Ex Parte Fusz

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Aug 29, 2018

12900260 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 29, 2018)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
12/900,260 10/07/2010 Eugene A. Fusz
76656 7590 08/31/2018
Patent Docket Department
Armstrong Teasdale LLP
7700 Forsyth Boulevard
Suite 1800
St. Louis, MO 63105
UNITED ST A TES OF AMERICA
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
29022-16 7440
EXAMINER
AIRAPETIAN, MILA
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3625
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
08/31/2018 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
USpatents@armstrongteasdale.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte EUGENE A. FUSZ
Appeal2017-005759
Application 12/900,260 1
Technology Center 3600
Before CARLA M. KRIVAK, HUNG H. BUI, and JON M. JURGOV AN,
Administrative Patent Judges.
JURGOV AN, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a Final
Rejection of claims 1-21, which are all the claims pending in the
application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm. 2
1 Appellant identifies ConsumerCartel, LLC, as the real party in interest.
(App. Br. 1.)
2 Our Decision refers to the Specification ("Spec.") filed October 7, 2010,
the Final Office Action ("Final Act.") mailed November 20, 2015, the
Appeal Brief ("App. Br.") filed April 19, 2016, the Supplemental Appeal
Brief ("Supp. App. Br.") filed August 22, 2016 submitting a corrected
"Claims Appendix," the Examiner's Answer ("Ans.") mailed December 20,
2016, and the Reply Brief ("Reply Br.") filed February 1 7, 2017.
Appeal2017-005759
Application 12/900,260
CLAIMED INVENTION
The claims are directed to "an online purchasing system for use by a
plurality of buyers" and a method of operating the online purchasing system
to "execute a multi-input search algorithm," "determine a sales price for [a]
product, wherein the sales price is a lowest price available from at least one
online search tool and [a] buyer-observed [product] price" input by one of
the buyers, and "transmit[] the sales price to a client system for display to
one of the plurality of buyers." (Abstract.)
Claims 1, 10, 16, and 21 are independent. Claim 1, reproduced below,
is illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A method of operating an online purchasing system for
use by a plurality of buyers, the purchasing system including a
data verification server computing system, the data verification
server computing system coupled to a client computing system
via a data communication network, the method comprising:
receiving, by the data verification server computing
system through the data communication network, an electronic
product information data signal including product information
from the client computing system including a buyer-observed
price of a product and an Internet location associated with the
buyer-observed price that are input by one of the plurality of
buyers, wherein the buyer-observed price is a price observed on
the Internet at the Internet location by the one of the plurality of
buyers;
verifying, by the data verification server computing
system, that the buyer-observed price is offered at the Internet
location by accessing and searching data encoding a web page
located at the Internet location for the buyer-observed price;
executing, by the data verification server computing
system, a multi-input search algorithm and determining a sales
price for the product, wherein the sales price is a lowest price
available from at least one online search tool and the buyer-
observed price;
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Application 12/900,260
transmitting, by the data verification server computing
system, the sales price to the client computing system for display
to one of the plurality of buyers; and
transmitting, by the data verification server computing
system, encrypted payment information to a secure payment
server computing system for purchasing the product on behalf of
at least one of the plurality of buyers.
(Supp. App. Br. 1 (Claims App'x).)
REJECTION
Claims 1-21 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to non-
statutory subject matter. (Final Act. 4--5.)
ANALYSIS
Patent eligibility is a question of law that is reviewable de nova.
Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
Patentable subject matter is defined by 35 U.S.C. § 101 as follows:
[ w ]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new
and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor,
subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
In interpreting this statute, the Supreme Court emphasizes that patent
protection should not preempt "the basic tools of scientific and technological
work." Gottschalkv. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972); Mayo Collaborative
Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 71 (2012); Alice Corp. Pty.
Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int'!, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014). The rationale is that
patents directed to basic building blocks of technology would not "promote
the progress of science" under the U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 8,
Clause 8, but, rather, would impede it. Accordingly, laws of nature, natural
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phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patent-eligible subject matter. Thales
Visionix Inc. v. US., 850 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Alice, 134
S. Ct. at 2354).
The Supreme Court set forth a two-part test for subject matter
eligibility in Alice. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355. The first step is to determine
whether the claim is directed to a patent-ineligible concept. Alice, 134 S. Ct.
at 2355 ( citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 76-77). If so, then the eligibility analysis
proceeds to the second step of the Alice/ Mayo test, in which we "examine
the elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an 'inventive
concept' sufficient to 'transform' the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application." Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2357 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at
72, 79). The "inventive concept" may be embodied in one or more of the
individual claim limitations or in the ordered combination of the limitations.
Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355. The "inventive concept" must be significantly
more than the abstract idea itself, and cannot be simply an instruction to
implement or apply the abstract idea on a computer. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at
2358. "'[W]ell-understood, routine, [and] conventional activit[ies]'
previously known to the industry" are insufficient to transform an abstract
idea into patent-eligible subject matter. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2359 (citing
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 73).
Alice/Mayo-Step 1 (Abstract Idea)
Turning to the first part of the Alice/ Mayo analysis, the Examiner
determines claims 1-21 are directed to a "shopping process" of "determining
a price for a product and purchasing the product [which] is an abstract idea
because it can be performed manually or in a computer and is similar to the
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fundamental economic activity at issue in Alice Corp. and Bilski." (Final
Act. 4--5; see also Final Act. 2; Ans. 5---6.)
Appellant contends the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1-21
because the claims are not directed to an abstract idea, and the Examiner
overgeneralized the claims and ignored claim limitations. (Reply Br. 2, 4;
App. Br. 7 (discussing claim 1).) We are not persuaded by Appellant's
arguments.
As the Examiner correctly finds, claim 1 is abstract because it is
directed to a shopping process of "performing a multi-input search to
determine the lowest price for a particular product" and purchasing the
product, which designates a fundamental economic practice of pricing,
selling, and managing transactions between entities. (Ans. 5-7 ( citing
Versata Dev. Group v. SAP America, Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1312-13, 1333
(Fed. Cir. 2015) ( system and method for determining a price of a product
offered to a purchasing organization, by storing pricing information
associated with hierarchy of organizational and product groups, retrieving
and sorting applicable pricing information, and determining the product
price using the sorted pricing information, were "directed to the abstract idea
of determining a price, using organizational and product group hierarchies,
in the same way that the claims in Alice were directed to the abstract idea of
intermediated settlement, and the claims in Bilski were directed to the
abstract idea of risk hedging")); see also OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com,
Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1361-62 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (methods of pricing a product
for sale comprising testing a plurality of prices, gathering statistics about
how customers reacted to offers testing the prices, using that data to estimate
outcomes, and automatically selecting and offering a new price based on the
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estimated outcome, were "directed to the concept of offer-based price
optimization," which is "similar to other 'fundamental economic concepts'
found to be abstract ideas by the Supreme Court and this court").)
Additionally, we agree with the Examiner the steps recited in claim 1
can be performed manually, e.g., between individual sellers and
buyers/buyers' agents checking product information to determine lower
product prices. (Final Act. 2, 4.) For example, stock trading on NYSE's
(New York Stock Exchange) trading floor, and securities trading by
individual investors (buyers) using broker services, determine lower
securities' prices offered by the sellers of securities. Claim 1 's "verifying"
and "executing" steps could also be performed by a person (e.g., a buyer's
agent) seeking to determine the lowest advertised price for a product at local
stores. As the Federal Circuit has concluded, "a process defined simply as
using a computer to perform a series of mental steps that people, aware of
each step, can and regularly do perform in their heads" is considered an
abstract idea. SmartGene, Inc. v. Advanced Biological Laboratories, SA,
555 F. App'x 950, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (citing CyberSource Corp. v. Retail
Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ("Such a method that
can be performed by human thought alone is merely an abstract idea and is
not patent-eligible under§ 101")). That is, mental processes can be
unpatentable even when automated to reduce the burden on the user of what
once could have been done with pen and paper. See CyberSource, 654 F .3d
at 1375 ("That purely mental processes can be unpatentable, even when
performed by a computer, was precisely the holding of the Supreme Court in
Gottschalk v. Benson.").
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Appellant further argues the present claims, like the claims of DDR
and Enfzsh, "are not directed to an abstract idea, but rather are directed to a
specific implementation of a solution" rooted in computer technology,
solving "an existing problem that is created by the Internet"-"the problem
of existing systems being unable to handle protecting buyers from price
discrimination." (Reply Br. 3 (citing Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822
F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016)); App. Br. 9-10 (citing DDR Holdings, LLC v.
Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2014)).) Appellant
submits this problem is particular to electronic e-commerce, and "does not
exist in the 'brick and mortar' context." (App. Br. 9.) Appellant asserts
"this problem is especially acute in the electronic ecommerce realm with
sellers using dynamic pricing to offer the same product at two different
prices for two different buyers" based on the buyers' information exposed
through Internet cookies. (App. Br. 8.) Appellant also argues the claimed
hardware unconventionally purchases a product on behalf of a buyer through
encrypted payment, similar to DDR's e-commerce hardware. (App. Br. 9.)
We remain unpersuaded, as Appellant has not demonstrated their
claims recite a specific improvement to the way computers operate, and
Appellant does not present evidence to establish the claims recite a specific
improvement to the computing systems. (Ans. 6-7; see Enfzsh, 822 F.3d at
1336, 1339.) Appellant also has not demonstrated their claims "improve the
way a computer stores and retrieves data in memory," as did the claims in
Enfzsh via a "self-referential table for a computer database." See Enfish, 822
F.3d at 1336, 1339. The only features of claim 1, for example, which could
be considered technological are the claimed computing systems, the
"accessing and searching data encoding a web page located at the Internet
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location for the buyer-observed price," and the "transmitting, by the data
verification server computing system, encrypted payment information to a
secure payment server computing system." (See Supp. App. Br. 1 (Claims
App'x).) These features, however, are recited in such a general, generic, and
functional manner that the claim fails to capture, with particularity, aspects
of the invention that make it possible for these claim elements to provide a
solution to the "price discrimination" problem. (See App. Br. 9--10.) For
example, claim 1 's transmission of encrypted payment information merely
recites generic technology for payment encryption, without reciting a
technological improvement to the transmission or encryption of payments.
Claim 1 's "accessing and searching data encoding a web page located at the
Internet location for the buyer-observed price" merely describes routine
Internet activity for fact checking information (a price). See Ultramercial,
Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715-16 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ("[a]dding routine
additional steps such as updating an activity log, requiring a request from the
consumer to view the ad, restrictions on public access, and use of the
Internet does not transform an otherwise abstract idea into patent-eligible
subject matter.") Appellant's claims also do not recite an unconventional
configuration of the claimed communication network.
Thus, Appellant has not demonstrated the claimed computing systems
and communication network, in combination, are able to perform functions
that are not merely generic, as were the claims in DDR. See DDR, 773 F .3d
at 1256-58 (holding the claims at issue patent eligible because "they do not
broadly and generically claim 'use of the Internet' to perform an abstract
business practice (with insignificant added activity," and "specify how
interactions with the Internet are manipulated to yield a desired result-a
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result that overrides the routine and conventional sequence of events
ordinarily triggered by the click of a hyperlink"). Appellant's asserted
claims are analogous to claims found ineligible in Ultramercial, and distinct
from claims found eligible in DDR. (Final Act. 3; Ans. 6-7.)
Additionally, Appellant's claims focus on the problem of searching
and finding lower prices-a problem that is not a technical problem or one
rooted in computer technology or particular only to the Internet. (See Spec.
