Ex Parte Fullington et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Feb 26, 2013

10730430 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 26, 2013)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte DAVID G. FULLINGTON, RAYMOND G. SLADKY,
DANIEL L. STEWART, MICHAEL L. GASPERI, and SCOTT P. MILES
____________

Appeal 2010-000318
Application 10/730,430
Technology Center 2800
____________

Before JOHN A. JEFFERY, BARBARA A. BENOIT,
and JAMES B. ARPIN, Administrative Patent Judges.

JEFFERY, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
rejection of claims 1, 3, 4, 6-8, 10-15, and 24. Claims 2, 9, 18-23, and 25
have been cancelled; and claims 5, 16, and 17 are withdrawn from
consideration. See App. Br. 4, 16-20.1 We have jurisdiction under 35
U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm-in-part.

1 Throughout this opinion, we refer to (1) the Appeal Brief filed June 4,
2009 (“App. Br.”); (2) the Examiner’s Answer mailed April 16, 2009
(“Ans.”); and (3) the Reply Brief filed June 16, 2009 (“Reply Br.”).
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants’ invention disables power delivered to high power loads,
such as motors, and has redundant mechanisms for shutting down an
associated low power logic section, including a safety relay circuit. See
generally Abstract; Spec. ¶¶ 0001, 0024-25; Fig. 1. Claim 1 is illustrative
with disputed limitations emphasized:
1. A drive circuit for delivering high-level power to an AC motor, the
drive circuit comprising:
a high power circuit including a set of semiconductor switching
devices capable of being coupled to the motor and delivering the high level
power thereto;
a logic circuit generating signals to control the semiconductor
switching devices;
a low power circuit to transmit the signal from the logic circuit to the
high power circuit only when the low power circuit is receiving electrical
power; and
a safety relay having a contact connected to a power terminal of the
low power circuit to control the application of power to the low power
circuit, wherein the safety relay is electrically isolated from the logic circuit.

THE REJECTIONS
1. The Examiner rejected claims 1, 3, 7, 8,2 11, 15, and 24 under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Schwesig (US 6,573,681 B2; June 3,
2003) and DeDecker (US 5,904,666; May 18, 1999). Ans. 3-6.
2. The Examiner rejected claims 4, 6, 13, and 14 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as unpatentable over Schwesig, DeDecker, and Rowlette (US
5,806,440; Sept. 15, 1998). Ans. 6-7.

2 Although the Examiner includes cancelled claim 9 in this rejection (Ans.
3), we nonetheless deem the Examiner’s error harmless and omit that claim
here for clarity.
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3. The Examiner rejected claim 10 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Schwesig, DeDecker, and Sato (US 6,775,115 B2; Aug.
10, 2004; filed Dec. 13, 2002). Ans. 7-8.
4. The Examiner rejected claim 12 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Schwesig, DeDecker, and Wilson (US 5,764,024; June 9,
1998). Ans. 8-9.

THE OBVIOUSNESS REJECTION OVER SCHWESIG AND DEDECKER
Regarding representative claim 1, the Examiner finds that Schwesig’s
drive circuit includes a “safety relay” (switches S1, S2) connected to a
power terminal of a “low power circuit,” which is said to correspond to drive
control “A” excluding the switches, systems I1, I2, and drive unit “ST,” the
latter of which the Examiner equates to the recited “logic circuit.” Ans. 3-4,
9-11. Although the Examiner acknowledges that Schwesig is silent
regarding this “safety circuit” being “electrically independent” of the logic
circuit, the Examiner cites DeDecker as teaching this feature in concluding
that the claim would have been obvious. Ans. 4.
Appellants argue that the cited prior art does not disclose a “safety
relay” as that term is understood in the art, namely, an electromechanical
relay with force-guided contacts permitting detection of contact weld faults.
App. Br. 10-11; Reply Br. 3-6. Appellants add that not only does the prior
art fail to teach electrically isolating a safety relay from the logic circuit as
claimed, but that the Examiner does not provide a factual foundation to
modify Schwesig with DeDecker’s teachings, as proposed. App. Br. 10-11;
Reply Br. 6-8. Appellants also argue various other recited limitations
summarized below.
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ISSUES
I. Under § 103, has the Examiner erred by finding that Schwesig and
DeDecker collectively would have taught or suggested a drive circuit
comprising:
(1) a safety relay electrically isolated from a logic circuit generating
signals to control semiconductor switching devices, as recited in claim 1?
(2) the safety relay connected to an override port of the low power
circuit, where the safety relay disables the low power circuit by providing a
first signal to the override port, as recited in claim 7?
(3) a set of ports exposed by the drive allowing connection of the
safety relay electrically independent of the logic circuit to the drive, as
recited in claim 24?
II. Is the Examiner’s combination of the teachings of Schwesig and
DeDecker supported by articulated reasoning with some rational
underpinning to justify the Examiner’s obviousness conclusion?

