 10/976,353 Technology Center 2400 ____________________ Before JOSEPH F. RUGGIERO, JOHNNY A. KUMAR, and DANIEL N. FISHMAN, Administrative Patent Judges. KUMAR, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appeal 2011-007350 Application 10/976,353 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a non-final rejection of claims 1, 3, 5-14, 16-19, 21-24, and 26-31. Claims 2, 4, 15, 20, and 25 have been cancelled. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. According to Appellants, the invention relates to a method and apparatus for evaluating the security of a client. See Abstract. Claims 1 and 21 are illustrative: 1. A method for evaluating the security of at least one client, comprising: providing at least one executable program to be executed by said client, wherein said at least one executable program is one of a plurality of possible programs and wherein said at least one executable program provides an unpredictable result; receiving a result from said at least one executable program; and determining whether said client has been corrupted based on an evaluation of said result, wherein said at least one executable program is randomly generated and wherein said evaluation of said result includes evaluating an elapsed time between when said at least one executable program is provided to said client and when said result is received. 21. A method for generating a target program, comprising: obtaining a first program; and combining said first program with a randomly generated program to generate said target program, wherein said target program inherits one or more properties of said first program and wherein said target program provides an unpredictable result. Appeal 2011-007350 Application 10/976,353 3 Rejections Claim 21 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to non-statutory subject matter. Ans. 4. 1 Claims 21 and 28 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as being anticipated by Johnson (US 2004/0139340 A1; July 15, 2004). Ans. 4. Claims 1, 3, 5-14, 16-19, 21-24, and 26-31 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Yodaiken (US 2004/0123137 A1; June 24, 2004) in view of Johnson. Ans. 5. Claims 12 and 17 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Yodaiken in view of Johnson and further in view of Chow (US 2005/0021966 A1; Jan. 27, 2005 (filed June 10, 2002)). Ans. 9. ANALYSIS We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellants’ arguments that the Examiner has erred. We disagree with Appellants’ conclusions. Rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as anticipated by Johnson.2 Appellants contend that Johnson does not disclose “provides an unpredictable result,” as recited in claims 21 and 28. App. Br. 6-8. The Examiner finds that in Johnson, the “concatenating random transforms or prepending or appending random ciphers to a program” would produce an 1 We pro forma affirm the § 101 rejection of claim 21, which was not contested by Appellants. 2 As pointed out by Appellants (App. Br. 6-7), and admitted by the Examiner (Ans. 10), we find that the failure to correctly label the prior art Johnson reference in the Non-Final Rejection (page 3) was an inadvertent and harmless error. Appeal 2011-007350 Application 10/976,353 4 unpredictable result. Ans. 10-12. In particular, Appellants recite the claim element, state the Examiner’s findings, and then allege that various sections of Johnson do not disclose it. App. Br. 6-8. However, Appellants do not respond to the Examiner’s findings, and we find Appellants have failed to traverse the specific factual findings the Examiner has set forth in the rejection for claims 21 and 28. See Ans. 4-5. In response to the Examiner’s findings, Appellants merely restate the Examiner’s findings and disagree (e.g., Reply Br. 2) without any explanation. In other words, Appellants’ arguments amount to no more than reciting the claim features and generally alleging that Johnson is deficient. Merely pointing out certain claim features recited in independent claims 21 and 28 and nakedly asserting that Johnson fails to disclose such features does not amount to a separate patentability argument. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii) (“A statement which merely points out what a claim recites will not be considered an argument for separate patentability of the claim.”); see also In re Lovin, 652 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[W]e hold that the Board reasonably interpreted Rule 41.37 to require more substantive arguments in an appeal brief than a mere recitation of the claim elements and a naked assertion that the corresponding elements were not found in the prior art.”); cf. In re Baxter Travenol Labs., 952 F.2d 388, 391 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“It is not the function of this court to examine the claims in greater detail than argued by an appellant, looking for [patentable] distinctions over the prior art.”). On this record, we find Appellants have failed to present substantive arguments and supporting evidence persuasive of Examiner error regarding the aforementioned disputed limitation in claims 21 and 28. Appeal 2011-007350 Application 10/976,353 5 Rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). We begin our analysis by again observing that Appellants respond to the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 3, 5-14, 16-19, 21-24, and 26-31 by merely reciting the language in the claims and asserting that the claimed limitations are not disclosed in any of the cited art. See App. Br. 8-13; Reply Br. 3-9. In addition, we find Appellants have failed to traverse the specific factual findings the Examiner has set forth in the rejection of claims 1, 3, 5-14, 16-19, 21-24, and 26-31. See Ans. 5-9, 13-19. Also, our reviewing Court has reaffirmed that the procedural burden of establishing a prima facie case of obviousness is met, in accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 132, by stating reasons for a rejection together with information and references as may be useful to the applicant in judging the propriety of continuing prosecution. See In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2011). This the Examiner has done, over the course of many pages in the Examiner’s Answer. See Ans. 5-9, 13-19. The Court in Jung also spoke approvingly of the Board’s longstanding practice of requiring the appellant to identify the alleged error in the examiner’s rejection, with the panel then reviewing the rejection for error based upon the issues identified by the appellant, and in light of the arguments and evidence produced thereon. Jung, 637 F.3d at 1365-66 (citing Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072 (BPAI 2010) (precedential)). Accordingly, we will sustain the Examiner’s § 103 rejections of claims 1, 3, 5-14, 16-19, 21-24, and 26-31 for the reasons discussed supra with respect to the rejection of claims 21 and 28. It follows that Appellants have failed to establish the Examiner erred in concluding that the combination of Johnson, Yodaiken, and Chow renders Appeal 2011-007350 Application 10/976,353 6 claims 1, 3, 5-14, 16-19, 21-24, and 26-31 unpatentable, as Appellants have failed to rebut the Examiner’s specific factual findings. CONCLUSION The rejection of claim 21 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to non-statutory subject matter is affirmed. The rejection of claims 21 and 28 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as being anticipated by Johnson is affirmed. The rejection of claims 1, 3, 5-14, 16-19, 21-24, and 26-31 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Yodaiken in view of Johnson is affirmed. The rejection of claims 12 and 17 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Yodaiken in view of Johnson and further in view of Chow is affirmed. DECISION The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 3, 5-14, 16-19, 21-24, and 26- 31 is affirmed. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED bab Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation