Ex Parte Frost et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Nov 13, 2017

13789189 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 13, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/789,189 03/07/2013 Brian Frost 3286.2-10846.4US(PA3847 7618
66137 7590 11/15/2017
TRASKBRITT, P.C. /Bally Gaming, Inc.
PO Box 2550
Salt Lake City, UT 84110
EXAMINER
MENDIRATTA, VISHU K
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3711
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
11/15/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
U S PTOMail @ traskbritt .com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte BRIAN FROST and JASON CHOO
Appeal 2016-004377
Application 13/789,189
Technology Center 3700
Before JENNIFER D. BAHR, STEFAN STAICOVICI, and
ANTHONY KNIGHT, Administrative Patent Judges.
BAHR, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants1 appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
decision, set forth in the Final Action (June 1, 2015; hereinafter “Final
Act.”), and repeated in the Answer (Jan. 22, 2016; hereinafter “Ans.”),
rejecting claims 1—21, 23—27, 29, and 30. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM-IN-PART.
1 The Application Data Sheet (Oct. 26, 2017) lists SG Gaming ANZ Pty Ltd
and Crown Melbourne Limited as applicants. The Appeal Brief (Sept. 30,
2015; hereinafter “Appeal Br.”), identifies Bally Technologies ANZ Pty Ltd,
Bally Technologies, Inc., Scientific Games Corporation, and Crown
Melbourne Limited as real parties in interest. Appeal Br. 3.
Appeal 2016-004377
Application 13/789,189
THE CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject
matter.
1. A gaming system, comprising:
a random outcome apparatus for a table game, the random
outcome apparatus configured to initiate a random game
outcome;
a plurality of player terminals associated with play of the
table game, each player terminal including a player user interface
comprising a display and configured to permit a player to select
at least one possible result associated with a game outcome and
to receive at least one wager from the player on the at least one
possible result; and
at least one processor programmed to:
provide to at least two player terminals of the
plurality active for play of the table game a graphical
indication of a time remaining of a same time limit for
placement of wagers before commencement of game play,
the graphical indication comprising a visible
representation configured for substantially continuous
display as a graphically changeable, non-numeric
indication on the displays of active player terminals of the
time remaining for placement of wagers;
determine winning wagers corresponding to at least
one result associated with the random game outcome,
initiated by the random outcome apparatus; and
credit proceeds for display at player terminals
associated with the winning wagers.
REJECTIONS
I. Claims 1—15, 17—21, 23—27, 29, and 30 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Hedges (US 4,339,798,
issued July 13, 1982), Pease (US 5,326,104, issued July 5, 1994),
and Terzian (US 5,757,730, issued May 26, 1998).
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II. Claim 29 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over Hedges, Pease, Terzian, and Partnership between Novomatic
and PCS A unique concept worldwide presented at the ICE in
London, Austrian Gaming Industries Press Release, January 1999,
wysiwyg//67/http://www.austrian-gaming.com/pr_ipr94.1itm
(hereinafter “Novo PR 1/99”).
III. Claim 16 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over Hedges, Pease, Terzian, and Luciano (US 6,050,895, issued
Apr. 18, 2000).2
DISCUSSION
Rejection I
Independent claim 1 recites, in pertinent part, at least one processor
programmed to provide a “graphical indication comprising a visible
representation configured for substantially continuous display as a
graphically changeable, non-numeric indication on the displays of active
player terminals of the time remaining for placement of wagers.” Appeal Br.
Appx. - 1 (Claims App.) (emphasis added). Independent claim 15 recites, in
pertinent part, at least one processor programmed to provide a “graphical
indication comprising a graphically changeable, non-numeric indication of
the time remaining until completion of the same time limit [for placement of
wagers] and configured for substantially continuous visible representation of
changes in the time remaining on the displays of the player terminals.”
2 The Examiner inadvertently omitted Terzian from the statement of the
rejection of claim 16 in the Final Action, but corrects this in the Answer.
Final Act. 12; Ans. 12, 16.
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Id. at Appx. - 5—6 (emphasis added). Independent claim 25 recites, in
pertinent part, a method comprising a step of displaying a “graphic
indication configured as a substantially continuously visible, non-numeric,
substantially continuously changing graphic representation of the time
remaining until termination of the [time limit for placement of wagers].”
Id. at Appx. - 8 (emphasis added).
The Examiner finds that Hedges discloses a system and method
substantially as recited in each of claims 1,15, and 25, including, in
pertinent part, a “processor programmed to communicate with player
terminals and indicate the player countdown ‘15 seconds to close’, ‘15
seconds to bet’, ‘no more betting’ (7:44-56) before commencement of the
game.” Ans. 2, 7, 10. However, the Examiner finds that Hedges does not
explicitly teach that the “‘15 seconds to close’ or ‘15 seconds to bet’
[warning is a] continuous display as a graphically changeable, non-numeric
indication of remaining time.” Id. at 3, 7, 10.
The Examiner finds that Pease discloses a gaming system which
displays a countdown timer in message display 32. Id.', see Pease 9:20—22,
12:53—57. The Examiner finds that a countdown timer is commonly
understood as displaying expiry of remaining time of a certain time period in
equal increments. Ans. 3, 7, 10. Accordingly, the Examiner determines that
it would have been obvious, in view of Pease, to display time remaining to
bet at each of the remote player stations in Hodges in countdown format, to
more precisely and clearly indicate the time remaining. Id. at 3, 8, 10-11.
The Examiner finds that Terzian teaches displaying “a passage of time
in (Fig. 1-8, 4:8-15) [‘Jcontinuous display as a graphically changeable, non­
numeric indication’ of remaining time.” Id. at 3, 8, 11. According to the
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Examiner, Terzian shows that “[t]he art area (1:5-14) recognizes visual
representation to indicate passage of time including time bars.” Id. at 4, 8,
11. The Examiner determines that it would have been obvious to further
modify Hedges to present “the passage of time to users in non-numeric,
graphic form to create variation.” Ans. 4, 8—9, 11 (adding that “the
modification . . . does not present any new or unexpected result except a
different visual form and would have been obvious”).
Appellants argue:
Hedges is silent as to whether the “15 SEC TO BET” message is
substantially continuously displayed until the “NO MORE
BETS” message is displayed. In other words, Hedges does not
teach that the “15 SEC TO BET” message is displayed and
continues to be displayed for the duration of the time remaining.
Appeal Br. 13 (emphasis omitted).
Thus, Appellants submit that “Hedges fails to teach ‘a visual
representation configured for substantially continuous display, ’ as recited
in claim 1.” Id. Likewise, Appellants submit that “Hedges does not teach
that the display is substantially continuously visible, or that his display
comprises a substantially continuous visible representation of changes in
the time remaining,” as called for in claim 15. Id. at 24. Similarly, in
addition to these asserted deficiencies, Appellants submit that Hedges does
not show a “graphically changeable” or “non-numeric” indication of the
time remaining {id. at 14; see id. at 24) and “does not teach that the display
provides & graphic indication of a time remaining,” as required in claim 25
{id. at 27).
These arguments do not identify error in the rejection because, as
noted above, the Examiner acknowledges these shortcomings in Hedges.
Ans. 3,7, 10.
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Appellants also argue that the countdown display of Pease is not a
‘“substantially continuous display,’ as recited in claim 1.” Appeal Br. 17
(emphasis omitted). In particular, Appellants point out that Pease discloses
displaying not only the time remaining message, but also other messages,
such as advertising. Id. at 16. Appellants acknowledge that Pease is silent
as to when the advertising messages are displayed, but conjecture that the
logical time to display advertising would be before a game has closed for
wagering and, thus, during the countdown. Id. at 16—17 (reasoning that “it is
understandable that messages to entice a player to enter the next game, such
as the aforementioned advertising message, would be displayed while the
countdown is running”). Moreover, Appellants point out that Pease’s
display 32 is alpha-numeric, and thus not “graphically changeable, non­
numeric,” as recited in claim 1. Id. at 18. Similarly, Appellants contend that
Pease does not teach that the time-related message displayed in display 32
“is substantially continuously visible, graphical, or non-numeric,” as called
for in claim 15, or that it “is substantially continuously visible, that it
substantially continuously changes to represent the time remaining, or that it
is graphic or non-numeric,” as called for in claim 25. Id. at 25, 27 (emphasis
omitted). Thus, Appellants submit that Pease does not cure the deficiencies
of Hedges. Id.