ANALYSIS
Claims 1, 3, 11, and 15
This appeal turns on a threshold question: What is a “safety relay”?
According to the Examiner, Schwesig’s switches S1 and S2 correspond to
the recited “safety relay” in view of their supply-voltage interrupting
functions under fault conditions. Ans. 3-4, 9. Appellants, however, dispute
this finding, arguing that these switches are not a “safety relay” as that term
is understood in the art, namely an electromechanical relay with force-
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guided contacts permitting detection of contact weld faults. App. Br. 10-11;
Reply Br. 3-6.
On this record, we find no error in the Examiner’s interpretation.
First, Appellants’ cited reference describing safety relay terminology (Reply
Br. 5) was published in 2004 which is after Appellants’ filing date of
December 8, 2003. This disparity weakens the reference’s probative value
since it does not necessarily reflect the term’s plain meaning at the time of
the invention. To be sure, references cited to show universal facts need not
be available as prior art before Appellants’ filing date, such as characteristics
and properties of materials or scientific truisms. MPEP § 2124. This
exception, however, does not apply where, as here, Appellants cite a
reference after the filing date to evidence a particular meaning of “safety
relay.”
We recognize that extrinsic evidence can inform our construction of
terms as they are normally understood in the art. See Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
415 F.3d 1303, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“We have especially noted the help
that technical dictionaries may provide to a court to better understand the
underlying technology and the way in which one of skill in the art might use
the claim terms.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). But even
if the cited evidence was publicly available at the time of the present
invention (which it is not), it would still be insufficient to limit our
interpretation, for the Specification is still the single best guide to
interpreting claim terms. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1320. Here, despite
Appellants’ contentions (Reply Br. 3-5), we find no express definition of the
term “safety relay” in the Specification that so limits the term. See CCS
Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
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(claim terms are properly construed to include limitations not otherwise
inherent in the term when the Specification “clearly set[s] forth a definition
of the disputed claim term.”).
To be sure, Appellants’ safety relay circuit 110 includes (1) normally-
open and normally-closed contacts that are physically coupled, such that
only one or the other can be closed at any time, and (2) an associated “safety
on monitor” that determines whether faults have occurred. Spec. ¶¶ 0024-
25; Fig. 1. Although Appellants’ Paragraph 0025 notes that the normally-
closed contact can become welded, that description hardly precludes the
Examiner’s broader interpretation of the term. That Schwesig’s switches S1
and S2 can be mechanical or electronic and are controlled via signals IL1
and IL2, as the Examiner indicates (Ans. 8-9 (citing Schwesig, col. 4, ll. 10-
22)), at least suggests some sort of electro-mechanical switch, such as a
relay, could be used. Accord Ans. 12 (finding that switches S1, S2 can
include a hardware switch with contacts and a relay coil).3 Appellants’
arguments regarding Schwesig’s failure to disclose a safety relay (App. Br.
10-11; Reply Br. 3-6) are simply not commensurate with the scope of the
claim.
Nor are we persuaded of error in the Examiner’s position that the cited
prior art at least suggests electrically isolating Schwesig’s “safety relay” (S1,
S2) from the identified “logic circuit,” namely, drive unit “ST” according to
the Examiner’s mapping. Ans. 10-11. First, to the extent that Appellants’
arguments are based on Schwesig’s systems I1 and I2 corresponding to the

3 Although this finding was made in connection with dependent claim 8, it is
nonetheless applicable here to clarify the Examiner’s findings regarding the
recited safety relay.
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recited “logic circuit” (App. Br. 11), these arguments are not commensurate
with the Examiner’s position which maps the drive unit “ST”—not the
systems—to the recited logic unit, as the Examiner indicates. Ans. 10. In
any event, claim 1 does not specify the particulars of the recited electrical
isolation, let alone associated isolating structure, as noted by the Examiner.
Ans. 11. A partial detail view of Schwesig’s circuit in Figure 1 showing
switches S1 and S2 and drive unit ST is reproduced below.

Partial detail view of Schwesig’s Figure 1
showing switches S1 and S2 and drive unit ST

As shown above, system I1 includes a controller and communicates
with switch S1 via signal IL1 to control that switch to interrupt supply
voltage SV1. See Schwesig, col. 3, ll. 60-63; col. 4, ll. 10-17. Similarly,
system I2 communicates with switch S2 via signal IL2 to control that switch
to interrupt supply voltage SV2. See Schwesig, col. 4, ll. 17-22. Schwesig’s
drive unit “ST,” however, is used to calculate transistor drive signals TAS1
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to TAS6. Schwesig, col. 3, ll. 63-64. Notably, the drive unit’s transistor
driving function is different than the systems’ switch driving functions.
Although the drive unit can be a subsystem of system I1, as Appellants
contend (Reply Br. 7; Schwesig, col. 3, ll. 64-65), that does not necessarily
mean that it would not have been obvious to electrically isolate the drive unit
from the switches S1 and S2 using, among other things, conventional
isolating magnetically- or optically-coupled components, such as those
indicated by Appellants (e.g., transformers, inductors, opto-isolators, etc.).
See Reply Br. 6. Nor have Appellants shown that drive unit “ST” is not
electrically isolated from switch S2—a “safety relay” under the Examiner’s
mapping, whose control signal IL2 is not connected to system I1, but rather
system I2 which lacks the drive unit.
In short, Appellants’ arguments regarding switch S1 (Reply Br. 7) are
not only unpersuasive for the reasons noted above, but do not address the
Examiner’s additional reliance on switch S2. In any event, Schwesig’s drive
unit need not be a part of system S1, but rather can be a separate unit, as the
Examiner indicates. Ans. 10; Schwesig, col. 3, ll. 64-66. This fact only
bolsters the Examiner’s position that the prior art suggests electrically
isolating this unit from switches S1 and S2. Despite the Examiner’s
somewhat inartful characterization regarding the “electrical independence”
of the logic circuit and safety relay (Ans. 4)—a term that is not recited in
claim 1, but rather in claim 244—the weight of the evidence on this record
nonetheless favors the Examiner’s position.

4 Although Appellants allege that the “[t]he present claims do not use the
language ‘electrical dependency’ which presumably means there is a causal
rather than electrical connection” (Reply Br. 7 (emphases added)), claim 24
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Lastly, while DeDecker is technically cumulative to Schwesig for the
reasons noted above, we nonetheless find no error in the Examiner’s reliance
on DeDecker merely to show that providing redundant protection to remove
power from a load via a switched circuit is well known in the art, and that
providing such redundant switching would have been an obvious
enhancement to Schwesig. Ans. 6-7 (citing DeDecker, col. 10, ll. 54-55).
Although this power removal is implemented via a secondary timer circuit,
skilled artisans would nonetheless recognize that this teaching at least
suggests providing an independent backup switching circuit isolated from a
logic circuit to remove power should the primary switch fail. The
Examiner’s proposed enhancement merely uses prior art elements according
to their established functions—an obvious improvement. See KSR Int’l Co.
v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007). Accordingly, the Examiner’s
combining the teachings of Schwesig and DeDecker is supported by
articulated reasoning with sufficient rational underpinning to justify the
Examiner’s obviousness conclusion.

in fact recites that a set of ports “allow[s] connection of a safety relay
electrically independent of the logic circuit . . . ” (emphasis added).
Therefore, to the extent that the meaning of electrical independence in claim
24 is made unclear by Appellants presuming a causal, rather than electrical
connection, as suggested by their arguments in connection with claim 1, this
apparent ambiguity may raise patentability questions regarding claim 24
under § 112. See, e.g., Ex parte Miyazaki, 89 USPQ2d 1207, 1211 (BPAI
2008) (precedential) (“[I]f a claim is amenable to two or more plausible
claim constructions, the USPTO is justified in requiring the applicant to
more precisely define the metes and bounds of the claimed invention by
holding the claim unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, as
indefinite.”). We leave these questions to the Examiner should further
prosecution follow this opinion.
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We are, therefore, not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting
representative claim 1, and claims 3, 11, and 15 not separately argued with
particularity.