,r,r 1-2, 5, 12; Ans. 7.) Finding lower product prices by comparing prices
from multiple sellers is a fundamental business practice, long prevalent in
our system of commerce before the advent of the Internet. See Versata, 793
F.3d at 1333-34 (determining a price using hierarchies is a building block
and abstract idea). Pricing, selling, and buying, like hedging in Bilski, are
"abstract ideas" beyond the scope of§ 101. See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2356;
Bilski v. Kappas, 561 U.S. 593 (2010).
Appellant also argues "the present claims effect an improvement in
the technical field of price discrimination" by "using hundreds of 'buyer-
observed prices' of a product from the Internet and automatically verifying
each price at the corresponding Internet location," and "perform[ing] a
multi-input search algorithm to ensure that a sales price is the lowest price
for a particular product." (App. Br. 9.) However, Appellant's arguments are
not persuasive and are not commensurate with the scope of the claims. For
example, independent claim 1 ( and similarly, independent claim 16) merely
requires verifying one buyer-observed product price and determining the
lowest price between that buyer-observed price and a price from one online
search tool. Independent claims 10 and 21 additionally require the "lowest
price" to be the lower price among two ("a plurality of') online search tools
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and a buyer-observed price, and to be "at least partially based on bulk
purchasing by the plurality of buyers." (Supp. App. Br. 3, 7-8 (Claims
App'x).) However, the claimed "at least partially based on bulk purchasing
by the plurality of buyers" does not require the claimed "lowest price" to be
"the lowest [product] price offered on the Internet" or the lowest price from
"hundreds of 'buyer-observed prices,"' as Appellant advocates. (See App.
Br. 9-10.)
We also find Appellant's reliance on McRO unavailing. (Reply Br. 4--
5 (citing McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games America Inc., 837 F.3d 1299
(Fed. Cir. 2016)).) Particularly, Appellant argues claims 1, 9, and 17, like
the claims of McRO, "focus on a specific means or method that improves the
relevant technology" and recite a "process [that] uses a combined order of
specific rules that renders information into a specific format that is then used
and applied to create desired results." (Reply Br. 4.)
We are unpersuaded because Appellant's claim 1 does not recite a
technological improvement. Neither does claim 9 (reciting "tracking
shipment of the product to the buyer via the data communication network")
nor claim 17 (reciting the data verification server computing system
"determine[ s] the sales price by comparing the lowest price from each of the
online search tools and the buyer-observed price"). (Supp. App. Br. 3, 6
(Claims App'x).) In contrast, McRO's claims and Specification employ
"rules that define output morph weight set stream as a function of phoneme
sequence and time of said phoneme sequence" to "achieve an improved
technological result." See McRO, 837 F.3d at 1310, 1316. McRO's
improved technological result is "allowing computers to produce 'accurate
and realistic lip synchronization and facial expressions in animated
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characters' that previously could only be produced by human animators."
See McRO, 837 F.3d at 1313. The claims in McRO were drawn to
improvements in the operation of a computer at a task, rather than applying a
computing system to perform generic data manipulation and transmission
steps for pricing and selling products, as Appellant's claims 1, 9, and 17
recite. See McRO, 837 F.3d at 1314.
Further, with respect to Appellant's preemption argument (Reply Br.
4), we note the McRO court also explicitly "recognized that 'the absence of
complete preemption does not demonstrate patent eligibility."' See McRO,
837 F.3d at 1315 (quoting Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788
F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015)); see also OIP Techs., 788 F.3d at 1362---63
("[T]hat the claims do not preempt all price optimization or may be limited
to price optimization in the e-commerce setting do not make them any less
abstract."), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 701 (2015).
Appellant also argues the Examiner's rejection "offers absolutely no
evidence that the claims are directed to the alleged 'abstract idea"' and
"provides no findings of fact to substantiate the assertion that the claims are
directed to an abstract idea or that the alleged abstract idea is one that has
been upheld by the courts." (App. Br. 6-7 (citing Ex parte Renald Poisson,
Appeal No. 2012-011084, p. 5 (PTAB 2015) (where the Board held that
absent supporting evidence in the record, the Examiner's opinion is an
inadequate finding of fact on which to base the Alice analysis)); Reply Br.
2.)
Appellant's arguments are not persuasive. First, patent eligibility
under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is a question of law that is reviewable de nova. See
Dealertrack, 674 F.3d at 1333. We are aware of no controlling authority that
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requires the Office to provide factual evidence under step one of the Alice
framework to support a determination that a claim is directed to an abstract
idea. Nor, contrary to Appellant's suggestion (App. Br. 6), did this Board
hold in Ex parte Poisson that there is any such requirement. Instead, the
Federal Circuit has repeatedly noted that "the prima facie case is merely a
procedural device that enables an appropriate shift of the burden of
production." Hyatt v. Dudas, 492 F.3d 1365, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing In
re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992)). The court has held that
the USPTO carries its procedural burden of establishing a prima facie case
when its rejection satisfies the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 132 by notifying
the applicant of the reasons for rejection, "together with such information
and references as may be useful in judging of the propriety of continuing the
prosecution of [the] application." In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1362 (Fed. Cir.
2011 ). Thus, all that is required of the Office is that it set forth the statutory
basis of the rejection in a sufficiently articulate and informative manner as to
meet the notice requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 132. Id., see also Chester v.
Miller, 906 F.2d 1574, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (Section 132 "is violated when
[t]he rejection is so uninformative that it prevents the applicant from
recognizing and seeking to counter the grounds for rejection.").
Second, there is no single definition of an "abstract idea." As the
Federal Circuit succinctly put it:
The problem with articulating a single, universal definition of
"abstract idea" is that it is difficult to fashion a workable
definition to be applied to as-yet-unknown cases with as-yet-
unknown inventions.
Amdocs (Israel) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288, 1294 (Fed.
Cir. 2016). Because there is no single definition of an abstract idea, the
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Federal Circuit has required us "to examine earlier cases in which a similar
or parallel descriptive nature can be seen-what prior cases were about, and
which way they were decided." Amdocs, 841 F.3d at 1288 (citing Elec.
Power Grp., v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353-54 (Fed. Cir. 2016);
accord USPTO Memorandum, July 2015 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility
(July 30, 2015), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ieg-
july-2015-update.pdf (instructing Examiners that "a claimed concept is not
identified as an abstract idea unless it is similar to at least one concept that
the courts have identified as an abstract idea").
In this case, the Examiner did what was required under the USPTO
Memorandum, and characterized the claims as required under Alice.
Particularly, the Examiner has provided reasoning and evidence supporting a
prima facie case that Appellant's claims are directed to a fundamental
economic practice, long prevalent in our system of commerce and
performable by humans manually (e.g., using pen and paper). (Ans. 5---6;
Final Act. 2, 4--5.) The Examiner, for support, also cites to Versata, Alice,
and Bilski. (Ans. 5-7; Final Act. 4.)
Accordingly, we agree with the Examiner independent claims 1, 10,
16, and 21, and dependent claims 9 and 17 are directed to an abstract idea.
Alice/Mayo-Step 2 (Inventive Concept)
Appellant alleges the present claims provide "an inventive concept ...
found in the non-conventional and non-generic arrangement of known,
conventional pieces." (Reply Br. 3--4 (citing Bascom Global Internet
Services, Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1350 (Fed. Cir.
2016)).) Appellant argues the present claims, like the claims of DDR,
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include devices specifically configured to implement a solution to a problem
in the software arts. (App. Br. 9--10; see also Reply Br. 3.)
Appellant's arguments are not persuasive. As the Examiner shows,
the claims use generic computer equipment ( server computing systems,
processor, data communication network, secure payment server, and
memory) performing routine computer functions for manipulating data.