Appellants’ argument regarding Pease’s display being alpha-numeric
does not identity error in the rejection because the Examiner does not rely on
Pease for this feature. See Ans. 3,8,11 (acknowledging that the
combination of Hedges and Pease “does not teach a non-numeric
representation of the passage of time”). Rather, the Examiner relies on
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Terzian for teaching “a graphically changeable, non-numeric indication” of
the passage of time. Id.
As to the issue of whether the display of Pease is “substantially
continuously visible” or “substantially continuously changes to represent the
time remaining,” the Examiner’s stated position as to how one of ordinary
skill in the art would interpret a “countdown” message display, as taught by
Pease, is reasonable. More specifically, a countdown is ordinarily and
customarily understood to be a backward counting in fixed units (such as
seconds) from an arbitrary starting number to mark the time remaining
before an event. See, e.g., Countdown Definition, Merriam-Webster,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/countdown (last visited
Nov. 2, 2017). Appellants’ speculation as to the particular timing of
advertisements that might also be displayed by message display 32 of Pease
amounts to unsupported attorney argument and, thus, is entitled to little, if
any, weight. See In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Pease
does not specifically disclose interrupting the time remaining countdown
display with other messages. Moreover, while Pease mentions advertising
messages as an example of messages that one might desire to display using
message display 32, Pease does not require display of such messages, nor
would it be necessary for one skilled in the art to incorporate all of the
disclosed features, or uses, of Pease’s display into the display of Hedges.
Obviousness does not require that all of the features of the secondary
reference be bodily incorporated into the primary reference. See In re
Keller, 642 F.2d413, 425 (CCPA 1981).
Appellants contend that one of ordinary skill in the art would be
dissuaded from using Terzian’s teachings in combination with the teachings
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of Hedges and Pease by Terzian’s language contrasting the digital displays
disclosed therein from “countdown sequences used in games.”
Appeal Br. 19. Although we appreciate the point made by Appellants, we
do not agree with Appellants. Despite making the contrast, Terzian does not
criticize or discourage the use of a display of the type disclosed for a
countdown sequence, such as time left for placing a wager. Specifically,
Terzian describes the digital time displays as useful for “general
timekeeping” (i.e., “the usual timekeeping needs and practices of ordinary
individuals occupied in their customary day-to-day activities, as contrasted
from special time monitoring procedures such as stop time, split time, lap
time and countdown sequences used in games, sporting events, science
experiments, etc.”). Terzian 1:7—14. The graphical, non-numeric feature of
Terzian’s display (i.e., arrays 18 and 20) “graphically demarcates the last
remaining minute in a new and unmistakable manner.” Terzian 2:67—3:2.
This display of the last remaining time is essentially the same function
served by the time-remaining-to-bet element of the display of Hedges. See
Hedges 4:10—13, 7:43—48, Fig. 4. Terzian discloses arrays 18, 20 as part of
a larger time display that includes numeric elements showing the hour of the
day that will commence after expiration of the minute conveyed by arrays
18, 20. Terzian 3:42-4:58. However, a person having ordinary skill in the
art would have readily appreciated the applicability of this display (arrays
18, 20) for conveying the expiry of a time period to the system of Hedges for
conveying the expiry of the time remaining to bet.
Appellants contend that “one of ordinary skill in the art would not
have been prompted to replace the alpha-numeric messages of Hedges and
Pease[, which are readily discernible to a literate patron,] with the array of
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stepwise changing blinking lines of Terzian” because “Terzian’s array of
horizontal lines ... are not readily readable to one not familiar with
Terzian’s system.” Appeal Br. 21—22. As noted by the Examiner, the
reason for displaying the time remaining in non-numeric graphic form would
be “to create variation” in the manner of display. Ans. 4; see also id. at 8,
11. Such variation would add interest in and attraction to the game. As
Terzian explains, the sequence of flashing descending horizontal elements,
and the symmetry of position and movement demarcate the progression of
the expiration of the time period in a graphical manner. Terzian 2:67—3:13.
Such a display would be discernible even to a patron who is not literate.
Appellants submit that the embodiment of Figures 1—8 relied on by
the Examiner is not a “substantially continuous” display, as called for in
claim 1, a “substantially continuous visible representation of changes in the
time remaining,” as called for in claim 15, or “substantially continuously
visible” and “substantially continuously changing,” as called for in claim 25.
Appeal Br. 20, 25, 28 (emphasis omitted). In particular, Appellants contend
that Terzian’s display does not satisfy these claim limitations because the
array of horizontal elements is changed in ten-second intervals, with one of
the elements flashing during the entire duration of the respective ten-second
interval. Id. at 20—21. Although Appellants’ description of the operation of
the embodiment of Figures 1—8 of Terzian’s display is accurate, the
characterization of the display as changing only in ten-second intervals is
somewhat misleading, as each element representing the currently expiring
ten-second interval flashes on-and-off each second. Thus, the display does
change each second, and a person watching the display, and the progression
of the flashing, can readily discern the time remaining, with special
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appreciation of the particular interval that is currently expiring. Moreover,
even if we accept Appellants’ characterization of the embodiment of
Terzian’s Figures 1—8 as changing only in ten-second intervals, for the
reasons that follow, we are not persuaded that such a display would fail to
satisfy the “substantially continuous” limitations of claims 1,15, and 25.
Claims 1,15, and 25 do not require “continuous” or “continuously”
changing display of the time remaining or changes in the time remaining;
rather, claims 1,15, and 25 require “substantially continuous” or
“substantially continuously changing” display of such. Appeal Br.
Appx. - 1, 6, 8. Appellants’ Specification does not use the language
“continuous,” much less “substantially continuous,” nor do the claims
specify any time interval over which the display of time remaining, or
changes in time remaining, must change or update, or specify any limits on
the degree to which discontinuities in the display are permitted. Thus, even
accepting Appellants’ characterization of Terzian’s display as changing only
in ten-second intervals, claims 1,15, and 25 do not distinguish over such a
display, which updates the representation of the time remaining at regular
ten-second intervals. Moreover, even if claims 1,15, and 25 were construed
as requiring the display to be updated as frequently as every second, this
would not distinguish over the combined teachings of Hedges, Pease, and
Terzian because Terzian specifically teaches dot matrix displays with racing
dots successively activated to move toward the expiry of the one-minute
“during each second of each ten second countdown interval. . . to display a
moving dot tracing a linear horizontal path from left to right during each
second.” Terzian 5:1—7 (emphasis added).
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For all of the above reasons, Appellants’ arguments do not apprise us
of error in the rejection of independent claims 1,15, and 25. Accordingly,
we sustain the rejection of independent claims 1,15, and 25, as well as
dependent claims 2—14, 17—21, 23, 24, 26, 27, 29, and 30, which Appellants
group with their independent claims (Appeal Br. 11—29), as unpatentable
over Hedges, Pease, and Terzian.
Rejection II
In contesting the rejection of claim 29, Appellants argue only that
Novo PR 1/99 does not cure the asserted deficiencies of the combination of
Hedges, Pease, and Terzian. Appeal Br. 32—33. Having not been apprised
of any such deficiencies, for the reasons discussed above, we also sustain the
rejection of claim 29 as unpatentable over Hedges, Pease, Terzian, and Novo
PR 1/99.
Rejection III
Claim 16 depends from independent claim 15, and further recites, in
pertinent part, that “the dealer terminal is configured to enable a dealer to
debit a player account so as to pay out by the dealer directly to a player in
physical form, upon request by the player, a remaining credit balance
associated with a player terminal in use by the player.”
Appeal Br. Appx. - 6 (Claims App.) (emphasis added).