Claims 7, 8, and 10
We do not, however, sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 7
reciting that the safety relay is connected to an override port of the low
power circuit, where the safety relay disables the low power circuit by
providing a first signal to the override port. The Examiner’s position is
based on coupling Schwesig’s safety relay S1, S2 to the connection port or
terminal to which read-back signals “SV1_Diag” and “SV2_Diag” are
connected. Ans. 4, 11-12. Although Schwesig does not explicitly use the
terms “port” or “terminal” in this context, Schwesig nonetheless shows a
node denoted by a black dot at supply voltage SV1 that connects the output
of switch S1 to the diode in the feedback path to send the read-back signal
“SV1_Diag” to system I1 via this diode. See Schwesig, col. 4, ll. 23-31; Fig.
1. Schwesig shows a similar node at the output of switch S2. See id. These
nodes are shown as dots in the partial detail views of Schwesig’s Figure 1
below:
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Partial detail view of Schwesig’s Figure 1 showing node (dot) at supply
voltage SV1 connecting switch and diode

Partial detail view of Schwesig’s Figure 1 showing node (dot) at supply
voltage SV2 connecting switch and diode

Even assuming, without deciding, that the electrical connections at
these nodes are bonded together, we nonetheless see no reason why some
sort of connection port or terminal could not be provided at these nodes, as
the Examiner suggests (see Ans. 11-12) if, for no other reason, than to
provide a convenient point of access to the node. Thus, we find providing a
port at these nodes an obvious variation, even under Appellants’ definition
of the term “port.” See Reply Br. 8 (defining “port” as “a connection point
for a peripheral device”).
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Nevertheless, we are persuaded of error in the Examiner’s finding that
this port is an “override port” where the safety relay disables the low power
circuit by providing a first signal to that port—a crucial causal requirement
of claim 7. To be sure, when switches S1, S2 are open, no power is sent to
the override port downstream of the switches, thus disabling at least some of
the components of the “low power circuit” under the Examiner’s mapping,
namely, components of the drive control “A” excluding the switches,
systems I1, I2, and drive unit “ST.” Ans. 3, 11. Therefore, skilled artisans
would recognize that these open switches result in a zero-voltage signal at
the nodes that is fed back to systems I1, I2 via signals “SV1_Diag” and
“SV2_Diag,” respectively.5
But these zero-voltage signals (and the corresponding disablement of
the low-power circuit downstream of the switches) result from disabling the
switches (i.e., “safety relay”). We cannot say—nor has the Examiner
shown—that these switches are disabled by providing the zero-voltage
signals to the ports associated with the nodes shown above (i.e., the
identified “override port”). See Schwesig, col. 4, ll. 10-34; col. 5, ll. 35-38.
Although the zero-voltage signals are fed back to the system I1 which
produces the switch-controlling signal IL1, to say that the switches (and the
low-power circuit downstream of the switches) are disabled by providing
this zero-voltage signal to the identified “override port” strains reasonable
limits on this record.

5 Although Appellants characterize these signals as diodes (App. Br. 13),
they are actually signals associated with diodes as the Examiner correctly
indicates. Ans. 11-12.
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Indeed, the only plausible possibility to meet the recited causal
requirement under the Examiner’s position would be that Schwesig’s zero-
voltage feedback signal causes the switches to remain open following an
initial opening to cause the low-power circuit to remain disabled. But the
Examiner has not shown that this is the case in Schwesig, nor will we
speculate in that regard here in the first instance on appeal. See Ans. 4, 11-
12; Schwesig, col. 4, ll. 10-34; col. 5, ll. 35-38.
We are, therefore, persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting (1)
claim 7, and (2) dependent claims 8 and 10 for similar reasons. Since this
issue is dispositive regarding our reversinghe rejection of these claims, we
need not address Appellants’ other arguments regarding claim 8. App.
Br. 14.

