Ex Parte Gannon et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardSep 23, 201612649728 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 23, 2016) Copy Citation UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR 12/649,728 12/30/2009 Mark A. Gannon 22917 7590 09/27/2016 MOTOROLA SOLUTIONS, INC. IP Law Docketing 500 W. Monroe 43rd Floor Chicago, IL 60661 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www .uspto.gov ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. CML07507 6066 EXAMINER MADAMBA, GLENFORD J ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2451 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 09/27/2016 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address( es): USAdocketing@motorolasolutions.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte MARK A. GANNON, JOSHUA B. HURWITZ, JOHN RICHARD KANE, DAVID W. KRAVITZ, and DOUGLAS A.KUHLMAN Appeal2015-003496 Application 12/649,728 Technology Center 2400 Before: JOSEPH L. DIXON, LINZY T. McCARTNEY, and JOHN P. PINKERTON, Administrative Patent Judges. DIXON, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appeal2015-003496 Application 12/649,728 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellants 1 appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a rejection of claims 1-21. This application is related to appeal 2015-007306 (serial number 12/649,748). We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. The claims are directed to a client-based binding of identifiers across information domains while maintaining confidentiality. Claim 1, reproduced below, is representative of the claimed subject matter: 1. In a multi-domain environment wherein an entity has a first presence identifier in a first domain and a second presence identifier in a second domain, the first domain distinct from the second domain and the first presence identifier of the entity being distinct from the second presence identifier of the entity, a method for a binder server to bind together the first and second presence identifiers, the method comprising: at the binder server including a processor for running a binding process hosted by a hardware component for: receiving, by the binding process from the entity, observable behavior information that associates the first presence identifier of the entity in the first domain with the second presence identifier of the entity in the second domain; creating, by the binding process, a cross-domain identifier that logically binds together the first and second presence identifiers of the entity in the first and second domains respectively without identifying the entity, the cross-domain identifier providing access to some information associated with the first presence identifier of the entity in the first domain, the 1 Appellants indicate that Motorola, Solutions Inc. is the real party in interest. (App. Br. 3). 2 Appeal2015-003496 Application 12/649,728 cross-domain identifier providing access to some information associated with the second presence identifier of the entity in the second domain, the cross-domain identifier not providing access to information associated with the first presence identifier of the entity in the first domain or with the second presence identifier of the entity in the second domain pertaining to an identity of the entity; and providing, by the binding process, the cross-domain identifier to a process distinct from the binding process. REFERENCES The prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on appeal is: Gross Butler et al. Peeters et al. Stefik Izrailevsky et al. Wilson et al. Blinn et al. Zhang et al. US 2005/0246391 Al US 2006/0265495 Al US 2008/0313035 Al US 2009/0069911 Al US 7,606,897 B2 US 2009/0293018 Al US 2010/0042735 Al US 2010/0198911 Al REJECTIONS The Examiner made the following rejections: Nov. 3, 2005 Nov. 23, 2006 Dec. 18, 2008 Mar. 12, 2009 Oct. 20, 2009 Nov. 26, 2009 Feb. 18,2010 Aug. 5, 2010 Claims 1, 4---6, 15 and 18-21 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Izrailevsky in view of Zhang and in further view of Butler. Claims 2, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 16 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Izrailevsky in view of Zhang and in further view of Butler and Stefik. 3 Appeal2015-003496 Application 12/649,728 Claim 3 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Izrailevsky in view of Zhang and in further view of Butler and Wilson. Claims 7 and 8 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Izrailevsky in view of Zhang and in further view of Butler and Peeters. Claim 14 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Izrailevsky in view of Zhang and in further view of Butler and Blinn. Claim 17 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Izrailevsky in view of Zhang and in further view of Butler and Gross. ANALYSIS With regard to independent claims 1 and 21, Appellants argue the claims together. (App. Br. 6). Consequently, we select independent claim 1 as the representative claim for the group and will address Appellants' arguments thereto. In this decision, we have considered only those arguments actually made by Appellants. Arguments which Appellants could have made, but did not make in the Brief have not been considered and are deemed to be waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv). With respect to representative independent claim 1, Appellants contend that the Examiner's reliance upon the Butler reference and the 4 Appeal2015-003496 Application 12/649,728 Examiner's findings are in error. (App. Br. 6-10). Appellants specifically contend: [I]t is clear that Butler shares the unique visitor identifier across cooperating domains. The unique visitor identifier essentially contains information pertaining to an identity of the visitor. Therefore, in Butler, the information pertaining to an identity of the visitor is shared across cooperating domains. (App. Br. 7). Appellants further contend: Next, the Office Action, on page 6, section "Response to Amendments and Remarks", states that 'first party cookie' (FPC) and 'third party cookie' (TPC) are user 'presence identifiers' that are unique and distinct from each other. Applicant respectfully disagrees with the Office Action. Butler, in paragraph [0061], states that "the first party ID stored in the visitor computer 14 and the third party ID stored at the tracking server 1 7 are the same." Next, Butler, in paragraph [0063], also states that "the visitor this time visits the Brand B web site for the first time ... no first party cookie (FPC) is detected . . . a (shared) third party cookie is detected ... where the FPC ID is set to the preexisting TPC ID ... " Thus, it can clearly be seen that the FPC for Brand A or FPC for Brand Bis the same as the TPC (i.e. FPC (Brand A)=TPC and TPC=FPC (Brand B)). Hence, the 'first party cookie' (FPC) and 'third party cookie' (TPC) are not unique and distinct from each other. (App. Br. 7). Appellants also generally respond to the Examiner's rejection. Appellants argue: Butler, in paragraphs [0003]-[0007], [0021-0028], and [0041-0052], describes a method for creating a unique identifier (FPC) to be placed on the visitor's computer and sent to the third party tracking service (TPC). This unique identifier is a replica identifier for both the Brand A site and the Brand B site (as FPC (Brand A)=TPC and TPC=FPC (Brand B)). As such, Butler merely teaches one entity presence identifier the replica identifier 5 Appeal2015-003496 Application 12/649,728 for both the Brand A site and the Brand B site. Butler does not teach the binding of the first and second presence identifiers of the entity itself. Therefore, Butler merely has one identifier of the entity in different services/domains and tracks the behavior of an entity in different services/ domains using a unique identifier. Also, in Butler, since the FPC for the client device in the second web site is set as the stored TPC i.e. TPC=FPC, therefore, the contents and the information associated with the TPC is also set or given into the FPC for the client device in the second web site. Hence, all the information and specifically information pertaining to an identity of the entity are given or passed from the first web site or first domain to the TPC (as FPC for the first web site=TPC) and then from the TPC to the second web site or the second domain (as TPC=FPC for the second web site). Further, Butler first determines a cross-domain unique identifier and then tracks the behavioral information of an entity. In detail, Butler describes that when a client visits a first web site for the first time, a FPC (first party cookie) and a TPC (third party cookie) are created and stored wherein the value of the first party cookie and the third party cookie is the same i.e. FPC=TPC. Now, when the same client device visits a second web site (associated with the first web site) then, no first party cookie is detected for the client device in the second web site, but a third party cookie is detected. So, the FPC of the client device in the second web site is set to the preexisting TPC. Hence, for the second web site, to track cross domain activities associated with a particular client device, the TPC or cross domain unique identifier or shared third-party Cookie containing information pertaining to the identity of the client device is present even before the client device visits the second web site. As such, Butler teaches that a unique visitor identifier is fundamental for tracking web site statistics, and that cookies in general (1st party or 3rd party) contain personal identifiable information. Transitioning 'transitioning from a 3rd Party- I st Party cookie' technique resolves