In addressing this limitation, the Examiner finds, “Hedges teaches
debiting the account (13:60-144) [sic] and ‘so as to pay out’ and the player
cashes (physical form) out is treated as directly paying to the player. The
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limitation ‘so as to pay’ is broadly and reasonably treated as paying cash to
players by any means.” Ans. 13.
Appellants argue that Hedges teaches that the credit operator at credit
station 9, and not the croupier at croupier station 11, has the means to cash
out a player.3 Appeal Br. 31. The Examiner does not respond to this
argument in the Answer. See Ans. 16—17; see also Reply Br. 8 (noting the
Examiner’s failure to address this argument).
Hedges teaches:
At the end of the game, the croupier enters the numerical
results of the game on the keyboard 113 of croupier station 11
which sends the message to credit station 9.
Credit station 9 uses the list of players playing the game to
locate all appropriate game files and credit files and uses the
wagers entered in the playing file with the game results to
compute the amount won or lost.
Credit station 9 then credits or debits the player’s account
and modifies the magnetic disk record 202.
Credit station 9 sends the message to player station 10
indicating a new account balance which is displayed on the
playboard 40 of FIG. 2.
Hedges 13:50—62. With respect to cashing out, Hedges teaches:
The player upon completion of wagering requests an
account termination from the credit operator who verifies the
player’s identity. Upon proper identification, the credit operator
enters the request in credit station 9 via the CRT terminal 204
and retrieves the player’s file and prints out an activity record on
the line printer 205. The credit operator removes the record and
uses it to cash the player out.
3 Appellants also argue that the Examiner erred in omitting Terzian (relied
on in rejecting claim 15, from which claim 16 depends) from the
combination (Appeal Br. 30), but the Examiner corrects this “inadvertent
typographical error” in restating the rejection in the Answer (see Ans. 12,
16).
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Hedges 13:63—14:3.
As used in Appellants’ Specification, the dealer (or croupier)4 is a
“dedicated gambling table dealer [who] operates the [System Game
Controller 5 (SGC 5)],” which corresponds to the claimed “dealer terminal.”
Spec. 133 ; see Appeal Br. 6. Appellants’ Specification discloses that
“‘CASH OUT’ button 221” is provided on the display of player terminal 2 to
inform the dealer (or croupier) that the player wishes to cash out.
Spec. 1 63. The dealer (or croupier) then processes this request through the
dealer terminal (SGC 5). Id. “The cash balance will then be returned to zero
balance on the player terminal via the CC 4 and the payment will be
completed with the croupier paying to the player the cash equivalent of the
balance in the form of gaming chips.” Id.
Thus, consistent with Appellants’ Specification, we construe the
aforementioned claim limitation that “the dealer terminal is configured to
enable a dealer to debit a player account so as to pay out by the dealer
directly to a player in physical form, upon request by the player, a remaining
credit balance associated with a player terminal in use by the player” as
requiring that the dealer terminal be provided with a dealer interface for
initiating processing of a cashout request resulting in the debiting of the
player’s account. Hedges does not disclose such a dealer interface on the
croupier station 11. Rather, in Hedges, the player sends a request directly
from the player terminal (player station 10) to credit station 9. Hedges
13:63—66. The credit operator operating credit station 9 then processes that
request at credit station 9. Id. 13:66—14:3. Hedges does not disclose any
4 Appellants’ Specification uses the terms “dealer” and “croupier”
interchangeably. Spec. 1 5.
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involvement in this cashout process by croupier station 11. Thus,
Appellants’ argument that Hedges lacks a croupier station (dealer terminal)
“configured to enable a dealer to debit a player account so as to pay out by
the dealer directly to a player in physical form, upon request by the player, a
remaining credit balance associated with a player terminal in use by the
player,” as recited in claim 16, is persuasive.
Accordingly, we do not sustain the rejection of claim 16 as
unpatentable over Hedges, Pease, Terzian, and Luciano.
DECISION
The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1—15, 17—21, 23—27, 29,
and 30 is AFFIRMED.
The Examiner’s decision rejecting claim 16 is REVERSED.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED-IN-PART
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