Ex Parte Gale et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Nov 30, 2016

12893000 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 30, 2016)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
12/893,000 09/29/2010 Allan Roy Gale 83161456 3289
28395 7590 12/02/2016
RROOKS KTTSHMAN P C /FfTET EXAMINER
1000 TOWN CENTER KIM, KYUNG J
22ND FLOOR
SOUTHFIELD, MI 48075-1238 ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3665
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/02/2016 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing @brookskushman.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte ALLAN ROY GALE, PAUL THEODORE MOMCILOVICH,
and MICHAEL W. DEGNER
Appeal 2015-001613
Application 12/893,000
Technology Center 3600
Before KENNETH G. SCHOPFER, BRADLEY B. BAYAT, and
MATTHEW S. MEYERS, Administrative Patent Judges.
BAYAT, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL1
STATEMENT OF CASE
Appellants2 appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
final rejection of claims 1—15. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
STATEMENT OF THE DECISION
We REVERSE.
1 Our decision references Appellants’ Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.,” filed June
10, 2014) and Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed Dec. 1, 2014), the Examiner’s
Answer (“Ans.,” mailed Sept. 29, 2014), and the Final Office Action (“Final
Action,” mailed Jan. 10, 2014).
2 Appellants identify the real party in interest as “Ford Global Technologies,
LLC” (Appeal Br. 2).
Appeal 2015-001613
Application 12/893,000
INVENTION
The invention is directed to a “system and method for controlling
chassis coupling current” (Spec. 1, Title). Claims 1, 6, and 11 are the
independent claims on appeal. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of
the subject matter on appeal (Appeal Br., Claims App. 1).
1. An automotive vehicle comprising:
a battery charger configured to receive electrical energy, via
an electrical connection including a ground wire, from an
electrical source remote from the vehicle and to output the
electrical energy to at least one electrical load; and
at least one controller configured to command a change in
the electrical energy output by the battery charger, wherein the
battery charger is further configured to, in response to the
command, control a rate of change in the electrical energy
output such that a coupling current to the ground wire resulting
from the change in the electrical energy output by the battery
charger has a magnitude less than a predetermined threshold.
REJECTIONS
1. Claims 1, 4—6, 9-11, 14, and 15 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Cavanaugh (US 2012/0032634 Al, pub.
Feb. 9, 2012).
2. Claims 2, 3, 7, 8, 12, and 13 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Cavanaugh and Godbole (US
2009/0160368 Al, pub. June 25, 2009).
ANALYSIS
In rejecting independent claim 1, the Examiner acknowledges that
Cavanaugh fails to disclose “wherein the battery charger (20) is further
configured to control a rate of change in the electrical energy output such
that a coupling current to the ground wire resulting from the change in the
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Appeal 2015-001613
Application 12/893,000
electrical energy output by the battery charger has a magnitude less than a
predetermined threshold” (Final Act. 3). To cure this deficiency, the
Examiner determines:
It is well known that [a] ground-fault circuit interrupter[]
is “a fast-acting circuit breaker designed to shut off electric
power in the event of a ground-fault” and that it interrupts the
current when the current amount leaving differs from the amount
returning by approximately 5 mA
(http[s]://www.osha.gov/SLTC/etools/construction/electrical_in
cidents/gfci.html). Cavanaugh discloses a vehicle battery
recharging system that is plugged into an outlet to draw
electricity to charge the vehicle battery (para. [0002]). It is
inherent that the system is designed to work on regular basis
without tripping the ground-fault circuit interrupters in the wall,
or else the invention would be not usable. It would have been
obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of
invention to design a recharging system that does not trip the
ground-fault circuit interrupters but rather regulates the
magnitude of the current to be less than the tripping threshold so
that the batteries may be charged quickly and without
interruption so as to make the vehicle drivable when needed.
(Final Act. 3—4.) According to the Examiner,
“[gjround fault circuit interrupters are designed to trip when the
difference between the current going to and returning from the
equipment is approximately 5 milliamperes. This means that the
equipment must send back a current that is less than 5
milliamperes. The coupling current is the current that is sent
back, and it must be less than 5 milliamperes different from the
current sent from the wall outlet in order not to trip the ground
fault circuit interrupters.”
(Id. at 11 (citation omitted).)
Appellants contend that the Examiner has not established a prima
facie case of obviousness because the rejection of claim 1 is based on mere
speculation (Appeal Br. 3). In particular, Appellants argue:
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Appeal 2015-001613
Application 12/893,000
A coupling current is a current flowing on a conductor (e.g., the
ground wire) that is not one of the intended sending and return
conductors. See, Application, p. 4, 11. 1-7 (“Current may then
flow from the chassis 11, through the ground wire and to the GFI
22. According to (1), this chassis coupling current may exceed
the 5 inA trip setting on the GFI 22 if the change in voltage per
unit time on the electrical connections between the battery
charger 12 and loads 14,16 is large enough.”). In an ideal design,
the coupling current would be zero milliamperes at all times.
Note that this is in stark contrast to the examiner’s incorrect
assertion that the coupling current “must be less than 5
milliamperes different from the current sent from the wall outlet
in order not to trip the ground fault circuit interrupters,” Office
Action, January 10, p. 11, (emphasis added).
(Id. at 4—5.)
In the Answer, the Examiner states that “[t]he inherency is that in
these interrupters, the system is designed to work at a level that is lower than
the triggering threshold, since exceeding such threshold would trigger the
interrupters and stop the flow of electricity” (Ans. 2). And
[sjince this teaching of designing circuits below certain
thresholds are well known to one of ordinary skill in the art, it
would have been obvious to apply such teaching to the teachings
of the prior arts to design an electrical system that operates at a
certain level of power below a threshold.
(Id. at 3.)
In reply, Appellants argue
that the claims are not merely drawn to an electrical system that
operates at a certain level of power below a threshold. . . .
Cavanaugh’s battery charger plus knowledge of GFCIs and fuses
equals just that: a battery charger plus a GFCI or fuse.
[According to Appellants, t]his does not suggest, for example,
the limitations directed to the at least one controller^]
as recited in the claim (Reply Br. 2).
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Appeal 2015-001613
Application 12/893,000
We are persuaded by Appellants’ arguments.
A rejection based on § 103 clearly must rest on a factual basis. The
Examiner has the initial duty of supplying the factual basis for the rejection
and may not resort to speculation, unfounded assumptions or hindsight
reconstruction to supply deficiencies in its factual basis. We have reviewed
the cited link describing GFCI, and we see no disclosure of modifying a
controller as recited in the claim. In other words, the Examiner has not
sufficiently shown why the knowledge of one skilled in the art of ground-
fault interrupters can reasonably be interpreted to modify Cavanaugh’s
system to arrive at the claimed invention, as required by claim 1.
Accordingly, we do not sustain the rejection of independent claim 1 as
obvious over Cavanaugh. For the same reasons, we do not sustain the
rejections of claims 2—5 dependent thereon. Cf. In re Fritch, 972 F.2d 1260,
1266 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“dependent claims are nonobvious if the independent
claims from which they depend are nonobvious”). Independent claims 6 and
11 recite similar limitations and the Examiner’s rejection of claims 6 and 11
as obvious over Cavanaugh rely on the same findings as in claim 1. Thus,
for the same reasons, we do not sustain the rejections of independent claims
6 and 11, including claims 7—10 and 12—15, dependent thereon.
DECISION
The Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1—15 is reversed.
REVERSED
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