Claim 24
We, however, sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 24 reciting, in
pertinent part, a set of ports exposed by the drive6 allowing connection of the
safety relay electrically independent of the logic circuit to the drive to

6 No antecedent basis exists for “the drive” recited in claim 24, Also, as
noted previously, an ambiguity may exist regarding the “electrical
independence” of claim 24 in view of the arguments raised in connection
with claim 1, namely, whether the term is synonymous with electrical
isolation, the lack of a causal connection, or some other form of undisclosed
“independence.” See Reply Br. 7 (alleging that the “[t]he present claims do
not use the language ‘electrical dependency’ which presumably means there
is a causal rather than electrical connection” (emphases added)). But see
App. Br. 15 (arguing that the ports of claim 24 “preserve the highest degree
of electrical and mechanical isolation between the safety relay and
microprocessor circuitry . . .” (emphasis added)). We leave patentability
questions under § 112 arising from this ambiguity to the Examiner should
further prosecution follow this opinion.
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control applying power to the low power circuit. Unlike claim 7, claim 24
does not require that the safety relay disable the low power circuit, but rather
more broadly recites that the relay can be connected to control applying
power to that circuit. In any event, Appellants’ arguments regarding
Schwesig’s lacking a safety relay and ports (App. Br. 14-15; Reply Br. 8)
are unavailing for the reasons noted above and by the Examiner (Ans. 5-6,
13).

THE OBVIOUSNESS REJECTION OVER SCHWESIG, DEDECKER, AND ROWLETTE
We likewise sustain the Examiner’s rejection of representative claim 6
reciting a safety relay including a coil, a normally-open contact, and a
normally-closed contact, where (1) the contacts are physically coupled so
that only one contact can be closed at any given time, and (2) the safety
relay disables the low power circuit when power is provided to the coil.
Ans. 6-7, 11. Although Appellants contend that Rowlette’s relays K1 and
K2 in Figure 2c are not physically coupled, so that only one of the contacts
can be closed at a given time (App. Br. 12; Reply Br. 9), the figure
nonetheless suggests as much since (1) K1’s switch is open and K2’s switch
is closed; (2) the relays have associated coils; and (3) the relays and
associated contacts are electrically coupled together. Notably, K2’s contacts
“3” and “4” are closed any given time since either the “HEAT” or “COOL”
circuits are selected, and K1 disables power to its directly-coupled
downstream circuit (including K2) by opening K1’s switch at its contact “4.”
See Rowlette, Fig. 2c. Although this direct electrical coupling may not
match the particular physical coupling contemplated by Appellants in their
Specification to account for contact welds (App. Br. 12), nothing in the
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claim precludes Rowlette’s electrically coupled contacts that are likewise
physically coupled via their associated direct electrical interconnections.
And even assuming, without deciding, that Rowlette’s relays disable
associated circuits by opening a circuit responsive to removing power from a
coil, as Appellants seem to suggest (App. Br. 12), we nonetheless find that
doing the opposite, namely disabling circuits by applying power would have
been an obvious variation to yield a predictable result well within the level
of ordinarily skilled artisans—a choice that depends on whether the
associated relay contacts are normally-open or normally-closed. See KSR,
550 U.S. at 417. In any event, Appellants’ arguments regarding the alleged
individual shortcomings of Rowlette and Schwesig (App. Br. 12) are
unavailing, for they do not persuasively rebut the Examiner’s reliance on the
cited references’ collective teachings.
We are, therefore, not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting
representative claim 6, and claims 4, 13, and 14 not separately argued with
particularity.

THE OTHER OBVIOUSNESS REJECTIONS
We also sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of claims 10
and 12. Ans. 7-9. Since Appellants present no separate arguments for
patentability for these claims (see App. Br. 8), we are unpersuaded of error
in the Examiner’s rejections of these claims for the reasons previously
discussed.

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CONCLUSION
Under § 103, the Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 1, 3, 4, 6,
11-15, and 24, but erred in rejecting claims 7, 8, and 10.

ORDER
The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1, 3, 4, 6-8, 10-15, and 24 is
affirmed-in-part.No time period for taking any subsequent action in
connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. §
1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED-IN-PART

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