(Final Act. 3, 5; Ans. 7.) Using computers to receive, search, verify, and
transmit data ( e.g., price values) over a network are routine computing
functions. (Final Act. 3 ( citing US PTO Memorandum, July 2015
Update: Subject Matter Eligibility, § IV, 7).) Appellant has not
demonstrated the asserted claims provide: (i) "a specific improvement to the
way computers operate" as explained in Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1336; (ii) a
"solution ... necessarily rooted in computer technology in order to
overcome a problem specifically arising in the realm of computer networks"
as in DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1257; (iii) an "unconventional
technological solution ... to a technological problem" that "improve[ s] the
performance of the system itself," as explained in Amdocs, 841 F .3d at 1300,
1302; or (iv) "a technology-based solution ... to filter content on the
Internet that overcomes existing problems with other Internet filtering
systems" and "improve[ s] an existing technological process" as explained in
Bascom, 827 F.3d at 1351.
Appellant's claims do not cover a technology-based solution that
improves an existing technological process; rather, Appellant's claims,
viewed as a whole, recite the concept of pricing and selling as performed by
a generic computer. (Ans. 6-7; Final Act. 3, 5.) See Dealertrack, 674 F.3d
at 1333-34 ("Simply adding a 'computer aided' limitation to a claim
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covering an abstract concept, without more, is insufficient to render [a]
claim patent eligible.") ( citation omitted); Bancorp Services, L.L. C. v. Sun
Life Assurance Co. of Canada (US.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
("[T]he fact that the required calculations could be performed more
efficiently via a computer does not materially alter the patent eligibility of
the claimed subject matter.").
Appellant also alleges the claims recite unconventional, non-routine
features not found in the art, and the Examiner "provides no findings of fact
to substantiate the assertion that the 'entire system and method is not
deemed to improve another technology or the computer itself, nor does it
operate with anything other than a general purpose computer."' (Reply Br.
3--4 (citing Ans. 5); see also App. Br. 7-8.) Appellant's argument is not
persuasive because the Examiner has cited paragraph 41 of Appellant's
Specification, which discloses generic computer equipment is used for the
claimed steps. (See Final Act. 3 ( citing Spec. ,r 41 ).) Particularly, paragraph
41 of Appellant's Specification provides that "embodiments of the invention
are operational with numerous other general purpose or special purpose
computing system environments or configurations" and
the online purchasing environment should not be interpreted as
having any dependency or requirement relating to any one or
combination of components illustrated in the exemplary
operating environment. Examples of well known online
purchasing environments and/ or configurations that may be
suitable for use with aspects of the invention include, but are not
limited to, personal computers, server computers, hand-held or
laptop devices, multiprocessor systems, microprocessor-based
systems, set top boxes, programmable consumer electronics,
mobile telephones, network PCs, minicomputers, mainframe
computers, distributed computing environments that include any
of the above systems or devices, and the like.
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Spec. ,r 41. This and other sections in Appellant's Specification do not state
how anything other than generic devices are used to perform the claimed
abstract steps of pricing and selling. (Final Act. 3.) Additionally, Appellant
presents no evidence as to how or why the claim limitations are
unconventional, other than to state they are. (Reply Br. 3--4; App. Br. 8-9.)
Because Appellant's claims 1, 9, 10, 16, 17, and 21 are directed to a
patent-ineligible abstract concept and do not recite something "significantly
more" under the second prong of the Alice analysis, we sustain the
Examiner's rejection of these claims under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
No separate arguments are presented for dependent claims 2-8, 11-
15, and 18-20, which fall with one of claims 1, 10, and 16.
37 C.F.R. § 4I.37(c)(l)(iv). We, therefore, sustain the rejection under
35 U.S.C. § 101 of claims 2-8, 11-15, and 18-20.
DECISION
The Examiner's rejection of claims 1-21 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is
affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv).
AFFIRMED
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