the issue of 3rd party cookies being deleted, but this does not resolve the privacy issues addressed by Applicant's invention which specifically provides "without 6 Appeal2015-003496 Application 12/649,728 identifying the entity" as claimed in independent claims 1 and 21. (App. Br. 7-8). Appellants subsequently identify the importance of privacy protection as discussed in paragraphs 7, 45, 49, 51 of Appellants' Specification, but Appellants do not identify any distinguishing features of the claimed invention from the disclosure in the Butler reference. Appellants generally contend: Further, Applicant describes an entity which has different identities in 2 different domains, and Applicant describes a way to bind the identities for that entity (user). Butler has 2 separate services which have different identities, and Butler teaches the binding of the identities of these services onto one (see Paras [0049-0064]). (App. Br. 9). Again, we note that Appellants' arguments generally repeat the language of independent claim 1 and emphasize the claim limitation "without identifying the entity." (App. Br. 6, 8, 9). Appellants' mere repetition of the claim language without further discussion or explanation does not show error in the Examiner's factual findings and conclusion of obviousness of claim 1. The Examiner responds to each of Appellants' arguments with a detailed response and explanation of the prior art and the claim interpretation. We agree with the Examiner's findings and conclusion of obviousness and adopt them as our own. (Ans. 29-37). Moreover, the Examiner additionally buttresses the reliance upon the Butler reference regarding the first and third party cookies with citations to the public cookie of the Zhang reference. (Final Act. 7-9 and Ans. 37-39). 7 Appeal2015-003496 Application 12/649,728 We agree with the Examiner that the Zhang reference discloses "public cookies," such as "cross-domain cookies" for enabling the tracking activities of a user in an entire network using such public cookies. (Ans. 7). We find no response to the Examiner's additional reliance upon the Zhang reference in the Appeal Brief and Appellants did not file a Reply Brief to respond to the Examiner's reliance thereon in the Examiner's Answer. As a result, Appellants do not show error in the Examiner's factual findings and conclusion of obviousness of representative independent claim 1. Thus, it is our view that Appellants have made a general allegation in the Brief that the above-mentioned claims define a patentable invention without specifically pointing out how the language of the claims patentably distinguishes over the cited references. Merely reciting the language of the claim is insufficient. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(iv) ("A statement which merely points out what a claim recites will not be considered an argument for separate patentability of the claim."). Merely alleging that the references fail to support an obviousness rejection or that the claim is novel over the cited reference is insufficient to persuade us of Examiner error. Attorney arguments and conclusory statements that are unsupported by factual evidence are entitled to little probative value. In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also In re De Blauwe, 736 F.2d 699, 705 (Fed. Cir. 1984); and Ex parte Belinne, No. 2009-004693, slip op. at 7-8 (BPAI Aug. 10, 2009) (informative), available at http://www. uspto. gov /web/ offices/ dcom/bpai/its/fd09004693. pdf . The Examiner provides in-depth discussion of the Butler reference as it teaches and suggests unique identifiers for the first party cookies (FPC) 8 Appeal2015-003496 Application 12/649,728 and the third party cookies (TPC). Moreover the Examiner identifies how Butler teaches and suggests the use of these cookies as it applies to a first Brand A and a first Brand B. We find Appellants' general response is insufficient to show error in the Examiner's findings and conclusion of obviousness of claim 1 and independent claim 21, which is not separately argued. With respect to dependent claims 4---6, 15, and 18-20, Appellants rely upon the arguments advanced with respect to claim 1, and Appellants do not set forth separate substantive arguments for patentability. As a result, these claims fall with claim 1, and we sustain the rejection of dependent claims 4-- 6, 15, and 18-20. With respect to claims 2, 3, 7, 8, 9-14, 16, and 17, Appellants rely on the arguments advanced with respect to claim 1. (App. Br. 10-12). As a result, these claims fall with claim 1. CONCLUSION The Examiner did not err in rejecting independent claim 1 based upon obviousness. DECISION For the above reasons, we sustain the Examiner's rejections of claims 1-21. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv). AFFIRMED 9 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation